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Abstract 
Legal certainty and the rule of law are important principles in many jurisdictions around 
the world. An important part of these principles is that laws should be sufficiently clear 
and predictable, so that individuals can plan their conduct in the knowledge of the legal 
consequences that will flow from it. In particular, individuals should not be found liable for 
infringing laws, or be penalised for doing so, where those laws did not provide sufficient 
certainty in advance that the conduct would be illegal. 
Competition laws have frequently been criticised for lacking certainty and predictability. 
So far most of the criticism in this respect has been levelled at US antitrust law, criticisms 
that will be discussed briefly in this paper. This dissertation will demonstrate that similar 
criticisms can be made of the competition laws of many other jurisdictions, using five 
competition regimes as a representative sample, namely the EU, Australia, Canada, 
South Africa and Hong Kong (the “subject jurisdictions”). 
What is “sufficient” legal certainty? After all, many laws are couched in terms that are, to 
a greater or lesser extent, vague. This dissertation will argue that a high degree of legal 
clarity is required of competition laws because of their largely criminal or quasi-criminal 
nature, and uses the criteria laid down by the European Court of Human Rights as an 
appropriate benchmark in this respect. We show that, to varying degrees, the competition 
laws of the subject jurisdictions do not meet those criteria, and therefore they are not 
sufficiently certain. 
We also demonstrate that this lack of legal clarity leads to many adverse consequences 
in terms of waste of society’s resources, unfairness, harm to the credibility of the legal 
system, and others.  
We then look at possible ways of solving the problem. We show that the existing methods 
that have been used to bring greater clarity into competition laws, or mitigate the adverse 
effects of lack of clarity, have not been fully effective in achieving this. Finally we propose 
a new way forward which mitigates substantially the adverse effects of legal uncertainty 
in competition laws.      
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1  Introduction 
 
Legal certainty is a principle that it is recognised in many jurisdictions. For example, it has been 
stated that it is: 
 
“…a ‘general principle’ of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice and a guiding 
idea of many, if not all, of the legal systems of the European Union’s Member States. It is 
similarly a general principle of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, 
whose jurisdiction includes not only all EU Member States, but almost all other states in 
Europe”. 1 
 
There is no universally-accepted definition of legal certainty. But at a general level, it can be 
described as a situation in which the law is reasonably predictable and stable, so that individuals 
and businesses know where they stand under the law, and that they will not be subject to 
unpredictable changes in their legal status. 
 
Legal certainty is closely associated with the principle of the rule of law.  Again there is no 
universally-accepted definition of this principle.  At its root is the notion that societies should be 
governed by clear and accessible laws, not by the discretion of rulers.  An English judge, the late 
Lord Bingham, summarised the rule of law as follows: “all persons and authorities within the state, 
whether public or private, should be bound by, and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly made, 
taking effect (generally) in the future [i.e. having prospective, not retrospective effect] and publicly 
administered in the courts.”2  Laws must not only be published and prospective in effect, they must 
also be clear enough for individuals to plan their conduct.3 
 
                                                     
1 James R Maxeiner “Legal Certainty: a European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?” 
15 Tul J Int’l & Comp L 541, 545.  
2 “The Rule of Law”, Sixth Sir David Williams Lecture, Centre for Public Law, University of 
Cambridge 16 November 2006 6-7, available at www.cpl.law.cam.ac.uk  (accessed on 9-8-2017). 
3 N 2 above. 
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The rule of law is a principle that is (like legal certainty) espoused by many governments 
worldwide, and generally seen as one to which democratic societies should aspire. In a statement 
on 20 April 2016, Mr Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary General of the United Nations, said: “Respect for 
the rule of law- within and among nations- is one of the foundations of progress in virtually all 
areas of our work”.4 A country’s respect for the rule of law is an important factor in a business’s 
decision to invest in a particular country. For example, the leader of the UK’s main employers’ 
organisation, the Confederation of British Industry, has been quoted as saying: “The UK is admired 
for its legal system and companies see the rule of law as one of the most important factors when 
deciding where to invest, alongside the ease of doing business and political stability”.5  
 
However, there are criticisms that the rule of law is being eroded, even in so-called developed 
economies.  In the business context, for example, a major international law firm produced a report 
in 2015 on the state of the rule of law in the UK, which went as far as to say that “the very 
foundations of the rule of law in the UK are weakening”. It criticised the vagueness of laws in 
certain areas, for example money laundering, financial services regulation, anti-bribery and date 
protection, arguing that the vagueness in these laws allowed them to be used for purposes for which 
they were not originally intended, or to prohibit conduct which was not regarded as illegal at the 
time it took place.6   
 
One area of law which has come under increasing attack for its lack of clarity is competition law 
(or, as it is called in the US, antitrust law) By “competition law”, for present purposes we mean, 
broadly, those laws which regulate conduct by businesses which is regarded as harming 
competition in markets.7  For example, one commentator says of US antitrust law: “prior to an 
antitrust action and any alleged violation of the law, no one can know with reasonable certainty 
                                                     
4 Available at  https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2016-04-20/secretary-
generals-remarks-ceremony-commemorate-70th-anniversary (accessed on 19-6-2016). 
5 Linklaters “In Defence of the Rule of Law” available at  
https://www.linklaters.com/en/insights/thought-leadership/rule-of-law-2015/in-defence-of-
the-rule-of-law (accessed on 2-11-2017). 
6 N 5 above. 
7 In Chapter 2 we analyse in more detail what competition law means. 
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what it means to ‘reduce competition substantially’…”8 Another goes as far as to argue that the 
so-called “rule of reason” under US antitrust law, against which most business arrangements and 
conduct is assessed, does not comply with the rule of law.9  
 
The potential consequences of lack of clarity in competition laws are particularly serious.  For 
example, since they regulate business conduct in the marketplace, and stringent sanctions can be 
imposed for (and other serious consequences arise from) infringements, there is a real risk that 
businesses will hold back from competing vigorously for fear of breaking the rules.  This is exactly 
contrary to the policy objective of many of these laws, which is to encourage vigorous competition, 
in the interests of increasing economic efficiency and benefitting consumers. 
 
Against this background, this dissertation has four purposes: 
 
• Most of the studies that have been conducted so far on the problems of lack of clarity in 
competition law have focused on US antitrust law.10 This dissertation will look at these 
authorities, and extend the analysis outside the US by examining the extent of lack of clarity 
in the competition laws of five other jurisdictions- the EU, Australia, Canada, South Africa, 
and Hong Kong (hereafter called the “subject jurisdictions”), and the reasons for this lack 
of clarity. 
• Many laws are to a certain extent are vague. Legal certainty is not a binary concept (certain 
or uncertain) but a relative one. So is there a relevant criterion or criteria for assessing 
                                                     
8 Domenick T Armentano Antitrust: the Case for Repeal 2ed (1999) 101. 
9 Maurice E Stucke “Does the Rule of Reason violate the Rule of Law?” UC Davis L Rev Vol 42 No 
5 (June 2009) 1375. 
10 N 8 and 9 above. See also, for example, Neil A Campbell and William J Rowley QC “Proposals  
for Evolving the Patchwork of Domestic Monopolisation and Dominance Laws” Business Law 
International Jan 2016; Daniel A Crane “Rules versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication” (2007) 
64 Wash & Lee L Rev 49;  Frank H Easterbrook “The Limits of Antitrust” 63 Tex L Rev (1984) 1; 
Jesse W Markham Jr “Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in US Antitrust 
Law” (2012) 17 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 591; Richard S Markovits “The Limits to Simplifying the 
Application of US Antitrust Law” University of Texas School of Law and Economics Paper No 
177, 19 Jan 2010; James R Maxeiner “Legal Certainty: a European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy” 15 Tul J Int’l & Comp L 541; Edwin S Rockefeller The Antitrust Religion 
(2007).This literature will be referred to further in Chapters 4 to 7. 
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whether competition laws are sufficiently clear? We argue that the basic criteria for legal 
clarity laid down by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) under the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”) is an appropriate 
benchmark for competition laws. In doing so, we do not suggest that the validity of the 
competition laws  in the subject jurisdictions would be threatened if this benchmark is not 
met. What we do argue is primarily two things: (a) if the benchmark is not met by the 
competition law of any state that is a party to the ECHR (which includes all EU Member 
States), the enforceability of competition laws in individual cases may be jeopardised, and 
(b) for all states, the criteria for legal clarity laid down by the ECtHR are an appropriate 
benchmark for competition laws to achieve.  
• We demonstrate that the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions fail to meet the 
ECtHR benchmark, to varying degrees. 
• The dissertation will examine the many adverse practical consequences that flow from this 
lack of clarity, and the measures that have so far been deployed to provide greater clarity, 
as well as to mitigate the adverse consequences of lack of clarity. 
• The dissertation will show that these measures have proved to be largely ineffective, and 
that the competition laws in most of the subject jurisdictions (and others that follow a 
similar model) have to be fundamentally re-designed to provide sufficient clarity. We 
provide recommendations as to how competition laws could, and should, be re-designed 
for this purpose.   
 
The choice of the subject jurisdictions is not random.  The EU has been chosen because it is the 
model of competition law which has probably been used most widely by other jurisdictions, to 
greater or lesser degrees, not just by its own 28 member states but also further afield, such as in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong. Moreover, it is one of the “oldest” competition regimes in 
the world, having been established in 1957. Being a supranational law covering 28 jurisdictions, 
this has produced an extensive body of case law that is a useful point of reference for other 
jurisdictions. Canada, Australia and South Africa have been chosen because their competition laws 
have also been in place for a considerable period of time, and therefore (like the EU) allow an 
assessment to be made not just of the statutes themselves, but of the experience of the enforcement 
authorities and courts in interpreting and applying the laws.  Hong Kong has been chosen because 
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it is the jurisdiction, or one of the jurisdictions, which has most recently introduced a competition 
law, and will therefore provide a useful illustration of whether any lessons have been learnt from 
the experience of other jurisdictions in terms of clarity in drafting the law. 
 
Competition law is often referred to as having “three pillars”: a rule against anti-competitive 
agreements between two or more businesses, a rule against abusive conduct by firms with market 
dominance or substantial market power, and merger control.11 This dissertation will focus on the 
first two pillars, for the following reason. Whereas, in respect of the first two pillars, the 
competition laws that we shall examine are largely based on self-assessment (that is, firms have to 
assess for themselves whether their agreements or conduct will comply with the law), merger  
control in most jurisdictions is based on a system of requiring an application for  prior approval of 
the proposed transaction before it can be implemented.12 The same problem of legal uncertainty 
therefore does not arise: it will usually be clearer for firms to assess whether the relevant financial 
thresholds are satisfied, than what impact a firms’s agreement or conduct will have on the market 
and whether it whether it has countervailing benefits that outweigh any harm to competition.  13 If 
the thresholds are satisfied, and the transaction is filed with the authority, and not completed unless 
and until the authority gives its approval, the firms will have complied with the law. Unlike with 
the first two pillars, firms do not therefore have to assess for themselves, on pain of breaking the 
law, whether the transaction will negatively affect competition, or qualify for an efficiency or other 
                                                     
11 See, for example, Moritz Lorenz An Introduction to EU Competition Law (2013) 34. 
12 In June 2017, it was reported that over 85 jurisdictions had merger control provisions, the 
vast majority of which contained mandatory prior filing requirements: only in 6 of those 
jurisdictions was filing voluntary. See David E Vann Jr “International Merger Control” in Getting 
the Deal Through (June 2017), Appendix.  
13 In 2005, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued a 
recommendation to its member countries to (inter alia) “use clear and objective criteria to 
determine whether and when a merger must be notified or, in countries without mandatory 
notification requirements, whether and when a merger will qualify  for review (See OECD, 
“Recommendation of the Council on Merger Review” (2005) 2). Similarly, the International 
Competition Network (ICN) recommends that “notification thresholds should be clear and 
understandable” and that “mandatory notification thresholds should be based on objectively 
quantifiable criteria”.  See ICN “Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review 
Procedures (2017) 5,6. 
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defence. This dissertation argues, with reference to the subject jurisdictions, that the competition 
rules against which firms have to assess whether their agreements or conduct will comply with the 
law are insufficiently clear. 
 
Although merger control will not therefore be a focus of this dissertation, the substantive test for 
assessing whether a merger or acquisition should benefit from clearance in some of the subject 
jurisdictions is the same as, or similar to, the tests for assessing other commercial agreements or 
conduct (i.e., in broad terms, whether it is or is likely to lessen competition substantially, and if so, 
whether there are countervailing benefits that outweigh the harm to competition). Occasional 
references will therefore be made to merger cases in discussing the meaning of these tests.  
  
This dissertation is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 will examine what competition law is.  
Although people often talk of competition law as if it has a universally-understood meaning, we 
shall see that the so-called competition laws in different jurisdictions often have widely-divergent 
objectives and substantive rules, and that their common characteristics relate more to form than 
substance. 
 
Chapter 3 will then examine the concept of legal certainty, and how clarity in laws forms part of 
the concept of legal certainty and the rule of law principle. We identify from the ECtHR’s case 
law an appropriate set of basic criteria for legal certainty against which competition laws can be 
measured, to assess whether they are sufficiently clear. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the extent of lack of clarity in the competition laws of each subject jurisdiction, 
and the causes of the lack of clarity. We demonstrate that, to varying degrees, these laws do not 
meet the ECtHR’s basic criteria for legal clarity.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the practical implications of this lack of legal clarity. We demonstrate that the 
lack of clarity has serious adverse implications. These include high compliance costs, high 
enforcement and litigation costs, unfairness, reduced access to justice and (as noted above) 
deterring businesses from engaging in conduct that might benefit the economy and consumers. 
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Chapter 6 demonstrates that the measures that have so far been used to provide greater clarity (or 
mitigate the adverse effects of lack of clarity) in the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws have 
been largely ineffective, and that other methods need to be used for this purpose. Chapter 7 looks 
at these methods, and proposes a re-design of competition laws which would provide sufficient 
legal clarity. Chapter 8 concludes. 
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2  What is Competition Law? 
 
2 1  Introduction 
 
Since this dissertation investigates the issue of legal certainty in competition law, we need to be 
clear what we mean by competition law for this purpose.  This Chapter therefore looks first at 
whether there is a common definition of competition law.  Having concluded that there is not, we 
then go on to look at common components in the competition laws in the subject jurisdictions, 
how competition and harm to competition are defined, why competition is valued, and what the 
objectives of competition laws are.  This analysis will prepare the ground for the assessment of 
potential solutions to legal uncertainty in Chapters 6 and 7. It will also draw out the main argument 
in this dissertation, namely that the lack of clarity in competition laws has such serious 
consequences that many countries need to conduct a fundamental re-design of competition laws to 
provide sufficient legal certainty.  
 
2 2  No Universally-agreed definition 
 
There is no doubt that “competition law” is a popular term.  A Google search on the term in Hong 
Kong on 2 November 2017 produced 15.8 million hits.  It has its own Wikipedia page.  Textbook 
titles include Competition Law,14 European Competition Law and Economics,15 EC Competition 
Law,16 and Competition Law in Canada.17   It is perhaps surprising therefore that there is no 
consensus on the meaning of the term. 
 
To begin with, what is called competition law in some jurisdictions is called something else in 
others.  For example, what is usually called competition law in Europe is called “antitrust law” in 
the US, “anti-monopoly law” in China and Japan, and (until recently at least) “trade practices law” 
                                                     
14 Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law 8ed (2015). 
15 Roger J Van den Bergh and Peter D Camesasca European Competition Law and Economics: a 
Comparative Perspective 2ed (2016). 
16 Georgio Monti EC Competition Law (2007). 
17 Susan Hutton Competition Law in Canada (2013). 
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in Australia.  Somewhat bizarrely, the term “antitrust” has been adopted relatively recently by the 
EU to describe a subset of competition law which deals with agreements between businesses, other 
than mergers, and abuse of market dominance, i.e. most of the conduct subject to competition law18 
– even although the term was originally adopted in the US in the late nineteenth century to denote 
the large US corporations or “trusts” at which the law was directed.19   
 
The range of conduct which falls within competition law, antitrust law, anti-monopoly law or trade 
practices law also varies from one jurisdiction to another.  In the EU, for example, competition 
law is not just directed at business conduct, but also at conduct by EU Member State governments 
in the form of “state aids” to businesses which distort competition.20  Somewhat illogically, 
however, it does not include the EU laws on public procurement, which require EU Member State 
governments to put contracts with private sector companies out to open tender, even although the 
main purpose of these rules is to ensure that there is competition between businesses for public 
sector contracts.  In Australia, trade practices law covers not just rules on competition, but also, 
for example, rules against misleading or deceiving consumers,21 as well as sector specific rules on 
access to networks in the energy and telecommunications sectors,22 both of which would normally 
be regarded as falling outside competition law in the EU.  The Canada Competition Act also has 
rules against deceptive marketing practices.23 
 
These disparities have not prevented efforts being made to define the term “competition law”, 
efforts which have not been entirely, if at all, successful.  For example, Whish and Bailey state 
that: “As a general proposition, competition law consists of rules that are intended to protect the 
process of competition in order to maximise consumer welfare.”24 However, there are at least three 
problems with this definition.  The first is that, as will be seen later in this Chapter, competition 
                                                     
18 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/  (accessed on 4-12-2017). 
19 A Neil Campbell, J William Rowley QC “Proposals for Evolving the Patchwork of Domestic 
Monopolisation and Dominance Laws” Business Law International January 2011 6. 
20 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Art 107, OJ L115/91 of 9.5.2008. 
21 Competition and Consumer Act (CCA) Part XI and Sch 2. 
22 N 21 above Part IIIA and XIC. 
23 Competition Act s 74.01. 
24 Competition Law 8ed 1. 
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law in some jurisdictions (such as the EU) was not primarily intended to protect the process of 
competition (or rivalry between businesses), but to protect the economic freedom of individual 
operators.  Some competition laws, including those of the EU and South Africa, are also intended 
to prevent dominant operators from exploiting their position vis-à-vis customers and consumers. 
This objective also has little to do with protecting the process of competition.  The second problem 
is that the goal of protecting competition may be to enhance consumer welfare in some 
jurisdictions, whereas in other jurisdictions – as will also be seen later in this Chapter – competition 
is protected for other reasons. The third problem is that, although competition law may take 
protection of competition as a starting point, there are many situations in which these laws 
expressly permit competition to be harmed, in order to achieve objectives which are considered 
more important than competition itself. 
 
Rather than trying to find a satisfactory definition of competition law at this stage, it is therefore 
more fruitful to examine first what the common elements of competition laws are (using the subject 
jurisdictions as the sample) before going on to look at what competition and harm to competition 
mean, why competition is valued, and what the objectives of competition laws are. 
 
2 3  Common Elements of Competition Laws 
 
2 3 1 EU 
 
In the EU, the competition rules are contained in Chapter 1 of Title VII of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).25  The EU competition rules are unique compared 
to the competition laws of the other subject jurisdictions, in the sense that, because of their 
supranational nature, they impose obligations not only on businesses, but also on EU Member 
States.  As was noted in section 2 2, the latter include provisions which prohibit Member States, 
subject to certain exceptions, from giving businesses state aids in a way which distorts competition 
in the market.  Since such rules do not exist in the national competition laws of the other subject 
jurisdictions, they can be left aside in seeking to identify the common components.  
                                                     
25 N 20 above. 
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As regards the competition provisions applying to businesses, these are mainly contained in 
Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU.  Article 101(1) deals with commercial arrangements between 
two or more businesses.  It prohibits agreements between “undertakings”, decisions of associations 
of “undertakings”, and concerted practices between “undertakings” (hereafter collectively referred 
to as “arrangements”) which have as their object or effect the “prevention, restriction or distortion 
of competition”, and which may affect trade between Member States. “Undertaking” is the term 
used in EU competition law in essence to describe a business; all entities that are subject to 
common control are treated as a single undertaking for this purpose.26 
 
The effect on trade between Member States criterion is essentially a jurisdictional one, designed 
to distinguish matters that have to be judged in terms of local national competition law (where 
there is no effect on trade between Member States) and EU competition law (where there is).  
 
Article 101(2) states that arrangements prohibited by Article 101(1) are automatically void.  
However Article 101(1) and 101(2) do not apply if the arrangement satisfies the four criteria set 
out in Article 101(3).  These criteria are that the arrangement must:  
 
• improve the production or distribution of goods or services or promote technical or 
economic progress;  
• lead to a “fair share” of those benefits being passed on to consumers; 
• not contain any restrictions of competition which are unnecessary for achieving those 
benefits; and 
• not eliminate competition in a “substantial part” of the products or services in question. 
 
The EU Commission has issued guidelines on how the assessment of these criteria should be 
approached.27 
 
                                                     
26 Case C-73/95P Viho v Commission [1996] ECR I-5457. 
27 “Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU” OJ C101/97 of 27.4.2004. 
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Article 101(3) could therefore be regarded as a qualified exception to the prohibition in Article 
101(1) on the grounds of economic efficiency. In other words, the exception is for agreements that 
improve economic efficiency (the first criterion), but it is qualified because it only applies if the 
three other criteria are satisfied.  This means, for example, that if consumers do not benefit from 
the improvement in efficiency to an extent that is “fair”, or the harm to competition is substantial, 
the exception does not apply.  As will be seen in Chapter 4, however, there is substantial 
uncertainty as to how this exception should be interpreted and applied in practice.    
 
In principle, any arrangement which satisfies the four criteria can benefit from the exclusion, 
including those types of arrangement which are commonly-regarded as constituting the most 
serious restrictions on competition, such as price-fixing, market-sharing, bid-rigging and output 
restriction (these are commonly-referred to in competition law jargon as “hardcore” 
arrangements). In practice, however, hardcore arrangements have rarely been held to satisfy the 
exclusion criteria. 
 
Article 102 TFEU prohibits an undertaking that holds a dominant position in the market from 
abusing that position, insofar as such abuse may affect trade between Member States (as in Article 
101(1), effect on trade between Member States is essentially a jurisdictional criterion).  Unlike 
Article 101, there is no express provision for exclusion.   
 
Turning to the competition laws of the other subject jurisdictions, it will be seen that they share 
with the EU the elements of (a) a rule aimed at preventing arrangements between businesses which 
harm competition, subject to exceptions, and (b) a rule aimed at preventing any business which 
has “substantial market power” or “dominance” from abusing or misusing that position. 
 
2 3 2 Australia 
 
In Australia, the competition provisions are contained in Part IV of the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (“CCA”).  Unlike EU law, where all arrangements are subject to a competition test 
(“preventing, restricting or distorting competition”) there are certain types of arrangement in the 
CCA that are prohibited in themselves i.e. per se (unless a specific authorisation is obtained), 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
13 
 
irrespective of their intended, likely or actual effects on competition.  These arrangements are 
regarded as the more serious violations of the CCA, and are as follows:  
 
• “Exclusionary” provisions.  This prohibition is aimed at so-called “primary boycotts”, i.e. 
an agreement between competitors not to deal with one or more suppliers or customers.28  
• Hardcore arrangements between actual or potential competitors, i.e. bid-rigging, market-
sharing, output- restriction and price-fixing. These arrangements are subject not just to a 
civil law prohibition, but also a criminal law prohibition if the requisite mens rea 
(knowledge or belief) is present. 29 
• “Third line forcing”: an arrangement whereby a business sells goods or services or gives a 
discount, but only on condition that the purchaser acquires other goods or services from a 
third person.30  
• Resale price maintenance.31 
 
Other arrangements are prohibited only if they have the purpose, or the actual or likely effect of 
“substantially lessening competition” (“the SLC test”).32  As with EU law, all types of anti-
competitive arrangements may in principle be allowed on certain public interest grounds,33 
although the grounds for authorisation under Australian law appear to be considerably wider than 
under EU law, as explained in Chapter 4 below. 
 
In Australia, the CCA uses the concept “substantial degree of market power” as the benchmark for 
triggering the rules on abuse (or “misuse”, to use the Australian term that has at least until recently 
been used), as opposed to the EU concept of dominant position.34  Australian law also adopted a 
different approach from EU law to the question of unilateral anti-competitive conduct.  There were 
two main differences: 
                                                     
28 S 45(1)(a), 45(2)(a)(i) and 45(2)(b)(i), in combination with s 4D. 
29 S 44ZZRA-44ZZRV. 
30 S 47. 
31 S 48. 
32 S 45. 
33 S 88. 
34 S 46. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
14 
 
 
• it was the purpose of the conduct that triggered the prohibition, not the effect; and 
• the market power had to be used for the purpose in question, whereas this is not necessary 
in the EU.35 
 
In order to establish a breach, it was necessary to show that the business has “taken advantage” of 
its substantial degree of market power for one of the purposes specific in the section, namely: 
 
• eliminating or substantially damaging a competitor; 
• preventing the entry of a person into a market; or 
• deterring or preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in a market.36 
 
However, Australia has recently adopted fundamental reforms to the misuse of market power 
provisions. These reforms remove the "take advantage" requirement, and replace the three 
purposes in the current law with a new test. The new test, which entered into force on 6 November 
2017, is as follows:   
 
"A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in 
conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in that or any other market".37 
 
This new test will considerably widen the scope of the conduct that will be caught. The 
implications of this test for legal certainty will be examined in Chapter 4. 
 
2 3 3 Canada 
 
                                                     
35 Case C-6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1975] ECR 495. 
36 S 46, as in force prior to 6 November 2017. 
37 https://www.australiancompetitionlaw.org/legislation/provisions/2010cca46.html (accessed 
on 7-11-2017). 
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In Canada, the Competition Act, like the Australian CCA, distinguishes between hardcore 
arrangements, which are prohibited in principle irrespective of their effects on competition, and 
other agreements that “substantially lessen competition”.  As in Australia, the former category 
covers price- fixing, market-sharing, output-restriction and bid-rigging, albeit the prohibitions are 
framed in different terms in Canada.38 Unlike Australian law, hardcore arrangements are subject 
only to criminal penalties: there is no parallel civil offence.   And unlike in Australia and the EU, 
there is no possibility (even theoretically) of an exemption for such arrangements. (There are also 
specific offences related to anti-competitive agreements in professional sport and between 
financial institutions).39 
 
Until 12 March 2010, other arrangements outside the hardcore category also constituted offences 
if they substantially lessened competition.  However, as part of a series of major reforms to the 
Competition Act which took effect on that date, non-hardcore arrangements were removed from 
the criminal provisions, and became covered by a new provision, section 90.1, which applies to 
any arrangement between at least two competitors that “prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent 
or lessen, competition substantially in a market” (given its similarity to the Australia test, we shall 
also refer to this test as the SLC test).40 
 
As a result of Section 90.1, and in contrast to the laws of the other subject jurisdictions, agreements 
that harm competition are no longer prohibited automatically by law. If the agreement causes SLC, 
the Tribunal may (subject to an efficiency exception which is discussed below) issue an order 
prohibiting any person from doing anything under the arrangement (i.e. a “cease-and-desist” 
order).41 Alternatively, the Competition Bureau may enter into a consent agreement with the 
businesses in question whereby they agree to take certain steps to terminate the SLC instead of the 
Bureau taking the case to the Tribunal: the consent agreement must be endorsed by the Tribunal.42  
Entering into and operating the arrangement is perfectly legal until such time as a cease-and-desist 
                                                     
38 S 45 and 47 of the Canada Competition Act. 
39 Ss 48, 49 respectively. 
40 See http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/h_03036.html (accessed 
27-1-18). 
41 S 90.1(1). 
42 S 90.1(1)(b). 
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order is issued or a consent agreement is signed.  Illegality only arises if a Tribunal order or 
Tribunal-endorsed consent agreement is breached.43   
 
Section 90.1 provides that the Tribunal must not make a cease-and-desist order if the arrangement 
has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that will be greater than, and will 
offset, the effects of the SLC.44 Two examples of efficiencies are given in the Act itself: a 
significant increase in the real value of exports, and a significant substitution of domestic products 
for imported products.45   
 
As with the EU, Canada uses the term “dominant position” in the case of unilateral conduct, 
although we shall see in Chapter 4 that the definition of the concept is somewhat different.46  Like 
arrangements outside the hardcore category, abuse of dominant position is not prohibited in itself: 
the Commission can enter into a consent agreement, or it can refer such conduct to the Tribunal 
and the Tribunal can issue a cease-and-desist order for the future.47  In addition, and rather 
unusually as there is no express prohibition of abuse, the Tribunal may impose an administrative 
monetary penalty if an abuse takes place.48  The Competition Act lists (non-exhaustively) a series 
of “anti-competitive” acts that will be regarded as an abuse, if they cause SLC.49 
 
2 3 4 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, as in Australia and Canada (but unlike the EU and Hong Kong), the Competition 
Act prohibits certain types of arrangements without any need to show any actual or potential 
impact on competition.  In the case of horizontal arrangements, these are hardcore arrangements, 
namely: 
 
                                                     
43 Ss 90.1(1)(a) and 105.  
44 S 90.1(4). 
45 S 90.1(6). 
46 Ss 78 and 79. 
47 Ss 79 and 105. 
48 S 79 (3.1). 
49 S 78. 
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• directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition; 
• dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods 
or services; and 
• collusive tendering.50 
   
Output restrictions are not specifically mentioned (unlike in Australia and Canada), but would be 
likely in any event to fall within the concept of “indirectly fixing a selling price” (since output is 
normally reduced to increase prices). In the case of vertical arrangements, minimum resale price 
maintenance is similarly prohibited.51 
 
Other arrangements- both horizontal and vertical- are prohibited if they cause SLC, i.e. have the 
effect of “substantially preventing, or lessening, competition in a market”.52  This is subject to an 
efficiency exception that is modelled on the Canadian one: the exemption applies where a party 
can prove that there is “any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain” which 
outweighs the anti-competitive effect. Any arrangement- even if it falls within one of the hardcore 
categories specifically prohibited- may be exempted by the Commission if it contributes to one or 
more public interest objectives identified in the Act.53  These are considered in Chapter 4. 
 
Unlike the competition laws of the other subject jurisdictions, the South African law defines the 
requisite degree of market power triggering the abuse provision partly in terms of market share.54  
A firm is automatically regarded as dominant if it has at least 45 per cent of a market.  There is 
also a rebuttable presumption of dominance from 35 per cent up to below 45 per cent market share.  
To rebut the presumption, the business must show that it does not have “market power”.  “Market 
power” is defined as “the power of a firm to control prices, to exclude competition, or to behave 
to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers”.55 (As will be 
seen in Chapter 4, this is quite similar to the notion of “dominant position” used in EU law).  Below 
                                                     
50 Competition Act s 4(1)(b). 
51 N 32 above. 
52 S 4(1)(a) and 5. 
53 S 10. 
54 S 7. 
55 S 1(1)(xiv). 
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35 per cent market share there is no dominance unless the business has market power, so the onus 
is on the enforcement authorities to prove that the firm has market power.  
Unlike the other competition laws examined in this thesis, the South African law prohibits certain 
types of conduct as abuses, without the explicit requirement that authorities must show an adverse 
impact on competition, and without any possibility of exclusion on grounds of economic 
efficiency.  Specifically, two types of conduct fall into this category, namely charging an 
“excessive price” to the detriment of consumers, and refusing to give a competitor access to an 
“essential facility”.56   An excessive price is defined as a price that “bears no reasonable relation 
to the economic value of that good or services, and is higher than that value.”57  An essential 
facility is defined as “an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably be duplicated, and 
without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or services to their 
customers.”58 
 
The law also prohibits dominant firms from engaging in “exclusionary acts”, subject to the same 
exception which applies in the case of “non-hardcore” arrangements, i.e. if there are 
“technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive 
effects” of the acts.59  An “exclusionary act” is defined as “an act that impedes or prevents a firm 
entering into, or expanding within, a market”.60 Some exclusionary acts are specifically listed: for 
these the onus is on the business to show that there are gains that outweigh the harm to competition. 
For those not specifically listed, it is for the Commission to do so.61  This matter is examined in 
more detail in Chapter 4. 
 
                                                     
56 S 8(a) and (b). 
57 S 1(1)(ix). 
58 S 1(1)(viii). 
59 S 8(c) and (d). 
60 S 1(1)(x). 
61 See further Philip Sutherland and Katherine Kemp Competition Law of South Africa (looseleaf 
2000 et seq-) section 7.11.2. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
19 
 
There is also a separate prohibition against price discrimination by dominant firms which is likely 
to have the effect of substantially lessening or preventing competition: this prohibition is not 
subject to an exclusion on grounds of economic efficiency.62 
 
As with arrangements between businesses, conduct that would otherwise be an abuse can be 
exempted by the Commission, if it contributes to one or more public objectives identifies in the 
Act.63 
 
2 3 5 Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, the rule on arrangements between businesses is materially identical to Article 101 
TFEU, prohibiting arrangements that have the “object or effect” of “preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition”, subject to the possibility of an exception on the basis of the same four 
criteria as the EU.64  Regarding the abuse provision, however, the wording is different from Article 
102 TFEU.65 There are two main differences. First, instead of using the concept of “dominant 
position”, the term “a substantial degree of market power” is used.  Secondly, the term “ abuse” is 
qualified: the undertaking “must not abuse that power by engaging in conduct that has as its object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong Kong”, i.e. the same 
competition test as for arrangements. This qualification does not exist under Article 102 TFEU. 
 
2 3 6 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, although there are differences in form and substance between the competition laws 
of the five jurisdictions examined in this thesis, they share the following common elements: 
 
                                                     
62 S 9. 
63 S 10. 
64 Hong Kong Competition Ordinance Part 2 Division 1. For a discussion of the EU criteria, see 
section 2 3 1 above. 
65 N 64 above Part 2 Division 2. 
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• a prohibition of, or provisions entitling the authorities to intervene against, arrangements 
between businesses which have negative effects on competition, subject to exceptions; and 
• a prohibition of, or provisions entitling the authorities to intervene against, businesses 
which have substantial market power (or market dominance) abusing that position. In 
Canada and South Africa there are express exceptions to these provisions, on grounds of 
superior performance and economic efficiency respectively, but not in the EU, Australia or 
Hong Kong. 
 
In Chapter 4, we shall use these common elements as a structure for examining the extent of legal 
certainty in the competition laws of the five subject jurisdictions. 
 
In this section, we have looked broadly at what competition laws look like, and what they do.  We 
have not looked at why they do it.  In other words, what are their objectives? What state of affairs 
are they seeking to achieve which would or might not pertain in their absence?  Any law aimed at 
regulating business conduct must have certain objectives in mind.  The objectives of competition 
laws will be examined in Section 2 6.  First, we must look at what competition, and harm to 
competition mean, and why competition is valued, since all of the laws examined here are aimed 
in the first instance at preventing harm to competition.   
 
2  4  What is Competition, and When is it Harmed? 
 
It is notable that “competition” is not defined in the competition legislation of any of the subject 
jurisdictions.  In Australia, the CCA does state that competition means “competition in a market”, 
but the word “competition” itself is not defined.66  Looking at dictionary definitions, “competition” 
is variously described as: 
 
• “The activity or condition of striving to gain or win something by defeating or establishing 
superiority over others.”67 
                                                     
66 S 45(3). 
67  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/competition (accessed on 31-1-2018) 
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•  “[T]he effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a third 
party by offering the most favourable terms.”68 
• “[T]he activities of companies that are trying to be more successful than others.”69 
• “the process or fact of competing”.70 
 
It will be noted that only the third of these definitions refers to competition in the market, and more 
specifically to competition for customers.  Similarly, Whish and Bailey have described 
competition as “a striving for the custom and business of people in the market place”.71  However, 
there can be competition in the market for things other than customers, and therefore this definition 
may be too narrow.  For example, broadcasters compete with each other to secure rights to screen 
sporting events, and mobile telephone companies compete with each other to secure radio 
spectrum.  Competition laws address harm to competition in the purchase of rights, products or 
services, not just in their sale, as Whish and Bailey themselves recognise.72 
 
This rivalry between businesses is probably what most people have in mind when they think about 
competition in the market.  Under this rivalry concept, harm to competition occurs when the forces 
of competition (or rivalry) are dampened, so that competition in the market becomes less intense.  
But how is a reduction in the intensity of market competition measured? Is any reduction of rivals 
regarded as relevant? Would it be regarded as a reduction of rivalry if two competitors combine 
their production facilities to reduce costs, or does one look only at whether the reduction of rivalry 
increase prices in the market (or reduces quality and/or customer choice)?  Clearly, cooperation 
between businesses is common, and produces economic benefits in many cases, so seeking to 
prevent all reductions of rivals would be too broad. So where should the line be drawn between 
cooperation that is permissible, and cooperation that is not permissible? These questions will be 
looked at further in Section 2 6, where the objectives of competition laws are examined. 
                                                     
68  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/competition (accessed on 31-1-2018). 
69 https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/competition (accessed on 31-1-
2018). 
70  http://chambers.co.uk/search/?query=&title=21st (accessed on 31-1-2018). 
71 Competition Law 4. 
72 At 640-642. 
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However, there is an alternative to rivalry as a concept of competition, what Monti calls the 
“economic freedom” concept of competition.73  Under this concept, competition involves freedom 
from restraints on commercial conduct, and from restraints on access to markets, whether self-
imposed by contract, or through restraints imposed by third parties. Such restraints in themselves 
constitute harm to competition. It has been argued that this concept of competition was derived 
from the so-called Ordoliberal school of thought in Germany, which will be discussed in section 
2 5: 
 
"The original aim of Articles 81 and 82EC was the protection of individual economic 
freedom. The Ordoliberal concept of competition valued individual freedom as an end in 
itself…Restriction of competition under Article 81(1) is understood as the restriction of 
other market participants' economic freedom and as such is prohibited".74 
 
Restrictions of competition under EU competition law have indeed traditionally been interpreted 
in terms of restrictions on economic freedom, as will be seen in Chapter 4.  An exclusive 
distribution agreement is a good example. Such exclusivity has been held to be a restriction of 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU (and its predecessors) because it (a) prevents the supplier 
from selling into the exclusive distributor’s  allocated territory and (b) prevents other potential 
distributors from selling in that territory.75  Whether the exclusivity has the effect of making the 
market less competitive, in the sense of resulting in higher prices (for example), is not considered 
relevant in this analysis.  
 
One problem of this approach is that if a business is to exercise its economic freedom (or freedom 
to compete) to the full, this impinges on other businesses’ freedom. Freedom to compete cannot 
therefore be absolute, and is only relative. So where should the line be drawn: when can freedom 
to compete be legitimately restricted? 
 
                                                     
73 EC Competition Law 25-29. 
74 Katalin Judit Cseres Competition Law and Consumer Protection (2005) 248. 
75 Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten & Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299. 
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Another problem, from a practical point of view, is that many, if not all, contracts contain 
restrictions on commercial freedom, so seeking to prevent all of these restrictions would be 
impracticable, and indeed economically disastrous. As Bork has said, such an approach “would 
require the destruction of all commercial contracts and obligations”.76 So if competition in the 
sense of economic freedom is to be protected, there must be criteria for determining which 
restrictions are permissible, and which ones are not.   
 
One of the later Ordoliberals, Erich Hoppman, recognised this problem of “drawing the line”, and 
suggested that a distinction be drawn between “natural” restrictions on  freedom to compete, and 
“artificial” ones. By “natural” he seemed to mean those that result from the process of competition 
itself- others would be classified as “artificial”. However, this approach has been criticised on the 
basis that this distinction is difficult to draw, and cannot be drawn without making a value 
judgment (such as by reference to the effects of the conduct).77 
   
EU competition law has also faced the challenge of distinguishing between acceptable and 
unacceptable restrictions on economic freedom, as we shall see in Chapter 4. 
   
So far we have looked at harm to competition in the context of arrangements between businesses.  
But as noted in Section 2 3, the competition laws examined in this thesis also prohibit certain types 
of unilateral conduct by firms with substantial market power or dominance that are considered 
harmful to competition.   Defining harm to competition in the case of unilateral conduct is even 
more challenging than in the case of arrangements between businesses, because competition itself 
is a cyclical and self-destructive process: any competition has winners and losers, and winners 
enjoy periods of substantial market power, often lengthy.   How is one to encourage firms to 
compete vigorously, even aggressively, while at the same time preserving competition?  We shall 
return to this conundrum in Section 2 6. 
                                                     
76 Robert H Bork The Antitrust Paradox: a Policy at War with Itself  (1978) 59. 
77 For a more detailed summary of Hoppman’s approach, and the criticisms of it, see Sutherland 
and Kemp Competition Law of South Africa 1.7.3; Peter Behrens “The Consumer Choice 
Paradigm in German Ordoliberalism and its Impact upon EU Competition Law” Europa-Kolleg 
Hamburg Discussion Paper 1/14 March 2014. 
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2 5  Why is Competition Valued? 
 
As we saw in Section 2 3, all of the competition laws examined in this thesis start from the principle 
that harm to competition (whether in the sense of rivalry or in the sense of economic freedom) 
should be avoided. This implies that competition is regarded in principle as a value to be protected.  
Why is competition valued? Or more precisely, why is it regarded as important (in principle) to 
prevent harm to competition?  There are both political and economic reasons as to why competition 
can be valued.  We look at each in turn. 
 
According to Gerber, the prime concern of Ordoliberalism, which it believed competition law 
should address, was private economic power, because it could ultimately lead to political power.78   
Competition was valued for its propensity to undermine private economic power.  Ordoliberal 
scholars believed that for the risk of private economic power to be minimised, individual freedom 
needed to be protected as a value in itself.  They believed that laws were necessary to guarantee 
individual businesses their economic freedom, where that freedom was threatened by the private 
economic power of others.  Where private economic power did arise, the businesses in question 
would be compelled to act “as if” they were in a competitive market. So the primary reason why 
competition was valued by the Ordoliberals was political, not economic. 
 
It was not just the German and EU competition laws which were influenced by the spectre of 
private economic power and such power being used to political ends: this was very much a concern 
when US antitrust law was introduced.79  More recently, it seems also to have been one of the 
concerns behind the introduction of the South African Competition Act in 1998.  The purposes of 
the Act include: 
 
                                                     
78 David J Gerber Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe (1998) 250-253.  
79 David J Gerber Global Competition Law, Markets and Globalization (2010) 123. For a detailed 
analysis of the values that have been attributed to competition in the US, and the goals that US 
antitrust law has been used to achieve, see Maurice E Stucke “Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals” 
53 BCLRev 551 (2012). 
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• to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to 
participate in the economy; and 
• to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes of 
historically disadvantaged persons.80 
 
Competition is more commonly valued nowadays, at least publicly, for its perceived beneficial 
economic effects, that is, its ability to achieve economic efficiency or consumer welfare.  The 
starting point for looking at the economic benefits of competition is what is normally called neo-
classical economic theory, under which markets are considered to work most efficiently in terms 
of allocating society’s resources (“allocative efficiency”) where there are many competitors, none 
of which can influence the market price, and least efficiently where there is a monopoly.  The 
theory is that a rational, profit- maximising business will continue to expand production for as long 
as it is profitable to do so, that is until the price decreases to such a level as to equal the marginal 
cost of producing an additional item: this state of equilibrium is called “perfect competition”. By 
contrast, under monopoly, output is lower and prices higher. In these circumstances, some 
consumers who would have bought the product at a lower price that would still have been above 
the cost of producing it will stop purchasing altogether. These consumers will now purchase other 
products from which they will not have received the same benefit. This loss is called the 
“deadweight loss” of monopoly, and the market is accepted to be allocatively inefficient. It follows 
that the more competitors there are, the more efficient the market is, and vice-versa.81   
 
A second type of efficiency according to the perfect competition model is productive efficiency: 
production costs are lower under perfect competition because when price reaches a point where it 
equals cost, the only way in which a producer can make a profit is by reducing cost. This saves 
society’s resources, the resultant savings being released for other valuable uses.  Monopolists by 
contrast, the theory goes, do not have this incentive to cut costs and therefore costs may be higher 
under monopoly, even although the resources are used to make the products that consumers want, 
                                                     
80 S 2. 
81 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker The Economics of EC Competition Law (2010) Chapter 1. 
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i.e. the market is allocatively efficient (this productive inefficiency is sometimes called “X- 
inefficiency”).82  
 
While the perfect competition model provides a useful basic insight into the relative potential 
social welfare effects of monopoly versus competition, it is unrealistic to expect that such a model 
could ever be achieved in real life, and even if it was, perfect competition might be socially 
undesirable. Some of the reasons are as follows: 
 
• It does not take into account the dynamic nature of markets. Perfect competition is a 
situation rather than a process. It has been described as “a market situation which, although 
it is a result of the free entry of formerly competing firms, has evolved to the point where 
no further competition within the industry is possible…both perfect competition and 
monopoly are situations in which the possibility of competitive behaviour is ruled out by 
definition”.83 In real life, monopoly may be no more than a stage in the competition 
process. A monopoly may arise due to innovation, which is an inherent aspect of 
competition: such monopolies will disappear eventually as other firms start imitating the 
innovator, or make new innovations that compete with those of the initial innovator. 
• For perfect competition to exist, a number of conditions must be present, which are highly 
unlikely to be satisfied simultaneously in any real market: the number of buyers and sellers 
must be large, products sold must be homogeneous, suppliers and consumers must be 
rational and have perfect information about current and future market conditions, and there 
must be no barriers   to entry. 
• The “X-inefficiency” theory overlooks the fact that monopolies, like any other business, 
have an incentive to maximise profits by increasing turnover and cutting costs, and 
overlooks the discipline exerted by potential entrants (except where the monopoly is a 
statutory one) and shareholders. As one commentator states: "Monopolists favour profits 
                                                     
82 N 81 above. 
83 Roger J Van den Bergh and Peter D Camesasca European Competition Law and Economics 2 
ed (2006) 63. 
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just like any other, thus cost-reducing or demand-enhancing innovation is in their interest 
as well".84      
 
A third type of efficiency which competition is argued to generate, albeit not derived from the 
theory of perfect competition, is called dynamic efficiency. The argument is that competition tends 
to drive businesses to be more innovative in terms of bringing new products and services to the 
market. Monopolies are said to have less incentive to do so. This theory has been strongly 
criticised. It has been argued that monopoly profits are necessary to engage in research and 
innovation, that the prospect of monopoly profits is necessary to drive innovation, and that there 
is no need for public intervention if such monopoly profits are realised because this will attract 
new entry that will erode those profits (so- called “Schumpeter” theory).85  
 
There does appear to be current empirical evidence suggesting that monopoly, or at least a strong 
market position, is not inconsistent with dynamic efficiency.  When one looks at businesses that 
are alleged to have a dominant position or a monopoly in certain segments of the “high-tech” 
sector, such as Google or Amazon, it is hard to find any basis for criticising them for not being 
innovative.  It would seem unwise to have a public policy which discourages monopoly. The 
prospect of enjoying at least a temporary monopoly and monopoly pricing is what drives 
innovation in the pharmaceutical sector (for example), and without that prospect, the initial 
research and development costs involved in bringing new products to the market would not be 
justified. Indeed, the policy need to accept monopoly for a temporary period to drive innovation is 
what underlies the patent system. Moreover, the potential threat of losing a monopoly or dominant 
position, once gained, due to innovation by other firms, acts as a constraint on the conduct of the 
incumbent: another reason not to discourage the acquisition of monopoly per se. 
 
Alternative views of how markets work, and should work, were put forward by the so-called 
Harvard School and (later) the Chicago School in the US.86  
                                                     
84 Adi Ayal Fairness in Antitrust: Protecting the Strong from the Weak (2014) 48.  
85 Whish and Bailey Competition Law 6. 
86 For a more detailed summary of the views of the Harvard School and Chicago School see Van 
den Bergh and Camesasca n 83 above 67-85. 
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The Harvard School’s views were developed in the US in the late 1930s and early 1940s and 
remained the dominant force in US antitrust thinking until the 1970s.87 The Harvard School 
believed that the structure of an industry (such as the degree of concentration and barriers to entry) 
determined the conduct of businesses within the industry, which in turn determined the 
performance of the industry (in terms of delivering benefits to consumers). They rejected perfect 
competition as a policy goal and put forward the alternative of “workable” competition: essentially 
a set of structural, conduct and performance criteria against which industries could be measured 
and fulfillment of which determined industry performance.88 The Harvard School accepted a 
relatively high degree of public intervention, including through antitrust law, to achieve workable 
competition.89 
 
The Chicago School’s views were radically different. They started from the same premise as the 
neo-classicist price theorists, namely that businesses were rational profit maximisers. However, 
they viewed competition as a dynamic process and therefore believed that monopoly was not to be 
feared as high profits would be eroded by new entry. Even if price competition was reduced, other 
forms of competition would replace it. Conduct aimed at maximising profits and which is 
economically efficient should be lawful, and the sole objective of antitrust law should be economic 
efficiency.90   
 
According to Van den Bergh and Camesasca, the Harvard School has had a strong influence on 
EU competition law, as exemplified by its concern about concentration and the conduct of 
dominant firms (although, as noted earlier in this section, Ordoliberalism in Germany- which was 
also concerned with these issues- also had an important impact), whereas the Chicago School has 
had a greater influence on US antitrust law.91 This may be one of the reasons why US antitrust law 
is generally less interventionist than EU competition law.  Nevertheless, the central tenets of the 
                                                     
87 N 86 above 67. 
88 N 86 above 70-73. 
89 N 86 above 75. 
90 N 86 above 79. 
91 N 86 above. 
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Chicago School- that markets are robust and self-correcting, and that barriers to entry outside 
Government regulation are rare- have been strongly criticized by certain US academics.92 
 
In spite of these differing approaches, there does seem to be a general consensus nowadays that 
competition has an important role to play in generating markets which are economically efficient. 
As we shall see in section 2 6, economic efficiency is a common objective of competition laws in 
the subject jurisdictions. 
 
Leaving aside economic efficiency, a second economic value attributed to competition  is 
consumer welfare.93  The theory is that competitive markets are better for consumers than 
monopolistic ones, because suppliers fight harder with each other to supply better products, or the 
same products at lower prices.  Although increased consumer welfare may seem like an economic 
value of competition, there is a political dimension too.  Everyone is a consumer, and governments 
and regulators, naturally, like to be popular.  For governments, a consumer welfare agenda, 
including competition law as a weapon in their armoury, can help attract votes and ongoing 
popularity.  Likewise, regulators can demonstrate that they are producing value for their publicly-
funded budgets by saving consumers’ money, or achieving other positive consumer outcomes.  It 
is easier for governments and regulators to “sell” competition law to the public on the basis of 
consumer benefits, than on its propensity to improve the overall efficiency of the economy. 
 
It is important to note that these values are not always consistent with each other.  For example, 
protecting economic freedom for its own sake may be economically inefficient and against the 
consumer’s interest.  Cooperation between businesses with contractual restraints, such as exclusive 
distribution agreements, may result in efficiencies that can be passed on to consumers.  Similarly, 
cooperation may result in gains in productive and dynamic efficiency, even if consumers lose out 
in the form of higher prices. As Jones and Sufrin state: 
                                                     
92 Eleanor M Fox and Lawrence A Sullivan "Antitrust- Retrospective and Prospective: Where are 
we coming from? Where are we going?" (1987) 62 New York LR 936, 956-959.  
93 See for the EU and US respectively the discussion in Victoria Daskalova “Consumer Welfare in 
EU Competition Law: What Is It (Not) About?” The Competition Law Review Vol 11 Issue 1 133 
(July 2015); Joshua D Wright and Douglas H Ginsburg “The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps 
Choice” Fordham Law Review Vol 81 Issue 5 (2013). 
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"If competition policy is concerned with consumer welfare rather than social welfare it will 
be concerned with the transfer of surplus from producers to consumers. However, social 
welfare may not be maximised by such a transfer. In other words, prohibiting conduct and 
transactions which reduce consumer welfare may not allow efficiency gains which 
maximise social welfare".94 
 
  These potentially conflicting values should be addressed in designing competition law, to ensure 
it is applied in a consistent and coherent fashion. 
 
 2 6  Objectives of Competition Laws 
 
As noted in Section 2 3 above, in defining the essence of competition law, it is not sufficient to 
simply describe the common characteristics of competition laws: it is necessary to “dig deeper” 
and look at their objectives, i.e. what state of affairs they are seeking to achieve (or avoid).  Given 
that competition laws are designed to regulate business conduct, and prevent certain types of 
business conduct, it should be possible to draw a correlation, or identify a causal link, between the 
business conduct which is sought to be prevented, and certain harm to society. 
 
There has been a vigorous debate (particularly in the US) about what the objectives of competition 
law is, are or should be. As one author puts it: “[t]he literature on the goals of competition law has 
become a recurrent and rapidly expanding business”.95 This dissertation does not engage in this 
debate or seek to advance the literature on this issue. As regards the “is or are” this is a question 
of statutory construction of an existing statute, which may include a study of the legislative history 
of the statute in question (see for example the Bork versus Lande debate regarding US antitrust 
law, which we shall refer to later in this section). By definition, the interpretation of a statute is a 
matter of national law, and is outside the scope of this paper. As regards the “should be”, this 
                                                     
94  EU Competition Law 12. 
95 See Ioannis Lianos “Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU Competition Law”, 
CLES Working Paper 3/2013, and the literature therein cited. For a US perspective see Maurice 
E Stucke “Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals” 53 BCLRev 551 (2012). 
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implies a national (or, in the case of the EU, supranational) public policy decision as to what the 
objective or objectives of the competition law should be. This dissertation takes no view on this 
issue in itself.  
 
Instead, this dissertation takes the perspective of a jurisdiction which is contemplating introducing 
a competition law, or amending an existing one, to provide sufficient legal certainty- certainty that 
does not exist at present under existing competition laws, as we shall argue in Chapter 4. For 
reasons that will be explained in Chapter 7, it is inevitable in practical terms that most jurisdictions 
must have competition laws. The question is therefore what types of arrangements and conduct to 
prevent, why they should be prevented, and how they should be prevented. The objective or 
objectives of competition law will be of some relevance in assessing the why of this question, 
although we will argue that the objectives are to some extent a fait accompli in practice, due in 
part to the widespread international condemnation of cartels. 
 
Our objective in this section is therefore merely to demonstrate that there are several objectives 
that could be pursued by a competition law, not all of which are consistent with each other. 
 
Given the perceived values of competition (in the sense of a rivalrous process) as described in 
Section 2 5 above, it may seem self-evident that the primary objective of competition laws should 
be to protect competition, by preventing business conduct which harms competition.  But as we 
noted in section 2 4 this section, prohibiting all commercial agreements which reduce rivalry 
without qualification may lead to undesirable policy outcomes. This is also the case if the term 
"competition" is used in the sense of economic freedom.. It would be over-simplistic, and even 
incorrect, to think that competition laws are there to protect competition in itself. 
 
Under the “economic freedom” approach, Hoppman believed that competition in the form of 
economic freedom would always produce broader economic benefits.96 However, it is now clear 
that restrictions on economic freedom are sometimes justified on grounds of perceived economic 
benefits, such as consumer welfare. Indeed, EU competition law permits restrictions on economic 
                                                     
96 Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law of South Africa 1.7.3. 
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freedom to achieve broader economic benefits. Similarly, under the rivalry approach, any 
cooperation between businesses arguably reduces rivalry. However, cooperation between 
businesses, like restrictions on economic freedom, can be economically efficient, as is expressly 
recognised in the competition laws of Australia, Canada and South Africa.  If efficiency is the 
value, or one of the values, of competition, it would seem perverse to prevent agreements which 
achieve efficiency. The same applies if consumer welfare is a value attached to rivalry: cooperation 
between businesses can produce consumer benefits in many cases.  Whether the economic freedom 
or rivalry approach is adopted, therefore, not all restrictions on cooperation can sensibly be 
prevented.  The task is therefore to determine which ones should be prevented and which ones 
should be allowed. 
 
In the case of arrangements between businesses, one method for “filtering” out harmless 
cooperation is to lay down some kind of de minimis or “safe harbour” provision, so that harm to 
competition that is considered minor is excluded from the “net” of the competition law.  For 
example, arrangements between competitors whose combined turnover or market share does not 
exceed certain levels can be excluded, as they are under EU competition law, for example.97   
 
Another, more fundamental, method is to ask why you value competition, and see if cooperation 
can do any better.  For example, if competition is valued because it generates economic efficiency, 
arrangements that improve overall economic efficiency could be allowed.  Under this approach, 
the different efficiencies and inefficiencies (productive, dynamic, allocative) resulting from the 
arrangement would be assessed, and if in net terms the balance was positive, the cooperation would 
be allowed.  For example, a merger might produce allocative inefficiency through price increases, 
but produce productive or dynamic efficiencies which far exceed the losses in allocative efficiency, 
and be allowed on that basis.  This is often called the “total welfare standard”.98   
                                                     
97 See Communication from the Commission “Notice on agreements of minor importance which 
do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union (De Minimis Notice)” OJ C291/1 of 30.8.2014. 
98 Louis Kaplow “On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law” Harvard John M Olin 
Center for Law, Economics and Business Discussion Paper No 693 05/2011, available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Kaplow_693.pdf (accessed on 
27-01-2018).  
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Similarly, it was noted that another value for which competition is embraced is its propensity to 
generate positive outcomes for consumers.  As with economic efficiency, it is accepted by some 
jurisdictions such as the US that consumers can often benefit from collaboration (i.e. a reduction 
in competition).  As will be seen in Chapter 4, the EU Commission has also stated that consumer 
welfare is the objective of EU competition law, although this view has not yet been expressly 
endorsed by the European Courts.  So arrangements that produced better consumer outcomes could 
be allowed.  This is often called the “consumer welfare standard”.  
 
In competition regimes that value economic efficiency or consumer welfare, therefore, competition 
law (as applied to arrangements as opposed to unilateral conduct) can perhaps therefore best be 
viewed as being based on a presumption.  The presumption is that competition (as opposed to 
collaboration) is the best way of generating economic efficiency, or consumer welfare, unless it 
can be shown that collaboration (i.e. reducing competition) can produce these benefits more 
quickly or effectively.  Insofar as arrangements between businesses are concerned, competition 
law in these regimes could therefore be defined as laws that prohibit arrangements between 
businesses that harm (or at least do not improve) economic efficiency or consumer welfare (as the 
case may be). 
 
However, it should be noted that economic efficiencies and consumer welfare are both difficult to 
measure, and in the case of consumer welfare there is the added difficulty that there is no consensus 
on what the term means: as Stucke notes, it “means different things to different people”.99  
 
Whether economic efficiency or consumer welfare is the chosen objective, an assessment of the 
effects or likely effects of the arrangements is required, and, as will be seen in Chapter 4, this can 
be a very complex task. Subjective judgments are involved, and this can lead to a great deal of 
uncertainty for businesses that are trying to assess whether their arrangements comply with the 
law. As Ezrachi notes: 
                                                     
99 “Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals” 570-591. For the difficulties of defining “consumer harm” 
see also Ioannis Lianos “Some reflections on the Question of the Goals of EU competition Law” 
CLES Working Paper Series3/2013 at 15-23.  
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“Economic theory in and of itself is not monolithic. While neoclassical economics is often 
presented as the only strand of economic theory, it is one of several strands. Naturally, 
diverging theories affect one’s perception of the competitive process, the relevant 
competition forces, one’s assumptions regarding market participants, and the role of 
institutions in antitrust enforcement”.100 
 
Many competition laws also allow other public policy values to justify arrangements that harm 
competition, so that competition is, at most, a qualified value. For example, as we shall see in 
Chapter 4, in the EU and Australia, arrangements that harmed competition have nevertheless been 
allowed on grounds of maintaining employment levels, or protecting the environment.  In South 
Africa, the competition law provides that arrangements which harm competition and are not 
justified by economic efficiency can still be exempted if they produce certain other public benefits, 
such as promoting “the ability of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically-
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive”.101 So such other values can be regarded as more 
important than competition. 
 
As far as arrangements between businesses are concerned, it is therefore over-simplistic, and 
perhaps even misleading, to define competition law as a law that protects competition.  It is perhaps 
more accurate to define it as a law determining the circumstances in which competition may be 
harmed, to achieve other public policy objectives which cannot be achieved, or can only be 
achieved less effectively, through competition. 
 
So far, we have been considering harm to competition caused by arrangements between one or 
more businesses.  But what about harm to competition caused by firms with substantial market 
power or market dominance?  Prohibiting such conduct is problematic, because, as noted briefly 
in Section 2 4, competition is by nature a self-destructive process, in that competition by definition 
produces winners, which in turn reduces competition.  If competitors are to compete vigorously, 
                                                     
100 Ariel Ezrachi “Sponge” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Vol 5 Issue 1 (April 2017) 49. 
101 Competition Act s 10.  
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which competition laws are supposed to encourage, the natural consequence is the exclusion of 
weaker competitors.  So when are the actions of the winner reprehensible?  As one author puts it: 
 
“Competition assumes, by definition, that enterprises attempt to “win” the battle of the 
marketplace – that is, to cause economic harm to competitors.  The fact that conduct is 
intended to cause such harm and that such harm results cannot, therefore, be the criterion 
for abusive conduct; that criterion must be sought in the characteristics of the conduct or 
in its other effects.”102 
 
In essence, therefore, since successful competitive unilateral conduct excludes competition, a 
provision which targets exclusionary abuse requires an assessment of what type of conduct is 
considered unfair: in effect, a “code of conduct” for firms perceived to be powerful, and a 
requirement for them to act as a kind of “benevolent dictator” to accommodate less powerful rivals 
and help them, to a greater or lesser extent, to gain a foothold or survive in the market.103 For 
example, EU case law has held that exclusive contracts with customers, whereby they agree to 
purchase their requirements from the dominant firm, and rebates conditional upon them buying all 
or the bulk of their requirements from the dominant firm, may be regarded as an abuse, even if the 
customer has agreed to, or even proposed, the exclusivity to get a lower price (although it is still 
open for the dominant company to demonstrate that such practices have efficiencies which 
outweigh the harm to competition and which benefit consumers, in which case the conduct will 
not be regarded as abusive).104   
 
Another issue is the timescale over which the dominant firm’s conduct should be viewed.  It may 
be that a successful company excludes all its rivals, but if that fact causes prices to rise, this may 
                                                     
102 Gerber Law and Competition 313. 
103 Bork opposed this approach, arguing that firms which  excluded competitors through means 
other than predatory pricing or mergers must by definition have done so through superior 
efficiency, and any unilateral conduct other than predatory pricing should be allowed on that 
basis. See The Antitrust Paradox 164-165.  
104 Case C-23/14 Post Danmark, not yet reported, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-23/14 ; Case C-413/14 Intel v Commission, not yet 
reported, available at: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-413/14. 
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well encourage new players to enter the market. Under a Chicago School approach (exemplified 
by Bork), which has had much influence in the US as we have seen,105 such conduct would be 
permitted, but under the influence of the Harvard School, the EU authorities have been less tolerant 
of such conduct, and taken a shorter- term view.  
 
A good example of the difference between the US approach and the EU approach was the 
Microsoft case.106 Whereas the US is reluctant to interfere with the property rights of even 
powerful firms under antitrust law, the EU is more ready to do so. After a lengthy investigation, 
the European Commission found that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by refusing to 
supply “interoperability information” to its competitors and to allow them to use such technology 
to develop and market operating systems for certain types of server computers. The Commission 
imposed a (then record) fine of 497 million euros on Microsoft, and ordered it to draw up detailed 
descriptions of the communications protocols by which Microsoft’s operating systems 
communicate with each other and then to license competitors to use those specifications to develop 
their own products. 
 
Forrester criticised this approach and contrasted it with the US approach: 
 
“The system of free competition in the market, the system that rewards success and 
punishes failure, becomes blurred by an excessive degree of paternalism. The US Supreme 
Court in Trinko was unequivocal in condemning this approach and held that 
‘enforced…sharing requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the 
proper price, quantity and other terms of dealing- a role for which they are ill-
suited’.”107(citation omitted). 
 
Similarly, and more recently, the EU Commission decided that Google had abused its dominant 
position in the search engine market by favouring its own comparison shopping service in search 
                                                     
105 N 86 above. 
106 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II 3601. 
107 Ian S Forrester “Article 82: Remedies in Search of Theories?” 28 Fordham Int’l L J 919, 951 
(the author of this article acted for Microsoft in the EU case).  
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results, and fined Google 2.42 billion euros for doing so- a record EU fine for abuse of 
dominance.108 And yet the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) found no reason to object to 
Google’s same practices a few years earlier.109 
  
It is interesting to compare and contrast the two authorities’ comments on Google’s conduct. The 
EU Commission stated that Google “denied other companies the chance to compete on the merits 
and to innovate. And most importantly, it denied European consumers a genuine choice of services 
and the full benefits of innovation”.110 The FTC, on the other hand, stated that Google adopted the 
practice “to improve the quality of its search results, that any negative impact on actual or potential 
competitors was incidental to that purpose” and that the practice “likely benefitted consumers”.111 
 
The current EU Competition Commissioner, Ms Margrethe Vestager, has openly acknowledged 
that the EU approach to regulating dominant firms is different from the US approach. She has been 
quoted as saying: 
 
“We want free markets, but we understand the paradox of free markets, which is that we 
sometimes have to intervene. We have to believe that it’s not the law of the jungle but the 
law of democracy that works…I never feel more European than when I am in the States. 
Because we are different”.112 
 
The European Courts have also often said that dominant businesses have a “special responsibility” 
not to let their conduct impair “genuine” competition.113  This implies that when a business is 
                                                     
108 EU Commission Press Release IP/17/1784 of 27 June 2017 “Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google [euros] 2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage 
to own comparison shopping service”. 
109 “Statement of the Federal Trade Commission regarding Google’s Search Practices In the 
Matter of Google Inc” FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3 2013.  
110 N 108 above. 
111 N 109 above. 
112 “Vestager looks again at Apple tax affairs as EU takes big tech to task” Financial Times 8 
November 2017. 
113 Case 322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461. 
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dominant, it has "special" obligations in terms of competition which do not apply to non-dominant 
businesses. But this raises at least four questions: 
 
• As a matter of policy, is it appropriate that extra obligations be imposed on a dominant 
business, especially where such dominance has been won by competing more effectively 
or efficiently than its competitors?  
•  Does imposing such extra obligations send the wrong message and discourage businesses 
from acquiring dominance, thereby inhibiting competition and the achievement of the 
economic benefits that competition brings? 
• Is it worth the cost of imposing and enforcing such extra obligations, in circumstances 
where the dominance may be short-lived (as is particularly the case in technology markets, 
for example) 
• If any extra obligations are to be imposed, what should these obligations be? In other 
words, what conduct should be considered as an abuse of dominance (or in US parlance, 
"monopolization")? This involves a similar problem that arises (as we saw) with 
agreements, namely where to draw the line between conduct which is permissible and 
conduct which is prohibited. 
 
The answers to such questions may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on their 
precise economic, historical and cultural circumstances. For example, small economies may be 
more prone to concentrated markets and even monopolies, and this may lead to greater scrutiny 
of, and a stricter approach to, conduct by dominant companies that negatively affects competition. 
The same applies to markets where barriers to entry are high, and where there is limited potential 
for dominant positions to be eroded by new market entry. The endurance of dominance (and the 
ability of markets to “self-correct”) may also be affected by local consumer preference, language 
barriers, and access to capital for new investment to challenge the dominant firm.  
  
The subject jurisdictions have approached the challenge of identifying what types of conduct to 
prohibit in different ways in their competition laws. It is difficult to discern from these laws any 
consistent philosophy in any of the subject jurisdictions as to the extent to which dominant firms 
should be regulated by competition law. For example, while the competition laws in most of the 
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subject jurisdictions (Australia, Canada and Hong Kong) are aimed only at exclusionary abuses, 
i.e. conduct that harms consumers indirectly through harming competition, the competition laws 
of the EU and South Africa also catch exploitative abuses, i.e. conduct that harms consumers 
directly through, for example, imposing excessive prices or unfair trading terms. So in this respect, 
the laws of the EU and South Africa concerning unilateral dominant firm conduct are more 
intrusive than the other subject jurisdictions.  On the other hand, however, for most types of 
exclusionary abuse, Canada and South Africa have express statutory efficiency defences to 
conduct which would otherwise constitute abuses (except in the latter case for excessive pricing 
and refusal to supply access to an essential facility): this is not the case in the EU, Australia and 
Hong Kong. It might suggest a generally lighter touch to exclusionary abuses in Canada and South 
Africa than in the other subject jurisdictions. 
 
Clearly it is desirable (although we shall argue later insufficient), in the interests of clarity, that 
competition laws that rely on general terms such as “monopolization” or “substantially lessening 
competition” explicitly state what their objective or objectives are. If there is more than one 
objective, they must either be consistent with each other, or it must be clear which one prevails in 
the event of conflicts. A clear statement of objectives helps guide the enforcement authorities and 
courts in interpreting and applying the rules, and businesses in assessing what types of arrangement 
and conduct are permitted and prohibited.114 The lack of clear objectives, combined with a law 
drafted in general terms (which many competition laws are)  means that competition law can be 
used to achieve different objectives, not all of which are consistent with each other, such as the 
promotion of economic efficiency, promotion of consumer welfare, promotion of the interests of 
small and medium-sized enterprises, and avoiding market concentration. Moreover, these factors 
also mean that the objectives pursued through the enforcement of competition laws can vary over 
time, depending on the policy preferences of those in charge of enforcement and the courts.115  
 
                                                     
114 Maurice E Stucke “Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals”  BCLR Vol 53 No 2 (2012) 551.  
115 N 114 above 559-566. For an analysis of the different objectives which have been pursued 
under EU Competition Law see Ioannis Lianos “Some Reflections on the Question of the Goals 
of EU Competition Law” CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013. 
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In the US context, the lack of clearly- stated objectives has led some authors to examine the history 
of the legislation in an effort to discern Congress’s intention in enacting the legislation. Using this 
approach, Bork argued that the exclusive objective of antitrust law is (and should be) the pursuit 
of economic efficiency.116 However, Lande disagreed with Bork’s interpretation of the legislative 
history of the Sherman Act, and argued that this history showed that Congress’s primary objective 
was to prevent wealth transfers from consumers to producers, i.e. to avoid consumers having “to 
pay prices above the competitive level”.117  
 
In some jurisdictions the competition laws state their objectives, but in others they do not.  In the 
EU (as in the US, as noted above), for example, the objective or objectives of the competition rules 
themselves (as opposed to the objectives of the EU as a whole) are not expressly stated.  Although 
the EU Commission has stated that the objective of EU competition law is to promote consumer 
welfare,118 this view has not yet been clearly endorsed by the European Courts.   
 
  
 
In Hong Kong, where the competition law has been largely modelled on EU competition law, the 
long title of the Competition Ordinance states broadly what the law does, but does not state why it 
does it: 
 
“An Ordinance to prohibit conduct that prevents, restricts or distorts competition in Hong 
Kong; to prohibit mergers that substantially lessen competition in Hong Kong…” 
 
                                                     
116 Robert H Bork The Antitrust Paradox (1978). 
117 Robert H Lande “Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: the 
Efficiency Interpretation Challenged” 50 Hastings LJ (1999) 871 and “Proving the Obvious: the 
Antitrust Laws were passed to protect Consumers (not just to increase Efficiency” 50 Hastings 
LJ (1999) 959.     
118 Neelie Kroes (ex-EU Competition Commissioner), speech at Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute, 23 September 2005. 
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In Australia, the objective is stated to be “to enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading…”119 It is not clear from this wording whether “welfare” 
is being referred to in the sense of total welfare, (i.e. overall economic efficiency), consumer 
welfare, or other types of welfare.  However, given that agreements and conduct which harm 
competition (and thereby consumers) can be authorised if they produce efficiencies that outweigh 
the harm to competition,120 it seems that it has been interpreted in the sense of total welfare.  That 
said, other public policy interests, such as maintenance of employment and environmental 
protection, can still take precedence over harm to competition in some cases, as was noted in 
Section 2 3. 
 
The competition laws in Canada and South Africa each list a number of objectives.  In Canada, 
the Competition Act states:  
 
“The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage competition in Canada in order to 
promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian economy, in order to expand 
opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while at the same time recognizing 
the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure that small and medium-sized 
enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the Canadian economy and in 
order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product choices.”121 
 
It can be seen that there is one direct objective- “to maintain and encourage competition in 
Canada”- and four indirect objectives which are presumed to flow from the direct objective. 
 
The problem with these indirect objectives is that they do not all relate clearly to competition, and 
to a certain extent they conflict with each other.  Each of these objectives is presented as being a 
result of maintaining and encouraging competition.  However, assuming that competition means 
the process of rivalry in the market place, only the first and the last – relating to economic 
efficiency and consumer welfare respectively– would usually be accepted as resulting from 
                                                     
119 S 2. 
120 See Chapter 4 section 4 3. 
121 Section 1.1. 
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promoting and maintaining competition.  Would maintaining and promoting competition within 
Canada expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets?  Traditionally, the 
creation of “national champions” (i.e. lessening competition in national markets) has been used by 
some countries as a tool to compete in international markets.  However, Porter has argued that 
competitive markets at home result in leaner and fitter companies that are be better equipped to 
compete effectively in overseas markets, and this view may have influenced the Canadian policy-
makers in setting the law's objectives: 
 
"A nation's competitiveness depends on the capacity of its industry to innovate and 
upgrade. Companies gain advantage against the world's best competitors because of 
pressure and challenge. They benefit from having strong domestic rivals, aggressive home-
based suppliers, and demanding local customers".122  
 
It is difficult to see how maintaining and promoting competition ensures that small and medium-
sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy (and what is 
“equitable” is subjective). Successful competitors tend to grow bigger, and bigger firms may enjoy 
cost efficiencies due to economies of scale, enabling them to set prices at levels which SMEs 
cannot match and which may even drive them out of the market.  If this happens, have SMEs had 
an “equitable opportunity to participate?” There is a risk that such an objective could be used to 
give SMEs a “helping hand” at the expense of their bigger rivals, perhaps for political reasons, 
rather than let the competitive process take its natural course. Indeed, the temptation to use 
competition law to promote the interests of SMEs exists even in jurisdictions whose competition 
laws do not expressly contain such objectives.  For example, under EU competition law, it has 
been held that, in certain circumstances, dominant companies may have to keep their prices at a 
sufficiently high level to ensure that smaller rivals can compete.123   
 
Several commentators have argued that competition laws should not be used to promote the 
interests of SMEs, and that if this is a chosen policy objective, it should be pursued through means 
                                                     
122 Michael E Porter “The Competitive Advantage of Nations” Harvard Business Review  March-
April 1990 73. 
123 See the discussion of this issue in Jones and Sufrin EU Competition Law 6 ed (2016) 402-407. 
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other than competition law, such as through the tax system, or state funding. For example, Posner 
has said: 
 
“Antitrust enforcement is not only an ineffectual, but a perverse, instrument for trying to 
promote the interests of small businesses as a whole. Antitrust objectives and the objectives 
of small business people are incompatible at a very fundamental level. The best overall 
antitrust policy from a small business standpoint is no antitrust policy. By driving a wedge 
between the prices and costs of the larger firms in the market…monopoly enables the small 
firms to survive even if their costs are higher than that of the large firm”.124 
 
In addition to the “disconnect” in the Canada Competition Act between the direct objective and 
two of the indirect objectives, the indirect objectives themselves appear to conflict with each other 
to some extent. Competition promotes economic efficiency (one of the indirect objectives) but, as 
discussed above, economic efficiency and the interests of SMEs (another indirect objective) may 
not be compatible. Large efficient firms can undercut SMEs on price, thereby inflicting harm on 
them, but this helps “provide consumers with competitive prices”- another one of the indirect 
objectives.  
 
South Africa has adopted the same direct objective and the same indirect objectives as Canada, 
and therefore the same comments above regarding the “disconnect” between the direct objective 
and two of the indirect objectives, and conflict between the indirect objectives apply.125  In 
addition, South Africa has added two further indirect objectives:  
 
• “to promote employment and advance the social and economic welfare of South Africans”, 
and  
• “to promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the ownership stakes 
of historically-disadvantaged persons”.    
 
                                                     
124 R A Posner Antitrust Law 2 ed (2001) 25.  
125 Competition Act s 2. 
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It is not clear what the perceived link is between promoting and maintaining competition, on the 
one hand, and promoting employment and advancing social welfare, on the other.  On the one 
hand, competition may drive the introduction of new products and services that generate 
employment opportunities. On the other hand, however, competition could drive organisational 
efficiencies, which might in turn lead to job losses. It is also unclear how promoting and 
maintaining competition promotes a greater spread of ownership- unless a Harvard School- style 
view is taken that workable competition requires de-concentrated markets. It is even more difficult 
to see how competition could “increase the ownership stakes of historically-disadvantaged 
persons”.  Sutherland and Kemp have attempted to reconcile some of these apparently conflicting 
objectives, for example stating that:  
 
“Competition law should not prop up inefficient firms for the sake of increasing the number 
of firms in a market, as that does not enhance rivalry in any real sense. Competitors should 
be protected only if it is in the long-term interest of competition. Ultimately, however, it is 
competitors that compete; and the South African statute requires that special consideration 
should be given to the ability of incipient small and medium enterprises, and firms owned 
by historically-disadvantaged persons, to become competitors on their merit”.126 
 
Conflicting objectives increase the level of legal uncertainty, as certain cases in Canada and South 
Africa demonstrate- these will be discussed in Chapter 4.  In Canada, for example, in the Superior 
Propane case,127 the court had to consider not only whether the proposed merger would produce 
efficiencies which outweighed the negative effects of the harm to competition, but also whether or 
not it would “allow SMEs an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy”.  There is no 
guidance on how one factor should be weighed against the other, and therefore this is a subjective 
and arbitrary exercise.   
 
In South Africa, the difficulty which the SME objective can cause in the interpretation of the 
Competition Act is well-illustrated by the Sasol v Nationwide Poles case.128 This case concerned 
                                                     
126 Competition Law of South Africa 1.10. 
127 Canada (Commissioner for Competition) v Superior Propane Inc 2003 FCA 53 (Jan 31 2003). 
128 Case 49/CAC/Apr05. 
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the interpretation of section 9 of the Act, which prohibits a dominant firm from engaging in price 
discrimination if such discrimination (inter alia) is “likely to have the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition” (the SLC test). In this case, Nationwide Poles, a supplier of 
wooden poles for fencing, had complained to the Tribunal (its complaint to the Commission having 
been rejected) that Sasol, which supplied it with creosote for the poles, had discriminated against 
it (contrary to section 9) by offering its larger rivals lower prices. The price differential was not 
contested: the main issue was whether this differential satisfied the SLC test.   
 
The Tribunal took the view that the SLC test, in the context of section 9, had to be read in the 
context of the SME objective in section 2: 
 
“In short, what the legislature wanted in section 9(1)(a) was to create a 
threshold, but a low one that related not to competitive harm but to 
competitive relevance. The legislature in availing small firms to bring cases 
and to switch the onus to the dominant firm did not want them faced with an 
evidential burden they could never meet.”129 
 
The Tribunal upheld the complaint on this basis. However, the Competition Appeal Court 
disagreed, holding that the SLC test had to be interpreted in the light of its natural meaning, and 
that the complainant had not established that the SLC test had been satisfied.130 
2 7  Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has shown that: 
 
• there is no commonly-accepted definition of competition law; 
• the ability of markets to “self-correct” positions of market power or monopoly (and 
conversely the degrees of intervention in the market that is considered appropriate)  can 
vary from one jurisdiction to another, and this can affect the way in which competition 
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laws are enforced (as evidenced by the difference in approach between the US and the EU 
to unilateral conduct); 
• the way in which competition law is enforced can  vary over  time, as evidenced in the US 
by the development of the Harvard School approach, and the movement away from that 
to the Chicago School approach; 
• there is a significant difference between the EU and the other subject jurisdictions in the 
way in which the concepts of “competition” and “harm to competition” have been 
interpreted; 
• there are differences between jurisdictions in the reasons why competition is valued; 
• there are significant differences between jurisdictions in the objectives their competition 
laws are intended to achieve, although in some cases the objectives are not clearly stated; 
• where the competition laws have stated that they have more than one objective, the 
objectives are to some extent inconsistent with each other.  
 
With all of these differences, it is therefore difficult to disagree with Monti’s observation that “it 
is impossible to identify the “soul” of competition law; the most that can be done is to show that 
there are different, equally legitimate opinions as to what competition law should achieve.”131  In 
other words, competition law is an elusive concept, and it is impossible to find a common 
definition, in the sense of a unified objective which so-called competition laws are intended to 
achieve. 
One thing that many competition laws do have in common (including the competition laws 
examined in this dissertation), as we noted in section 2 3 6, is their structural components, i.e. rules 
dealing with anti-competitive arrangements, and unilateral conduct by firms with substantial 
market dominance. We shall use these components as the framework for examining, in Chapter 4, 
the relative levels of legal certainty (and uncertainty) in the competition laws of the subject 
jurisdictions. Before doing so, we next examine in Chapter 3 what we mean by legal certainty.  
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3 What is Legal Certainty? 
 
3 1 Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this Chapter is to seek to identify whether there is a legal standard, against 
which it can assessed whether competition laws are sufficiently certain. We argue that the standard 
laid down in the ECtHR is an appropriate benchmark. First, the fact that 47 countries have signed 
up to the ECHR means that the principles laid down in the ECtHR’s case law can reasonably be 
said to be acceptable to a large proportion of the world’s jurisdictions. Secondly, the same fact has 
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given rise to a substantial body of case law that might provide a useful guide not only to ECHR 
signatories, but also to other countries that are faced with the issue of achieving sufficient legal 
certainty in competition laws. Although ECtHR case law will be used as the benchmark, references 
to US case law and literature on the issue of legal certainty in competition law will also be referred 
to where relevant for comparative purposes. 
 
In this Chapter, we look first in section 3 2 at what legal certainty means. One facet of this concept 
is that laws should be sufficiently clear that the individual knows, in advance of engaging in any 
given conduct, what legal consequences will flow from it. It is this facet of legal certainty, in the 
particular context of competition law, which is the focus of this dissertation. Section 3 3 examines 
why clarity in laws is valued. Section 3 4 notes that there is a great deal of divergence in the clarity 
of laws, and that while some are relatively specific in their terms, others are more vague and 
generic. Section 3 5 looks at the legal requirements for clarity in laws which exist in Europe (with 
brief references to US law), particularly in regard to criminal law and laws which interfere with 
fundamental rights and freedoms. Section 3 6 then looks at the issue of how clear competition laws 
should be, and in particular whether they should be regarded as criminal laws, and as laws 
interfering with fundamental rights and freedoms. We argue that they should. Indeed, as we shall 
see later in this Chapter, the European Court has held that the enforcement of EU competition law 
must comply with the protections contained in the ECHR (as now implemented in EU law by the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union), including the requirement for legal 
clarity.132 The ECtHR has held the same in respect of the law of at least one state which is party 
to the ECtHR (Italy, which is also an EU Member State, and has a competition law closely modeled 
on EU competition law, like the national competition laws of many other EU Member States). 
 
Having established that the criteria for legal certainty laid down by the ECtHR form an appropriate 
benchmark for competition laws, this will enable us to assess in Chapter 4 whether, and if so to 
what extent, the competition laws in the subject jurisdictions are sufficiently clear.  
3 2  Meaning of Legal Certainty 
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Legal certainty is an important legal concept that is recognised in most legal systems.  For example, 
Maxeiner states that “it is a guiding idea of many, if not all, of the legal systems of the European 
Union’s Member States”; is a “general principle” of EU law and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) (whose jurisdiction covers almost all countries in Europe); and 
“is closely related to the principles of law discussed in the United States as the ‘formal rule of 
law’”.133 
 
As with competition law, there is no uniformly- agreed definition of legal certainty.  It is a multi-
faceted concept, comprising a number of what might be called “sub-principles”.  Maxeiner 
identifies five of these sub-principles under the EU general principle of legal certainty: 
 
• laws and decisions must be made public; 
• laws and decisions must be definite and clear; 
• decisions of courts must be binding; 
• limitations on the retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed; and 
• legitimate expectations must be protected.134 
 
After an extensive analysis of the principle of legal certainty as it features in EU case law, Raitio 
concludes as follows: 
 
“Based on the case study the principle of legal certainty in EC law refers to the principle 
of non-retroactivity, protection of legitimate expectations, protection of vested rights, 
issues of procedural time limits and immediate application of the law, as well as the use of 
comprehensible language in the administration of the EC”.135 
   
                                                     
133 James R Maxeiner “Legal Certainty: a European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?” 15 Tul J Int’l & Comp L 541. 
134 N 133 above. 
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Similarly (but not co-extensively with the EU sub-principles), in the US “[t]he essential elements 
of the formal rule of law are: laws should be validly made and publicly promulgated, of general 
application, stable, clear in meaning, consistent, and prospective.”136  
 
As we shall see, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence also recognises the sub-principles that laws should be 
made public (or “accessible”) to those subject to them; that they should be clear and predictable in 
their application;  and that they should not be retroactive (at least as far as criminal laws are 
concerned). 
 
In addition to the sub-principles listed above, one could add that the concept of legal certainty 
encompasses the idea that individuals should be given reasonable notice before new regulation or 
legislation affecting their rights or obligations is introduced, i.e. they should not be taken by 
surprise. As one author has put it:  
 
“[t]here should be a reasonable period of time between the creation of the said expectation 
and the enforcement of the regulation so that those persons can take measures against the 
liabilities imposed on them by the given action”.137 
 
That there should be no sudden, unexpected changes in a person’s legal status also underlies the 
concept of limitation periods for litigation or prosecutions.  These are justified on the basis that 
persons should have certainty after a given period that they will not be sued or prosecuted for past 
conduct.  Legal uncertainty could also refer more generally to an environment within a given 
jurisdiction where laws are subject to frequent change, causing disruption to commercial 
transactions and making investment decisions difficult: such a situation could be said to lack 
sufficient legal certainty.  Laws should therefore be stable over a reasonable period of time. 
 
This dissertation focuses on the “sub-principle” of legal certainty (and of the rule of law) that a 
law should be sufficiently clear that individuals or businesses can know what legal consequences 
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(if any) will flow from their conduct.  For example, will the conduct be legal or illegal, or subject 
to a possible injunction or cease-and-desist order?  If illegal, what sanctions could result – a 
financial penalty, disqualification (for example, from driving, or from being a director of a 
company) and/or others? As the late English judge Lord Diplock put it: 
 
“The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before 
committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are 
the legal consequences that flow from it”.138  
 
Another English judge, the late Lord Bingham, described this notion of clarity as his first “sub-
rule” of the rule of law principle, and said that the individual might be expected to obtain legal 
advice, in appropriate cases, to find out what the law is: 
 
“… the law must be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.  
This seems obvious: if everyone is bound by the law they must be able without undue 
difficulty to find out what it is, even if that means taking advice (as it usually will), and the 
answer when given should be sufficiently clear that a course of action can be based on 
it”.139 (emphasis added). 
 
3 3 Why is Clarity in Laws Valued? 
 
In the same way that we asked in Chapter 2 why we value competition, it is useful to ask why we 
value clarity in how laws apply to our actions. It is submitted that there are at least five main 
reasons. We deal with each of these reasons in turn. 
 
The first reason is fairness. Many societies believe in the rule of law as a guiding principle. While 
there is no universally-agreed definition of what is meant by the rule of law, the English judge 
Lord Bingham has defined it in the following terms: 
                                                     
138 Black-Clawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenberg AG [1975] AC 591, 
638. 
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“The core of the existing principle is, I suggest, that all persons and authorities within the 
state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws 
publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly administered in the courts.”140  
Under the rule of law, it is regarded as inherently unjust that someone should be held to have 
broken the law, or otherwise be subject to a change in legal status, as a result of a given act or 
omission, without having been given reasonable notice in advance that these consequences would 
flow from that course of action. As noted above, according to Lord Bingham’s first sub-principle 
of the rule of law “if everyone is bound by the law, they must be able without undue difficulty to 
find out what it is”.141 This concept of fairness underlines the rule that exists in all of the subject 
jurisdictions (and many others) that criminal laws should not be applied retrospectively, that is, to 
conduct which took place prior to the law’s introduction. It also means that existing laws, i.e. those 
that were in effect when the conduct took place, should be clear and predictable in their application 
to particular conduct. As we shall see, this concept of fairness is reflected, for example, in the US 
“void for vagueness” doctrine, which the US Supreme Court has held to be embodied in the due 
process provisions in the US constitution. It is also reflected in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (“ECHR”), to which all EU Member States, and many other European countries, 
are party, as well as the constitutional laws of the other subject jurisdictions. 
 
Secondly, clarity is valued because with clear laws comes freedom. Individuals know the 
boundaries of their freedom of action, and can act within those boundaries in the knowledge that 
they will be free from coercion by the state.  By contrast, in an environment where individuals do 
not know what legal consequences might follow from their actions, this uncertainty may lead them 
to hold back from carrying out actions which might actually be legitimate, thereby interfering with 
their freedom. 
The third reason is that in free and democratic societies, the preference is for governments to 
govern according to rules rather than discretion. This is Lord Bingham’s second sub-principle of 
the rule of law: “questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application 
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of the law and not the exercise of discretion”.142 This does not mean that the legislature can 
never delegate decision-making to a government minister or regulator. What it does mean is that 
the parameters of, and criteria for, the exercise of the discretion must be clearly laid down in the 
law. 
The fourth reason relates to the doctrine of separation of powers that exists, to greater or lesser 
extents, in many democratic societies.143  This doctrine requires that legislation be adopted by duly 
elected representatives of the people, not by the government or the courts. The more vague and 
unclear the rules are, the greater the risk that a regulator responsible for enforcing the law, or the 
courts, are effectively forced to make the rules rather than to enforce or interpret them, i.e. 
effectively to take on the role of the legislature.  This is a question of degree. For example, whether 
the courts are making the law rather than interpreting it in a given case may itself be unclear and a 
matter of debate. 
 
The fifth reason is economic in nature, and relates more to businesses rather than individuals acting 
in their personal capacity.  In the same way that unclear rules may cause individuals to hold back 
from engaging in conduct that may actually be legitimate, thereby hampering their freedom (the 
second reason described above), unclear rules may also cause businesses to do so.  But in the 
business field this is not just a matter of protecting their freedom for its own sake.  Lack of certainty 
may cause businesses to refrain from carrying out certain investments, or engaging in other 
conduct or transactions that are beneficial for the economy and society as a whole, so that there is 
an economic cost to lack of clarity.  Chapter 5 will examine in more detail the economic costs of 
lack of clarity in the field of competition law. 
 
There is a possible sixth reason, but this one is more open to debate. The view has been advanced 
that laws need to be clear if they are to achieve their public policy objective, because if laws are 
unclear people are unlikely to comply with them. For example, Gerber has said: 
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“Only to the extent that law provides knowable content can it serve most of the social 
purposes it purports to serve. This means that it can serve these purposes only where 
authority-based decisions about the content of the law can be predicted with reasonable 
confidence”.144 
 
Some economists and legal scholars have disputed this view, arguing that laws are more likely to 
achieve optimum compliance if they are somewhat vague, rather than precisely clear: 
 
"A bright line rule causes all individuals either to steer into the same safe harbour, even if 
that harbour is quite costly for some, or to ignore the harbour entirely if the harbour is 
simply too costly. The effect of the rule is likely to be one of two extremes: either excessive 
compliance or nil. A vague standard, on the other hand, does not attach sharp changes in 
the probability of liability to small changes in a particular behaviour selected as the turning 
point for liability; rather, as behaviour improves, there is a gradual reduction in the 
probability of liability that elicits different responses from different individuals. These 
responses are likely to fall between the two extremes induced by the bright line rule and 
thus likely to more closely approach some optimal outcome".145  
 
3 4  Specific Rules and Generic Rules 
 
Some laws are more clear and specific than others.  At one end of the scale are road traffic laws, 
for example.  A prohibition against parking on a double yellow line, or driving at a speed of over 
70 miles per hour, could hardly be criticised for being legally uncertain.  But many other laws are 
grey, rather than black and white, and involve the exercise of judgment.  For example, to assess 
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whether a given action (or omission) may result in liability for negligence under the law of tort, 
one would have to ask at least the following questions:146 
 
• Did the person who allegedly caused the harm owe a duty of care to the person allegedly 
harmed? 
• Was there a breach of that duty? 
• Did the breach directly cause the harm? 
• Was the harm a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach? 
 
Each of these elements may be open to argument in individual cases.  For example, there may be 
room for argument as to whether a duty of care existed, or whether the breach of duty directly 
caused the harm (or whether in fact there was a prior cause, or a supervening cause).  Equally, in 
assessing whether a duty of care existed, this issue has to be viewed from the perspective of a 
“reasonable person”: what is reasonable in any given case may be open to debate and ultimately 
the court has to decide. 
 
On the continuum of clarity, there are laws that may seem on their face to be clear, but upon further 
examination are not as clear as they appear to be.  Take the crime of theft, for example.  One might 
think that theft can be defined quite simply: the appropriation of someone’s property without that 
person’s consent.  But the definition of theft in England and Wales, for example, is more complex.  
The Theft Act 1968 contains five key concepts, each of which is subject to a detailed definition: 
 
• “dishonestly” (the appropriation of the other person’s property must have been done 
dishonestly); 
• “appropriates”; 
• “property”; 
• “belonging to another”.147 
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The individual definitions of these concepts themselves contain certain exceptions.  For example, 
an appropriation is not to be regarded as dishonest if the accused believed they would have the 
other’s consent if the other “knew of the appropriation and the circumstances of it.”148  And 
“appropriation” includes not only a situation where the person stole the property, but also “any 
later assumption of right to it by keeping or dealing with it as an owner.”149  Clearly, assessing 
whether the crime of theft has been committed will in many cases involve a detailed enquiry as to 
the state of mind of the accused at the time, and the precise factual circumstances. 
 
With some laws the focus is not, or not only, on the nature of the conduct (unreasonable, dishonest, 
etc) but on its effects. For example, in many jurisdictions, a “breach of the peace” can constitute a 
criminal offence, or lead to other legal sanctions.  A typical definition of breach of the peace is 
that contained in Scottish law, which is “conduct severe enough to cause alarm to ordinary people 
and threaten serious disturbance to the community”.150  Clearly there may be room for 
disagreement in individual cases whether the conduct caused or was likely to cause the relevant 
effects (“alarm to ordinary people” and “serious disturbance to the community”) such as to render 
the conduct unlawful.  As we have seen in Chapter 2, the competition laws of the subject 
jurisdictions for the most part fall into this category: the legality of most types of agreement and 
conduct under competition law depends on an assessment of their effects on competition. 
However, it is one thing to assess the actual impact that someone’s conduct has had on those around 
them; it is quite another, as we shall argue later, to assess the future impact that a business’s 
arrangements or conduct will have on the market, and whether any negative effects cn be justified 
by efficiencies or other factors. 
 
Why is it that some laws (such as the road traffic examples given above) can be drafted in very 
clear and specific terms, while many other, perhaps most, laws use wider more general language 
to describe the conduct which is targeted by the law? The reason depends on the law in question. 
With the tax example, there has to be a fixed sum that is due for the purpose of government 
budgeting and administrative convenience, on the one hand, and to enable citizens to plan their 
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financial affairs, on the other. A law that said “you will pay such sum of tax that the government 
shall reasonably demand, based on your individual circumstances” would clearly be unworkable. 
Moreover, taxation is a form of interference with individual property rights, and the constitutional 
laws of some jurisdictions, such as the US and EU, require such interferences to be clearly 
prescribed by the law.151 
 
In the case of speed limits, their basic justification is human safety: more accidents are caused by 
fast driving than slow driving. There may be many drivers who can drive safely at fast speeds but 
there are also many who cannot, and it is felt better in the interest of safety to “over- regulate” the 
former in order to make sure the latter are caught (setting different speeds for different classes of 
driver would clearly be unworkable). Over- regulation in a rule such as this is causes so-called 
“Type 1 errors” or “false positives”, whereas under-regulation leads to so-called “Type II errors” 
or “false negatives”. Under this approach, the choice of rule depends on which error is in net terms 
more costly to society: the least costly alternative should be chosen.  
 
However, with many laws regulating conduct, it is not possible to set such clear and specific rules. 
The reason is that it may not be possible to foresee all of the different forms in which the conduct 
targeted by the law will be engaged. Attempts to do may result in offensive conduct “slipping the 
net” of the law because it does not fall within one of the acts listed in the legislation. The conduct 
which is targeted must therefore be described in more general terms.  These could be called generic 
rules. For example, in tort law, it is impossible to foresee all of the different ways in which the tort 
of negligence can be committed, and therefore the law must rely on general concepts such as 
“reasonableness” and “duty of care” which can be applied to the facts of individual cases. In the 
context of criminal law, the UK Privy Council has stated: 
 
“In an ideal world it ought to be possible to define a crime in terms which identified the 
precise dividing line between conduct which was, and that which was not, criminal. But 
some conduct which the law may properly wish to prescribe as criminal may best be 
described by reference to the nature of the activity, rather than particular methods of 
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committing it. It may be impossible to predict all these methods with absolute certainty, or 
there may be good grounds for thinking that attempts to do so would lead to undesirable 
rigidity. In such situations a description of the nature of the activity which is to be penalised 
will provide sufficient notice to the individual that any conduct falling within that 
description is to be regarded as criminal. The application of that description to the various 
situations as they arise will then be a matter for the courts to decide in the light of 
experience”.152  
 
For example, in one US case, the defendants challenged California’s unfair competition law for 
being unconstitutionally vague (a concept we will return to later).  The law in question criminalised 
any “unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading 
advertising.” In rejecting the challenge, the court held: 
 
“ ‘Unfair competition’ and ‘unfair or fraudulent business practice’ are generic terms.  
Like the terms ‘nuisance’ or ‘negligence’ they must be translated into specific situations 
of fact in order to be cognizable.  The attribute of generality does not of itself, however, 
require a holding of nullity for vagueness… it would be impossible to draft in advance 
detailed plans and specifications of all acts and conduct to be prohibited, since unfair or 
fraudulent business practices may run the gamut of human ingenuity and chicanery.  
What constitutes ‘unfair competition’ or ‘unfair or fraudulent business practice’ under 
any given set of circumstances is a question of fact, the essential test being whether the 
public is likely to be deceived.”153 
 
There is a very important practical reason for using a description of the nature of the conduct 
rather than attempting to predict the various forms it can take when drafting the statute. If such 
attempts fail to catch all of these forms (which, as noted above, is likely) this may require the 
whole legislative process to be put in train again in order to widen the statute to capture the forms 
of the conduct that were missed, with all of the costs and disruption which that process involves.  
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With many laws, where it is the nature of the conduct that triggers the legal consequences, the 
conduct is qualified by the use of certain descriptors, to capture the conduct that is targeted, while 
excluding benign forms of the conduct. For example, the passage from the US case cited above 
referred to “unfair competition” and “unfair or fraudulent business practice”. Where the effect of 
the conduct is a necessary condition of liability, a word such as “substantial” might be used, in 
order to put a quantitative filter on the effects which trigger the law’s application, and exclude 
minor effects (otherwise a great deal of time and effort might be spent in tackling conduct with 
minor effects, which may not be efficient). We saw in Chapter 2 that most of the subject 
jurisdictions use the SLC test (“substantially lessen competition”) in their competition laws. If a 
certain purpose is a trigger for liability, but the individual engaged in conduct with several 
purposes in mind, liability might be triggered if the relevant purpose was the “predominant” or 
a “substantial” one. Terms such as “substantial” and “predominant” involve different degrees of 
assessment and therefore uncertainty, as we shall see when we examine the competition laws of 
the subject jurisdictions in Chapter 4. 
 
Certain general descriptors of human conduct contained in laws are clearer than others.  The 
concept of negligence in tort law involves an assessment of the standard of care that a reasonable 
person would exercise in the circumstances.  Although opinions may differ on how that standard 
applies to a particular set of facts, the test involves a degree of objectivity by referring to the 
benchmark of a “reasonable person”.  The same could be said for “fraudulent”, which implies 
intentional dishonesty.  At the other extreme is “unfair”, which in itself is a subjective notion: what 
one person may consider fair, other persons may consider unfair, and without any objective 
benchmark or criterion for judging unfairness it is difficult or even impossible to say who is right. 
Similarly, the word “excessive” means “too much”- but how much is too much? Again this is 
subjective. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the word “excessive” has caused serious difficulties in 
competition law. 
 
It may seem instinctively to be the case that specific rules are preferable to generic rules when it 
comes to predicting the legal outcome of certain conduct. However, Raban has claimed that this 
view is a “fallacy”, and confuses a lawyer’s ability to predict the consequences of applying the law 
with people’s ability to predict the consequences of their actions: “what may be perfectly certain 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
60 
 
and predictable for lawyers and judges applying the law may fly in the face of people’s 
predictions”.154 He argues that, while specific, clear rules are superior “by definition” in predicting 
the application of the law to given conduct, “vague legal standards are often better in many 
situations for allowing people to predict the consequences of their actions”. 
 
Raban gives as one example the traditional rule that, where the terms of a contract are clear and 
unambiguous, effect must be given to them, even if it does not accord with the parties’ 
understanding of their agreement. This rule is clear for lawyers to apply. However, it would result 
in unpredictability for the parties. Admission of extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intentions and 
other matters would mean that the outcome was more predictable for the parties. However, this 
argument would not appear to apply to competition law, where the uncertainty (or lack of clarity) 
results for the most part precisely because liability depends on a multitude of indeterminate factors, 
as we shall see in Chapter 4. 
 
Raban also argues that vague rules are preferable in many situations because “they replicate, one 
for one, the social, moral, economic or political norms that already prevail and which, given the 
nature of the phenomena they describe, cannot be reduced to clear and determinate language”. He 
gives the example of laws where liability depends on concepts or mental states such as coercion, 
reasonableness, good faith, malice and intention- concepts that have to be applied on a case-by-
case to a variety of situations. Again, this argument does not appear to apply to competition law, 
where liability requires an assessment of the effects or likely effects of arrangements or conduct 
on competition, and a judgment of whether harmful effects on competition (however those effects 
may be defined) are judged to be offset by certain public benefits (except in the case of those 
categories of arrangement where such effects are presumed, i.e. hardcore arrangements such as 
price-fixing and bid-rigging). It will become clear in Chapter 4 that this is an entirely different, 
more complicated and more subjective assessment than whether someone acted in good faith, 
maliciously or reasonably. 
 
                                                     
154 Ofer Raban “The Fallacy of Legal Certainty: Why Vague Legal Standards May Be Better for 
Capitalism and Liberalism” 19 BU Pub Int LJ 175 (2010). 
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We saw in Chapter 2 that the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws all contain generic rules 
targeting arrangements and conduct which harm competition, subject to certain other criteria being 
met (such as dominance or SMP being established in the case of unilateral conduct). As well as 
these generic rules, Canada also has specific (or per se) rules prohibiting certain types of hardcore 
arrangements, namely price-fixing, market-sharing, output-restriction and bid-rigging. Australia 
and South Africa also have specific rules that prohibit hardcore arrangements, but provide for 
authorisation to be granted if they lead to public benefits which are regarded as outweighing the 
harm they cause to competition. In the case of the generic competition rules, we shall see in 
Chapter 4 that the subject jurisdictions have faced major challenges in defining what sort of harm 
to competition to prohibit, and even the concept of harm to competition itself, in a way that is clear 
enough for businesses to apply to their conduct. 
 
3 5  The Legal Requirement for Clarity in Laws 
 
3 5 1 Introduction 
 
The fact that laws can be generic rather than specific does not mean that there are no legal limits 
as to how generic (or unclear) laws can be. Many jurisdictions have constitutional requirements 
for clarity in certain areas of the law to protect citizens’ basic rights. In this section we look 
primarily at the position in Europe under the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“ECHR”), by way of example.155 Brief references will also be 
made to the position in the US and Hong Kong. 
 
In Europe, we shall see that a relatively high degree of legal certainty is required in two areas- 
criminal laws, and laws which interfere with the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR. In 
one of the subject jurisdictions, Hong Kong, it also appears to be the case that this requirement 
applies to a third category: laws that interfere with citizens’ freedom generally, even outside those 
rights and freedoms which are specifically guaranteed by the terms of Hong Kong’s constitution.  
                                                     
155 Available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf  (accessed on 27-1-
2018). 
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In this section, we shall deal primarily with the requirement for a high degree of legal clarity in 
criminal law. This is because, as we shall see in section 3 6, there has been a vigorous debate as to 
whether competition law should be treated as criminal law for the purpose of protecting the rights 
of the alleged violator, including the right to legal certainty. We also touch briefly on the high 
degree of legal clarity required for interferences with fundamental rights and freedoms, and discuss 
whether competition law constitutes such an interference, and whether therefore a high degree of 
clarity is required on that basis too. 
 
3 5 2 The Requirement for a High Degree of Clarity in Criminal Law  
 
In Europe, the requirement that criminal law should achieve a minimum standard of clarity has 
been given supranational binding legal effect by the ECHR, in those states that have acceded to it.  
These include not only all of the 28 EU Member States but also 19 non- Member States, i.e. 47 in 
total.156 Article 7 of the ECHR provides (to the extent relevant to this thesis): 
“No punishment without law  
1. No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time 
when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was 
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”  
This provision embodies the principle of nulla crimen, nulla poena sine lege:  no-one should be 
held guilty, or penalised, for a crime which was not a crime or subject to a penalty at the time the 
conduct in question took place: the principle of non-retroactivity.  This does not just mean that 
new criminal laws must not have retrospective application.  It has also been held to mean that no-
one can be prosecuted for an offence under a pre-existing law, in circumstances where that law 
was so unclear that it could not reasonably be predicted that the conduct in question would 
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constitute an offence.157 The following main principles on the requirement for clarity have 
emerged from the ECtHR’s case law: 
 
• As a general principle, “criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s 
detriment, for instance by analogy”. 158 
• It follows that an offence must be clearly defined in the law.  This requirement is satisfied 
“where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, 
with the assistance of the court’s interpretation of it, what actions will make him criminally 
liable”. 159 
• The law does not need to specify precisely how it will apply in all factual situations.  This 
is because laws must be flexible enough to cope with a variety of factual situations.  A 
degree of vagueness in this sense is therefore inevitable.160  
• Points of law which are unclear from the wording of the statute or prior case law may also 
have to be clarified through the case law.161  Under the Article 7 principles, it is recognised 
that absolute clarity in laws is not necessary and is probably unattainable. The purpose of 
the courts is to fill gaps in the law through their judgments in the cases that come before 
them. However, as a general principle, the courts should restrict themselves to interpreting 
unclear points in the existing law, not effectively make new law and thereby usurp the role 
of the legislator. As the former English judge Lord Bingham put it: “It is one thing to alter 
the law’s direction of travel by a few degrees, quite another to set it off in a different 
direction. The one is probably foreseeable and predictable, something that a prudent person 
would allow for, the other not.”162  
• Nevertheless, for an act or omission to be unlawful, the outcome from this clarification 
must not only be consistent with the “essence” of the offence, it must also have been 
reasonably possible for an individual, with the benefit of legal advice, to predict this 
                                                     
157 Kokkinakis v Greece, judgment of 25 May 1993 para 52; SW v United Kingdom, judgment of 
22 November 1995 para 35.  
158 N 157 above. 
159 N 157 above. 
160 Cantoni v France, judgment of 11 November 1996 para 31. 
161 SW v United Kingdom n 157 above para 36. 
162 N 2 above. 
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outcome.   If this is not the case, the individual’s conviction will be in breach of Article 7 
and will therefore be invalid. The ECtHR has often made the following statement, in cases 
where Article 7 has been invoked in respect of allegedly unclear laws:  
 
“However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, including 
criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation.  There will always be 
a need for elucidation of doubtful points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. 
Indeed, in the United Kingdom, as in the other Convention States, the progressive 
development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is a well entrenched and 
necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing 
the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation 
from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of 
the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.”  (emphasis added).163 
 
These principles therefore do not dictate that criminal laws be absolutely certain. They recognise, 
as we noted earlier that national courts have done, that a degree of vagueness is necessary in most 
laws to allow them to be flexible enough to cope with a variety of factual situations- what we 
referred to in section 3 4 as “generic” laws. They also recognise that points of law in statutes may 
need to be clarified through the case law. This is permissible, subject to two conditions: the 
outcome must be consistent with the “essence” of the offence, and a lawyer must be able to predict 
the outcome of the clarification.  
 
Two questions arise here, namely what is meant by “essence” of the offence, and what is meant 
by “legal advice”? 
 
It seems from the ECtHR case law that the term “essence” of the offence means the same as the 
commonly-used terms “essential ingredients”, “essential elements”, or “constituent elements” of 
the offence, i.e. the factual elements which the prosecutor must prove for the prosecution to be 
successful. For example (emphasis in quotations below added): 
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• The English Crown Prosecution Service has stated that “the essential element of the crime 
of conspiracy is the agreement by two or more people to carry out a criminal act”.164   
• The Judicial Commission of New South Wales, Australia has said that “to make out the 
offence [of dangerous driving causing death] the Crown must establish beyond reasonable 
doubt each of the following essential facts or ingredients of the offence: that the accused 
was the driver of a vehicle; that the vehicle was involved in an impact; that the impact 
caused the death of the deceased; and that at the time of the impact, the accused was driving 
the vehicle in a manner dangerous to another person”.165 
• Sir Anthony Mason NPJ, for the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal, has said that “It is 
necessary to define the constituent elements of the offence… In my view, the elements of 
the offence of misconduct in public office are: a public official, who in the course of or in 
relation to his public office, willfully and intentionally culpably misconducts himself”.166 
 
 
 
 
 
3 5 3 How clear do Criminal Laws need to be? 
 
The Article 7 principles do not answer the question of what degree of legal uncertainty in laws is 
permissible. In other words, for a prosecution to be successful, is it the case that the lawyer, 
advising the client: 
 
• should have had no reasonable doubt as to the outcome? 
• should have been satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, as to the outcome? or 
                                                     
164 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/inchoate_offences/#Conspiracy (accessed on 30-11-
2017). 
165https://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/dangerous_driving.html#p
5-260 (accessed on 30-11-2017). 
166 Shum Kwok Sher v HK SAR, FACC1/2002 para 84. 
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• should have been aware that there was a reasonable possibility of the outcome? 
 
Given that the standard of proof for criminal prosecutions in many jurisdictions is beyond 
reasonable doubt, there is a strong argument in principle that, if there is a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the conduct would be lawful or unlawful, the client should be acquitted, in accordance 
that the benefit of any doubt should be given to the accused. However, in many cases the ECtHR 
has taken a stricter view and appears to favour the third approach, i.e. if the accused, with legal 
advice, should have known that there was a possibility (presumably a reasonable one) that the 
action would be illegal, no defence based on Article 7 is available. In other words, the courts are 
effectively saying “if in doubt, don’t act”.  Some of these cases are referred to below, by way of 
example. In effect, this arguably means that the courts are condoning the uncertainty, and 
construing it in favour of the State, not the individual. As Buxton has said: 
 
“…it is difficult to discern in the ECHR jurisprudence any general principle that the 
criminal law must be accessible and certain above a very modest level, and where certainty 
of criminal law has come into issue in ECHR questions, the standards required by the 
Convention jurisprudence have been distinctly undemanding”.167 
 
For example, in Jorgic v Germany, which involved the forcible removal of Bosnian Serbs in the 
former Yugoslavia, the issue was whether the crime of genocide under German law required the 
physical destruction (i.e. killing) of a group, or whether it could extend to destruction of a group 
as a social unit.168 In upholding the German Court’s decision in favour of the latter, and rejecting 
the applicant’s claim that the German law was insufficiently clear in this respect, the ECtHR held 
that the applicant, if need be with the assistance of a lawyer, could reasonably have foreseen that 
he risked being charged with and convicted of genocide.  
 
In another case, Cantoni v France, concerning the sale of pharmaceutical products by a French 
supermarket, the ECtHR held that if the individual, with the benefit of legal advice, should have 
                                                     
167 Richard Buxton “The Human Rights Act and the Substantive Criminal Law” [2000] Crim LR 
331, 332. 
168 Judgment of 12 July 2007. 
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predicted even the risk of prosecution (as opposed to actual conviction) this would be sufficient 
for the law to comply with Article 7.169   
 
The assessment as to whether laws are sufficiently clear to comply with Article 7 can be somewhat 
arbitrary and subjective, and judges in the same case may take different views as to whether the 
benefit of the doubt should be given to the individual or the State.  A good example is Soros v 
France, a case involving a conviction for insider dealing against the financial trader George 
Soros.170  Mr. Soros was convicted of insider dealing in 2002 by a Paris court.  He challenged the 
decision before the ECtHR, arguing that, at the time of his conviction, the French law on insider 
dealing was not sufficiently clear as to whether it applied to persons (such as himself) who did not 
have any professional or contractual relations with the target company.  The ECtHR rejected his 
challenge, but only by a narrow majority of four to three.   
 
The majority of judges said that, given Mr. Soros’s experience as an institutional investor, “he 
could not have been unaware that his decision to invest in shares in [the target company] entailed 
the risk that he might be committing the offence of insider dealing” (emphasis added).171 
 
The dissenting judges, on the other hand, opined that neither legal advice, nor an analysis of the 
case law, would have enabled Mr. Soros to know clearly that his proposed conduct was prohibited.  
In other words, Mr. Soros could legitimately take the view that his conduct would not be illegal.  
They expressly cited the first principle of Article 7 cited above, namely that if a provision of law 
gives rise to a “reasonable doubt” as to its meaning, it is the accused who should benefit, not the 
legislature which has failed to clearly express itself.172  
 
There are strong arguments in principle that the mere possibility that conduct will be held illegal 
should not be enough for a law to be sufficiently clear under Article 7: 
 
                                                     
169 N 160 above. 
170 Judgment of 6 October 2011. 
171 Para 57. 
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• In a free society, it is assumed that people are free to act to the extent they are not legally 
prohibited from doing so.  This means that any uncertainty in the law should, as a matter 
of principle, benefit the citizen, not the State. Even the ECtHR itself has said so. This view 
is consistent with views of the rule of law expressed by Lords Diplock and Bingham, 
referred to in Section 3 2, concerning the need for predictability, and minimising the extent 
of administrative or judicial discretion in interpreting laws. As noted above, given that the 
standard of proof for criminal prosecutions in many jurisdictions is beyond reasonable 
doubt, there is a strong argument in logic that any reasonable doubt as to whether the 
conduct would be lawful or unlawful should benefit the accused.   
• Formulations suggesting that the mere risk or possibility of illegality should preclude the 
individual from acting are contrary to the above principles, and in particular the 
requirements of the rule of law.  They are tantamount to an express tolerance of vague and 
uncertain laws.  Carried to their logical conclusion in the competition field, for example, a 
law which simply said “anti-competitive conduct is prohibited”, without defining what 
“anti-competitive” actually means, leaving this to the decision of the authorities, might be 
valid and enforceable, because it would put the individual on notice that any conduct which 
could conceivably have an effect on competition (however defined), or perhaps even the 
spirit of competition, might be illegal.  This appears to offend freedom and rule of law 
principles.  
 
So why was the ECtHR prepared to set the bar for legal clarity at such a low level in these cases, 
in spite of the stated principle that the benefit of any doubt as to the law’s meaning should be given 
to the accused? The answer is not clear, but there are a number of possible explanations- all of 
them admittedly speculative. It may be that the conduct in Jorgic was felt to be mala in se, that is, 
so obviously morally reprehensible and against society’s norms that no clear, explicit law should 
have been necessary to guide the individual’s conduct. In Cantoni, since human health was at 
stake, the ECtHR may have felt that the business should have erred on the side of safety, and on 
that basis the law gave sufficient notice to guide its conduct, even although it was not drafted with 
the greatest clarity. Finally, in both cases, the ECtHR may have felt that the decisions it reached 
would be more in tune with public expectations of justice than effectively overturning the 
prosecutions.  
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3 5 4 The Broad Notion of “Criminal” under the ECHR  
 
A very important point to note is that, under the ECtHR’s case law, the notion of a criminal law is 
defined broadly, and it does not depend on whether the law is classified as criminal under the 
domestic law of the country concerned. This is an “anti-avoidance” measure: if what was criminal 
depended only on national classification, a signatory state could avoid the fundamental rights and 
freedoms laid down in the ECHR merely by classifying the offence as non-criminal.  
 
Under ECtHR case law, there are three criteria that have to be taken into account (the so-called  
Engel criteria173) in assessing whether a legal contravention is criminal: 
 
• Does the national law in question treat the contravention as criminal? 
• Is the contravention of “general concern and application”, as opposed to being limited to a 
particular industry or profession? 
• Do the sanctions for contravention include a penalty that is intended as punishment and/or 
a deterrent, as opposed to compensatory? 
 
If the answer to the first question is yes (domestic law classifies the offence as criminal) this is 
likely to be an end of the matter: the offence will also be classified as criminal for ECHR purposes.  
If the answer to the first question is no, however, consideration will then be given as to whether 
the offence is of general concern and application, and whether the sanctions include a deterrent or 
punitive penalty.174 The ECtHR has held that the second and third criteria are alternative, not 
cumulative: 
 
                                                     
173 Engel v Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976. 
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“It is enough that the offence in question is by its nature to be regarded as criminal or that 
the offence renders the person liable to a penalty which by its nature and degree of severity 
belongs in the general criminal sphere”.175 
 
A good example of the wide concept of “criminal” under the ECHR is the case of Ozturk v 
Germany.176 Mr Ozturk was fined for careless driving, having driven his car into a parked car. As 
regards the first of the Engel criteria (national classification) such road traffic offences had been 
“de-criminalised” under German law, and were classified as regulatory offences as opposed to 
criminal offences. However, as noted above, national classification of the law as non-criminal is 
not conclusive as to its status under the ECHR. As regards the second criterion, the nature of the 
offence, the ECtHR noted that the offence was not directed towards “a given group possessing a 
special status” but “towards all citizens in their capacity as road users”. The German government 
argued that criminal offences involved a “degree of ethical unworthiness such as to merit the moral 
value-judgment of reproach that characterised penal punishment”, whereas this was not the case 
of such road traffic offences. However, the ECtHR held that the fact that this was “a minor offence 
hardly likely to harm the reputation of the offender” was irrelevant.177 Finally, as regards the third 
criterion, the ECtHR held that the purpose of the penalty was to “punish as well as deter”, and the 
“relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake…cannot divest an offence of its inherently 
criminal character”.178 
 
This case law has been applied outside Europe. For example, Hong Kong has a statutory Bill of 
Rights that includes the equivalent of Article 7 and other ECHR protections of fundamental rights. 
The Hong Kong courts have interpreted the concept of criminal offence in the Bill by reference to 
the ECtHR case law. In a case involving insider dealing, which at the time was treated as a civil 
not criminal matter, the Court of Final Appeal held, applying the Engel criteria, that it should be 
regarded as criminal for the purpose of the Bill, because of the substantial deterrent and punitive 
                                                     
175 Jussila v Finland, judgment of 23 November 2006 para 31; Menarini Diagnostics v Italy, 
judgment of 27 September 2001 para 38. 
176 N 174 above. 
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178 N 177 above. 
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penalties which insider dealing attracted.179 The Court held that this meant that the accused should 
not have been compelled to give evidence incriminating himself, and that the Hong Kong criminal 
standard of proof (beyond reasonable doubt) should have been used. 
 
The Engel and Ozturk cases concerned Article 6 of the ECHR, which lays down certain procedural 
safeguards for persons “charged with a criminal offence”, as opposed to Article 7, which also 
refers to “criminal offence”. There is no reason to believe that the ECHR concept of “criminal 
offence” is any different under Article 7 from what it is under Article 6, and therefore the same 
wide concept of “criminal offence” should in principle apply in assessing whether laws are subject 
to the requirements of clarity under the ECHR. 
 
3 5 4 Lesser Safeguards for “Less Serious” Criminal Offences? 
 
The ECtHR has taken the view, in the context of Article 6 ECHR, that criminal offences differ in 
their degree of seriousness, and the level of procedural protection may be lower in the case of less 
serious offences than for more serious ones. For example, in Jusilla v Finland, a Finnish tax 
authority imposed a penalty equivalent to 308.80 euros on a trader for making certain errors in his 
tax return.180 The trader appealed to the local administrative court, requesting an oral hearing 
(pursuant to the normal legal requirement to grant one), and that the tax inspector and the applicant 
be called as witnesses. Finnish law gave the court a discretion to dispense with the requirement to 
have an oral hearing, where the court took the view that such a hearing was unnecessary. The court 
exercised its discretion in this case, and refused an oral hearing on the basis that the written 
submissions were sufficient to dispose of the case, and that an oral hearing would not give the 
trader any additional protection. The trader then brought an action before the ECtHR, claiming 
that this refusal constituted a breach of his right to an oral hearing under Article 6 ECHR.   
 
The ECtHR had no difficulty establishing that the imposition of the penalty was of a criminal 
nature for the purpose of Article 6 ECHR, in spite of the relatively small sum involved, because 
the offence in question (submitting incorrect information in a tax return) was of general rather than 
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180 Judgment of 23 November 2006. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
72 
 
sector specific application, and the penalty was intended to be punitive and deterrent. The second 
and third Engel criteria were therefore satisfied. However, it went on to state that criminal offences 
vary in their degree of seriousness, and as this one was at the lower end of the scale of seriousness, 
the Article 6 guarantees did not apply “with their full stringency”.181 It agreed with the Finnish 
court that the applicant’s rights had been adequately safeguarded through the written process, that 
an oral hearing would not have given him any further protection, and that therefore there had been 
no breach of Article 6 in refusing the application for an oral hearing.182 
 
The ECtHR’s reasoning in Jusilla can be (and has been) subject to certain criticisms. Apart from 
the fact that it does not sit comfortably with the wording of Article 6, which seems to require an 
oral hearing in all cases, the assessment of where an offence sits on the scale of seriousness, and 
hence the degree of procedural protection to which the alleged offender is deemed to be entitled, 
would seem to be rather subjective, and different judges may take different views on this issue. 
Moreover, the seriousness of an offence may vary over time- witness in the case of competition 
law, for example, the gradual criminalisation of cartel conduct that seems to be taking place 
globally, and the ever-increasing level of fines.183  
 
There is another argument too. Even within the same offence, the seriousness of the particular 
conduct can vary dramatically. Take the offence of careless driving. In Hong Kong, for example, 
depending on the degree of culpability, the penalty can range from a relatively modest financial 
penalty to a number of years in prison.184 This is another reason not to single out particular 
offences, and say that some are more serious than others. 
 
                                                     
181 N 180 above para 43. 
182 N 180 above para 48. 
183 These points were made by Donald Slater, Sebastien Thomas and Denis Waelbroeck in 
“Competition law proceedings before the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no 
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In any event, it is submitted that, even if one was to accept that certain procedural safeguards 
under Article 6 ECHR can be dispensed with for offences deemed less serious, this does not mean 
that the substantive requirement for legal certainty under Article 7 can also be slackened for such 
offences. As noted above, the ECtHR in Jusilla was at pains to point out that dispensing with an 
oral hearing did not prejudice the accused: his rights were adequately protected through the written 
proceedings. In contrast, a firm which is found liable for an infringement in circumstances where 
it could not have predicted its conduct was illegal has to rely on the full force of Article 7 for 
protection: there is no alternative means of protection within Article 7 (or its equivalent in other 
jurisdictions). 
 
3 5 5 A Brief US Comparison 
 
In the US, the requirement for a high degree of certainty in criminal law is, as in Europe, 
constitutionally guaranteed.  As long ago as 1891, the US Supreme Court stated that “[L]aws which 
create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is 
their duty to avoid.”185 Similarly, in 1926, the same court said: 
 
“That the terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to 
inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its 
penalties is a well recognized requirement, consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair 
play and the settled rules of law, and a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of 
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of the due process of 
law”.186 
 
As the above passage indicates, the requirement for legal certainty in criminal law has therefore 
been held in the US  to flow from the Fifth Amendment to the US constitution on due process of 
law, which reads (in relevant part):“[N]or shall any person… be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law...”. 
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In Europe, the ECtHR cannot invalidate a national criminal law which is not sufficiently certain, 
or a decision enforcing such a law- it can only declare that the enforcement of the law in a given 
case is in breach of the ECHR requirement for legal certainty.187 (It can also award damages for 
violation of Convention rights and freedoms, where the domestic law of a signatory state provides 
insufficient compensation188). In the US, however, the Supreme Court can  strike down laws which 
are insufficiently clear under the so-called “void for vagueness” doctrine. Over the years many US 
laws have been held to be void for vagueness in the criminal sphere.  For example, in Kolender v 
Lawson, the Supreme Court struck down a law against vagrancy on the grounds that the prohibited 
activities of “loafing”, “strolling” or “wandering from place to place” did not give people fair 
notice of what sort of conduct was prohibited and could criminalise innocuous everyday 
activities.189 
 
 
 
3 5 6 Laws interfering with Fundamental Rights and Freedoms 
 
As well as with criminal laws, the ECHR imposes requirements for clarity in national laws that 
interfere with the fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR.  
 
The ECHR tolerates national interferences with some fundamental rights and freedoms, such as 
freedom of expression, but only if such interferences comply with certain criteria, including that 
they are “prescribed by law”.  This term has been held to mean that these laws must be accessible 
                                                     
187 AH Robertson and JG Merrills Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the European Convention 
of Human Rights 3ed (1993) 311; Michel de Salvia “Can the Reparation awarded to Victims of 
Violations under ECHR be Considered a Real ‘Just Satisfaction?’” in Attila Fenyves, Ernst Karner. 
Helmut Koziol and Elisabeth Steiner (eds) Tort Law in the Jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights (2011) 388. 
188 Robertson and Merrills n 188 above 311. 
189 461 US 352 (1983). For a full discussion of the void for vagueness doctrine and its history see 
Cristina D Lockwood “Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void for Vagueness 
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(i.e. ascertainable), and foreseeable (i.e. predictable) in their application to particular 
circumstances.  If they are not, the ECtHR can declare that they are an unlawful interference with 
the fundamental right in question.  This may leave the state in question with no option but to 
change its law to avoid future challenges. Unlike Article 7, which only applies expressly to 
criminal offences, interferences with fundamental rights can be under either criminal or civil laws 
for the requirement of clarity to apply. 
 
For example, in Sunday Times v United Kingdom, the English courts held that a newspaper 
publisher had committed a contempt of court by publishing an article concerning ongoing 
litigation.190  The publisher challenged this finding before the ECtHR, arguing that the English law 
on contempt of court was so unclear that it could not predict with sufficient certainty that 
publishing the article would constitute an offence.  On this basis, it argued that the English law on 
contempt of court was an unlawful interference with the company’s freedom of expression. 
The ECtHR acknowledged that the UK law on contempt of court was an interference with the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression.  As such, the law had to be sufficiently clear to be 
lawful: it should not be so vague that it was not reasonably foreseeable that the article in question 
would constitute a contempt of court.  The court said that: 
 
“[a] norm cannot be regarded as a "law" unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to 
enable the citizen to regulate his conduct: he must be able - if need be with appropriate 
advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences 
which a given action may entail.”191 
 
Applying this test, the ECtHR rejected the appeal in this case (albeit by a very narrow margin), 
holding that the UK law was sufficiently clear to be compatible with the ECHR. 
 
In the US too, there is a constitutional requirement for a high degree of legal certainty for laws 
which interefere with constitutionally- guaranteed rights and freedoms, in particular those 
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the US constitution, including free exercise of religion, 
                                                     
190 Judgment of 26 April 1979. 
191 Para 49. 
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freedom of speech and the right to peaceable assembly. This is often referred to as the “overbreadth 
doctrine”.192 
 
As noted above in relation to criminal offences, unlike the US Supreme Court under the US 
constitution, the ECtHR does not have power to strike down national laws interfering with 
fundamental rights and freedoms which are excessively vague: it can only declare that the law is 
an unjustified interference on this basis. In practice, however, such a declaration (as under Article 
7) may leave the state in question with no option but to change the law to comply with the ECHR 
requirements on clarity, in order to pre-empt future challenges.  
 
3 5 7 Laws interfering with Freedom Generally 
 
In a free society, it would seem reasonable to expect that everyone is able to go about their own 
business generally without intervention by the public authorities, unless there is a clear legal basis 
for the intervention. Hong Kong’s constitution, the Basic Law, which was adopted on the transfer 
of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the UK to China, seems to say as much. While it lists a 
number of specific rights and freedoms which are found in many national constitutions, such as 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy, it also goes on to state in broad terms (unrestricted 
to the specific rights and freedoms): “The rights and freedoms enjoyed by Hong Kong residents 
shall not be restricted unless as prescribed by law” (emphasis added).193  
 
On this basis, it would also seem reasonable to expect that if you are prevented or restricted from 
doing something by a public authority purporting to act under a particular law, the law should be 
sufficiently clear to justify the intervention.  
 
To take an example, there may be minor road offences which may in a particular jurisdiction fall 
outside the sphere of criminal law, such as parking in a restricted area. But if there was no sign 
stating that parking was not allowed in that area, or the sign was phrased in ambiguous language, 
                                                     
192 See summary and case law at www.law.cornell.edu/anncon/ (accessed on 15-11-2017). 
193 Basic Law Article 39, available at http://www.basiclaw.gov.hk/en/basiclawtext/ (accessed on 
15-11-2017). 
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it would seem to be unreasonable and unfair (by most people’s standards) to be penalised for 
parking there. So there is an argument that a relatively high degree of legal certainty should apply 
to public interventions against private freedoms generally.    
 
3 6 Does the Legal Requirement for Clarity apply to Competition Law?  
 
3 6 1 Introduction 
 
In section 3 5, using primarily Europe as an example, we saw that the requirement for clarity in 
laws is constitutionally- guaranteed in the case of criminal laws, and laws which interfere with 
fundamental rights and freedoms. In this section we look at whether competition law should be 
subject to a similar high degree of legal certainty. We shall focus mainly on the issue of whether 
competition law should be treated as criminal law according to the ECtHR’s standards, and subject 
to the requirement of a high degree of clarity on this basis. Having demonstrated that this is the 
case, we shall look at the additional legal implications that this conclusion entails. Finally, we 
touch briefly on whether competition law interferes with fundamental rights and freedoms, and 
whether a high degree of legal clarity is required on this basis too.  
 
 
3 6 2  Is Competition Law Criminal Law? 
 
We saw in Chapter 2 that the competition laws of some of the subject jurisdictions, namely 
Australia, Canada and South Africa, include express criminal offences for engaging in hardcore 
conduct. If the ECtHR’s case law is to be used as an appropriate benchmark, there is little doubt 
that these rules against cartel conduct would be subject to the same high standard of certainty 
required for criminal offences generally. As we saw in section 3 5 2, national classification of a 
law as criminal is likely to be determinative of its criminal status under the ECHR under the first 
Engel criterion. In any event, the second and third criteria would also appear to be satisfied in the 
case of expressly-criminalised hardcore conduct: the rules are of general concern and application, 
and the penalties for infringement are intended to be punitive and deterrent, as opposed to merely 
compensatory. 
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But what about agreements and conduct which are not expressly- criminalised? In the three 
jurisdictions just cited, this would include non-hardcore agreements and abuse of 
dominance/misuse of market power. In the other two subject jurisdictions, the EU and Hong Kong, 
this would apply to all agreements and conduct falling within the scope of the competition law.  
 
Certainly, there are strong arguments in principle why a high degree of clarity under competition 
law should also apply even to agreements and conduct which are not expressly- criminalised. 
These include the following:  
 
• Like criminal law in the normal sense of the term, competition laws are enforced by the 
State, or by regulators under powers delegated by the State, against private entities, as 
opposed to be being purely a matter of private civil enforcement, such as contract and tort 
law. 
• The constitutional requirement for clarity in criminal laws has been justified by the courts 
on the basis of the severe adverse consequences of being found guilty. Breach of 
competition law- even outside the hardcore cartel area- can also be punishable by severe 
financial penalties that are intended to deter further breaches, as is the case with many 
criminal offences. The recent fine of 2.42 billion euros imposed by the EU Commission on 
Google for abuse of dominance in the search engine market is a clear example.194 
Moreover, a breach of competition law can also attract private claims for damages, whether 
on a follow-on basis (after a finding of infringement) or a standalone basis, and damages 
awards can be very high.  
• A finding, or even allegation, that a business has breached competition law, as with 
criminal offences, can carry a great deal of stigma. Competition law penalties make 
headline news, and headlines such as “EU hits Google with a record antitrust fine of $2.7 
billion”,195 and “Qualcomm fined 997 million euros by EU for paying Apple to exclusively 
                                                     
194 EU Commission Press Release IP/17/1784 of 27 June 2017 “Antitrust: Commission fines 
Google [euros] 2.42 billion for abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage 
to own comparison shopping service”. 
195 www.cnbc.com (accessed on 1-11-2017). 
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use its chips”,196 clearly indicate to the public that the companies have engaged in conduct 
which is officially considered wrongful. Competition officials often “talk up” the 
infringements by using criminal law analogies, such as theft and robbery.  For example, an 
ex-EU Commissioner has said “[It] is up to us to show that when we break up cartels, it is 
to stop money being stolen from customers’ pockets.”197 Similarly, an ex- head of the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission has been quoted as saying about price-
fixing:  "It is simply theft, stealing from consumers, and in the view that the ACCC has 
had for years now, if you can put people in jail for stealing from taxpayers, evading tax, if 
you can put people in jail for stealing from the social welfare department, then you ought 
to be able to put people in jail for stealing from consumers, sometimes literally millions or 
hundreds of millions of dollars through this form of straight theft."198 Such efforts to 
stigmatise conduct have also been made in the context of abusive conduct by dominant 
companies. For example, in a case brought against Intel under US antitrust law, the New 
York Attorney General was quoted as saying that “Intel robbed its competitors of the 
opportunity to challenge Intel’s dominance…”199  In the EU context, it has been argued 
that there is a “clear EC policy to stigmatise violations of EC competition law through the 
way in which offences are presented to the public and the consequences of their breach”.200  
                                                     
196 www.theguardian.com (accessed on 25-1-2018). 
197 Neelie Kroes “Taking Competition Seriously- Anti-Trust Reform in Europe” International Bar 
Association/European Commission Conference, Brussels 10 March 2005. 
198 “Extra powers to ACCC over price-fixing” WA Today 24 July 2009 available at 
www.watoday.com.au (accessed on 28-10-2017).   
199 “New York antitrust suit accuses Intel of bribery” 4 November 2009 www.cnet.com 
(accessed on 15-01-2018). 
200 Donald Slater; Sebastien Thomas; Denis Waelbroek “Competition Law Proceedings before the 
European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?” GCLC Working Paper 
04/08 15, available at  http://aei.pitt.edu/44310/ (accessed on 3-11-2017). In relation to Article 
102 in particular, an English High Court judge has commented; “Once upon a time, a long time 
ago, the lack of legal certainty in regard to the parameters of Article 102 was not such a big deal. 
This was because there wasn’t a great deal of stigma attached to an infringement, there weren’t 
huge fines, and private enforcement of the competition rules was not really in the mainstream. 
So if the legal lines weren’t so bright, it didn’t matter too much. But things have obviously 
changed enormously. There is stigma- a great deal of stigma- attached now” (emphasis added). 
The Hon Mr Justice Barling in Barry Hawk (ed) International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham 
Competition Law 2013 (2014) 454. 
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• Businesses themselves are very conscious of this stigma and wish to avoid it. After an 
extensive survey amongst businesses, the UK competition authority (the Office of Fair 
Trading (OFT) as it then was) found in 2010 that “the key drivers for competition law 
compliance were the fear of reputational damage and financial penalties”.201 In a 
subsequent survey commissioned by the OFT’s successor, the Competition and Markets 
Authority, 78 per cent of the business respondents in 2015 identified potential harm to 
reputation as a reason for complying with competition law. This was the fourth most 
important reason given (after being the right thing to do ethically, providing a level playing 
field, and “it’s the law”: factors which also have reputational implications) and ahead of 
the risk of sanctions.202 
 
At least two further factors support the arguments for a high degree of clarity in competition law, 
even in respect of arrangements which are not expressly-criminalised: 
 
• We shall show that the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions, to a large extent, 
satisfy the second and third Engel criteria: the laws are of general application, and (with 
certain exceptions) they provide for punitive and deterrent penalties. This is particularly 
significant for the 47 countries that are signatories of the ECHR, which have to ensure that 
their competition laws comply with the clarity requirement- as well as jurisdictions like 
Hong Kong which follow ECtHR case law in interpreting their constitutions. But it is also 
significant for other countries with competition laws: the fact that so many countries have 
signed up to the ECHR means that the principles laid down in the ECtHR’s case law can 
fairly be said to be representative of the views of a large proportion of the world’s 
governments, and indeed arguably the people they lead. So this case law might also provide 
a useful guide to non-European countries that are faced with this issue.  
                                                     
201 “Drivers of Compliance and Non-Compliance with Competition Law” OFT 1227 May 2010 6. 
202 “UK businesses’ understanding of Competition Law” IFF Research 26 March 2015 41,42. See 
also Barry Rodger “Competition Law Compliance: The CMA 2015 Study, Compliance Rationales 
and the Need for Increased Compliance Professionalism and Education” ECLR Vol 36 No 10 (Oct 
2015) 423. 
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• The ECtHR has indeed confirmed in the case law that national competition laws can be  
treated as criminal for the purpose of the protections of the accused laid down in the ECHR 
if they satisfy the Engel criteria, even though not classified as criminal under national law. 
The European Courts have confirmed the same regarding EU competition law. These 
protections include the requirement of clarity under Article 7 of the ECHR.  
 
We deal with each of these two points in turn. 
 
3 6 3 Are the Subject Jurisdictions’ Competition Laws Criminal under ECHR 
Standards? 
   
As regards the second Engel criterion, EU competition law would certainly satisfy this criterion, 
as it contains prohibitions which are of general, rather than merely sectoral, application. The 
competition laws of the other jurisdictions would also do so, for the same reason, with the 
exception of Canada, in respect of non-hardcore arrangements. As we saw in Chapter 2, Canada 
does not prohibit such arrangements or subject them to penalties. They can, at most, be subject to 
a cease-and-desist order for the future. Assuming the order is complied with, there are no further 
adverse consequences for the firm concerned. Moreover, the reason for the introduction of the new 
lighter-touch regime for non-hardcore arrangements which took effect in 2010 was that many 
strategic alliances between competitors are economically beneficial and should be allowed. As the 
Competition Bureau has said in its guidelines: 
 
“Strategic alliances can permit Canadian firms to capture the benefits of rapid 
technological changes and dynamic competitive conditions. They can permit firms to 
combine capabilities and resources so as to lower the costs of production, enhance product 
quality, and reduce the time required to bring new products to market. Such pro-
competitive collaborations, even when they involve competitors, can often benefit 
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Canadians by allowing firms to make more efficient use of resources and accelerate the 
pace of innovation.” 203 
 
It is hard to imagine that the ECtHR, faced with these facts, would view the Canadian treatment 
of non-hardcore arrangements as satisfying the second criterion, if it had the jurisdiction and 
opportunity to review the Canadian law.  
 
As regards the third criterion, punitive and deterrent penalties, there is no doubt that EU 
competition law would satisfy this criterion, as it provides that firms can be fined up to ten per 
cent of their worldwide turnover for infringements. In its guidelines on penalties, the EU 
Commission has said: 
 
“Fines should have a sufficiently deterrent effect, not only to sanction the undertakings 
concerned (specific deterrence) but also in order to deter other  undertakings from engaging 
in, or continuing, behavior that is contrary to Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (general 
deterrence).”204  
 
In Hong Kong, the Tribunal can impose a fine of up to ten per cent of the business’s Hong Kong 
turnover for any infringement, whether first-time or not, so the Hong Kong competition law would 
also fulfill the third criterion. In Australia too, substantial penalties can be imposed for 
infringements either inside or outside the hardcore category, which are clearly intended to act as a 
deterrent.  Whether a person has previously engaged in similar conduct is expressly stated to be a 
factor, presumably an aggravating one,  that can be taken into account in setting the level of the 
penalty, which implies that penalties are to be set at a level intended to deter further infringements.  
 
In Canada and South Africa, however, the position as to the third criterion would be less 
straightforward.  
                                                     
203 “Competitor Collaboration Guidelines”, preface, available at: 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03177.html (accessed on 1-11-
2017). 
204 “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003” OJ C210/2 of 1.9.2006. 
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In Canada, outside the expressly- criminalised hardcore category of arrangements, no penalties 
can be imposed for engaging in arrangements which substantially lessen competition (they can 
only be imposed if a Tribunal order, or Tribunal-endorsed consent agreement is breached). 
Accordingly, insofar as such arrangements are concerned, the third Engel criterion (as well as the 
second) is unlikely to be fulfilled. As regards abuse of dominance, although it is not expressly 
prohibited by law (but can be subject to a cease-and-desist order), the Tribunal can still impose a 
substantial penalty for such conduct – up to 10 million Canadian dollars for the first abuse and up 
to 15 million Canadian dollars for subsequent abuses.205   The Competition Act states that the 
purpose of the penalty is “to promote practices by [the person subject to the penalty] that are in 
conformity with the purpose of this section and not to punish that person”.206   However, promoting 
compliance is difficult to distinguish from deterring non-compliance, and the latter is in turn 
difficult to distinguish from penalising non-compliance. In reality, under ECHR standards, the 
Canadian administrative penalty provision for abuse might well be regarded as punitive and 
therefore be treated as criminal. 
 
Certain commentators have indeed questioned the constitutionality of this penalty provision under 
Canadian law. For example, Bishop argues that the factors which can be taken into account in 
setting the level of the penalty could mean that the penalty is set at a level which is much higher 
than what is necessary to deter the conduct in question, and therefore means that the penalty is of 
a “denunciatory” (or “retributive”) nature rather than a purely deterrent one, meaning that it is a 
criminal one. This, he argues, is inconsistent with the fact that the standard of proof for abuse is a 
civil rather than criminal one, and that the policy intent behind the abuse provision is that it should 
not be treated as a criminal provision.207  
 
                                                     
205 S 79(3.1). 
206 S 79(3.3). 
207 Grant Bishop “The Economic Consequences and Constitutionality of Administrative 
Monetary Penalties for Abuse of Dominance” (2013) Canadian Competition Law Review 37. See 
also George N Addy, John Bodrug, Charles Tingley “Abuse of Dominance in Canada: Reflections 
on 25 Years of Section 79 Enforcement” (2012) Canadian Competition Law Review 277, 302-
304. 
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In South Africa, the law distinguishes between hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing or 
market-sharing, which can attract penalties for a first-time infringement, and other types of 
arrangements, where only a repeat of previous conduct found to be in breach of the law can attract 
penalties.   The penalty itself is substantial – up to ten per cent of the business’s annual turnover.  
While there is no doubt that hardcore arrangements would satisfy the third Engel criterion, the 
position is not clear regarding non-hardcore arrangements where first-time infringements carry no 
penalty at all.208   
 
A similar distinction is made under the South African abuse provisions, between abuses which are 
expressly specified (such as excessive pricing and refusal to provide access to an essential facility), 
which can be subject to a penalty for a first time infringement (up to the 10 per cent turnover 
maximum) and other, non-specified abuses where only a repeat of a previous infringement can 
attract a penalty.209 Again, conduct in the first category would satisfy the third Engel criterion, but 
the position is not clear regarding conduct in the second.  
 
However, in any event, since the Engel criteria are alternative rather than cumulative, if the South 
Africa law were to fulfill the second criterion (which is likely, as explained above) this would be 
sufficient for it to qualify as criminal under the EHCR standards.  
 
3 6 4 South Africa’s rejection of ECHR standards regarding the criminal status of 
Competition Law 
 
In section  3 6 3 above, we discussed whether the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws would be 
treated as criminal under the ECHR standards, thereby requiring a high degree of legal clarity.  
However, the adjudicators of competition law in South Africa have expressly rejected these 
standards.  
 
                                                     
208 Competition Act s 59 
209 N 209 above.  
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In the Federal Mogul case210 the Competition Tribunal found that Federal Mogul (“FM”) had 
contravened section 5 (2) of the Competition Act, which prohibits minimum resale price 
maintenance (RPM).  The Commission asked the Tribunal to impose a penalty of ZAR 8,500,000 
(approximately USD 623,401) on FM for the contravention, which the Tribunal was entitled to do 
under the Act.  However, FM argued that the imposition of a penalty would be unconstitutional.  
The basis of its argument was that the penalty was of a criminal law nature, and therefore FM was 
entitled to the constitutional protections afforded to persons charged with a criminal offence, 
including the criminal standard of proof – beyond reasonable doubt – and the right to remain silent. 
The Competition Act did not offer those protections, and therefore to that extent, FM argued that 
it was unconstitutional.  FM cited the ECtHR case law referred to above in support of its argument 
that, although the sanction was not expressly criminal under the statute, it was of a punitive and 
deterrent (and therefore criminal) nature, such as to render the constitutional protections 
applicable. 
 
The Tribunal, however, disagreed, stating that “we are not obliged to follow the dominant 
European approach if we feel that the dissenting arguments are more forceful and in accordance 
with our own system”.211 The Tribunal distinguished the ECHR from the South African 
Constitution in the following way.  Whereas under the ECHR all of the due process protections 
where “bundled” into Article 6, and therefore none of them would apply unless the proceedings 
were treated as criminal, under the South African constitution, the right to procedural fairness 
and right of access to the courts were applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings, and 
therefore the need to develop an extensive notion of what was criminal was “more compelling” 
in Europe.  (The Tribunal held that in any event Article 6 ECHR would not preclude the 
imposition of a penalty, in particular because it did not impose the criminal standard of proof). 
 
The Tribunal also found that courts no longer have a “bipolar” view of the law – that something 
is either criminal or civil – and that there could be administrative penalties which were in neither 
                                                     
210 Competition Commission v Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd 
08/CR/Feb01. 
211 Para 47. 
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category.  In deciding whether a transgression should be classified as criminal, the Tribunal laid 
down three criteria: 
 
• The nature of the transgression – by reference to its history and purpose, is it “typically of 
a criminal nature”? 
• What is the nature of the penalty?  
• Is there a “rational connection” between the conduct the legislature seeks to prohibit and 
the sanction it imposes?  The greater the disjuncture between the two, the more likely it is 
that the sanction will be regarded as punitive and the greater the degree of protection that 
must be afforded.212  
 
As regards the nature of the competition law, the court distinguished between the criminal 
treatment of cartels in certain jurisdictions and other competition law transgressions.  With 
the latter it pointed to the following characteristics as indicating that they were not of a 
criminal law nature: 
 
• The absence of any mens rea requirement. 
• “Competition transgressions contain no moral or normatively condemnatory aspect”: 
whether an action will constitute an infringement will depend on matters such as whether 
there is market power and whether the effect on competition is substantial. 
• For these reasons the criminal standard of proof is not appropriate. 
 
Regarding the nature of the penalty, the Tribunal noted first that a penalty could only be imposed 
in the case of a clear contravention (such as RPM) or repeat offences – in other words the 
defendant ought to have known that the action was unlawful.  
 
Referring to a number of cases, particularly in Australia, and commentators, the Tribunal 
distinguished between two purposes of punishment – retribution and deterrence.  Whereas 
retribution implies that the action is immoral and bad, a penalty designed only to deter does not 
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have such a connotation.  It is designed (and set at a level) for the pragmatic purposes of 
preventing recurrence, by making it more costly than not for the defendant to re-offend, and by 
deterring others from committing contraventions. 
 
Although the Tribunal held that section 5(2) was not free of any retributive element, it held that 
deterrence was the primary purpose. 
 
Finally, on rationality, the Tribunal held that a penalty with a cap based on a percentage of 
turnover was rational since increased turnover was normally an effect of anti-competitive 
conduct and reflected loss to consumers.  Impliedly, the Tribunal therefore held that there was no 
“disjuncture” between the conduct and the sanction.  (However, against this, it could be argued 
that where, in a particular case, a penalty was set at a level close to the cap, in circumstances 
where the increase in turnover as a result of the contravention was minimal, there could be a 
significant disjuncture between the conduct and the penalty). 
 
On appeal, the Competition Appeal Court again rejected the arguments that section 59 triggered 
the constitutional protection afforded in criminal cases, but for different reasons.213  It held that 
the protections only applied to persons who had been “formally charged” with an offence, and that 
only the National Prosecution Authority could do so, not the Competition Commission.  Section 5 
(2) was not therefore of a criminal law nature.  The Court also noted that in criminal matters, 
imprisonment is normally provided as an alternative to a penalty, which was not the case with 
section 5 (2).214 “The rights set out in section 35 (3) of the Constitution are reserved for those 
people who have been charged in criminal matters and who are likely to be sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment.  It is the imprisonment aspect, which deprives a charged or accused person of his 
liberty, which is sought to be protected by the entrenchment of the rights”.  In addition, the penalty 
did not form part of the person’s criminal record, which the Court considered was also a relevant 
factor.  
 
                                                     
213 Federal Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Competition Commission 
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214 Pars 37, 38. 
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However, Prins and Koornhof argue that subsequent South African case law has called into 
question the view that the penalties under the South Africa Competition Act are not criminal, and 
that urgent clarification of this issue is needed: 
 
“The rather strange apparent status quo in contemporary South African competition law when 
considering the opinions found in current case law is as follows: 
1. Complaints of prohibited practices are submitted to or initiated by an investigative body, 
which conducts investigations of a seemingly criminal nature into these complaints; 
2. That investigative body may decide to refer and prosecute complaints of prohibited 
practices before a separate, adjudicative body whose processes are neither civil nor 
criminal in nature, but rather sui generis and inquisitorial in approach; and 
3. That adjudicative body may decide, upon determination of prohibited practices on the part 
of the respondent, to impose administrative penalties which are seemingly criminal in 
nature”.215 
 
In conclusion, all of the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions would appear to fall within 
the definition of criminal laws if the ECHR standards were applied, on the basis of one or more of 
the Engel criteria, even in respect of non-hardcore arrangements and conduct which are not 
expressly-criminalised, with the exception of the regime for non-hardcore arrangements in Canada. 
However the same does not necessarily apply fully under the national laws of the subject 
jurisdictions, as the South Africa example demonstrates. 
3 6 5 ECtHR and European Courts’ Case Law on Competition Law as Criminal Law 
 
We shall see in this section that the ECtHR has regarded a national competition law in Europe as 
criminal for the purpose of the ECHR, applying the Engel criteria, and the European Courts have 
also accepted that EU competition law is criminal for the purpose of the ECHR protections, 
including Articles 6 and 7. We shall deal with each in turn. 
 
                                                     
215 D Prins & P Koornhof “Assessing the nature of competition law enforcement in South Africa” 
Law, Democracy & Development Vol 18 (2014) 136.  
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As regards the ECtHR case law, one case in which it held a national competition law not to be 
criminal was Neste St Petersburg v Russia.216 The Russian competition law at the time of the 
conduct in question (1999) prohibited agreements or concerted practices between businesses 
dealing in the same commodity market that could result in (inter alia) price-fixing. However, the 
law provided that the competition authority could authorise such arrangements if (broadly 
speaking) the benefits exceeded the costs. The law provided that certain remedies could be 
imposed by the competition authority in case of infringement, including disgorgement of profits 
gained from the infringement and even compulsory division of the business, but not financial 
penalties or imprisonment. Appeals against the authority’s decisions were heard in the commercial, 
not criminal courts, and under the Russian Criminal Code, criminal responsibility only applied to 
individuals, not companies.  
 
The Russian competition authority decided, after investigation, that a number of petrol supply 
companies had infringed the law by price-fixing, and ordered them to pay to the Government the 
amount of the profit they had received as a result of the infringement. They appealed against the 
decision on the grounds, inter alia, that they should have been given the benefit of, but were 
denied, the procedural safeguards under Article 6 of the ECHR, arguing that the offence was 
criminal for the purpose of the ECHR. 
 
As regards the first Engel criterion, the proceedings were not classified as criminal under domestic 
law. As to the second criterion, the Court held that the law was not criminal in nature, for a number 
of reasons. First, the law was of sectoral (rather than general) application, applying as it did only 
to commodity markets, not industry-wide. This reason would have been sufficient in itself to 
dispose of the second criterion, but the court went on to state that, under the law, “monopolistic 
behaviour may even be authorised by the State if proven to serve common good. Genuinely 
criminal behaviour is not usually subject to such utilitarian justification”.217 A third reason it gave 
is that “freedom of market competition is a relative, situational value and encroachments on it are 
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not inherently wrong in themselves”.218 (As noted below, these second and third points are 
inconsistent with, and appear to have been overruled by, subsequent ECtHR case law).  
 
As regards the third Engel criterion, the ECtHR held that this also was not met, because the law 
did not provide for punitive and deterrent penalties for infringements. 
 
However, more recently, the ECtHR ruled in Menarini Diagnostics v Italy that the Italian 
competition law was to be regarded as constituting a criminal offence for the purpose of the 
ECHR.219 This law was very closely modeled on EU competition law, prohibiting arrangements 
which prevent, restrict or distort competition, as well as abuse of dominance. The law did not 
expressly criminalise any arrangements or conduct, but the competition authority could impose 
financial penalties of up to ten per cent of the business’s turnover for infringement. The law 
nevertheless provided (like the Russian competition law in Neste St Petersburg) that the 
competition authority could authorise arrangements if they produced public benefits that 
outweighed the harm to competition. 
 
In the case in question, the competition authority decided that a number of suppliers of diagnostic 
tests for diabetes had engaged in price-fixing, in breach of the competition law. As the law was 
not classified as criminal under Italian domestic law, the issue again turned on the application of 
the second and third Engel criteria.  
 
On the second criterion, the ECtHR held that it was fulfilled, because the law was aimed at 
protecting market competition and hence affected the general interests of society that are normally 
protected by criminal law.220 This impliedly overruled the comment in Neste St Petersburg that 
“freedom of market competition is a relative, situational value and encroachments on it are not 
inherently wrong in themselves”. Moreover, whereas in Neste St Petersburg, the authority’s power 
to authorise certain arrangements was a factor in ruling that the second criterion was not fulfilled, 
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in Menarini, a similar authorisation power did not alter the ECtHR’s conclusion that the second 
criterion was fulfilled.221  
 
On the third criterion, the EHRC held that this was also satisfied, because the penalty was of a 
punitive and deterrent nature.222  
 
Turning to the European Courts’ case law under EU competition law, the early cases did not refer 
to the ECHR protections, at least where EU Commission decisions were challenged on grounds 
which included lack of legal certainty, and the European Courts showed little sympathy to the 
parties’ objections on this ground. 
 
In the very first case in the European Court on abuse of dominance under Article 102 TFEU (then 
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty), namely Continental Can,223 a business, which the Commission 
found to be dominant in the relevant market, had acquired a competing business, thereby virtually 
eliminating competition in the relevant market. The issue was whether the acquirer had abused its 
dominant position by doing so. Article 86 had hitherto only been held to apply to “exploitative” 
abuse, i.e. conduct by a dominant company which directly exploited its position by imposing unfair 
prices or other terms on customers or suppliers, and not cases where, as in this case, the conduct 
affected the structure of the market.  
 
In his Opinion advising the Court, Advocate General Roemer pointed out that the natural or literal 
meaning of the word “abuse” indicated that there could only be an abuse if the dominant position 
was used as an instrument, and used in an objectionable manner.  In other words, there could be 
no abuse without use.  The Advocate General’s view is consistent with the natural, dictionary 
meaning of the term. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines the verb “abuse” to 
mean “to use (something) to bad effect or for a bad purpose”.  It was common ground between 
Continental Can and the Commission that the former did not use its dominant position to effect 
the acquisition in question.   
                                                     
221 The authorisation power is contained in Italy’s Competition and Fair Trading Act 1990 s 4. 
222 Paras 41, 42. 
223 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215. 
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The Advocate General also advised the Court to adopt a narrow interpretation of Article 86, on 
grounds which were consistent with Article 7 ECHR (although he did not expressly mention this 
provision): 
 
“It is quite clear that the Commission is attempting to interpret Article 86 extensively by 
equating the damage to consumer interest which occurs when competition ceases to exist, 
i.e. when there is a limitation of possibilities of choice, with damage to the consumer 
consequent upon a limitation of production as a result of a dominant position.  As a matter 
of principle, this interpretation must be subject to doubt in the face of a provision as drastic 
as that contained in Article 86 which constitutes a prohibition (probably having as a 
consequence nullity in civil law) and for the infringement of which a penalty is provided.  
In the light of this, there is a great deal to be said for the theory that one ought to give a 
narrow interpretation, i.e., that one ought to be cautious in attempting analogies and that 
one ought to demand – as the applicants consider correct – that there must be a case of an 
infringement of at any rate the kind enumerated in the examples set out in Article 86, par. 
2 (a) to (d).  Put into other words therefore, one ought in this connection to proceed from 
the principle in dubio pro libertate, as that principle was emphatically underlined by well-
known authors in relation to the relevant regulation of paragraph 22 of the German law 
against restriction on competition, with the object of adhering closely to the text of the 
provision”.224 
 
However, in its judgment, the Court simply ignored the Advocate General’s view that Article 86 
should be construed narrowly, and that the benefit of the uncertainty should be given to the 
applicant.  Instead, it upheld the Commission’s view that Article 82 could apply to acquisitions, 
on the grounds (amongst others) that the competition provisions would otherwise be rendered 
ineffective.    
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European judicial challenges to competition infringement decisions on grounds of legal certainty 
since Continental Can have mostly focused on arguing that no fines, or lower fines, should be 
imposed because of the uncertainty, not that no infringement existed in the first place.  Even with 
fines, however, the European Courts have rarely upheld such challenges, and appear to have taken 
the view “if in doubt, don’t act”.  In other words, the regime is given the benefit of the doubt, not 
the individual.  
 
For example, in another early case on abuse of dominance under EU law, Hoffman-la Roche v 
Commission,225 which concerned exclusive purchasing and fidelity rebates, the pharmaceutical 
company Hoffman - la Roche argued that no fine should have been imposed on it because the 
concepts of “dominant position” and “abuse” had not been sufficiently defined through the case 
law. The Advocate General, advising the Court, agreed, stating that even with legal advice, the 
applicant was entitled to have reasonable doubts as to whether the conduct was illegal.  However, 
the Court refused to quash the fine on this basis.  The Court said that the “possibility, if not the 
probability, of this application of the law had to be taken into consideration by a vigilant 
commercial operator”.226  In other words, “if in doubt, don’t act”. 
 
Later on, the European Courts recognized that the principle of non-retroactivity (including legal 
certainty) embodied in Article 7 ECHR applied to EU competition law. For example, in 2005, the 
European Court stated:  
 
“The Court of First Instance held, first of all and correctly, that the principle of non-
retroactivity of criminal laws, enshrined in Article 7 of the ECHR as a fundamental right, 
constitutes a general principle of Community law which must be observed when fines are 
imposed for infringement of the competition rules and that that principle requires that the 
penalties imposed correspond with those fixed at the time when the infringement was 
committed.”227 
 
                                                     
225 Case 85/76 [1979] ECR 461. 
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In spite of this statement, in the Microsoft case, the European General Court refused to quash the 
fine imposed on Microsoft, on the basis that the company “ought to have been aware that its refusal 
might infringe the competition rules”. 228 (emphasis added). 
 
Nevertheless, in recent cases the European Courts have recognised that, although EU competition 
law is not expressly classified as criminal (indeed, EU law expressly states that penalties are not 
to be treated as criminal229) it is to be to classified as criminal for the purposes of the ECHR, 
including Article 7, which has now been incorporated into Article 49 of the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (“the Charter”) which took effect along with the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 
December 2009.230   
 
In AG-Treuhand v Commission, the applicants challenged the infringement decision itself, not just 
the penalty, on the specific basis that it was not sufficiently predictable to comply with Article 7 
of the ECHR.231 The issue was whether the Commission was correct to attribute liability for an 
infringement of EU competition law not only to the members of a cartel itself (a group of chemical 
producers which had engaged in price-fixing), but also a consultancy firm which had assisted with 
administrative arrangements for operating the cartel, such as reserving meeting rooms and travel 
arrangements, and storing secret documents. The consultancy firm argued that it was not 
sufficiently foreseeable on the basis of previous case law that it would be held guilty of an 
infringement in these circumstances, and therefore the infringement decision was contrary to 
Article 7 (and therefore the Charter). 
 
The Court accepted that Article 7, as implemented by the Charter, applied to EU competition law. 
However, it rejected the consultancy firm’s argument on legal certainty. It held that, although the 
European Courts had never explicitly ruled on a similar issue, the applicant “should have expected, 
if necessary after taking appropriate legal advice, its conduct to be declared incompatible with the 
                                                     
228 Case T-201 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-000. 
229 Council Regulation 1/2003 OJ L1/1 of 4.1.2003 Article 23(5). 
230 OJ C303/1 of 14.12.2007. 
231 Case C-194/14P not yet reported, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-194/14%20P (accessed on 25-10-
2017). 
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EU competition rules, especially in the light of the broad scope of the terms ‘agreement’ and 
‘concerted practice’ established by the Court’s case law”.232 The Commission’s infringement 
decision was therefore held to be consistent with the Article 49 of the Charter (and therefore Article 
7).233 
 
In the academic literature too, there is a consensus that EU competition law, and the national 
competition laws of states that are parties to the ECHR, should comply with the clarity 
requirements of Article 7, at least in cases where punitive or deterrent penalties are sought.234  
 
It is true that these competition laws are not directly subject to Article 7, in the sense that their 
validity is at risk if they (in conjunction with relevant case law interpreting and applying the laws) 
do not provide sufficient clarity. It is only enforcement action in which punitive or deterrent 
penalties are sought that is directly at risk of being declared invalid. So are vague competition laws 
which do not satisfy Article 7’s standards of clarity acceptable, as long as no punitive or deterrent 
penalties are sought? We shall argue in Chapter 6 that this is not the case, and that vague 
competition laws result in significant harmful consequences even if no such penalties are sought. 
Moreover, it should be recalled that Article 7 lays down the principle that no-one should be found 
guilty of infringing a law which is insufficiently clear, not just the principle that they should not 
be penalised for doing so. The ECtHR’s case law under Article 7 provides an appropriate 
benchmark in terms of the level of certainty to which those in charge of drafting competition laws 
should strive.  
 
3 6 6  Is Competition Law a “Less Serious” Criminal Offence, and is Less Legal 
Certainty therefore required? 
                                                     
232 N 231 para 43.  
233 N 231 paras 26-47. 
234 See for example Andreas Scordamaglia “Cartel Proof, Imputation and Sanctioning in European 
Competition Law: Reconciling effective enforcement and adequate protection of procedural 
guarantees” The Competition Law Review Vol 7 Issue 1 (December 2010) 5; Kristina Nordlander 
and Patrick Harrison “Are Rights Finally Becoming Fundamental?” CPI Antitrust Chronicle Feb 
2012 (1); Donald Slater; Sebastien Thomas; Denis Waelbroek “Competition Law Proceedings 
before the European Commission and the Right to a Fair Trial: No Need for Reform?” GCLC 
Working Paper 04/08 available at  http://aei.pitt.edu/44310/ (accessed on 3-11-2017). 
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Could it be argued, according to the ECtHR’s reasoning in Jusilla v Finland  discussed in section 
3 5 3, that although competition law may be criminal law, it is at or near the less serious end of the 
scale of criminal offences, and therefore the protections offered by the ECHR, including legal 
clarity, need not be so stringent?   
 
In Jusilla, the ECtHR did indeed seem to suggest that competition law was not part of “hardcore” 
criminal law, and therefore lower down on the scale of seriousness than the “traditional” hardcore 
categories of criminal law: 
 
“Notwithstanding the consideration that a certain gravity attaches to criminal proceedings, 
which are concerned with the allocation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of a 
punitive and deterrent sanction, it is self-evident that there are criminal cases which do not 
carry any significant degree of stigma. There are clearly “criminal charges” of different 
weight. What is more, the autonomous interpretation adopted by the Convention 
institutions of the notion of a “criminal charge” by applying the Engel criteria have 
underpinned a gradual broadening of the criminal head to cases not strictly belonging to 
the traditional categories of the criminal law, for example administrative penalties, prison 
disciplinary proceedings, customs law, competition law, and penalties imposed by a court 
with jurisdiction in financial matters. Tax surcharges differ from the hard core of criminal 
law; consequently, the criminal-head guarantees will not necessarily apply with their full 
stringency…”.235 (citations omitted, emphasis added).  
   
In section 3 5 4 we noted certain criticisms that can be, and have been, levelled against the ECtHR’s 
approach in ranking offences according to their degree of seriousness and varying the degree of 
safeguards according to the degree of seriousness of the offence. The above passage suggests, 
although it does not say so expressly, that competition law is not part of “traditional” criminal law, 
and may therefore require less stringent protection for the accused. But this view is also open to 
criticism nowadays, when competition law infringements generally can be subject to penalties of 
                                                     
235 Para 43. 
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up to ten per cent of a firm’s annual turnover, hardcore conduct is being increasingly criminalised 
(with imprisonment of individuals as a potential sanction in some jurisdictions) and a great deal of 
stigma attaches to infringements. It should be borne in mind that this statement by the ECtHR, 
insofar as it referred to competition law, was obiter, and that the tax surcharge offence in that case, 
and the small penalty that was imposed, are a far cry from the stigma and stringent penalties which 
result from many competition law infringements. 
 
Nevertheless, in one EU cartel case, KME v Commission, Advocate General Sharpston relied on 
the Jusilla passage above, in advising the European Court to reject the applicant’s argument that 
the degree of scrutiny exerted by the General Court over the Commission’s decisions was not 
sufficient to comply with ECtHR case law under Article 6 ECHR.236 Before the European Court 
handed down its judgment in this case, the General Court was faced with a similar argument in 
another cartel case, Schindler v Commission, and followed Advocate General Sharpston’s 
approach in rejecting the argument.237  When it came to the European Court’s final judgment in 
KME, the Court agreed with the Advocate General that the applicant’s argument should be 
rejected, but did not refer to the ECtHR case law, preferring instead to state simply that the EU 
judicial review system was not contrary to “the requirement of effective judicial protection in 
Article 47 of the Charter [of Fundamental Rights of the European Union]”.238 
 
Whatever the merits of the European Courts’ relaxation of the requirement for a full independent 
hearing at first instance (and a contrary view by the Courts would imply that the whole system of 
enforcement of EU competition law would have to be overhauled, with the Commission no longer 
being able to act as decision-maker), we argued in section 3 5 4 that such relaxation is certainly 
not appropriate in the case of the requirement of a high degree of clarity in criminal law- whatever 
the perceived degree of seriousness of the offence. Accordingly, if competition laws with punitive 
and deterrent penalties are to be treated as criminal (as the ECtHR and European Courts have held), 
a high degree of clarity is required.  
                                                     
236 Case C-272/09P Advocate General’s Opinion paras 67-70. 
237 Case T-138/07 paras 52-59. 
238 Para 106. Article 47 states, in relevant part “Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by 
law”. 
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The Court in AC Treuhand did not state expressly, as the previous cases cited above had done, that 
the mere risk of illegality was sufficient to preclude a challenge on grounds of legal certainty. We 
argued earlier in this section that it is inconsistent with rule of law principles to hold that the mere 
possibility that conduct might be deemed illegal provides sufficient clarity to comply with Article 
7. There is an additional reason for setting the bar for legal clarity higher than this in the case of 
competition law. In economic terms, vague competition laws could have the perverse effect of 
deterring firms from competing vigorously for fear of breaking the law- the precise opposite of 
what most competition laws are intended to achieve.  Clarity therefore makes sense from an 
economic point of view, as well as a freedom and rule of law point of view.  
 
However, if the courts choose in future to approach the issue of the precise degree of legal clarity 
which competition laws should provide, it is submitted that there are three basic conditions which 
competition laws should satisfy to be sufficiently clear, according to the ECtHR principles 
discussed in section 3 5 2: 
 
• The “essence” of the offence must be clear. We discussed earlier in this section what 
“essence” means in this context. 
• Points in the law may have to be clarified through the case law. 
• However, it must be possible for a business to predict, with “legal advice” (a concept which 
we also defined) the outcome of this clarification and its application to the business’s 
proposed arrangement or conduct. 
 
We shall discuss in Chapter 4 whether the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions satisfy 
these conditions. 
 
 
 
3 6 7 Implications of Treating Competition Law as Criminal- apart from High Legal 
Clarity 
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Treating competition laws as criminal does not just mean that laws have to be clear for them to be 
enforced or (or in some jurisdictions safe from being struck down as unconstitutional). It also raises 
a number of other issues that are relevant to clarity in laws. For example, if competition law is 
treated as criminal: 
 
• Should the higher standard of proof which exists in many jurisdictions for criminal 
offences- beyond reasonable doubt- apply? 
• Should the presumption of innocence principle which applies to criminal offences in many 
jurisdictions (for example in Article 6(2) ECHR) apply, meaning that the burden of proof 
lies on the prosecution?  
• Should the normal requirement that mens rea be proved for criminal offences apply? 
 
We deal with each of these implications in turn. 
 
Regarding the question of standard of proof, applying the criminal standard of proof beyond 
reasonable doubt in competition laws is problematic in many cases.  Where competition laws 
prohibit certain types of conduct per se, i.e. all that needs to be proved is that the offending act 
took place, it may be practicable to apply this standard.  But for other infringements, where liability 
depends (inter alia) on the effects or likely effects of the arrangements or conduct on competition 
in the market, it may not be possible in many cases to prove such effects beyond reasonable doubt, 
because those effects are uncertain, and depend on an economic assessment on which views may 
differ. 
 
The standard of proof issue arose in the first case on abuse of dominance under the UK 
Competition Act, which is closely modeled on Article 102 of the TFEU, Napp Pharmaceuticals 
Limited v Director General of Fair Trading.239 The Competition Appeal Tribunal noted that, 
although the proceedings were to be treated as criminal for the purposes of Article 6 of the ECHR 
(which sets down various procedural safeguards for accused, including the presumption of 
innocence requirement), the ECHR, and the UK Competition Act, were silent as to the requisite 
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standard of proof.  The Tribunal went on the say that, because of the complex economic 
assessments often involved in competition law cases, Parliament was more likely to have intended 
the civil balance of probabilities standard to apply.  Nevertheless, it said that, given the severity of 
the sanctions involved, strong and convincing evidence would have to be produced before an 
infringement could be found.240 
 
This line of reasoning is hard to understand. The higher standard of proof in criminal cases is a 
procedural safeguard to ensure that that the accused is given the benefit of any reasonable doubt. 
As some commentators have put it: “The more serious the offence, the more necessary it is to 
comply with procedural safeguards”.241 The Tribunal itself acknowledged the severity of the 
sanctions and that UK competition law was to be treated as criminal for the purpose of the ECHR. 
Arguably the standard of proof should not be lowered just to make it easier for the prosecutor to 
obtain a conviction, as the Tribunal appeared to do. If successful prosecutions are difficult to bring 
because of the complex economic assessments required, then arguably the solution is to change 
the law to make it clearer, not to lower the procedural safeguards of the accused. 
 
In Hong Kong, we noted in section 3 5 4 that its Court of Final Appeal, in the Koon Wing Yee case, 
had held that the law against insider dealing was to be treated as criminal for the purposes of the 
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (which is interpreted in line with Article 7), because of the 
power to impose punitive and deterrent penalties for breach, even although under domestic law it 
was not treated as a criminal matter. It also held that, as a result, in contrast to the UK approach in 
Napp, the criminal standard of proof - beyond reasonable doubt- applied, in the absence of any 
express statutory provision to the contrary. 
 
More recently, however, the Hong Kong Court of Instance (CFI), in a case involving the 
competition rules that applied to the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors, followed the 
Napp approach.242 It held that, while the proceedings were not criminal for ECtHR purposes 
                                                     
240 Paras 101-113. 
241 Donald Slater, Sebastien Thomas, Denis Waelbroek “Competition law proceedings before 
the European Commission and the right to a fair trial: no need for reform?” GCLC Working 
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because these competition rules only applied to two specific sectors and not the economy as a 
whole (in other words the second Engel criterion was not met), even if they had been classified as 
criminal, the standard of proof would not have been the criminal one for the same reason given in 
Napp, i.e. the complex economic assessments involved in competition cases made such a standard 
inappropriate. The court said that the Koon Wing Yee judgment should be limited to its particular 
context, i.e. insider dealing. The CFI judgment has been appealed, so it remains to be seen whether 
it will be upheld by the higher court(s). 
 
Under the South Africa Competition Act, the standard of proof is expressly stated to be the balance 
of probabilities.243 It is questionable whether this should be the appropriate standard of proof for 
those types of conduct that would be treated as criminal according to the ECtHR’s definition, or 
whether a higher standard of proof should apply. 
 
Turning to the burden of proof, Article 6(2) ECHR provides that persons accused of a criminal 
offence are entitled to the presumption of innocence until they are proven guilty, so that the burden 
of proof lies on the prosecution.  This principle applies not just in the EU but also in the other 
subject jurisdictions.  Certain commentators have questioned whether the extensive use of 
presumptions against the alleged infringer under competition law is consistent with this 
fundamental right.244  For example, in EU competition law, there is a (rebuttable) presumption that 
a business that has a market share of 50 per cent or more has a dominant position.  In South Africa, 
there is an irrebuttable presumption of dominance at 45 per cent (or higher) market share and a 
rebuttable presumption of dominance between 35 per cent and up to below 45 per cent.  These 
commentators have argued that the EU presumptions may not be consistent with Article 6(2) 
because they are effectively a shortcut to finding proof of guilt, by not having to prove that the real 
test of dominance is actually met. 
 
There has been a great deal of debate about the constitutionality of section 73A(5) of the South 
African Competition Act. Section 73A provides that, if a director of a company is found guilty of 
                                                     
243 S 68. 
244 Kristina Nordlander  and Patrick Harrison “Are Rights Finally Becoming Fundamental?” CPI 
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engaging in or knowingly acquiescing in one of the hardcore prohibited practices under section 
4(1)(b) of the Act, such as price-fixing or bid-rigging, he or she may be subject to imprisonment 
for up to 10 years. Section 73A(5) provides that: 
 
“In any court proceedings against a person in terms of this section, an acknowledgement 
in a consent order contemplated in section 49D by the firm or a finding by the Competition 
Tribunal or the Competition Appeal Court that the firm has engaged in a prohibited practice 
in terms of section 4(1)(b), is prima facie proof of the fact that the firm engaged in that 
conduct.”245  
 
It has been argued that, by imposing a reverse burden of proof on the accused- to disprove the 
finding of the Court or Tribunal- this provision constitutes a violation of the accused’s right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty.246  
 
The final issue in this section is mens rea, which is a necessary element for the prosecution to 
prove for most criminal offences.  Under EU competition law, mens rea (in the form of intention 
or negligence) is only expressly required for a penalty to be imposed: this implies that no such 
mens rea is required to establish an infringement.247  In other words, breach of competition law is 
a matter of strict liability, even although (at least outside the category of hardcore arrangements) 
it involves complex economic assessments on which views may differ, on matters such as whether 
competition will be harmed, and whether there are benefits that outweigh such harm.  It appears 
that the same applies to the competition laws of South Africa and Hong Kong, and at least the non-
                                                     
245 Government Gazette Vol 530 No 32533 28 August 2009. 
246 Andrew Smith and Mkhululi Stubbs “The Competition and Constitutional Conundrum: 
Cartels, Criminalisation and Complex Monopolies” Sibergramme 2/2009 10 September 2009, 
ISSN 1606-9986; Tshokofelo Letsike “The criminalisation of cartels: how effective will the new 
Section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act be?”, presentation at Seventh Annual 
Competition Law, Economics and Policy Conference, Johannesburg 5-6 September 2013. For 
contrary views see Louise Jordaan and Phumudzo S Munyai “The Constitutional Implications of 
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Raymond Msaule “An Interpretation and Application of Section 73A(5) of the Competition Act 
89 of 1998, South Africa” Acta Universitatis Danubius Juridica, Vol 12, No 3 (2016). 
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criminalised infringements under Australian law. In Canada, however, since engaging in anti-
competitive arrangements or abuse (outside the expressly-criminalised hardcore arrangements) is 
not in itself automatically prohibited by law, the issue of mens rea in establishing liability does not 
arise in respect of these areas of arrangements and conduct.  
 
Under EU competition law, even relying in good faith on legal advice which turns out to be wrong 
is no defence to an alleged infringement. In the Schenker case, which concerned a price-fixing 
cartel amongst Austrian freight-forwarding companies, the European Court held that such reliance 
was not even relevant to the question of whether the business has committed the infringement 
intentionally or negligently, thereby justifying the imposition of a penalty.248 If the business “could 
not have been unaware of the anti-competitive nature of its conduct” (as the Court held was the 
case here) this was sufficient to justify a penalty, irrespective of whether it had received legal 
advice that the arrangement was legitimate.249  
 
Although the wording of the Court’s judgment was general and not limited to the facts of this 
particular case, it may be that it regarded the breach as such an obvious one that legal advice could 
not be relied upon in those circumstances. Whether the Court would have taken the same view in 
a case involving complex economic assessments is not clear (although it will argued in  Chapter 4 
that such assessments do not constitute legal advice). If the business conducts a complex economic 
assessment and concludes in good faith that the proposed arrangement or conduct will comply 
with the law, and the authority or court subsequently disagrees, it can hardly be said that the 
business “could not have been unaware of the anti-competitive nature of its conduct”.  
 
Is it fair that a business can be held guilty of an infringement or subject to a penalty if it genuinely 
believes that its arrangement or conduct complies with competition law, has no intention to 
infringe the law, and gets it wrong only because: 
 
                                                     
248 C-681/11 Schenker & Co and Others not yet reported, available at: 
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• its complex economic assessment does not coincide with that of the authority or courts, 
looking at the matter after the fact and with full evidence which was not available to the 
business at the time it entered into the arrangement or engaged in the conduct; and/or 
• it relies in good faith on legal advice that the arrangement or conduct was permitted? 
 
It could be argued that this is not the case, either because the law is not sufficiently clear (on the 
basis of the Article 7 principles which were discussed in section 3 5 2), or because the mens rea 
requirement which is normally applicable to “classic” criminal offences should also be applied to 
competition law, given that it is to be treated as its criminal for ECHR purposes.  
 
3 6 8 Does Competition Law Interfere with Fundamental Rights and Freedoms? 
 
As was noted in section 3 5 6, there is another area, apart from criminal law, where the ECHR 
requires laws to be clear, namely laws or regulatory action which interferes with fundamental 
rights and freedoms. These include the right of property guaranteed by Article 1 of the First 
Protocol of the ECHR. Certain aspects of competition law could impinge on the right to property, 
and as such would also have to be sufficiently clear to be compatible with the ECHR on this basis 
(although there does not appear to be any case law in which this issue has arisen).   
 
For example, if a dominant firm refuses to license intellectual property rights, or allow access to 
an essential facility, this can constitute an abuse, at least under EU and South Africa competition 
law.250 By effectively requiring the business in question to grant a licence or allow access to its 
facility in order to comply, this rule arguably interferes with the right to property (which in Europe 
is guaranteed under Article 1 First Protocol of the ECHR).  Under ECHR principles, the conditions 
under which such a refusal would constitute an abuse would have to be clear.  
 
More generally, certain sanctions for breach of competition law, in the form of financial penalties, 
disgorgement of profits, damages awards, or divestment of assets, could constitute an interference 
with property rights, and therefore arguably would also have to be clear to be constitutionally valid. 
                                                     
250 For the EU position, see O’Donoghue and Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 82EC 
(2006) Ch 8. For the South African position see Competition Act s 8(b). 
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In the Hong Kong competition law, for example, one of the orders the Tribunal can make, if it 
finds an infringement, is an order “restraining or prohibiting a person from acquiring, disposing of 
or otherwise dealing with any property specified in the order.”251 Is such a power sufficiently 
circumscribed in order to ensure proper protection of the right to private property (which is also 
guaranteed by the Hong Kong Basic Law?). It could be argued that this is not the case. 
 
Potential interference with property rights is therefore another reason why a high standard for legal 
clarity should apply to competition law. Indeed we also pointed out in section 3 5 4- with reference 
to Hong Kong’s constitution- that arguably any public intervention against private freedom should 
satisfy a high degree of legal certainty. 
 
3 7 Conclusions 
.  
In this Chapter we have looked at what “legal certainty” means, and identified clarity in laws as 
one facet of legal certainty. The principle that a law should be clear enough for an individual to 
know what legal consequences will flow from a particular act or omission is regarded as an 
important component of the rule of law. The reasons why such clarity is valued were examined in 
more detail. We then looked at the constitutional requirements for clarity in laws, taking the US 
and Europe as central jurisdictions, and noted that higher standards of clarity are required for 
criminal laws, and laws which interfere with fundamental rights and freedoms.  
 
We then assessed whether the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions should be treated as 
criminal for these purposes. Using the criteria in the ECtHR case law as a benchmark, we argued 
that they should, with certain exceptions. Indeed EU competition law has been so treated by the 
European Courts. Although the precise degree of clarity that is required has been a matter of some 
controversy in the European case law, we identified from the ECtHR’s case law under Article 7 of 
the ECHR three basic conditions that competition laws should satisfy to be sufficiently clear to 
comply with the rule of law. These are that (a) the “essential ingredients” of the law should be 
clear, (b) any residual areas of doubt should be issues of law, and (c) the business should be able 
                                                     
251 Competition Ordinance Schedule 3 Para 1(d). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
106 
 
to predict the application of the law to its proposed arrangements or conduct with the benefit of 
legal advice.  
 
In Chapter 4 we shall examine the degree of clarity that exists in the competition laws of the subject 
jurisdictions, and assess whether they satisfy these three basic conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 Are Competition Laws Sufficiently Clear? 
 
4 1 Introduction 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
107 
 
In Chapter 2, we identified key elements that the competition laws in the subject jurisdictions 
share, namely: 
 
• a prohibition of, or provisions entitling the authorities to intervene against, agreements and 
other types of collusion between businesses which have negative effects on competition, 
subject to exceptions and; 
• a prohibition of, or provisions entitling the authorities to intervene against, businesses 
which have substantial market power (or market dominance) abusing (or in Australia, 
“misusing”) that position. In Canada and South Africa there are express legislative 
exceptions to these provisions on grounds of superior performance and economic 
efficiency respectively, but not in the EU, Australia, or Hong Kong. However, recent EU 
case law suggests that a similar exception should be read into EU law.252 
 
In this Chapter, we look at the extent of clarity that exists within these elements in each of the 
subject jurisdictions’ competition laws. In the light of this analysis, we conclude by assessing 
whether the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions satisfy the three conditions for sufficient 
legal clarity that we identified in Chapter 3.253 
 
For the purpose of the analysis it will be useful to break down the key elements into four 
components, namely: 
 
• arrangements which harm competition; 
• exclusions and authorisations of such arrangements; 
• dominance or substantial market power; and 
• abuse or misuse of dominance or substantial market power. 
 
4 2 Arrangements Which Harm Competition 
                                                     
252 See Case C-23/14 Post Danmark, not yet reported, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-23/14 (accessed on 15-10-2017). 
253 See section 3 5 2. 
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4 2 1 EU 
 
In the EU, the rules applying to arrangements between businesses are contained in Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).254  They have remained 
substantively unchanged since 1957, when they were (along with the rules on abuse of dominant 
position under what is now Article 102 TFEU) included in the Treaty of Rome between the six 
original Member States of what was then called the European Economic Community, and is now 
the EU. 
 
Article 101(1) and (2) provide as follows: 
 
“1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market: all 
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted 
practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, 
and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions; 
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment; 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties;   
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have 
no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be automatically 
void.” 
 
Article 101(3) provides that agreements can be exempted from the prohibition in Article 101(1) if 
they meet certain criteria- this exemption is discussed in section 4 3 1. 
                                                     
254 OJ C326/1 of 26.10.2012. 
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It can be seen that the prohibition in Article 101(1) is couched in very general terms: any agreement 
which has the “object or effect” of “preventing, restricting or distorting competition” is covered 
by the provision.  There is no definition in the TFEU of the terms “object” or “prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition”.  The examples of agreements in paragraphs (a) to (e) 
which are particularly liable to be caught by the prohibition is non-exhaustive, so that even an 
agreement which falls outside these categories might be caught.  Moreover, the examples 
themselves are not worded very clearly: for example, what is an agreement “limiting production, 
markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers”? 
 
In fact, the provisions of Articles 101 (and the rules on abuse of dominance under Article 102, 
dealt with in sections 4 4 and 4 5 below) were so generally-worded that there was initially doubt 
as to whether these provisions were intended to be legally-binding on “undertakings” (i.e. 
businesses) at all, or whether they were simply intended to set out objectives or guidelines which 
were to be implemented in more detail in subsequent legislation.255  This issue was clarified with 
the adoption, five years after the Treaty came into force, of the first regulation implementing the 
competition articles, namely Regulation 17/62.256 Article 1 of Regulation 17/62 stated that the 
agreements and conduct described in the competition articles ”shall be prohibited, no prior 
decision to that effect being required”.  This statement made it clear that the Article 101(1) 
prohibition was directly legally-binding on businesses, irrespective of the vagueness of the 
prohibition.  The same provision is contained in Article 1 (1) of the current implementing 
regulation, Regulation 1/2003.257 
 
                                                     
255 Gerber Law and Competition 346. See also Deringer “Verordnung Nr 17/62 and Verordnung 
Nr 1/2003- die historische Perspektive”, presentation to the seminar “Ein Halbes Jahrhundert 
Europaisches Wettbewerbsrecht” Brussels 17 July 2003 available at: 
www.freshfields.com/publications/pdfs/practices/Verordnung.pdf (accessed on 1-10-2017). 
256 Council Regulation 17/62 First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, 
available at  http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31962R0017:EN:HTML (accessed on 2-10-
2017). 
257 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L1/1 of 4.1.2003. 
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It was therefore left to the European Court to clarify the meaning of these provisions through the 
case law.  Has it done so?  In assessing this question we focus on the core concept of “preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition”.  
 
To determine what this concept means, it is necessary to be clear about what is meant by 
“competition”.  The meaning of the word “competition” in Article 101(1) is not self-evident from 
its context.  Nor does the EU Treaty define “competition”, and it has never been expressly defined 
in the case law of the European Courts.  
 
As we noted in Chapter 2, there are two main ways in which the notion of “competition” has been 
used in competition laws: competition in the sense of commercial freedom, and competition in the 
sense of rivalry.258  In the EU, it is the former interpretation that has traditionally been used in the 
European Courts’ case law, and that was used in the early decisions of the European 
Commission.259 
 
The structure of Article 101 itself supports this interpretation.  As will be seen in section 4 3, the 
effect of the agreement on the intensity of market competition, i.e. rivalry, is addressed under the 
question of exemption in Article 101(3), not in Article 101(1): an agreement will not qualify for 
exemption if it “eliminates competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question”. 
It would seem illogical to make exemption dependent on sufficient residual market competition 
under Article 101(3), if the Article 101(1) analysis had already concluded that market competition 
had been appreciably reduced (or was likely to be so reduced) by the agreement. Unless, that is, 
there are different degrees of intensity of competition for the purposes of Article 101(1) and 101(3) 
respectively, Article 101(1) referring to an appreciable reduction and Article 101(3) to a 
substantial reduction or elimination. But if this is the case, where to draw the line between 
appreciable and substantial would be extremely unclear and somewhat arbitrary. 
 
                                                     
258 See section 2 4. 
259 Section 2 4 above. 
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The difficulties of making such a distinction are illustrated by the Commission guidelines on the 
application of Article 101(3) of the TFEU.260 As we shall see, under the Commission’s “more 
economic approach” to the application of the competition rules, the Commission interprets harm 
to competition as reductions in rivalry which harms consumers, in contrast to its (and the European 
Court’s) traditional interpretation as restrictions in economic freedom. It is worth comparing two 
passages in these guidelines in this respect: the first dealing with the harm to competition criterion 
in Article 101(1), and the second dealing with the harm to competition criterion in Article 101(3).   
 
In respect of Article 101(1) the guidelines state: 
 
“Agreements between undertakings are caught by the prohibition rule…when they are 
likely to have an appreciable adverse impact on the parameters of competition on the 
market such as price, output, product quality, product variety and innovation.”261   
 
In respect of Article 101(3) the guidelines state: 
 
“In the assessment of the impact of the agreement on competition, it is also relevant to 
examine its influence on the various parameters of competition…If following the 
conclusion of the agreement the parties have implemented and maintained substantial price 
increases or engaged in other conduct indicative of the existence of a considerable degree 
of market power, it is an indication that the parties are not subject to any real competitive 
pressure, and that competition has been eliminated with regard to a substantial part of the 
products concerned”.262 
 
In other words, according to the guidelines, the tests for detecting harm to competition under 
Article 101(1), and the elimination of competition under Article 101(3), are very similar, and it is 
difficult to know where the line is to be drawn. 
                                                     
260 Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) [now 101(3)] of the EU Treaty OJ C101/97 of 
27.4.2004.  
261 Para 16. 
262 Para 111. 
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 A significant number of European Court judgments have treated restrictions on commercial 
freedom (either on the parties to the agreement, or on third parties) as restrictions on competition, 
irrespective of their effects on the market.263  For example, the European Court has regarded the 
following clauses in an agreement between an electrical goods manufacturer and its dealers as 
restrictions of competition: 
 
• limiting the dealer’s ability to deal with other manufacturers; and 
• requiring non-specialist dealers to achieve a turnover comparable to specialist dealers.264  
 
A similar approach has been taken in many Commission decisions and regulations under the 
exemption provision in Article 101(3).265  For example, in joint venture agreements, the fact that 
the parent companies, in the absence of the joint venture, would be able to compete with each other 
in the development of new products, and that the joint venture prevents them from doing so, has 
in itself been regarded as a restriction of competition under Article 101(1), irrespective of the 
effects of the joint venture on competition in the market.266  Similarly, an exclusive distribution 
agreement has been regarded as restricting competition in two ways: by preventing the supplier 
from appointing more than one distributor, and by restricting other potential distributors from 
purchasing and distributing the product.267 
 
A good example to illustrate this approach is the Métropole case.268  Here, the European Court of 
First Instance (now called the General Court) upheld the Commission’s decision that an obligation 
on the parent companies of a pay television joint venture to supply certain programmes exclusively 
to the joint venture company constituted a restriction of competition contrary to Article 101(1). 
This was because, by definition, the exclusivity removed the ability of the joint venture company’s 
                                                     
263 See the discussion in Georgio Monti EC Competition Law (2007) 25-33. 
264 Case 26/76 Metro SB- Grossmaerkte v Commission [1997] ECR 1875. 
265 See Monti, n 263  above. 
266 GEC-Weir Sodium Circulators OJ L327/26 of 20.12.77; Vacuum Interrupters OJ L48/32 of 
19.2.77. 
267 Joined Cases 56,58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR Eng Sp Ed 299. 
268 Case T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR-II 2459. 
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competitors from gaining access to these programmes.  The Court reached this conclusion in spite 
of the fact that the agreement was actually found to have a positive effect on market competition 
in pay television.  This factor which was only considered relevant in justifying the grant of an 
exemption to the agreement under Article 101 (3).  (The EU’s block exemption regulation for 
vertical agreements was not in force at that time, and therefore the Commission’s decision was in 
response to an application for an individual exemption decision.  As will be seen later, the facility 
for applying for individual decisions was abolished in 2003, and the parties now have to self-assess 
whether the exemption criteria are satisfied.) 
 
Freedom of commercial action for this purpose incorporates, or is allied to, the notion of 
independence or autonomy of action in the market place, at least as far as relationships with 
competitors are concerned.  The European Court has held that there is a “notion inherent in the 
Treaty provisions on competition” that each operator must decide its commercial policy 
independently, and this means that an operator must not disclose to one or more competitors its 
decisions or intentions regarding its conduct on the market, if this leads or is likely to lead to 
coordination of commercial conduct between competitors, for example on prices.269  
 
One advantage of treating restrictions on commercial freedom as restrictions on competition is 
relatively high legal clarity.  It is relatively straightforward in most cases to identify restrictions of 
competition based on this approach.  However the disadvantage is that such an approach is highly 
intrusive, as was noted in Chapter 2.270  For example, many commercial contracts, or clauses in 
commercial contracts, will be regarded as restricting competition in this sense, even although their 
effect on market competition is neutral, or even beneficial.  This means that the agreement has to 
satisfy the criteria for exemption under Article 101(3), or the terms of a block exemption 
regulation, if it is to be permitted. (The concept of block exemption will be discussed in section 4 
3 1 below). 
 
                                                     
269 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile  v NMa [2009] ECR I-4529.  
270 Section 2 4. 
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Prior to July 2003, parties to arrangements caught by Article 101(1) needed to apply for, and 
obtain, a decision from the European Commission confirming that the exemption criteria in Article 
101(3) were satisfied, before they were allowed to implement the arrangements. (Unless, that is, 
the arrangement met the terms of a block exemption regulation). The need to apply to the 
Commission for an exemption decision, combined with the fact that the notion of restriction of 
competition under Article 101(1) was so wide, meant that the Commission became over-burdened 
with exemption applications. Perhaps as a result, the European Courts sought to limit the scope of 
the Article 101(1) prohibition in various ways, thereby reducing the need for exemption 
applications.  However, in doing so, greater uncertainty has been introduced into the process of 
assessing whether an arrangement is caught by the prohibition in Article 101(1), as will be 
explained below. 
 
One method the European Courts have used to limit the scope of Article 101(1) is to hold that 
certain restrictions on commercial freedom are not restrictions of competition. For example, where 
certain restrictions on the parties to a transaction, such as a joint venture, are “directly related” to 
the transaction and “necessary” for it to take place, they will be regarded as falling outside Article 
101(1) if the transaction as a whole falls outside Article 101(1).  This is the so-called “ancillary 
restraints” doctrine.271  
 
The ancillary restraints doctrine in EU competition law appears to have originated from a concept 
with the same name in US antitrust law, which in turn was derived from the US common law. 
According to Bork: 
 
“For 250 years the common law has upheld and enforced agreements not to compete if they 
were ancillary to valid main transactions. By “ancillary” the common law meant 
subordinate or collateral to another transaction and necessary to make that transaction 
                                                     
271 F Enrique Gonzalez Diaz “The Notion of Ancillary Restraints under EC Competition law” 
Fordham International Law Journal Vol 19 Issue 3 (1995) 951. Kayvan Hazemi Jabelli “EU 
Ancillary Restraints: A Reasoned Approach to Article 101(1)” available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2166318, (accessed on 5-1-2018). 
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effective. The doctrine of ancillary restraints is commonly believed to have application to 
the Sherman Act”.272 
 
However, what is considered “necessary” to a transaction has given rise to confusion, and the case 
law in this area seems self-contradictory, as we shall see when comparing the Court’s approach in 
the Metropole and O2 cases below. 
 
The genesis of the ancillary restraints doctrine in EU competition law was the early case of Société 
Technique Minière, which concerned an exclusive distribution agreement.273  The Court held that 
when considering whether competition was restricted: 
 
“the competition must be understood within the actual context in which it would occur in 
the absence of the agreement in dispute…it may be doubted whether there is an interference 
with competition if the said agreement seems really necessary for the penetration of a new 
area by an undertaking.”274  (emphasis added). 
 
In other words if, in the absence of exclusivity, the transaction and the extra competition it would 
bring about would not exist, the inclusion of an exclusivity clause cannot be said to restrict 
competition. 
 
One problem with this concept is determining what “really necessary” means in practice.  For 
example, does it mean that it would be impossible to implement the transaction without the 
restriction, that it would be difficult or very difficult to do so, or that it would be unprofitable to 
do so (and over what time should profitability for this purpose be assessed)?   
In the context of mergers, the Commission has said that necessity for this purpose does not only 
mean that the transaction would otherwise be impossible. It can also mean that, in the absence of 
the restriction, the merger “could only be implemented under considerably more uncertain 
                                                     
272 Robert H Bork “Ancillary Restraints and the Sherman Act” American Bar Association Section 
of Antitrust Law Vol 15 (1959) 211.  
273 Case 56/65 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm ECR Eng SpEd 235. 
274 N 273 above 250. 
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conditions, at substantially higher cost, over an appreciably longer period or with considerably 
greater difficulty”.275  (There seems to be no reason why the Commission’s view should not 
equally apply to commercial transactions other than mergers). Clearly these are all matters of 
degree and subjective judgment. 
 
Another difficulty with the ancillary restraints doctrine, in the context of EU competition law, is 
that it seems to overlap with one of the criteria for exemption under Article 101(3).  One of these 
criteria is that each restriction of competition in the agreement is “indispensable” to achieve the 
benefits of the arrangement (in terms of efficiency or other benefits).  But if the necessity or 
indispensability of the restriction is already part of the analysis under Article 101(1), what is the 
point of the separate indispensability criterion in Article 101(3)?  This difficulty can be illustrated 
by comparing two judgments of the European Court of First Instance, which seem to contradict 
each other. 
 
In the Métropole case referred to above,276 the parties had argued that the exclusive right of access 
by the joint venture to certain programmes supplied by the parent companies was necessary to 
enable the joint venture to penetrate the French pay television market, given the dominant position 
of the incumbent operator, and therefore fell outside Article 101(1) as an ancillary restriction.  The 
Court rejected this argument on the grounds that it was possible in the abstract to set up a pay 
television joint venture without an exclusive access right, and therefore the clause fell within 
Article 101(1).277  Nevertheless, the Court upheld the Commission’s decision that the clause was 
“indispensable” in practice to enable the joint venture to penetrate the market on a sustainable 
basis.278 
 
By contrast, in O2 (Germany) the same Court held that the issue of whether a roaming agreement 
with another mobile operator was necessary to secure O2’s competitive position in the market 
                                                     
275 “Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations” OJ C56/24 of 
5.3.2005 para 13. 
276 N 268. 
277 Para 122. 
278 Paras 142, 145. 
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should have been considered by the Commission under Article 101(1), not Article 101(3).279  In 
other words, if there was such a necessity, the agreement did not restrict competition at all, and 
therefore fell outside Article 101(1).  The Court annulled the relevant part of the Commission’s 
decision on that basis.  
 
The outcome in Métropole seems at odds not only with the same Court’s ruling in O2(Germany), 
but also with other judgments of the European Courts, some of them referred to in Métropole 
itself.280 According to these judgments, the question of whether a restriction of competition exists 
under Article 101(1) cannot be decided in the abstract, but must be looked at in its legal and 
economic context, and in particular the situation which would have prevailed in the absence of the 
restriction.281 This is also the view taken by the Commission in its various guidelines. For example, 
in its guidelines on Article 101(3) it states that, in determining whether or not an agreement is 
caught by Article 101(1), the question that must be asked is “[d]oes the agreement restrict actual 
or potential competition that would have existed without the agreement?”282 
 
Apart from the ancillary restraints doctrine, another way in which the European Courts have sought 
to limit the ambit of the prohibition in Article 101(1) is by holding that any restrictions of 
competition must be “appreciable” in order to fall within the prohibition.  However, the meaning 
of “appreciability” is not entirely clear in this context, and the concept has been used to mean 
different things in different cases. Another difficulty is that the facts necessary to establish 
appreciability may not be within a business’s knowledge. These two difficulties will be discussed 
in turn below.  
 
The concept of “appreciability” (sometimes referred to as the de minimis principle) was laid down 
by the European Court in 1969 in Völk v Verwaecke.283  In the context of a contractual dispute 
between a supplier and its exclusive distributor, the European Court held that an agreement falls 
                                                     
279 Case T-328/03 O2 (Germany) v Commission [2006] ECR II-1231. 
280 Paras 106-127. 
281 N 268 above paras 75,76. 
282 N 260 above para 18. 
283 Case 5/69 [1969] ECR 295. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
118 
 
outside Article 101(1) where it has “only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account 
the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market in question”.  
The agreement in question contained at least two restrictions of competition: an exclusivity 
obligation on the supplier (not to supply any other distributor within the territory) and an obligation 
on the distributor not to sell competing products.  Logically, therefore, the potential effects on the 
market to which the Court seems to be referring are one or both of the following: 
 
• foreclosure of other potential distributors from selling the supplier’s products: if the 
supplier was in a “weak” position this would mean that other potential distributors would 
have (at least theoretically) the possibility of selling other competing suppliers’ products; 
• foreclosure of other suppliers from the territory: if the distributor was in a “weak” position, 
this would mean that other suppliers would have (at least theoretically) access to other 
potential distributors in the territory. 
 
The Court did not attempt to define what would amount to a “weak” market position, i.e. what 
degree of foreclosure would be regarded as “insignificant”.  
 
In Delimitis, a case which concerned exclusive purchasing agreements for beer, the European 
Court seemed to set conflicting thresholds of foreclosure. On the one hand, it suggested that the 
relevant test is whether access to the market is “denied” to other suppliers. But on the other hand, 
it said that access must merely be made “difficult” for them.284  The Advocate General had advised 
the Court that no specific figure could be set as a “rule of thumb”, but did indicate that there would 
be an appreciable restriction where 40 to 60 per cent of the market was foreclosed to rival 
suppliers.285 
 
In the case of such “vertical” agreements, the Commission has said in its so-called De Minimis 
Notice that it will not regard agreements containing one or more restrictions of competition to be 
appreciable, and will not therefore take any enforcement action, where neither party’s market share 
                                                     
284 Case C-234/89 Delimitis v Henniger Brau [1991] ECR 935 paras 23, 24. 
285 Para 19. 
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exceeds 15 per cent (except where the agreement contained hardcore restrictions such as resale 
price maintenance).286  However, as the Notice itself states, while the Commission will not initiate 
proceedings against parties to agreements that fall within the “safe harbour”, the Notice is subject 
to the views of the European Courts, and in that sense is not legally-binding: 
 
“In cases covered by this Notice, the Commission will not institute proceedings either on 
a complaint or on its own initiative…This Notice is without prejudice to any interpretation 
of Article 101 of the Treaty which might be given by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union”.287   
 
  In addition, the Notice makes clear that there is no presumption that an agreement will restrict 
competition appreciably where this threshold is exceeded: this must be considered on a case-by-
case basis.288  Parties to many vertical agreements therefore have no clear rule or guide as to when 
their agreements will be caught by Article 101(1), and when they will therefore require to satisfy 
the exemption criteria in Article 101(3), or the terms of a block exemption regulation, if they are 
to comply with Article 101. 
 
In the case of “horizontal” agreements, what constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition 
is also unclear.  In Völk v Verwaecke, the European Court did not distinguish between horizontal 
and vertical agreements in saying that agreements with insignificant effects on the market due to 
the weak position of the parties fell outside Article 101(1).  However, it seems that foreclosure of 
third parties is not necessarily relevant, as it is in the case of vertical agreements.  A price-fixing 
agreement between competitors (for example) does not in itself exclude third parties from the 
market: if anything the higher prices might encourage new entry into the market.  
 
In its De Minimis Notice, the Commission has expressed the view that horizontal agreements do 
not appreciably restrict competition where the parties’ combined market share does not exceed 10 
                                                     
286 “Notice on Minor Agreements which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 
101(1) of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union” OJ C291/1 of 30.8.2014 para 8. 
287 Paras 5 and 7. 
288 Para 3. 
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per cent, except in the case of hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing.289  However, it seems 
doubtful whether the Commission’s view is consistent with the post- Völk v Vervaecke case law 
of the European Court, which seems to have taken a tougher stance on the application of Article 
101(1) to horizontal agreements. As noted above, the European Court has stated that there is a 
“notion inherent in the Treaty provisions on competition” that each operator must decide its 
commercial policy independently, and that this “strictly preclude[s]” any direct or indirect contact 
between them which creates “conditions of competition which do not correspond to the normal 
conditions of the market”.  This statement has been made in the context of an exchange of 
information on costs between competitors,290 as well as an agreement between Irish beef 
processors to reduce industry overcapacity.291  It appears that by “normal conditions” of the market 
the Court seems to mean simply the conditions which would have prevailed in the absence of the 
contact: in the latter case the Court implied that the agreement appreciably restricted competition 
because, in the absence of the agreement, the parties would have had no option but to intensify 
their commercial rivalry or resort to mergers.  This seems to set a very low threshold for 
appreciability- effectively any contact between competitors which affects the operation of the 
market would be appreciable.  In this context it would seem that even contacts or agreements 
between “weak” market operators could be caught. So even if the EU Commission itself does not 
take action against a particular agreement because it falls below the de minimis threshold, the 
parties might still be held liable in civil litigation, based on the European Court’s case law. 
 
The difficulty of assessing whether a restriction of competition is appreciable is exacerbated  
by at least two factors: 
 
• The legality (or otherwise) of an agreement under Article 101 is not judged solely at the 
time of signing the agreement.  The prohibition is against implementing an agreement that 
contravenes Article 101, not just entering into such an agreement.  This factor, combined 
                                                     
289 Paras 8,13. 
290 T-Mobile  n 269 above. 
291 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society [2008] ECR I-8637 
paras 34,35. 
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with the fact that appreciability depends, at least to a certain extent, on economic effects, 
means that an agreement’s compatibility with Article 101 can vary over time.292   
• In assessing whether the restriction of competition is appreciable, the European Court has 
held that the agreement must not be considered in isolation, and that other factors might 
combine to mean that an agreement, which would otherwise be innocuous from a 
competition point of view, appreciably restricts competition. This can be called the 
“cumulative effects” doctrine. 
 
We deal with each of these factors in turn. 
 
Regarding the first difficulty (the time factor), even if a business is confident when it enters into 
the agreement, based on its assessment of what the relevant market is (an assessment which itself 
is by no means straightforward) that the parties’ combined market shares are so low that the 
agreement falls outside Article 101(1), that position can change over time.  As Whish and Bailey 
have put it, “an agreement can infringe Article 101(1) at some times and at other times not do so, 
depending on the surrounding facts: in other words it can drift into and out of voidness”.293 As we 
shall see, the same problem applies to the applicability of exemption under Article 101(3): an 
agreement that is caught by Article 101(1) may fulfil the exemption criteria at some times but not 
others, depending on market circumstances. 
 
Clearly it is at best highly burdensome, and at worst impracticable, to expect parties to commercial 
agreements to monitor market circumstances continuously, and to amend or terminate their 
agreements if they fear that, due to a change in market circumstances, they may no longer comply 
with Article 101.  The assessment of whether arrangements comply with Article 101 can be 
difficult enough in itself, without the added burden of having to conduct such continuous 
monitoring.  Even if the parties conclude that amendment or termination of the agreement is 
necessary in the light of market circumstances to comply with the law, they may already be in 
breach the law, and will remain so until the agreement is amended or terminated to comply.  The 
                                                     
292 Whish and Bailey Competition Law 150. 
293 N 292 above. 
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result is that a large number of parties to commercial agreements in the EU may be unknowingly 
breaking the law by operating agreements that infringe Article 101 (unless they happen to qualify 
for exemption under Article 101(3)), which is a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs. 
 
This problem did not exist to the same extent under the pre-1 July 2003 regime, when the parties 
could apply to the Commission, in advance of implementing an arrangement, for a “negative 
clearance” (a declaration by the Commission that the agreement fell outside Article 101(1)).294  
While a negative clearance was not strictly binding, in practice the prospect of either Commission 
enforcement action or third party action against an agreement benefitting from one was remote. 
There was therefore no risk of them being found to be in breach.  However, as noted above, this 
system proved to be unworkable, because the wide notion of “restriction of competition” resulted 
in the Commission being inundated with applications. The Commission therefore resorted to 
giving so-called “comfort letters” in the case of agreements which, on a preliminary review were 
perceived not to raise significant competition problems such as to merit detailed investigation, 
whilst reserving the right to open an investigation if in fact competition problems did arise. 
 
Now that businesses have to make their own self-assessments as to whether their agreements are 
caught by Article 101(1) (and if so whether they qualify for exemption), and given the difficulties 
of making this assessment, the chances of them inadvertently breaking the law, and being subject 
to enforcement action or third party litigation, are considerably higher than before 1 July 2003. 
 
The second difficulty- the doctrine of cumulative effects- is arguably even more acute. In Brasserie 
de Haecht, the European Court held that, even if the impact on the market of an individual 
agreement was insignificant, and hence the agreement in isolation would fall outside Article 101 
(1), if the cumulative effect of the agreement with other such agreements operated by the same 
and other suppliers in the market was to restrict competition appreciably, the individual agreement 
would be caught by Article 101(1).295 
 
                                                     
294 Council Regulation 19/62, n 256 above Art 2. 
295 Case 23/67 Brasserie de Haecht v Wilkin-Janssen ECR Eng Sp Ed 407. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
123 
 
Developing this concept in the Delimitis case, the European Court held that a beer supply 
agreement is prohibited by Article 101 (1) if two cumulative conditions are met: 
 
• it is “difficult or impossible” for new suppliers to get access to the market, taking into 
account inter alia the number of outlets tied to existing suppliers; and 
• the exclusive purchasing agreements operated by the particular supplier in question make 
a “significant contribution” to this sealing-off effect.296 
 
However, there are at least two major problems with each of these conditions.  The first problem 
is that they are imprecise: what degree of “difficulty” of access meets the first condition, and how 
“significant” must the contribution of the individual suppliers’ agreements to the “sealing-off” 
effect be to meet the second condition?  The second problem is that, even if the relevant thresholds 
in these conditions were clear, assessing whether they were met would require possession of 
information which is unavailable either to the supplier, or to any of the purchasers.  
 
In assessing whether their prospective agreement would infringe Article 101, the supplier and 
customer would have to have access to at least the following information: 
 
• the volume of beer supplies which is subject to exclusive purchasing commitments entered 
into by other beer suppliers; 
• the number of tied licensed premises in the market as compared to untied ones; 
• whether there are ‘‘concrete possibilities” for new suppliers to acquire existing breweries, 
or to open new ones to the minimum efficient scale; 
• the duration of each beer supply agreement in the market (so that the average duration in  
the market can be calculated).  In this respect, the Court said: 
 
                                                     
296 Delimitis  n 284 above paras 15-27. 
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“If the duration [of the particular supplier’s agreements] is manifestly excessive in relation 
to the average duration of beer supply agreements generally entered into on the relevant 
market, the individual contract falls under the prohibition under Article 85(1)”.297 
 
It is doubtful whether many breweries would have access to information about the duration of 
other parties’ agreements, far less prospective publicans who have no less an interest in ensuring 
that their agreement is legally enforceable.  Moreover, even if they did have access to the 
information, the complexities of this assessment, and the number of variables and value judgments 
involved, would make it very difficult for a business to predict accurately whether its view of the 
legality of a particular commercial agreement would be shared by a competition authority or court, 
examining the case with the benefit of hindsight and with full information-gathering powers. What 
is a “manifestly excessive” duration for an exclusive purchasing agreement (to quote the words of 
the European Court) is clearly a subjective assessment.   
 
It is remarkable that the logical consequence of the Court’s judgment is that a supplier and 
customer wishing to enter into an exclusive purchasing commitment have to make this sort of 
assessment before entering an agreement, and get the right answer, to avoid breaching the law.  
The Delimitis judgment might work well as a guideline for a regulator to review market structure 
ex post facto with a view to assessing whether regulatory intervention is necessary to make an 
industry more competitive.298  However, it does not enable the parties to predict with any 
reasonable certainty whether their agreements will comply with the law.  
 
A further difficulty has been added to the task of assessing whether commercial arrangements 
between businesses comply with Article 101. Contrary to the traditional approach of the European 
Courts, the European Commission, in its most recent guidelines on horizontal cooperation 
agreements issued in 2011, implied that a restriction of competition under Article 101(1) means a 
                                                     
297 Para 26. 
298 The (then) UK Monopolies and Mergers Commission did precisely this in 1989 when it 
recommended the loosening of ties between brewers and pubs, leading to the introduction of 
legislation to achieve this.  
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reduction in market competition, i.e. rivalry, as opposed to the traditional interpretation as a 
restriction on commercial freedom: 
 
“For an agreement to have restrictive effects on competition within the meaning of Article 
101(1) it must have, or be likely to have, an appreciable adverse impact on at least one of 
the parameters of competition on the market, such as price, output, product quality, product 
variety or innovation.”299 
 
This approach is similar to the “substantial lessening of competition” (SLC) approach taken in 
Australia, Canada and South Africa, which is subject to its own uncertainties, as will be discussed 
below.300  It is not yet entirely clear whether European Courts will endorse the Commission’s new 
approach, and if so to what extent, given their previous case law, but there are signs from the 
European Court’s recent Intel judgment in the context of abuse of dominance that it is sympathetic 
to the Commission’s approach.301 This uncertainty has added further lack of clarity in the 
application of Article 101. 
 
Assuming that the European Courts do endorse the Commission’s new approach, the result is that 
businesses will have to conduct a more detailed economic assessment of the effects or likely effects 
of their arrangements on market competition before they can take a view on whether they comply 
with Article 101. Such economic assessments are to a large extent speculative and uncertain, since 
they involve (a) predicting what future effects on the market the agreement will have (b) predicting 
what the market would be like without the agreement (the “counterfactual”) and (c) comparing the 
“with and without” scenarios in (a) and (b), and taking the view whether competition will be 
substantially less under (a) than (b). Clearly this exercise involves considerable scope for 
uncertainty and conflicting views. 
 
4 2 2 Australia 
                                                     
299 “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements” OJ C11/1 of 14.1.2011 para 27. 
300 Sections 4 2 2 to 4 2 4. 
301 The Intel judgment will be discussed in section 4 4 1 below. 
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In Australia, unlike under EU and (as we shall see) Hong Kong competition law, some types of 
arrangements are specifically prohibited because they are presumed to cause harm to competition. 
Broadly speaking these are: price-fixing, output-restriction, market-division, bid-rigging and 
“third-line forcing”. Indeed the parties which enter into them can be prosecuted criminally if the 
requisite mens rea is present.   
 
Each of these types of arrangement is defined in relatively specific terms.  For example, one of 
these types, price-fixing, is defined as:  
 
“(a) fixing, controlling or maintaining; or 
  (b) providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of; the price for, or a         discount, 
allowance, rebate or credit in relation to:  
  (c) goods or services supplied, or likely to be supplied, by any or all of the parties to the 
contract, arrangement or understanding.”302 
 
Apart from these specific types of arrangements, virtually all others are subject to the test of 
“substantially lessening competition” (the SLC test).303 
 
The term “substantially lessening competition” is not defined in the CCA, but it is clear that the 
term refers to the process of competition in a market, and not to the individual activity of competing 
as under EU law.304  It has been held that competition “expresses itself as rivalrous market 
behaviour” and that it is “a process rather than a situation”.  Competition can be on a number of 
factors: price, service, quality, technology or consistency of product.305  
 
                                                     
302 CCA s 44ZZRD. 
303 CCA s 45. 
304 CCA S 45(3). 
305 Queensland Cooperative Milling Association Ltd, Defiance Holdings Limited (Proposed 
Mergers with Barnes Milling Ltd) (1976) 8 ALR 481, 515.  
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A “lessening” of competition would therefore seem to involve a situation where competition in the 
market becomes less intense or vigorous.  As a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has 
held, “the question is whether the dynamic of competition, what might be called the competitive 
forces in the market, have been ‘substantially lessened’”.306  But how does one determine whether 
this is the case?  For example, would the merger of two businesses with market shares of five per 
cent each in a market with 20 businesses be regarded as harming competition, or does one try to 
predict the outcome of the merger in terms of prices and service quality? 
 
One problem which is immediately evident here is that the agreement may dampen one factor of 
competition, but increase competition in another factor.  For example, if two competitors in a 
market of four players form a joint venture to develop and market a new, more advanced version 
of a product which both previously marketed separately, this may lessen competition between them 
and result in a net increase in market prices, at least in the short term.  However, it may also 
stimulate competition in innovation in the market as a whole, by encouraging the other market 
players to develop rival offers.  In these circumstances, how is one to determine whether the 
agreement lessens competition, or increases it?  It is hard to avoid the conclusion that this is a 
rather subjective, arbitrary assessment. 
 
A second problem is the temporal dimension: over what period of time is the effect on competition 
to be measured?  An agreement may lessen competition in the short term, but in the longer term 
increase it (or vice-versa).  Here, in the case of mergers, the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) has adopted a working rule of practice that it will look at the position over 
a one to two year time frame from the time the agreement takes effect.307  So if the merger initially 
has the effect of increasing prices, but within a two year period prices stabilize or decline, and 
competition on other factors such as innovation increase, in the eyes of the ACCC it may not be 
regarded as substantially lessening competition.  There seems to be no reason why a similar 
approach would not apply to other commercial agreements: it has been held that “substantially 
                                                     
306 O’Brien Glass Industries Ltd v Cool & Sons Pty Ltd [1983] FCA 191 (18 August 1983). 
307 ACCC Merger Guidelines  para 3.14 available at 
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Merger%20guidelines%20-%20Final.PDF (accessed on 8-
11-2017). 
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lessening competition” means the same thing wherever it is used throughout the CCA, including 
Section 45 as well as the merger provisions.308   But such an exercise is a largely speculative and 
subjective one: no-one knows what the market will look like in one or two years, and what impact 
the agreement will have on the market.  
 
By what parameters is a lessening of competition to be assessed?  For example, should it be by 
reference to whether price competition will be reduced, resulting in higher prices? If so, how is 
that likely effect to be determined?  It is useful to distinguish here between “horizontal” agreements 
and “vertical agreements”.  
 
With horizontal agreements, such as joint ventures between competitors, a primary concern, as 
with horizontal mergers, is whether the agreement gives rise to a position of market power, leading 
to increased prices, reduced output, reduced service quality or other adverse effects on consumers.  
In the case of horizontal mergers, section 50 of the CCA provides a list of nine factors which are 
relevant to this assessment, such as the height of barriers to entry in the market, the level of 
concentration in the market, and whether the merger would result in the elimination of a vigorous 
and effective competitor.  These factors must be balanced against each other.  For example, the 
degree to which the merger increases concentration (combined with the extent of existing 
concentration) will be one factor indicating the degree of likelihood that the transaction may result 
in adverse consumer effects. But even if the merger leads to a highly concentrated market, this 
may not lead to market power if barriers to entry are low and any attempt to increase prices would 
attract new entry.  As noted later, South Africa has a list of similar factors for mergers, but the list 
is seldom used in practice, even for mergers, let alone other transactions.309 Clearly, assessing 
whether an agreement will lead to SLC according to this “melting pot” of factors is, to a large 
extent, a subjective and arbitrary exercise. 
 
In assessing SLC, the concern is not just whether the transaction will increase market power 
directly: the foreclosure effects on actual or potential competitors must also be considered.  This 
is particularly so in the case of vertical agreements.  For example, signing-up customers to 
                                                     
308 Australian Gas Light Company v ACCC [2003] FCA 1525 (19 December 2003) para 347. 
309 Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law of South Africa 10.6. 
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exclusive purchasing contracts effectively deprives competitors of the opportunity to serve those 
customers, and the Australian courts have held that this may have the effect of substantially 
lessening competition in the market, at least in certain circumstances, as will be seen below.  One 
difficulty of this assessment is determining what degree of market foreclosure is sufficient to 
constitute a substantial lessening.  A possible test is whether the foreclosure leads to market power.  
As will be seen below in relation to Canada, the Competition Bureau there has stated that there 
will be SLC, in the case of both horizontal and vertical agreements, if the agreement creates, 
maintains or enhances market power.  Another issue, taking again the example of exclusive 
purchasing agreements, is whether it must be practically impossible for competitors to serve the 
customers in question to constitute SLC, or simply more difficult?  Yet another is the extent of 
time to which customers are tied: is six months or one year sufficient, or is three or five years 
necessary? 
 
In the case of EU law, we have seen that similar issues arise in the case of vertical agreements, and 
the Delimitis judgment shows that this is to a large extent an arbitrary and subjective assessment.  
It seems that the same applies in Australia.  In O’Brien,310 one of the issues was whether a 
supplier’s conduct in offering discounts of 45 or 50 per cent to retailers that agreed to purchase 
from it all, or a substantial majority, of their purchases, had the effect of substantially lessening 
competition.  A Full Court of the Federal Court held that it did, albeit not unanimously but by a 
two-to-one majority.  Speaking for the majority, Fox J justified the decision in the following terms: 
 
“The tendency [of the conduct] was to lower the forces of competition in the market, by 
reducing the capacity of retailers to choose between sources of supply, to weaken the 
trading position of competitors, and to inhibit the entry of other competitors”. 
 
He emphasised, however, that this finding was specific to the facts of the case, and the fact that 
the supplier held the largest share of the market (approaching 40 per cent) was particularly 
relevant: 
 
                                                     
310 N 306 above. 
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“I do not suggest that a distinction between a discount based on percentage of total 
requirements and one based on quantity, or value, is necessarily critical.  It all depends upon 
the circumstances.  In the present case, O’Brien occupied in the market the position I have 
described, and a requirement of the former nature has an effect relative to that position.  In 
particular circumstances, another wholesaler who makes the same requirement might not 
offend.  On the other hand, a discount related to value could offend, if, for example, the 
value did represent most of the likely purchases of a sufficient number of retailers.” 
 
So, similar to the approach of the European Court, the majority view was that the competitive 
forces in the market could be lowered, and a substantial lessening of competition result, merely 
from reducing the freedom of retailers to choose between the sources of supply, and inhibiting the 
entry of other potential competitors.  Fox J implied that to avoid a substantial lessening of 
competition, a supplier had to compete “by leaving uninhibited the right of choice, or substitution, 
in the market”.  This sounds very similar to the EU’s “economic freedom” approach to defining a 
restriction of competition which we discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
However, in his dissenting judgment, Franki J stated that the fact that the conduct made it 
substantially more difficult for the wholesaler to sell windscreens to retailers who enjoyed an 
additional discount was not sufficient to constitute a substantial lessening of competition.  In his 
view, the fact that the relevant market seemed to be no less competitive following the conduct 
negated any suggestion that the conduct had substantially lessened competition. Franki J believed 
that a substantial lessening of competition could only be demonstrated if, as a result of the conduct, 
the market was less competitive – presumably by reference to increased prices, lower output, lower 
quality, or less innovation. 
 
As well as the question of whether an agreement lessens, or is likely to lessen competition, another 
difficulty is assessing whether it does so “substantially”.  What does “substantially” mean?  While 
the Australian courts have generally shied away from giving a specific meaning to the term, saying 
that everything depends on the circumstances, and the cases are not consistent, there seems now 
to be a consensus that the word in this context does not mean large or considerable. 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
131 
 
The High Court of Australia has held that the term means “meaningful or relevant to the 
competitive process”,311 and in a UK case, the Competition Tribunal also adopted this definition, 
rejecting the argument that it meant “large”, “considerable” or “weighty”.312 However, this 
definition is unhelpful. It is, like the word “substantially” itself, inherently subjective and 
imprecise. It begs the question: what effect is meaningful or relevant to the competitive process? 
One possible interpretation of this definition is that any effect on price, service quality, innovation 
etc. is “meaningful or relevant to the competitive process”, and therefore once an effect of 
lessening competition is demonstrated, the qualification “substantially” is redundant.    
 
The Australian courts have stressed the difficulties of interpreting the word “substantially” in the 
context of competition.  Franki J acknowledged in O’Brien that “[t]he determination of whether 
conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially lessening competition is a matter of great 
difficulty”. He emphasized the subjectivity of the assessment, echoing Fitzgerald J’s comment in 
Outboard Marine that “…in the end, the answer in this case really depends on little more than 
one’s own instinctive impressions formed by weighing the various considerations in this particular 
market which favour one view or another”.313 
 
In Dandy Power Equipment, Smithers J also emphasised that what was substantial was a question 
of degree and judgment: 
 
“Substantially” is a word the meaning of which in the circumstances in which it is 
applied must, to some extent, be of uncertain incidence and a matter of judgment.  
There is no precise scale by which to measure what is substantial”.314 
 
Smithers J also said that the process involved looking at the “counterfactual”- what the competitive 
situation would have been in the absence of the agreement: 
                                                     
311 Stirling Harbour Services Pty Ltd v Bunbury Port Authority [2000] FCA 38 para 114. 
312 Case No 1214/4/8/13 Global Radio Holdings Limited and Competition Commission [2013] 
CAT 26 paras 24,25. 
313 Outboard Marine (Aust) Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments (No 6) Pty Ltd [1982] FCA 265. 
314 Dandy Power Equipment Pty Ltd and Dandy Power Pty Ltd v Mercury Marine Pty Ltd [1982] 
FCA 178. 
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“To my mind one must look at the relevant significant portion of the market, ask 
oneself how and to what extent there would have been competition therein but for the 
conduct, assess what is left and determine whether what was lost in relation to what 
would have been, is seen to be a substantial lessening of competition”. 
 
If judges find these issues difficult, as they clearly do from the passages cited above, even with the 
benefit of hindsight and full evidence before them, it is all the more difficult for businesses and 
their legal advisers to predict whether their agreements will fall foul of the rules.  Even although 
(unlike in the EU) there is a process in Australia for seeking authorisation for agreements that may 
substantially lessen competition, the use of a subjective and vague standard clearly poses the risk 
that firms may err on the side of safety and seek authorisation in case of doubt, which may not be 
economically efficient.  We return to the issue of authorisations in Chapter 6, when looking at 
possible solutions to the lack of clarity problem. 
 
4 2 3 Canada 
 
Canada, like Australia, uses the SLC test in its Competition Act to address arrangements outside 
the hardcore category (which are expressly-criminalised) and abuse of dominance. Prior to 
amendments to the Competition Act that took effect in 2010, all anti-competitive agreements were 
criminalised. However, one of the amendments that took effect in 2010 was to introduce a 
distinction between hardcore agreements (price-fixing, market-sharing, output-restriction and bid-
rigging) and other agreements. The former category remained criminal, while the latter category 
became subject to a new regime in section 90.1.315 This change arose from a recommendation by 
the Competition Policy Review Panel, whose Final Report in 2008 stated: 
                                                     
315 The Canadian competition legislation has had a long and somewhat tortuous history. 
Originally consisting of criminal provisions, these provisions proved to be ineffective because of 
the difficulty of proving cases to the criminal standard. The Government sought to make 
enforcement more effective by converting the legislation into civil provisions in 1919, and 
setting up a dedicated enforcement agency for the first time. However, the 1919 statute was 
found to be unconstitutional in 1921, leading to the restoration of criminal provisions in 1923. 
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“…criminal law is too blunt an instrument to deal with agreements between competitors 
that do not fall into the ‘hardcore’ cartel category, such as restrictions on advertising or 
strategic alliances, but that may harm competition nonetheless.  A more sophisticated 
economic approach to address the latter has been advocated by the Bureau and other 
experts…”316 
 
As a result, there is no general prohibition of anti-competitive arrangements outside the hardcore 
category, or of abuses of dominant position (although, as we shall see later, the Tribunal can 
impose an administrative penalty for abuse of dominance).  If any such arrangements or abuses 
take place (which are not offset by efficiencies) the Commission may intervene and investigate the 
matter.  If no voluntary settlement is reached, it can bring the matter before the Tribunal for a 
determination that the arrangements or conduct meet the criteria to merit a cease-and- desist order 
that is issued by the Tribunal.  A business does not act illegally unless and until it breaches a 
Tribunal order.317   
 
The Act does not define what SLC means.  However, in its Guidelines, the Competition Bureau 
states that: 
 
“A substantial lessening or prevention of competition results from agreements that are 
likely to create, maintain or enhance the ability of the parties to the agreement to exercise 
market power.  For example, an agreement can lessen competition where parties to the 
agreement are able to sustain higher prices than would exist in the absence of the agreement 
by diminishing existing competition”.318 
 
                                                     
See Michael Trebilcock, Ralph A Winter, Paul Collins and Edward M Iacobucci The Law and 
Economics of Canadian Competition Policy (2002) 8-13.  
316 “Compete to Win” 59. 
317 Competition Act s 66. 
318 “Competitor Collaboration Guidelines” 20, available at:  
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03177.html (accessed on 10-10-
2017). 
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The Act provides a list of eight relevant factors to be taken into account in assessing whether there 
is SLC. These factors are as follows:  
 
• the extent to which foreign products or foreign competitors provide or are likely to provide 
effective competition to the businesses of the parties to the agreement or arrangement; 
• the extent to which acceptable substitutes for products supplied by the parties to the 
agreement or arrangement are or are likely to be available; 
• any barriers to entry into the market, including tariff and non-tariff barriers to international 
trade; interprovincial barriers to trade, and regulatory control over entry; 
• any effect of the agreement or arrangement on the barriers referred to in the last bullet point 
above; 
• the extent to which effective competition remains or would remain in the market; 
• any removal of a vigorous and effective competitor that resulted from the agreement or 
arrangement, or any likelihood that the agreement or arrangement will or would result in 
the removal of such a competitor; 
• the nature and extent of change and innovation in any relevant market; 
• any other factor that is relevant to competition in the market that is or would be affected 
by the agreement or arrangement.319 
 
While the above factors may be a useful checklist for the enforcement authority or courts in 
assessing whether there is SLC, they are of very limited benefit to businesses in assessing in 
advance whether there is likely to be SLC, since there is no indication of how these factors are to 
be weighed against each other in reaching a conclusion as to whether there is SLC. 
 
As under Australian law, it is clear under Canadian law that SLC refers to lessening of competition 
in a market, rather than a restriction of commercial freedom, its counterpart under previous EU 
case law.  The Act also provides a useful clarification.  In assessing whether there is an SLC, it 
states that the Tribunal must not make the finding solely on the basis of evidence of concentration 
                                                     
319 S 90.1(2). 
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or market share.320 This statement re-inforces the message that it is the degree to which the 
intensity of competition has been lessened which matters. However, the problems of what degree 
of lessening is to be considered substantial, and how to measure this, still remain.  
 
The Canadian Federal Court of Appeal commented on how to approach the assessment of SLC in 
the Canada Pipe case.321 Although this was an abuse of dominance case, the SLC test in Canada 
also applies in this context, and there is no reason for supposing that the SLC test would be applied 
in a different way in assessing agreements. The Court held that, as in Australia, assessing SLC 
involves a comparative assessment of the state of competition in the market with and without the 
transaction.  Did (or would, if the question is the likely effect of the conduct in future) the practice 
in question “result in a prevention or lessening of competition as compared to the conditions 
governing in the absence of the practice, and was this lessening of a degree sufficient to be 
considered substantial?”322   
 
The Court held that this exercise involves the comparison of an actual situation (if the conduct is 
current or in the past) with a hypothetical situation (the market situation without the conduct, i.e. 
the “counterfactual”).  In the case of a likely future effect of conduct, it would even involve the 
comparison of two hypothetical situations: the likely market situation with the agreement, and the 
likely market situation without the agreement.  The Court acknowledged the complexity of the 
task, and said that an economist was more competent than a judge to advise on this.  It criticised 
the Tribunal for not having conducted such a comparison, and gave some examples of the issues 
the Tribunal should have considered:  
 
“Proper examination of this question might include the following considerations: whether 
entry or expansion might be substantially faster, more frequent or more significant without 
the [rebate scheme]; whether switching between products and suppliers might be 
substantially more frequent; whether prices might be substantially lower; and whether the 
quality of products might be substantially greater.  In this regard, identification of the 
                                                     
320 S 90.1(3). 
321 Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Canada Pipe Co 2006 FCA 233. 
322 Paras 37-48. 
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occurrence of entry, or reference to evidence of competition subsisting in the presence of 
the impugned practice, is insufficient.”323 
 
Clearly, therefore, the exercise of assessing whether an agreement causes SLC involves similar 
difficulties and subjectivity in Canada as under Australian law.  As noted above, however, 
agreements that cause SLC are not prohibited by law in Canada (as they are in Australia). If, 
therefore, a business enters into an agreement which causes SLC, it has not acted illegally by doing 
so. The Competition Bureau may only bring proceedings in the Tribunal under section 90.1 of the 
Competition Act, applying for an order against the business requiring it to take certain steps to 
remove the SLC, such as amending or terminating the agreement. Alternatively, the business may 
enter into a consent agreement with the Competition Bureau for the same purpose, thereby 
avoiding the need for proceedings in the Tribunal (except that the consent agreement has to be 
endorsed by the Tribunal).324 A breach by the business of a Tribunal order or Tribunal-endorsed 
consent agreement is a criminal offence, punishable by a fine or imprisonment.325  
 
So far, there have been no cases in which the Tribunal has made an order under section 90.1.  In 
the two cases that have been brought by the Commissioner so far under Section 90.1, the 
Commissioner entered into consent agreements with the relevant parties, thereby averting the need 
for the cases to be heard by the Tribunal.   
 
In the first case, the Commissioner had concluded that a joint venture between three airlines (Air 
Canada, United Airlines and Continental Airlines) would prevent or substantially lessen 
competition on certain routes covered by the joint venture.326  Under the terms of the consent 
agreement, they were required to amend their joint venture agreement to exclude those routes from 
the agreement. It appears that the parties have complied with the terms of the consent agreement, 
since no further enforcement action has been brought against the parties since the consent 
agreement was entered into in 2012. 
                                                     
323 Para 58. 
324 S 105. 
325 S 66. 
326 Case CT-2012-001 Air Canada available at www.ct-tc.gc.ca, accessed on 25-09-2017). 
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The second case concerned arrangements between four publishers of e-books, and e-book retailers, 
imposing restrictions on the retailers’ ability to set the retail price (resale price maintenance or 
RPM clauses) and  “most-favoured nation” (MFN) clauses, whereby the price for one retailer was 
set by reference to the price charged to other retailers.327  Under the consent agreement, the 
publishers agreed not to impose RPM clauses, and to take steps to amend any agreements which 
contained RPM and MFN clauses. Again, like the airlines’ case, the actions required to be taken 
under the consent agreement were defined in specific terms. 
 
4 2 4 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, the Competition Act prohibits certain hardcore arrangements without the need to 
show SLC, subject to the possibility of an exemption on certain public interest grounds (these 
grounds will be discussed in section 4 3 4).328 These arrangements are: 
 
• directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any other trading condition; 
• dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or specific types of goods 
or services;  
• collusive tendering; 
• minimum resale price maintenance. 
 
For other arrangements between businesses, the Competition Act uses a similar SLC test as in 
Australia and Canada: “substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market” (again 
subject to a possible exemption on certain public interest grounds).329  As in Canada, the Act does 
not define this term.  However, the same competition test is used for assessing mergers, and 
therefore any guidance provided by the statute or case law on mergers should also be relevant to 
other agreements. In the context of mergers, the Act requires the Commission and Tribunal to 
                                                     
327 Case CT-2014-001 Hachette Book Group Canada Ltd et al available at www.ct-tc.gc.ca, 
(accessed on 25-09-2017). 
328 Competition Act s 4(1)(b). 
329 Competition Act s 4(1)(a). 
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“assess the strength of competition in the relevant market, and the probability that the firms in the 
market after the merger will behave competitively or co-operatively, taking into account any factor 
which is relevant to competition in that market…” The Act then provides a non-exhaustive list of 
eight relevant factors, which is broadly similar to the equivalent list in Canada.  The list is as 
follows: 
 
• the actual and potential level of import competition in the market; 
• the ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory barriers; 
• the level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market; 
• the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
• the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth, innovation, and product 
differentiation; 
• the nature and extent of vertical integration in the market; 
• whether the business or part of the business of a party to the merger or proposed merger 
has failed or is likely to fail; and 
• whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective competitor.330 
 
As in Canada, there is no explicit guidance on how these factors are to be weighed against each 
other in reaching a conclusion as to whether there is SLC. Sutherland and Kemp make the 
following criticisms of these criteria: 
 
“…(1) their impact in evaluating mergers is complex, all of these factors are not weighed 
in the same manner; (2) some of the factors in the list bundle together issues that should be 
kept apart; (3) the list is not a numerus clausus; and (4) a competition authority will not 
have to refer expressly to the list or any factor in it as the type of issues mentioned will 
merely have to be taken into account in so far as they are relevant”.331 
 
                                                     
330 S 12A(2). 
331 Competition Law of South Africa 10.6 
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It seems clear that in South Africa, as in Australia and Canada, it is the degree to which the intensity 
of competition in the market place has been or is likely to be lessened which matters in determining 
whether there is SLC.  However, similar difficulties apply in assessing whether competition will 
be lessened, what degree of lessening is to be regarded as substantial, and how this is to be 
measured: these are ultimately, to a large extent, matters of subjective judgment in each case.   
 
Most enforcement proceedings that the Commission has initiated against anti-competitive 
arrangements have involved hardcore arrangements, and not agreements subject to the SLC test.332 
There is therefore little guidance available on how the Commission or the Tribunal interpret SLC 
in practice. In fact, there appear to be only two published cases so far in which the SLC test has 
been applied, both involving, in a broad sense, agreements between competitors which had the 
effect (or at least the perceived effect) of excluding actual or potential competitors from the market. 
 
The first case, UIPDA, was settled through a consent order and therefore, perhaps for that reason, 
the published analysis is relatively brief.333  This case concerned a local managed health care 
scheme operated by an association of medical practitioners, dentists and optometrists.  One doctor 
was expelled from the association because he had agreed to deal with another managed health 
scheme, allegedly in breach of the first scheme’s rules.  
 
The Commission took the view that the exclusivity restriction, as well as certain geographical 
restrictions on where the members of the scheme could practise, had the effect of substantially 
preventing or lessening competition from competing medical schemes contrary to the Act, and 
were unnecessary to carry out the goals of the organisation.334  
 
It is not clear from the text of the consent order what the relevant markets were in which the 
Commission thought competition had been substantially lessened.  This gives the impression that 
                                                     
332 “Unleashing Rivalry: 10 Years of Enforcement by the South African Competition Authorities” 
42 (2009) available at  http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/10year.pdf 
(accessed on 5-10-2017). 
333 Competition Commission v UDIPA 58/CR/Aug02. 
334 Par 5.2. 
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the Commission was more concerned by the perceived unreasonableness or lack of justification 
for the restrictions than the impact on competition itself, similar to the earlier traditional EU 
approach to analysing restrictions of competition under Article 101 TFEU.  This may be a 
reflection of the fact that the South African law has a broader range of objectives than competition, 
consumer welfare, or economic efficiency. 
 
The competition assessment in the second case, Netstar, took place in the context of a contested 
case.335  The Tribunal found that a group of three vehicle tracking companies, and the industry 
association of which the three companies were members (VESA), had entered into an arrangement 
causing SLC in breach of the Act, by setting certain standards for entry to the association which 
new entrants to the industry could effectively not meet.  The Tribunal held that this practice had 
the effect of blocking entry to the market for stolen vehicle recovery (“SVR”) services, since the 
customers for those services, namely insurance companies, would effectively deal only with 
service providers which had been approved by the trade association.  The Tribunal reached this 
decision after a detailed review of the evidence, including examination of witnesses.  The fact that 
the relevant market for the purpose of assessing whether there was SLC was the SVR market 
appears to have been uncontentious. 
 
However, on appeal to the Competition Appeal Court, the Court took a different view.336  The 
Court stated that there are three elements in assessing whether an arrangement leads to SLC in 
breach of the Act:  
 
• What is the relevant market? (The arrangement only breaches the Act if it leads to SLC in a 
relevant market). 
• Is there SLC in the relevant market?  The Court held that “substantial” for this purpose meant 
that the prevention or lessening of competition must not be “speculative or trivial” but could 
be “notional or hypothetical”. 
                                                     
335 Competition Commission v Netstar (Pty) Ltd & Others 17/CR/Mar05.  
336 Netstar (Pty) Ltd  v Competition Commission 97/CAC/May10. 
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•  Did the agreement or concerted practice cause the SLC. The Court recognised that there could 
be cases, such as this one, where the agreement or concerted practice may be one cause of the 
SLC, but there may also be other causes. In these situations, the Court held that it is only if the 
agreement or practice is the “primary or substantial” cause of the SLC, or in other words “plays 
the dominant role” in the SLC, that it will breach the Act.  In this case, the Court held, in 
respect of the third element, that the predominant cause of the SLC was not the standards of 
the association, but the requirements of the South African Insurance Association and its 
members, which decided to use VESA accreditation in giving reduced or discounted 
premiums.337 The Court therefore overturned the Tribunal’s decision. 
 
The test of whether the agreement is the “primary or substantial cause” of the SLC seems relatively 
unusual by international standards. It is not reflected in the competition laws of Canada and 
Australia, where the approach, as we have seen above, is to look at the counterfactual, i.e. to 
compare the situation with and without the agreement, to assess whether there is SLC. This 
amounts to a “but for” test: if competition would not have been substantially lessened “but for” 
the agreement, the SLC test will be satisfied. In the EU, we saw that an agreement which would 
not in itself materially restrict competition may be held to do so, if it is part of a group of similar 
agreements which in combination materially restrict competition.  
 
4 2 5 Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, the competition test is exactly the same as under EU competition law: “prevent, 
restrict or distort competition”.338  The extent to which the Hong Kong courts will be guided by 
EU case law remains to be seen: the Hong Kong law took effect on 14 December 2015 and there 
have so far been no substantive judgments by the Competition Tribunal interpreting this term.  
While the UK and Jersey competition laws (which also use the EU test) contain express provisions 
stating that the courts must interpret the law insofar as possible consistently with EU case law,339 
the Hong Kong law contains no such provision.  The result is that there is even greater lack of 
                                                     
337 Pars 66-71. 
338 Competition Ordinance s 6. 
339 Competition Act 1998 s 60 and Competition (Jersey) Law s 60, respectively. 
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clarity in Hong Kong competition law than in EU competition law as to what the term “prevent, 
restrict or distort competition” means.  
 
4 3 Exemption or authorisation of arrangements 
 
4 3 1 EU 
 
In the EU, Article 101(3) provides for an exemption from the prohibition of anti-competitive 
arrangements in Article 101(1) if certain conditions are satisfied.  Article 101(3) provides as 
follows: 
 
“The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of: 
• any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
• any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
• any concerted practice or category of concerted practices 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting 
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: 
 
• impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; or 
• afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a 
substantial part of the products in question.” 
 
As was mentioned in section 4 2, before 1 July 2003, Article 101(3) was not directly applicable, 
and the only way the parties could obtain exemption was to apply to the Commission for an 
individual exemption decision, unless the agreement fell within a “block exemption” regulation.  
Since many vertical agreements satisfied the conditions of block exemptions, or could be 
structured so that they did, in practice it was mostly horizontal agreements such as joint ventures 
that were notified. 
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With the ability of the parties to obtain the Commission’s decision on the agreement (one way or 
the other) prior to its being implemented, there was little risk, at least in theory, of the parties 
committing an infringement, if they applied for a decision.  In practice, exemption decisions took 
a long time to obtain, because of the Commission being overburdened with exemption applications 
(one of the reasons why the process was abolished).  Many parties were therefore prepared either 
to settle for informal, non-legally binding “comfort letters”, or to implement the agreement and 
rely on the fact that notification protected them from the risk of fines, if not a finding of breach, if 
exemption was subsequently refused.  This meant that the vagueness in the terms of Article 101(3), 
which had never been defined clearly by the European Courts- such as the exact scope of the 
benefits which are relevant, what constitutes a “fair share” of benefits for consumers, and what a 
“substantial part of the products in question” means- were not a great source of concern for 
businesses. In fact, if anything, the vagueness was a benefit: it enabled the parties to bring more 
arguments into play in their exemption applications. 
 
However, on 1 July 2003, the notification system was abolished, and Article 101(3) became 
directly applicable.340 Since then, businesses have had to assess for themselves not only whether 
their agreement is caught by Article 101(1), but also, if it is, whether it satisfies the exemption 
criteria in Article 101(3). Making the wrong assessment could mean that they commit an 
infringement.  The vagueness in Article 101(3) has therefore become a major concern for 
businesses. Even although, nowadays, most enforcement by the European Commission is directed 
at “hardcore” collusion such as price-fixing, businesses still need to ensure that they comply with 
the law in entering into other arrangements. Removing any mechanism for gaining clearance or 
comfort from the Commission has therefore made the compliance task more burdensome for 
businesses and their legal advisers than it was before.341 
                                                     
340 Council Regulation 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the Rules on 
Competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L1/1 of 4.1.2003.  
341 For legal practitioners’ confirmation of this point, see Stephen Kinsella and Anouck Meier 
“Decentralisation, or the Law of Unintended Consequences” Competition Policy International 
29 October 2008, available at: 
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/decentralization-or-the-law-of-unintended-
consequences/ (accessed on 5-6-2017). 
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Conscious of this fact, shortly after Article 101(3) became directly applicable, the Commission 
issued guidelines on its application.342  However, it is doubtful whether these guidelines have 
achieved the Commission’s objective of creating greater clarity for businesses, enforcers, and 
courts.  If anything they may have increased the lack of clarity. This is for two main reasons.  The 
first is that it is not clear whether the Commission’s views are consistent with the terms of the 
TFEU, or the views of the European Courts.  The second is that, even if the guidelines are legally 
correct, the methodology that the Commission sets out in the guidelines for assessing whether the 
exemption criteria are satisfied is so complex that it does not enable businesses to predict with 
confidence whether their agreement is exempt.  These reasons are explained in turn below.   
 
Regarding consistency with the TFEU and the Courts’ case law, uncertainty arises from at least 
the following: 
 
• As noted in section 4 2, the Commission now defines an appreciable restriction of 
competition under Article 101(1) as one which adversely affects consumers (in terms of 
prices, innovation, quality, etc). However, the European Courts have held that the effects 
on consumers are only relevant under Article 101(3), not 101(1).343  Moreover, as also 
noted in section 4 2, the Courts’ judgments themselves are to some extent inconsistent with 
each other. 
• The Commission defines the relevant benefits of the agreement for the purpose of the first 
exemption criterion under Article 101(3) strictly in terms of its economic benefits (for 
consumers), whereas in previous cases the European Court has indicated that other public 
interest benefits, such as improving  employment levels, may also be taken into account.  
The scope of the benefits which may be taken into account is therefore unclear. As Jones 
and Sufrin state: “…the Commission, in adopting the consumer welfare standard, has 
eschewed the use of competition law to protect or advance other interests, but the case law 
                                                     
342 “Guidelines on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty” OJ C101/1 of 27.4.2004. 
343 Cases C-501/06 P etc GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2008] ECR I-9291. 
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of the EU Courts, and the decisional practice of the Commission in the past, is not so 
clear”.344 
• In assessing what constitutes a “fair share” of benefits to consumers, the wording of the 
Treaty suggests that this involves an assessment of the extent to which the benefits of the 
agreement- economic or otherwise- are passed on to consumers and an assessment of 
whether the amount of benefits passed on is “fair” (clearly a very subjective assessment). 
The Treaty does not state that any weighing of benefits against harm to competition is 
required. Indeed, the Commission previously interpreted the term “fair share” in this way 
in its exemption decisions.345 However, the guidelines set out a different methodology, 
involving a quantification of the harm to consumers resulting from the restriction of 
competition under Article 101(1), and a quantification (where possible) of the benefits to 
consumers from the agreement.  A “fair share”, according to the Commission guidelines, 
is one where the latter exceeds the former.346  This novel approach to the application of 
Article 101 was no doubt driven by the Commission’s desire to align its approach under 
Article 101 with the “more economic” approach it had adopted in respect of mergers, where 
the test is whether the merger is likely to result in net harm to consumers.  It is not yet clear, 
however, whether this approach will be endorsed by the European Courts. 
 
Turning to the complexity of the methodology, even if the Commission’s new approach to 
assessing what constitutes a “fair share” of benefits for consumers is endorsed by the European 
Courts, it clearly involves considerable complexities, making it difficult for businesses to predict 
whether their agreement will be exempt. Quantification of future consumer harm and future 
consumer benefits is not something that most businesses or their legal advisers are qualified to do, 
and in any event is a largely subjective assessment. One article comments that, for such a 
“consumer welfare balancing” test to work satisfactorily: 
 
                                                     
344 EU Competition Law 41. 
345 For example GEC/Weir Sodium Circulators OJ L327/26 of 20.12.1977; Vacuum Interrupters OJ 
L383/1 of 31.12.1980; Mitchell Cotts/Sofiltra OJ L41/31 of 11.2.1987. 
346 Guidelines on Article 101(3) n 299 above para 85. 
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“…our courts and competition authorities would have to be populated by enlightened 
economists born and bred in the arcane business of balancing pro- and anti-competitive 
effects- a sort of philosopher King, like those whom Plato would have ruling his 
Republic.”347  
 
It is an arbitrary and subjective exercise because what counts as a benefit is not objectively 
verifiable, and in any event may not be quantifiable.  For example, where two competitors set up 
a joint venture to manufacture a more expensive and technologically-advanced new product to 
replace the cheaper older products which each of them were previously producing, how is one to 
determine whether the higher price is worth paying to have a more advanced product?  Different 
people may reach different views on such an issue. In the case of such “qualitative efficiencies” 
the Commission itself concedes that this “necessarily requires a value judgment”.348 
 
As Armentano comments: 
 
“…the problem with these calculations is that they cannot actually be made, because 
individual costs and benefits are ultimately subjective and personal: they cannot simply be 
added up or subtracted to determine net social efficiency or welfare.”349 
 
Indeed, recent empirical evidence suggests that the consumer benefits traditionally recognised in 
competition law- lower prices, higher quality and greater choice- may be an incomplete or 
inaccurate measure of consumer preferences. A survey by the global market research firm AC 
Nielsen in 2016 found that “[n]early 75% of global respondents, on average, say that a brand’s 
                                                     
347 Christian Ahlborn and A Jorge Padilla “From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the 
Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law” 12th Annual Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, Florence 8-9 June 2007 42. 
348 Guidelines on Article 101(3) n 299 above para 103. 
349 Antitrust: The Case for Repeal 102. 
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country of origin is as important as or more important than nine other purchasing drivers, including 
selection/choice, price, function and quality”.350 
 
4 3 2 Australia 
 
In Australia, the ACCC may authorise businesses to engage in anti-competitive agreements or 
conduct (other than misuse of market power) if it is satisfied that there is a benefit to the public 
from the agreements or conduct which outweighs any public detriment caused by any lessening of 
competition.351  An application for this purpose must be made to the ACCC. 
 
The CCA gives only two examples of public benefits, but these are non-exhaustive, namely that 
the agreements or conduct lead to: 
 
• a significant increase in the real value of exports; and 
• a significant substitution of domestic products for imported goods. 
 
Other public benefits that have been held to outweigh the harm to competition include increases 
in productive efficiency;352 environmental benefits and promoting growth in jobs;353 redressing 
the bargaining power of small and medium-sized entities;354 and savings in transaction costs.355  
In these cases the reasoning is relatively brief: on the negative side of the balance the Commission 
simply said that the public detriment arising from the SLC was not significant.  So the assessment 
was largely qualitative rather than quantitative.  Where the benefit consisted of productive 
efficiencies, no attempt appears to have been made to quantify the efficiencies, or the public 
                                                     
350 See http://www.nielsen.com/bd/en/press-room/2016/the-global-battleground-for-
consumer-goods-new-nielsen-research-finds-75-percent-of-consumers-say-brand-
origin.print.html (accessed on 8-2-2018).  
351 CCA s 90. 
352 DP World Australia Ltd & Patrick Stevedores Pty Ltd A91238-A91240. 
353 Gladstone Ports Corporation & Ors A91208. 
354 Liquor Stax Australia Pty Ltd A9123. 
355 N 310 above. 
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detriment, and weigh them against each other.  The ACCC has denied authorisation where it was 
satisfied that the alleged benefits could be achieved in a way that did not involve SLC.356  
 
In its “Guide to Authorisation”, the ACCC distinguishes between “economic benefits” and “non-
economic benefits”, defining the former in terms of efficiencies, i.e. productive, allocative and 
dynamic efficiencies.357  If the efficiencies outweigh the public detriment caused by the SLC, 
authorisation will be granted.  The Australian Competition Tribunal has described this as a “form 
of the total welfare standard”.358  Under the total welfare standard the efficiencies which the 
agreement brings about are weighed against the “deadweight loss” caused from the reduction of 
competition, and if the former is greater than the latter, the transaction is allowed.  As was 
explained in Chapter 2,359 the deadweight loss is essentially the loss of allocative inefficiency 
resulting from the fact that some customers who would have bought the product at the competitive 
price have ceased to buy the product altogether, because of the higher prices resulting from the 
reduction of competition, and will spend their money on products they value less. The fact that the 
other customers are buying the product at a higher price is considered irrelevant under the total 
welfare test: the wealth transfer from consumers to producers is considered neutral because those 
resources are not lost to society.360  This contrasts with the EU Commission’s approach under EU 
competition law, where higher prices to any consumers are regarded as negative under the net 
consumer welfare test. 
 
The ACCC makes it clear that the assessment is not simply a matter of whether the numerical 
value of the benefits exceeds that of the detriment (in any case quantification may not always be 
possible) but weightings have to be applied.361  So it is not clear, for example, whether a “merger-
to-monopoly” would be authorised, even if the productive efficiencies substantially exceeded the 
deadweight loss caused by consumers ceasing to buy the products. 
                                                     
356 See for example Brisbane Marine Pilots Pty Ltd A91235; Maquarie Generation & Ors A91198 
and A91199. 
357 ACCC December 2010 para 5.15, available at www.accc.gov.au. 
358 Re Qantas Airways Ltd [2004] ACompT 9. 
359 Section 2.5. 
360 Paras 5.21-5.32. 
361 Paras 5.28-5.30. 
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In addition to the facility for applying for authorisation on grounds of countervailing public 
benefits, Australia also has a system of notification for exclusive dealing agreements.362 Exclusive 
dealing can be summarised as a situation where “one trader [imposes] restrictions on another 
freedom to choose with whom, in what, or where it deals”.363 Exclusive dealing is generally only 
prohibited if it has, or is likely to have, the effect of substantially lessening competition (“the SLC 
test”). However, in the case of one form of exclusive dealing, namely “third line forcing”, it is 
prohibited outright. Third line forcing “involves the supply of goods or services on condition that 
the purchaser acquires goods or services from a particular party or third party, or a refusal to supply 
because the purchaser will not agree to that condition”.364 
 
Notification gives the parties immunity from prosecution until such time (if ever) that the ACCC 
decides to revoke the immunity, which it is entitled to do after serving notice on the parties, if it is 
satisfied that the likely public benefit from the conduct will not outweigh the detriment to the 
public. In the case of third line forcing, the immunity will commence 14 days after notification, 
unless the ACCC has issued a draft notification within that period. In the case of other forms of 
exclusive dealing, the immunity will commence upon notification. The ACCC may consult 
interested parties when assessing a notification, and a copy of the notification is placed on a public 
register.365 
 
 
4 3 3 Canada 
 
In Canada, unlike in the EU and Australia, no exemption or authorization is possible for hardcore 
arrangements. Non-hardcore arrangements that satisfy the SLC test are assessed under a form of 
the total welfare standard, as in Australia. The Tribunal may not make an order in respect of an 
arrangement if it finds that it: “has brought about or is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that 
                                                     
362 CCA s 93 in conjunction with s47(2)-(9). 
363 ACCC “Guide to Exclusive Dealing Notifications” 2011 p 1. 
364 N 365 above. 
365 CCA s 95. 
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will be greater than, and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of competition that 
will result” from the agreement and that “the gains in efficiency would not have been attained if 
the order had been made”.366  Unlike Australia, however, there is no formal process for applying 
for exemption or authorisation of agreements, or provision allowing public interest benefits other 
than efficiency to be taken into account. 
 
The Bureau’s Guidelines give examples of relevant efficiencies: reductions in costs due to 
rationalisation of sales and advertising functions; improved utilisation of distribution and 
warehousing; increased specialisation in distribution, sales and marketing functions; more 
intensive use of a network infrastructure; and improvements in product quality.367 Gains that are 
merely redistribution of income, such as cost savings from extracting lower prices from suppliers, 
are expressly excluded.368    
 
Although the total welfare standard appears on its face to be more objective than the European 
Commission’s “net consumer welfare” test, the analysis of whether an arrangement increases total 
welfare is complex, since efficiencies are not always easily quantifiable, and the calculation of 
deadweight loss is far from straightforward. These difficulties are illustrated by the leading 
Canadian case on this subject, Superior Propane, which concerned a merger.369   
 
This case highlights three additional factors that complicate the assessment in Canada of whether 
the efficiency gains outweigh the anti-competitive harm: 
 
• The Court held that the wealth transfer from consumers to producers should not always be 
regarded as neutral. It had to be determined whether any part of the transfer was “socially 
adverse”, and therefore should weigh more heavily in the balance than the interests of 
shareholders of the merged firm.  If so, a weight should be assigned to that portion and the 
amount should be added to the deadweight loss in assessing whether efficiencies were 
                                                     
366 S 90.1(4). 
367 “Competitor Collaboration Guidelines” s 3.5.1. 
368 S 90.1(5). 
369 Canada (Commissioner for Competition) v Superior Propane Inc 2003 FCA 53 (Jan 31 2003). 
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greater than the anti-competitive effects.  The Court accepted the Competition Tribunal’s 
finding that the only part of the transfer that was socially adverse was the extra revenue 
from the estimated price increase for low-income households that used propane for 
essential purposes and had no good alternatives.370  The Tribunal had no evidence on the 
record as to what weight should be attributed to that portion, but even if it was doubled, 
found that when this amount was added to the deadweight loss, the efficiencies still were 
substantially greater.  On this basis the merger was allowed, even although it created a 
monopoly in certain parts of Canada. One commentator has pointed out that such a 
weighing exercise: 
 
“…places a hugely onerous burden on the Commissioner to present a precise socio-
economic profile of consumers and shareholders of producers in order to measure the 
impact of socially adverse redistributive effects”.371 
 
• The Court held that, since one of the objectives of the Competition Act was “to ensure that 
small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the 
Canadian economy”, whether the merger denied SMEs that opportunity was one of the 
factors that would weigh negatively in the balance. Although it was found that the merger 
did not do so in this case,372 this factor illustrates the complications that can arise when 
competition laws have conflicting objectives, as we discussed in Chapter 2.373 The 
conventional view, at least in the US and EU, is that competition law is about protecting 
the competitive process, not individual competitors, and in principle firms which are more 
efficient (even through the fact that they are bigger) should be allowed, and indeed 
encouraged, to succeed.  It has been argued that if SMEs are to be protected, this should be 
done through methods other than competition law.374  By contrast, the competition laws of 
Canada and South Africa list as one of their objectives ensuring that SMEs have “an 
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equitable opportunity to participate in the economy”. The assessment of whether the 
opportunity that a transaction might deny to SMEs is an “equitable” one is clearly a matter 
of subjective judgment and therefore unclear as a matter of law. 
• The requirement in the Act is not just that the efficiencies are greater than the effects of the 
lessening of competition, but also that they offset them.  The Tribunal held that this meant 
that the excess of efficiencies over the negative effects had to be “substantial”.375  It is not 
clear how big the gap between efficiencies and negative effects has to be in order to be 
regarded as substantial- again this is a matter of subjective judgment in each case.  (We 
noted in section 4 2 the subjectivity which is also involved in assessing what whether a 
lessening of competition is “substantial”).  
 
If these matters are difficult for the authorities and courts, assessing the matter with the benefits of 
full evidence and expert testimony, and often after the effects of the commercial transaction have 
been witnessed, it is clearly even more difficult and burdensome for businesses to assess in advance 
of entering into the commercial arrangement, without such benefits, whether the arrangement 
would qualify for this exclusion.  
 
4 3 4 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, arrangements that cause SLC will not lead to liability where a party to the 
arrangement can prove that “any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting 
from it outweighs that [SLC] effect”.376 As in Australia and Canada, this appears to be a form of 
the total welfare standard. For mergers, the wording of the exclusion is slightly different: instead 
of “outweigh”, the wording is “greater than, and offset”, which is identical to the Canadian 
wording.  It is not clear whether these differences are inadvertent or whether they are intended to 
convey different meanings. There does not seem to be any logical reason to have different 
standards for mergers and agreements, and in Canada the same standard is used for both.  
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The Tribunal considered the meaning of this exclusion, in the context of mergers, in its Trident 
Steel judgment.377 The reasoning in the judgment is somewhat obscure, and does not seem to sit 
entirely consistently with the wording of the Act.  
 
The Tribunal found that the merger would cause SLC in the market for processed steel panels for 
the outer body of motor vehicles.  The merged entity would be the only domestic producer of these 
products, and neither competition from imports nor countervailing bargaining power would 
prevent it from exercising market power.378 
 
The Tribunal next considered whether the exclusion on grounds of economic efficiency applied.  
The Tribunal noted that this exclusion was derived from the equivalent one in Canada, where it 
had been interpreted in essence as constituting a total welfare (or total surplus) standard. (At that 
time the Superior Propane judgment in Canada, and the qualifications it made to the total welfare 
standard under the Competition Act there, had not yet been issued).  The Tribunal surveyed the 
arguments in the economic literature for and against the total welfare standard, but noted that the 
question was not whether the standard was desirable (as it was already contained in the statute) 
but how it should be interpreted.379  
 
Regarding the issue of what efficiencies should be considered on the positive side of the equation, 
the Tribunal held that only “real” efficiencies or economies should be taken into account, such as 
new products or processes, and production efficiencies.  Mere pecuniary efficiencies such as 
negotiating better terms from suppliers should not be taken into account, since these do not relate 
to a saving of society’s resources.380 The Tribunal appeared to suggest that mere proof of real 
efficiencies was sufficient on the efficiency side of the equation, without the need to quantify these 
efficiencies. But as Sutherland has pointed out, this conflicts with the statutory criterion that the 
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efficiency is “greater than” and “offsets” the anti-competitive effects of the merger, implying that 
some quantification of the efficiency is required.381 
 
So far, the reasoning was relatively unsurprising.  What was surprising was that the Tribunal then 
expressed the view that the extent to which efficiencies were passed on to consumers was relevant 
under the Act, even though there is no express provision for this in the Act itself, and this issue is 
not relevant to the total welfare approach that the Tribunal appeared to have accepted.  The 
Tribunal proposed a sliding scale: the greater and more compelling the efficiencies, the less need 
there is to show that these are passed on to consumers, and vice- versa.  The Tribunal recognized 
the uncertainty embodied in this approach, but disposed of this concern in the following terms: 
 
“Whilst this approach might be criticised for giving the competition authority too 
much discretion at the expense of business certainty, the alternative, which is to 
interpret this section as a mathematical comparison of two areas on a Williamson 
diagram, permits an approach so clinical and rigid that it would reduce the proper 
exercise of a discretion to a matter of calculus.”382 
 
The Tribunal in this case did not feel compelled to assess what proportion of efficiencies should 
be passed on to consumers, since it found that “the efficiencies claimed are so overwhelming…that 
they will dwarf the anti-competitive effects”.383  The anti-competitive effects appear to have been 
regarded as, at most, the revenue from the price increase that the merged entity could sustain before 
customers resorted to imports, which was not much higher than the market price.  The Tribunal in 
practice therefore did not fully apply the total welfare standard: under that standard the price 
increase up to the level of the import parity price would have been regarded as neutral.  The end 
result, therefore, as in Canada, seems to be a “compromise” between the total welfare and the 
consumer welfare approach.  
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In the context of a merger approval process, as in Trident, the parties await clearance from the 
authority proceeding with a transaction, and therefore do not have to rely on their own self-
assessment of whether the efficiency gains outweigh the harm to competition before proceeding 
to implement the merger. It is a different matter for other commercial arrangements, where the 
parties do have to rely on their own self-assessment. As noted in relation to Canada, even a 
“simple” total welfare assessment, i.e. one that does not include an assessment of the extent to 
which the efficiencies are passed on to consumers, is beyond the capacity of businesses and judges, 
and even economists who have the available analytical tools may reach different conclusions.  In 
South Africa, if a business’s assessment is that it can implement the arrangement because the 
exclusion applies, and the Commission subsequently disagrees, the business is not only exposed 
to the prospect of proceedings by the authority with a view to requiring the parties to amend or 
terminate the agreement, as in Canada. It may already have broken the law by implementing the 
agreement. As we will discuss later, this is a matter of great concern from a rule of law point of 
view. 
 
In the Netstar case,384 no such assessment was appropriate because no reasonable efficiency 
arguments were available, but in a joint venture or other type of cooperation agreement between 
competitors falling short of a merger, such an assessment may well be required.   
 
Apart from minimum resale price maintenance, all vertical agreements can also benefit from the 
economic efficiency exclusion if they satisfy the test. This provision appears to have been applied 
in only one case, Hibiscus Coast Municipality,385 but this case appears to have been settled by a 
consent order, and it remains to be seen what kind of analysis will applied in dealing with 
competition and efficiency issues arising from vertical agreements. 
 
Any agreement, horizontal or vertical, which might otherwise be prohibited may also be eligible 
for an exemption on other grounds of public policy, if an application is made to the Commission, 
and the Commission is satisfied that it contributes to any of the following objectives: 
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• maintenance or promotion of exports; 
• promotion of the ability of small businesses, or those controlled or owned by historically 
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; 
• change in productive capacity necessary to stop decline in an industry; or 
• the economic stability of any industry designated by the Minister of Trade and Industry, 
after consultation with the Minister responsible for the industry in question.386 
 
The Commission must also be satisfied that any restriction on the parties is required to attain the 
relevant objective. 
 
4 3 5 Hong Kong 
 
For arrangements which have the “object or effect” of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition, an exclusion is available in identical terms to Article 101(3) of the TFEU under EU 
law, requiring that the arrangements satisfy four criteria to qualify for the exclusion (improvements 
in production or distribution, fair share of the benefits passed on to consumers, etc.).387 
 
We noted in section 4 3 1 the uncertainties that have arisen under EU law regarding the  
Commission’s “re-interpretation” of this provision (and whether the European Courts will follow 
it), as well as the types of benefits which qualify for the exclusion: are these only economic 
benefits, or do they include non-economic benefits such as promoting employment or 
environmental protection?  So far there is no Tribunal judgment on these issues. Similar 
uncertainties have effectively been “imported” into Hong Kong law from the EU.   
 
Unlike the EU, a facility is available whereby the parties can apply to the Commission for a 
decision as to whether the exclusion applies to a particular agreement, but the Commission is only 
required to give a decision if certain conditions are satisfied, notably if the application “poses novel 
or unresolved questions of wider importance or public interest” and “there is no clarification in 
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existing case law or decisions of the Commission”.388 No decisions have yet been issued under 
this provision. 
 
4 4 Dominance / Substantial Market Power  
 
4 4 1 Introduction: the problem of market definition 
 
To assess whether a firm has a dominant position or substantial market power in a market, one 
needs to know what the market is.  In all of the subject jurisdictions, the starting point for 
determining whether a firm has a dominant position or substantial market power is therefore the 
definition of the relevant market.  The relevant market is also usually defined in the context of 
assessing whether an arrangement substantially lessens competition in a market, and the South 
African courts have stated that this is a necessary step in the analysis.389 However, market 
definition tends to be regarded as an even more critical element in the case of abuse or misuse of 
market power, because of the extra obligations which firms incur if they are found to be dominant 
or have substantial market power. 
 
The concept of the relevant market is not defined in the competition legislation of any of the subject 
jurisdictions apart from Australia, where the legislation states that “market means a market in 
Australia and, when used in relation to any goods services, includes a market for those goods and 
services and other goods or services that are substitutable for, or otherwise competitive with, the 
first-mentioned goods or services.”390 
 
The relevant market is essentially a hypothetical construct (as indeed are the concepts of dominant 
position and substantial market power, as we shall see later).  It has both a product dimension, and 
a geographical dimension, and involves looking at both demand-side substitutability and supply-
side substitutability.  The test that is normally used is commonly-known as the SSNIP (small 
significant non-transitory increase in price) test.  Starting with the product which the business in 
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question is producing, if a hypothetical monopolist in the supply of that product applied a small 
(five to ten per cent) non-transitory (i.e. lasting) increase in price, would customers switch to other 
products, or producers in other geographical locations? If so, those other products and locations 
are included in the “candidate” relevant product market and “candidate” relevant geographical 
market respectively.  The process is then repeated (and if necessary repeated again) until the 
answer is “no” to both the product market and geographical market.  The resulting markets are 
then the relevant product market and relevant geographical market.  A fuller description of the 
market definition process can be found in any standard competition law textbook.391  
 
It may be that in certain situations the definition of the relevant product/service market or 
geographical market is obvious.  For example, as regards the product/service market, for the 
international transport of certain goods such as vehicles, there may be no substitute for shipping 
lines: airlines would not be a substitute, as transporting vehicles by air would be impracticable.  
Similarly, regarding the geographical market, consumers requiring the services of a mobile 
telecommunications operator are generally restricted to dealing with operators which have licences 
within the jurisdiction in question, so the relevant market for mobile services would be national.   
 
However, it can readily be seen that in many cases, the answer will be unclear and a matter of 
judgment, that is, subjective.  For example, if the price of cola drinks increased by five to ten per 
cent, would consumers switch to other soft drinks?  Some may do so and some may not.  And if 
the price of chicken in a local supermarket went up by five to ten per cent, would consumers travel 
further afield to buy chicken, and if so how far?  Where a shopper has a choice of buying cheese 
in a local farmers’ market or in a supermarket ten minutes’ walk away, are they in the same relevant 
market? The digital, internet age complicates matters further. To what extent is Amazon a 
substitute for the local bookstore, for example?  Many products can be bought online as well as in 
local shops. In determining the geographical market from a customer point of view, is it only 
physical forms of buying the product (going into a shop) which is to be taken into account (in 
which case the relevant geographical market may be local) or should online distribution be taken 
into account (in which case the relevant geographical market may be much wider)? Are “over-the-
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top” (i.e. internet-based) phone calls substitutable for telephone calls via fixed or mobile networks?  
And what if there is no price for the product at all, at least for the initial, basic version of a service, 
which is the model for many internet services – how can one hypothesise about the effects of a 
notional increase in price when there is no price?  
 
Whish and Bailey comment on the difficulty of the market definition process as follows: 
 
“Conceptually, the idea that the relevant market consists of goods and services that are 
interchangeable with each other is simple enough. In practice, however, the measurement 
of interchangeability can give rise to considerable problems for a variety of reasons: for 
example there may be no data on the issue, or the data that exist may be unreliable, 
incomplete or deficient in some other way. A further problem is that, in many cases, the 
data will be open to (at least) two interpretations. It is often the case therefore that market 
definition is extremely difficult: this is why the EU Courts have recognised that the 
Commission has a ‘margin of assessment’ in economic matters such as market 
definition”.392  
 
In other words, a firm’s liability under competition law may depend on information that is not 
within its possession, and is in any event ambiguous. Moreover, the courts themselves have 
expressly recognised that the Commission has a discretion as to how to interpret this information 
and define the market, thereby potentially triggering a business’s liability under competition law. 
This is extremely troubling from a rule of law standpoint. 
 
Once the relevant market has been identified (or, given the hypothetical and arbitrary nature of the 
exercise, “selected” is probably a more appropriate word) the next issue is whether the business in 
question has a dominant position or substantial market power. As we shall see, these concepts, like 
the concept of relevant market, are to a large extent subjective. 
 
4 4 2 EU 
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The EU uses the concept of “dominant position”.  However here, there appears to be an inherent 
contradiction in Article 102 of the EU Treaty, as interpreted by the European Courts.  Dominant 
position has been identified as: 
 
“…a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent 
effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and ultimately 
of its consumers”.393 
 
However, the ability to act independently seems incompatible with the concept of exclusionary 
abuses.  Why would a firm that was independent- i.e. free from competitive constraints - need to 
take steps to exclude competitors?  To take an example from the case law, why did British Airways 
need to offer travel agents increased commission in the form of the special bonus scheme in that 
case (which the European Courts decided was abusive since it tied travel agents to BA at the 
expense of its competitors) if it was genuinely capable of acting independently from its 
competitors?394  If the latter was the case, could it not have actually reduced its commission rates, 
in the knowledge that travel agents would still have to sell as many BA tickets as possible to 
maximize their profits, and that travel agents would not switch to competitors (in the same way 
that, conversely, a dominant firm can charge higher prices to customers without fear of losing 
customers to such an extent as to make it unprofitable to do so).  So although a statutory monopoly 
may be able to act independently in the market, because by definition it has no competitors, it 
seems that independence per se cannot be the appropriate test for dominant position.  
 
There are two possible answers to this question, both arising from the seminal definition of 
“dominant position” by the European Court in the United Brands case cited above.  
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The first answer is that the word “independently” is qualified by the words “to an appreciable 
extent”.  Independence does not therefore mean total independence but only “appreciable” 
independence.  However, as with an “appreciable” restriction of competition under Article 101, 
the European Courts have never defined what constitutes “appreciable” independence for the 
purpose of the concept of “dominant position”.  In a “Guidance” notice published early in 2009, 
the Commission stated that an undertaking which is capable of profitably increasing its prices 
above the competitive level for a significant period of time can generally be regarded as 
dominant.395 However, independence in terms of the ability to raise prices does not seem necessary 
for dominance either.  For example, in a previously-monopolised telecommunications market 
which is in the early stages of competition, the incumbent operator might have its prices capped 
by the regulator, but few would doubt its market power in terms of the ability to make life difficult 
for new competitors, and even exclude them from the market, in various ways. 
 
Perhaps, then, the key concept in the United Brands definition is not the independence criterion, 
but the ability to prevent effective competition on the market. However, there are also problems 
with using this criterion, one conceptual and one definitional.  The conceptual difficulty is that, if 
it is accepted that Article 102 prohibits exclusionary abuses (as the European Courts has held is 
the case), exclusionary abuses by definition are a manifestation of “the power to prevent effective 
competition being maintained”, and therefore the concept of dominant position is redundant.  The 
definitional difficulty concerns the question of what constitutes the “prevention of effective 
competition”.  We shall look at this issue in more detail in section 4 5, in the context of abuse. 
 
The European Court has held that there is a presumption of dominance with a market share of 50 
per cent or above, but a business wishing to rebut this presumption needs to know what facts it has 
to prove to rebut it, i.e. what the definition of dominant position actually is.396  What businesses 
have been left with under the case law and the Commission guidance is a list of relevant factors in 
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assessing whether they are in a dominant position.397  These include primarily market shares, and 
barriers to entry (such barriers meaning the obstacles that a potential competitor would face in 
entering the market).  If the business has a high market share that has been sustained or increased 
over time, or if barriers to entry are high, or both, a dominant position is more likely to be found.  
However, there is no indication of how high market shares or barriers of entry have to be, or what 
“mix” of them would need to be present, to trigger a finding of dominance.  As the European Court 
itself put it in United Brands: “In general, a dominant position derives from a combination of 
several factors which, taken separately, are not necessarily determinative”.398  In other words, this 
is an arbitrary and subjective assessment. 
 
4 4 3 Australia 
 
In Australia, the test is “substantial degree of power in a market” as opposed to “dominant 
position”.399  However, it appears that there is not a great deal of difference between the two 
concepts, and the CCA shares with EU law similar uncertainty as to what the test means. 
 
The CCA states that, in determining the degree of market power a business has, the court must 
have regard to the extent to which the business is constrained by the conduct of competitors, 
potential competitors or customers.400  However, the CCA makes it clear that absolute freedom 
from constraint is not necessary.401  This test is similar to the “independence” component of the 
test for “dominant position” under EU competition law. 
 
In Boral, the majority in the High Court indicated that assessing substantial market power requires 
an examination of the actual conduct of the company, as well as its competitors and customers, on 
the basis that this is “the best evidence of the state of the market and the best indication of the 
extent of [the company’s] power”.402  The High Court supported the trial judge’s conclusion that 
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a finding of substantial market power was inconsistent with the evidence in the case, which showed 
that the market was intensely competitive. 
 
While the courts have an obligation to have regard to the degree of constraints, if any, from 
competitors (actual and potential) and customers, it has a discretion to look at other matters in 
determining the degree of market power that a business has.  These include contractual 
arrangements or understandings, actual or proposed, with other parties; the number, size and 
strength of competitors; and the stability or volatility of demand.403   
 
It therefore appears that, while (according to Boral) conduct in the market may provide the best 
evidence of whether any business has a substantial degree of market power, the latter can be 
inferred, without such evidence, from other factors, notably very large market shares (or a 
monopoly in the market) combined with high barriers to entry.  Countervailing bargaining power 
by purchasers may also be relevant in assessing whether they can impose a constraint on market 
power.  However, the presumption of a dominant position at a market share of 50 per cent or above, 
which as noted above exists in the EU, does not appear to have any counterpart in Australia.  
 
Clearly, all of these factors are questions of degree and assessment on a case-by-case basis.  So 
far, most of the cases in which the High Court has been called upon to assess the issue have left 
little room for controversy as to whether a substantial degree of market power existed, either 
because the parties conceded that this was the case, or because of the existence of very high (or 
monopoly) market shares combined with high barriers to entry.  Only in Boral did the High Court 
find no substantial degree of market power, because an examination of the conduct of market 
operators demonstrated that the market was highly competitive. 
 
4 4 4 Canada 
 
In Canada, the relevant test is “dominant position”, as in the EU. The Competition Act defines 
dominant position as a situation where “one or more persons substantially or completely control, 
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throughout Canada or any area thereof, a class or species of business”.404 In Commissioner of 
Competition v Toronto Real Estate Board and Canada Real Estate Association (“TREB”) the 
Competition Tribunal held that the term “class or species of business” is equivalent to the concept 
of the relevant market, which we discussed in section 4 4 1 above.405 The Tribunal recognised that 
firms often have market power, and that the market power for the purpose of the abuse provisions 
must be “substantial”, i.e. “more than moderate”- a higher threshold than that used to determine 
whether a given agreement or practice causes SLC.406 It defined a substantial degree of market 
power as “a degree of market power that confers upon the entity considerable latitude to determine 
or influence price or non- price dimensions of competition in a market, including the terms upon 
which it or others carry on business in the market”.407 What constitutes “considerable latitude” or 
“influence” for this purpose will clearly be a matter of debate in many cases, and to a large extent 
a subjective assessment. While the Tribunal said that this concept “roughly approximates” that of 
dominant position under EU law, this does not take us very far, given the lack of clarity as to the 
meaning of this concept under EU law, as we discussed in section 4 4 2 above. 
 
The Competition Bureau has issued guidelines that explain in detail how it approaches the abuse 
of dominance provisions, including the assessment of dominance.408  Both the definition of the 
relevant market, and the assessment of dominance, seem to be broadly similar to the approach 
adopted in Australian law to substantial market power.  Market power is defined as the power to 
maintain prices above the competitive level for a significant period of time.  Alternatively, even if 
pricing power is absent, market power can be defined as an ability to reduce product quality, 
choice, service, innovation, or any other feature that buyers value.409 
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As with EU and Australian law, because direct evidence of these matters is often unavailable, the 
authorities may rely on indirect indicators of market power.  The Tribunal has supported these 
views. In TREB, it said that market power can be measured either directly- by looking at the level 
of profits (a substantial level of profits being indicative of market power) or indirectly, through 
indiciae such as market share, entry barriers, or countervailing bargaining power of customers. A 
market share of above 50 per cent creates a rebuttable presumption of dominance, as in the EU.410  
 
4 4 5 South Africa 
 
In South Africa, a dominant position is presumed conclusively if a business has a market share of 
at least 45 per cent. While this presumption gives considerably more clarity than the laws of the 
other subject jurisdictions, in that they do not have irrebuttable presumptions of dominance at a 
certain level, it does come at a certain cost. A firm with this level of market share (or even above) 
could still be operating in a highly competitive market (i.e. not in fact be dominant), and imposing 
on that firm the extra obligations which a finding of dominance triggers could therefore actually 
distort competition in the market. There is a rebuttable presumption of dominance between 35 per 
cent and 45 per cent (the presumption is rebuttable by showing no market power) and no 
dominance below 35 per cent unless the business has market power.411  The definition of market 
power is vague – “the power of a firm to control prices, or to exclude competition, or to behave to 
an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers or suppliers”.412  This definition 
appears to have been derived from a combination of US law and EU law. Sutherland and Kemp 
note that the first two criteria appear to have been taken from the US concept of “monopoly power” 
established by the Supreme Court.413 The second and third criteria are also used in EU competition 
law, as noted earlier.414 So the same comments which were made about the lack of clarity and 
potential conflicts in this area under EU law apply to South Africa. 
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4 4 6 Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, the wording of the test is essentially the same as in Australia: whether the business 
has a “substantial degree of market power”.415  The Competition Ordinance lists non-exhaustively 
a series of factors that may be taken into account for this purpose, namely the business’s market 
share, its power to make pricing and other decisions, and barriers to entry.416  In its “Guideline on 
the Second Conduct Rule”, the Competition Commission defines “substantial degree of market 
power” as “the ability profitably to charge prices above competitive levels or to restrict output or 
quality below competitive levels, for a sustained period of time”.417  It states that a sustained period 
would normally be two years, but gives no indication of what it means by “competitive levels”.418 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 5  Abuse (Misuse) of Dominance / Substantial Market Power 
 
4 5 1 EU 
 
In the EU, the concept of “abuse” is addressed in Article 102 of the TFEU. Article 102 reads as 
follows: 
 
                                                     
415 Competition Ordinance s 21. 
416 S 21(3). 
417 Available at 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct_rule/second_
conduct_rule.html (accessed on 1-10-2017). 
418 Para 3.2 
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“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market 
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market 
insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. 
 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.” 
 
The concept of “abuse” (like “dominant position”) is not defined in Article 102, or elsewhere in 
the TFEU.  Moreover, the list of examples in Article 102 is non-exhaustive, and the examples 
themselves are imprecise and could be subject to arbitrary, subjective judgments.  For example, 
what is an “unfair” purchase price, selling price or trading condition? 
 
Gerber reports that the lack of certainty in Article 102 (Article 86 as it then was) meant that during 
the first decade of EU competition law, it was seldom enforced: 
 
“The concept of abuse was vague, and the civil law – trained officials of the Commission 
and judges of the European Court were reluctant to apply vague legal concepts.  Moreover 
the Commission did not wish to risk losing cases because of the Court’s probable 
reluctance in this regard, and the lack of any well-accepted sense of how the provision 
should be applied made enforcement by a politically weak Commission highly risky”.419   
                                                     
419 Law and Competition 356. 
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The fact that the EC Council of Ministers was prepared to make or declare the competition 
provisions of the Treaty directly applicable to businesses in Regulation 17/62 (as noted in section 
4 2 1), and to empower the Commission in the same regulation to impose fines of up to ten per 
cent of worldwide turnover, at a time when even the basic principles of the abuse of dominance 
provision had not been worked out and there was no case law to offer guidance, seems to constitute 
a remarkable disregard of the rule of law.  It is not surprising therefore that the Commission was 
nervous about enforcing the provision.   
 
In 1970 Rene Joliet, a law professor who later became a judge at the European Court, examined 
the list of examples in the provision, and argued that it only applied to conduct by a dominant firm 
which exploited its position by imposing unfair prices or other terms on customers or suppliers 
(so-called “exploitative” abuse), as opposed to conduct which affected competitors or market 
structure.420  This argument was supported by the French and German versions of the Treaty, 
where the equivalents of the term “abuse of dominant position” seem to restrict the concept to 
exploitative abuse. 
 
However, the view that the concept of abuse was restricted to exploitative abuse was rejected by 
the European Court in its very first case on Article 102 (then Article 86), namely Continental 
Can.421 The issue there was whether Article 102 could apply to an acquisition by a dominant firm 
of another firm in the same market, which had the effect of virtually eliminating competition in 
the relevant market.  The Court held that the abuse concept was not limited to exploitative abuse, 
and that it also captured conduct which harmed consumers indirectly, by excluding competitors 
and thereby damaging the competitive structure of the market.422  (Such conduct is commonly 
called “exclusionary” abuse as distinct from “exploitative” abuse). 
 
                                                     
420 Pinar Akman “Searching for the Long-Lost Soul of Article 82EC” (2009) Oxford J Legal Studies 
267, 271 n21. 
421 Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission [1973] ECR 215.  
422 N 421 above para 26.  
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Another issue that arose in Continental Can was whether the dominant position had to be used to 
cause the harm to competition.  The Commission accepted that Continental Can’s ability to 
implement the acquisition did not arise from its dominant position, in other words, that it did not 
use its dominant position to conduct the acquisition.  But the Commission argued that such a causal 
link between the dominant position and the alleged abuse was unnecessary. Advocate General 
Roemer, advising the Court, disagreed.  In his Opinion, the Advocate General Roemer considered 
the natural, literal meaning of the term “abuse of dominant position”, which he said “appears to 
hint that its application can be considered only if the position on the market is used as an instrument 
and is used in an objectionable manner”. (This is consistent with the dictionary meaning of the 
term: the Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines the verb “abuse” as “to use something 
to a bad effect or for a bad purpose”.)423  The Advocate General produced a number of other 
plausible arguments against the application of Article 102 to mergers and acquisitions. 
 
However, in spite of the Advocate General’s detailed rebuttal of the Commission’s arguments, the 
European Court upheld the Commission’s view that Article 102 could apply to acquisitions.  Its 
reasoning was peremptory: it paid no attention to the literal meaning of the word “abuse”, but 
based its view on its analysis of the Treaty objectives, that is, it applied a teleological interpretation.  
In essence, its view was that, since one of the Community’s activities was the institution of a 
system ensuring that competition is not distorted, “it requires a fortiori that competition must not 
be eliminated”.  It went on to reason that any other interpretation would create a major lacuna in 
the Treaty: it would be pointless prohibiting agreements which restricted competition if businesses 
could avoid this prohibition, and indeed eliminate competition between them completely, by 
merging with or acquiring one another.424 
 
Under EU law, the concepts of exploitative and exclusionary abuse have both given rise to 
problems of legal certainty. 
 
                                                     
423  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/abuse (accessed on 6-10-2017). 
424 Paras 23-25. 
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Starting with exploitative abuse, the difficulties in assessing what constitutes unfairly high (or 
excessive) prices are notorious, and there is little EU case law on how the Commission and Courts 
have approached this issue, or the issue of unfair trading terms generally. A price that is intended 
to cover costs can hardly be regarded as excessive. It is generally accepted that a firm which has 
achieved a monopoly through competing successfully should be able to charge a higher price to 
increase its profits- indeed this prospect is a strong incentive to compete vigorously. So how much 
higher than cost does a price have to be, to be classified as excessive? This is largely a subjective 
assessment, as there is no clear legal standard as to what is excessive. Moreover, in many industries 
(such as pharmaceuticals), businesses have to incur significant losses in the early stages of 
developing a new product or service, in the expectation or hope that it will recover those losses 
later. This may lead to pricing which is many times higher than the marginal costs of manufacture 
or provision. How is “excessive” to be judged in these circumstances?  
 
Perhaps because of these difficulties, the Commission appears to have shown little appetite for 
enforcing exploitative abuse of dominance, and has more or less conceded as much.425 This means 
that case law has been sparse.426  The difficulties in predicting what constitutes an exploitative 
abuse of dominance have been covered extensively elsewhere,427 and there is unlikely to be 
                                                     
425 In her speech at Fordham in 2005, the then EU Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes 
said “it is sound for our enforcement policy to give priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, 
since exclusion is often at the basis of later exploitation of customers”. Available at  
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-05-537_en.htm?locale=en (accessed on 6-10-
2017). 
426 A rare example is the investigation into the pricing practices of the Russian gas supplier 
Gazprom, where the Commission accused Gazprom of charging wholesalers in five EU Member 
States- Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland- prices that were “significantly higher 
than competitive western European gas prices”. See Communication from the Commission in 
Case AT.39816 “Upstream gas supplies in Central and Eastern Europe” OJ C81/9 of 16.3.2017. 
As a result, Gazprom gave commitments to the Commission to address its concerns: see 
Commission Press Release IP/18/3921 of 24 May 2018 “Commission imposes binding 
obligations on Gazprom to enable free flow of gas at competitive prices in Central and Eastern 
European gas markets”. There are further recent signs that the traditional reluctance to 
challenge excessive pricing may be starting to change, at least in the pharmaceutical sector: see 
n 536, 537 below. 
427 For example, Robert O’Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC 
(2006) Chapters 12 and 13. 
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resistance to the proposition that the rules in this area are highly uncertain.  Perhaps it is at least 
partly for this reason that some jurisdictions, such as the US and Singapore, do not use competition 
law to tackle exploitative abuse at all. 
 
As regards “exclusionary” abuse, legal uncertainty exists at several major levels. We shall deal 
with four of them here. There may be others, but the four levels we discuss should be sufficient 
to show for the purpose of this Chapter that substantial legal uncertainty permeates the law on 
abuse under EU law, and that it is not sufficiently certain to comply with the benchmark laid 
down by the ECtHR. The four levels are as follows: 
 
• The type of conduct that may be categorised as abusive, if it satisfies the other criteria 
(such as harming competition).  Vigorous competition can drive out competitors and 
result in a monopoly, so harm to competition is not a sufficient test for abuse: there must 
be something in the nature of the conduct itself which makes it potentially abusive (if the 
other criteria are satisfied). 
• How firm does the causal link between the conduct and the harm to competition  have to 
be? The European Court’s judgment in Intel v Commission in 2017 seemed to suggest 
that the conduct just needs to be “capable” of harming competition (as opposed to 
“likely” to harm competition).428 But as we shall see, it is not clear what capability means 
for this purpose. 
• How harmful to competition must the conduct be? It seems that it is not necessary for 
competitors  to actually be driven out of the market, and that weakening their ability to 
compete is enough, but how many competitors have to be weakened. And what does 
weakening mean? 
• Having established that the conduct is of a type that is potentially abusive, and that it is 
capable of causing sufficient harm to competition, how can a firm accurately assess 
whether its conduct will be saved by the efficiency defence? 
 
                                                     
428 Case C-413/14 P, paras 138-142, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-
413/14 (accessed on 15-5-2018). 
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We deal with each of these levels of uncertainty in turn. We emphasise that our objective is not 
to advance the debate on any of these issues or to suggest answers to them, and therefore a 
comprehensive analysis of them is outside the scope of this dissertation. The Intel case in itself 
has generated a great deal of literature on at least some aspects of them.429 Our objective is only 
to demonstrate the substantial degree of legal uncertainty that surrounds each of them, and to 
argue later that this degree of uncertainty does not comply with the ECtHR’s benchmark, as well 
as causing many other problems which we shall discuss in Chapter 5. 
 
As regards the first issue- what type or types of conduct are potentially abusive- the European 
Court first attempted a definition of this concept in its Hoffman- la Roche judgment, in 1979: 
 
“The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking 
in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a 
result of the very presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is 
weakened and which, through recourse to methods different from those which condition 
normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial 
operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition”.430 
 
However the notion of what constitutes “methods different from those which condition normal 
competition” has never been defined by the European Courts. The same applies to the phrase 
“competition on the merits”, which is often used by the European Commission and the European 
Courts (including in Intel). They have in several cases concluded that the conduct was not 
                                                     
429 See, for example, Richard Whish “Intel v Commission: Keep Calm and Carry On!” Journal of 
International Competition Law and Practice Vol 6 Issue 1 (Jan 2015) 1; Wouter J Wils ”The 
Judgment of the EU General Court in Intel and the So-Called More Economic Approach to Abuse 
of Dominance” (2014) 37 World Competition 405; Patrick Rey and James S Venit “An Effects-
Based Approach to Article 102: a Response to Wouter Wils (2015) 38 World Competition 3; 
Pablo Ibanez Colomo “Intel and Article 102 TFEU: Making Sense of a Perpetual Controversy” LSE 
Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 29/2014, available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2530878, accessed on 29.1.18; Nicolas Petit “Intel, Leveraging 
Rebates and the Goals of Article 102 TFEU” (2015) 11 European Competition Law Journal 25.  
430 Case 85/76 Hoffman-la Roche v Commission [1979] ECR 461 para 91. 
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“competition on the merits” but have never explained what the term means.431 The Courts instead 
have decided on a case-by-case basis that particular types of conduct fall within this category, in 
some cases by analogy with previous cases. 
 
It can be noted that the Court in Hoffman- la Roche defined exclusionary abuse as conduct that 
comprises two elements:  
 
• it does not “condition normal competition”; and  
• it “has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in 
the market or the growth of that competition”.  
 
In other words, as we discussed above, hindering, restricting or eliminating competition is not in 
itself objectionable – there must also be something objectionable about the conduct in itself.  
Businesses can eliminate competitors and therefore competition simply by competing effectively, 
and being more efficient than their competitors, and this is something competition law is supposed 
to encourage, not discourage.  As Gerber has put it: 
 
“Competition assumes, by definition, that enterprises attempt to ‘win’ the battle of the 
marketplace – that is, to cause economic harm to competitors.  The facts that conduct is 
intended to cause such harm and that such harm results cannot, therefore, be the criterion 
for abusive conduct; that criterion must be sought in the characteristics of the conduct or 
in its other effects”.432 
 
The difficulty has been in defining the objectionable feature or features of conduct regarded as 
abusive, and thereby finding a common definition that applies across different types of conduct. 
 
There are also significant gaps in the case law. For example, the circumstances in which above-
cost price-cutting constitutes an abuse are still unclear.433 
                                                     
431 OECD Policy Brief “What is Competition on the Merits?” (June 2006). 
432 Law and Competition 313. 
433 See Whish and Bailey Competition Law 789-794. 
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One article points out that the equivalent of the term “normal competition” in the original German 
text of the European Court’s judgment in Hoffman- la Roche is Dienstleistungswettbewerb.434 The 
article traces this term back to a distinction made by the Ordoliberals in Germany between 
Leistungswettbewerb (or “performance” competition) and Behinderungswettbewerb 
(“impediment” or “hindrance” competition).  The latter included predatory pricing and loyalty 
rebates, which are amongst the practices which the European Commission and Courts have 
prohibited.  Gerber notes that this test was developed further under German competition law in the 
1970s, when the courts added a further limb to the test of abuse: the conduct must not only 
constitute “impediment competition”, it must also restrict the competition remaining in the 
market.435  The similarity between this two-part test and the one in Hoffman-la Roche is striking, 
and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Hoffman- la Roche test was derived from this concept 
of abuse in German competition law. 
 
Various tests have been developed by academics and practitioners in an attempt to distinguish 
abusive behaviour from competitive behaviour, but all of these tests are recognized to have pitfalls, 
and not to be appropriate to cover all types of abusive conduct.436  For example, the “as-efficient 
competitor” test – whereby a dominant firm’s prices do not constitute an abuse if an equally – 
efficient competitor could match them and make a profit – might work for pricing abuses such as 
predatory pricing, or margin squeezes. With predatory pricing, for example, if the dominant firm 
is pricing above its own average variable costs, the pricing would not normally be regarded as 
abusive, even if a smaller competitor with higher costs could not match the dominant firm’s 
price.437 However, this test would not be relevant to non-pricing abuses such as an abusive refusal 
                                                     
434 Kallaugher and Sher “Rebates Revisited: Anti-Competitive Effects and Exclusionary Abuse 
under Article 82” [2004] ECLR 263. 
435 Law and Competition 346. 
436 For a summary of them, see Vickers “Abuse of Market Power”, Speech to the 31st 
Conference of the European Association of Industrial Economics, Berlin 3 September 2004. See 
also E. Elhauge “Defining better Monopolisation Standards” (2003) 54 Stanford Law Review 
253. 
437 There has been considerable debate about whether this test is suitable for loyalty or 
exclusivity rebates. Wils and Whish have argued that it is not, because the harm that such 
rebates cause to competition  stems from the exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity,  not the net price 
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to supply. Moreover, even with pricing abuses, it has been argued that where barriers to entry are 
high, above-cost pricing could also be anti-competitive in some situations, by effectively excluding 
potential competitors which might become efficient and present an effective competitive force in 
the future.438 
 
Another approach, one that has been advocated by Ahlborn and Padilla, is to apply to the allegedly 
abusive conduct either a “structured rule of reason” test or a “qualified per se legality test”.439  
Essentially the structured rule of reason test would involve weighing the net effects of the conduct 
on consumer welfare only after the conduct passed through a series of initial screens designed to 
ensure that this “weighing” exercise was restricted to conduct which is most likely to cause net 
consumer harm. The qualified per se legality test would regard the conduct as presumptively legal 
unless certain exceptional circumstances applied, the overall objective being again to capture 
conduct that is in net terms harmful to consumers. The choice of which of these tests to apply to 
what conduct would depend on which test would minimise the costs of “error” (false convictions 
and false acquittals) when applied to the conduct in question.  The concept of “error” in this context 
pre-supposes an understanding of what objective the law is seeking to achieve: an error would be 
a failure of the law to achieve its objective.  In EU competition law, for example, the policy 
objective, at least according to the European Commission, is consumer welfare. A false conviction 
would be wrongly condemning conduct which is beneficial to consumers; a false acquittal would 
be wrongly allowing conduct harmful to consumers to escape punishment. 
 
These Ahlborn and Padilla tests are more an approach to designing rules than a test for what 
constitutes an abuse, and (as noted above) they pre-suppose that net consumer welfare is the 
ultimate objective of Article 102.  However, the European Court has made it clear that under 
Article 102, as well as 101, its main concern is with protecting competition per se, as opposed to 
consumers. As Advocate General Kokott put it in her Opinion in British Airways v Commission: 
                                                     
levels, they create.,  See the articles by Wils and Whish cited at n 429 above. However, The 
European Court appears to have endorsed the Commission’s use of the test for the rebates in 
Intel: see n 450 below. 
438 See Vickers n 387 above 19-20. 
439 N 304 above. 
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“Article 82EC, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or 
primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or consumers, but to 
protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an institution)…”440   
 
The EU Commission’s own efforts to develop a satisfactory definition of abuse have met with 
little success.  The Commission published a detailed discussion paper on exclusionary abuse in 
December 2005.441  This paper did not set out a clear definition of abuse which could be applied 
in all situations, but rather methodologies for determining whether various types of potentially 
abusive conduct (refusals to supply, predatory pricing, loyalty rebates etc.) were actually abusive.  
However, this paper was undermined by the subsequent European Court judgment in British 
Airways, which determined that BA’s loyalty bonuses to travel agents were abusive, largely by 
analogy with previous case law, not by applying the Commission’s proposed methodology.442 
 
Presumably as a result of this judgment, the discussion paper was transformed from interpretative 
guidance on the abuse of dominance provision to a statement of the Commission’s methodologies 
for assessing its “enforcement priorities”, which was published in early 2009.443  While this 
statement may give businesses an indication of the circumstances in which the Commission might 
take enforcement action, it does not provide them with definitive guidance on what type of conduct 
would constitute a potential abuse. Many firms wish to avoid breaching the law, even if it is a 
breach that does not feature amongst the Commission’s enforcement priorities. 
 
This paper does contain an attempted definition of potentially abusive conduct, but regrettably one 
that does not clarify matters.  Effectively, what the Commission calls “anti-competitive 
                                                     
440 Case C-95/04 P [2007] ECR I-2331 para 68. 
441Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses” 
December 2005, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf (accessed on 25-09-2017). 
442 N 440 above. 
443 N 455 below. 
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foreclosure” would, in the Commission’s view, create a presumption of abuse, which the firm in 
question could rebut by showing that the conduct was “objectively necessary” (e.g. for health and 
safety reasons) or by showing that it produced efficiencies resulting in benefits to consumers which 
outweighed the harm to them caused by the anti-competitive foreclosure.  The Commission defines 
anti-competitive foreclosure as: 
 
“a situation where effective access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets 
is hampered or eliminated as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby 
the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the 
detriment of consumers”.444  
 
However, it is submitted that this does not work as a definition of the types of conduct which are 
potentally abusive. The requisite effects  could be triggered by vigorous competitive behaviour 
(such as being quicker or more innovative than competitors) which should not- as acknowledged 
by the Commission and the European Courts- be treated as an abuse.  These tests would therefore 
be tantamount to classifying all conduct that forecloses competitors as presumptively abusive, 
requiring the dominant firm to bear the burden of relying on the efficiency defence  to justify its 
conduct. Since it is generally accepted that even dominant firms should be encouraged to compete 
(within limits) and in doing so exclude competitors, this approach would be counter-productive in 
policy terms, and arguably an even more intrusive standard than Hoffman- la Roche, which is 
presumably not the intention.   
 
The need to find an appropriate definition or test for potentially abusive conduct might not be so 
critical, if the types of abuse (even if having no common criteria or dominator) had been 
exhaustively defined by the European Courts, However, this is not the case, and new types of 
abuse, or novel applications of the existing categories of abuse (which as we have seen are very 
broadly defined) arise in the case law from time to time.  
 
                                                     
444 Para 19. 
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For example, in 2012, the European Court held for the first time, in AstraZeneca v Commission, 
that using regulatory procedures strategically to impede the entry of competitors was an abuse.445  
 
In addition, several commentators have argued that in its decision in June 2017, the Commission 
penalised Google (at a current record of 2.42 billion euros) for conduct that the company could not 
have predicted was abusive.446 The Commission defined the conduct as: 
“…the more favourable positioning and display, in Google’s general search results pages, 
of Google's own comparison shopping service compared to competing comparison 
shopping services”.447 
This leaves interesting questions for the future over what further so-called “self-preference 
activities” might be held abusive. For example, if a dominant firm uses its profits in its dominant 
business to cross-subsidise operations in a market where it is not dominant, would this be an 
abuse? If it uses its customer database in the dominant business to cross-sell products in another 
market, would this be an abuse? 
Akman states that it is impossible to fit the facts of the Google case within existing case law.448 
Eben also argues that the outcome was difficult to predict on the basis of previous case law.449 
The case is now on appeal: it remains to be seen what view the General Court will take on the 
Commission’s decision. 
 
                                                     
445 Case C-457/10 P, available from the Court’s website at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-457/10 , last accessed on 10.10.2017. See also Neil 
Mackenzie and Stephen Langbridge “Expanding the Frontiers of Abuse of Dominance- the 
AstraZeneca case and its Implications for South Africa” available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Astrazeneca-Conference-Paper-
FINAL.pdf, last accessed on 10.4.2018. 
446 Commission Decision AT.39740- Google Search (Shopping) 27.6.2017. 
447 Para 341. 
448 Pinar Akman “A Preliminary Assessment of the European Commission’s Google Search 
Decision” (September 18, 2017) Antitrust Chronicle, Competition Policy International, 2017. 
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3078652.  
449 Magali Eben “Fining Google: a Missed Opportunity for Legal Certainty?” European 
Competition Law Journal Vol 14 Issue 1 (2018).  
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Accordingly, under EU competition law, the critical and elusive element of “bad” conduct is still 
missing, and in the absence of this component, abuse remains without a clear or satisfactory 
definition.  
 
Turning to the second issue, the strength of the causal link between the conduct and the harm to 
competition, the European Court in Intel used the term “capable” (repeating the word several 
times), implying that it was sufficient that the conduct was capable of causing the relevant harm 
to competition.450 (The word has also been used in previous cases such as BA v Commission).451  
But it is not clear what this means.452 Ibanez Colomo disagrees with Advocate General Wahl’s 
Opinion in the case that it is equivalent to “likely” and that it is a lower standard, but how low is 
not clear- he suggests it may be equivalent to “plausible”.  
 
The European Court gave some indication of the factors that would be relevant in assessing 
capability:  
 
“…first, the extent of the undertaking’s dominant position on the relevant market and, 
secondly, the share of the market covered by the challenged practice, as well as the 
conditions and arrangements for granting the rebates in question, their duration and their 
amount; [the Commission] is also required to assess the possible existence of a strategy 
aiming to exclude competitors that are as least as efficient as the dominant company from 
the market”.453 
                                                     
450 Paras 138-142. The Court agreed with the Commission that rebates conditional on the 
purchaser purchasing all or most of its requirements from the dominant supplier would be 
presumed to be capable of harming competition, but, in what it called a clarification of existing 
case law, said that the firm could seek to rebut that presumption by showing with supporting  
evidence that the rebates  were not capable in the particular market circumstances of harming 
competition. If it did so, the Commission would have to engage with those submissions before 
making a decision. This and the many other interesting aspects of the case are outside the 
scope of this dissertation:  the aspect of Intel we focus on is the meaning of “capability”. 
451 Case C-95/04 para 77 “capable of producing an exclusionary effect”. 
452 Mark Taylor and Jurgen Schindler “Intel: Clarification or Contradiction?” The Antitrust Source 
Dec 2017; Pablo Ibanez Colomo “The Future of Article 102 TFEU after Intel” Journal of European 
Law and Practice Vol 9 Issue 5 (May 2018) 293. 
453 Para 139. 
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Clearly these factors are, to a greater or lesser extent, matters of degree and therefore subjective. 
It is not clear what mix of the factors in what amounts will mean that the conduct is capable of 
causing the requisite harm to competition, and therefore it is very difficult for a firm planning its 
conduct to know whether it will cross that line.  
 
The Court’s last point- excluding competitors which are at least as efficient from the market- leads 
to our third issue: the degree of harm to competition which will trigger an abuse. In other words, 
the conduct’s capability to do what? The Court in Intel mentioned exclusion of “as efficient” 
competitors from the market, but it seems unlikely in the light of previous case law that total 
exclusion from the market would be necessary.   For example, in Hoffman la Roche the relevant 
foreclosure test was stopping competitors’ growth, while in British Airways slowing the rate of 
competitors’ growth was held to be sufficient.  (A problem with the British Airways test is that it 
is difficult to predict whether a given practice will slow down competitors’ growth, because that 
involves assessing how fast competitors would have grown in the absence of the practice, 
something which is outside the dominant firm’s knowledge and control).454  According to the 
Commission, an abuse will be committed only where competition in the market is “foreclosed”.455  
This means that competitors must be excluded from the market, or at least be weakened to such an 
extent that they are prevented from competing “effectively”. The Commission also equates this to 
“hampering” or “eliminating” competitors’ “effective access” to markets 456  Again, these terms 
are all matters of degree and subjective, making it very difficult for a firm to know in advance 
whether its conduct will be found to be abusive.  
 
The final issue of legal uncertainty can be dealt with very briefly. The Court confirmed in Intel (in 
line with previous case law) that, even although the conduct is capable of causing sufficient harm 
to competition, it can still be “saved” if the harm to competition is “counterbalanced, or 
outweighed, by advantages in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer”. This seems 
                                                     
454 See Ahlborn and Padilla “Fairness to Welfare” n 347 above at 29. 
455 “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” OJ C45/7 of 24.2.2009 paras 
19, 20. 
456 N 455 above. 
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similar to the “net consumer harm” test which the Commission applies in assessing arrangements 
under Article 101. As we noted earlier in relation to arrangements, the net consumer harm test is 
not sufficiently clear to enable businesses to predict with confidence whether their conduct will be 
regarded as abusive. Similar uncertainties are involved in applying this exclusion to conduct which 
would otherwise be found to be abusive. Again, it is very difficult for a firm to know in advance 
whether its conduct (assuming it is capable of causing sufficient harm to competition- which is 
also a difficult assessment, as discussed above) will qualify for the efficiency defence.457  
 
4 5 2 Australia 
 
In Australia, until recently, the law provided that a  firm with substantial market power (SMP) 
“misused” its SMP if it took advantage of that position for the purpose of eliminating or 
substantially damaging a competitor, preventing a person from entering a market, or deterring or 
preventing a person from engaging in competitive conduct in a market.458   
 
The courts recognised that these purposes are part of a vigorous competitive process, and therefore 
the purpose element is usually present in any competitive market.  The key question was therefore 
whether the business had “taken advantage” of its SMP to achieve one of the proscribed purposes.  
As two of the High Court judges said in Boral: 
 
“the purposes proscribed by section 46 include the purpose of eliminating or damaging a 
competitor.  If the objective is achieved, competitors will necessarily be damaged.  If it is 
achieved to a sufficient extent, one or more of them may be eliminated.  That is inherent in 
the competitive process.  The purpose of the statute is to promote competition; and 
successful competition is bound to cause damage to some competitors”.459 
 
The judges could have added that vigorous competition may also be consistent with the two other 
proscribed purposes – preventing entry of a person into a market, or deterring or preventing a 
                                                     
457 See the discussion in section 4 3 1. 
458 S 46. 
459 Para 122. 
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person from engaging in competitive conduct in a market.  The High Court made it clear that it is 
a normal part of the competitive process for businesses to try to “see off” their rivals, including 
potential rivals.  So if a business priced at a lower level (even below cost) in order to retain its 
customers, and thereby deterred a potential competitor from entering the market, that was, in the 
court’s view, perfectly normal competition.  This raised the fundamental issue that we looked at 
in Chapter 2, namely the extent to which vigorous competitive conduct by dominant firms should 
be constrained in order to assist smaller rivals. The Act was subsequently amended to prohibit 
pricing below cost for a sustained period for one of the purposes proscribed by section 46.460 
 
In Queensland Wire Industries the High Court held that “take advantage” simply meant “use”.461  
(As noted above, in the EU, by contrast, it is not necessary to show that the dominant position has 
been used to cause the harm to competition).462 In applying the “take advantage” concept, the High 
Court held that it was necessary to take the hypothetical scenario where the business had no SMP 
(the counterfactual) and ask whether the conduct could, or would have taken place. There were 
inconsistencies in the High Court’s case law on whether the correct test was that the firm could 
have engaged in the conduct in question without SMP, or that it would have (or be likely to have) 
done so.  The latest High Court judgment on this issue seemed to suggest that the latter was the 
correct test.463  This does not seem entirely logical. Given that “take advantage of” was n held to 
mean “use”, this suggested that the SMP must be the tool which enabled the requisite purpose to 
be achieved: whether the business would have the incentive to use that tool in a competitive market 
would seem to be irrelevant.  In practice, “could” and “would” might amount to the same thing, if 
“could” is used in the sense of being financially realistic, rather than just technically possible.   
 
In any event, these issues have now become academic in the light of amendments to the CCA that 
took effect in 2010 and 2017.  These amendments were made in response to criticisms that the way 
in which the courts had interpreted the “taking advantage” requirement was so restrictive as to 
make it very difficult for the ACCC to bring successful misuse of SMP cases.   
                                                     
460 S 46(1AA). 
461 [1989] HCA 6. 
462 Section 4 5 1  above. 
463 NT Power Generation v Power and Water Authority [2004] HCA 48. 
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The 2010 amendments gave the court a wide discretion as to the factors it could take into account 
in assessing whether the “take advantage” criterion is satisfied.464  They provided a non-exhaustive 
list of factors, namely: 
 
• whether the conduct was materially facilitated by the corporation’s  SMP; 
• whether the corporation engaged in the conduct in reliance on its SMP; 
• whether it is likely that the corporation would have engaged in the conduct if it did not 
have SMP; and 
• whether the conduct is otherwise related to the corporation’s SMP. 
 
While this provision made it easier for the ACCC to bring successful misuse of SMP cases, it came 
at the cost of less predictability and certainty for businesses as to whether their conduct was 
prohibited.  
 
Further uncertainty is likely to be introduced by recent amendments to section 46 which came into 
force on 6 November 2017. These amendments abolish the concept of “misuse” completely, and 
introduce a new “effects test” as an alternative to purpose. The key part of the new provision reads: 
 
“A corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market must not engage in 
conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition in that or any other market”.465    
 
Since the concept of “misuse” will be removed, and even vigorous competition can lessen 
substantially competition in the market (in extremis creating at least a temporary monopoly) it is 
not clear under this proposed provision where the line would be drawn between legitimate and 
illegitimate conduct. Indeed, this lack of clarity has attracted much criticism from the legal 
profession, including the following comments: 
                                                     
464 S 46(6A). 
465 New s 46(1). 
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• “There is a risk that the proposed…effects test could be used by the ACCC as a ‘catch-all’ 
provision for targeting big businesses’ conduct, rather than focusing on what is more 
universally considered to be an abuse of dominant position”. 
• “…the ACCC open themselves up to the criticism that the new section will be used as a 
catch-all section to right the ACCC’s perceived wrongs of cases that they have lost in the 
past”. 
• “Businesses should be entitled to have certainty as to the analytical basis of types of misuse 
of market power conduct that will be viewed by the ACCC as a breach of the new section”. 
• “As the law stands, that ‘taking advantage’ requirement means a company with market 
power is not prevented from conducting itself, even aggressively, in the same way as any 
firm without market power would. Under the new law a company with market power may 
be so prohibited”.466 
 
4 5 3 Canada 
 
 In Canada, the Competition Act lists (non-exhaustively) a number of “anti-competitive acts” 
which will be regarded as an abuse if they have had, are having, or are likely to have, the effect of 
SLC. These acts are as follows: 
 
• squeezing, by a vertically integrated supplier, of the margin available to a non-vertically 
integrated customer which competes with the supplier, for the purpose of impeding or 
preventing the customer’s entry into, or expansion in, a market; 
• acquisition by a supplier of a customer who would otherwise be available to a competitor 
of the supplier, or acquisition by a customer of a supplier who would otherwise be available 
to a competitor of the customer, for the purpose of impeding or preventing the competitor’s 
entry into, or eliminating the competitor from, a market; 
• freight equalization on the plant  of a competitor for the purpose of impeding or preventing 
the competitor’s entry into, or eliminating the competitor from, a market; 
                                                     
466 See “ACCC consults on ‘root and branch’ reform” GCR6 September 2016. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
185 
 
• use of fighting brands introduced selectively on a temporary basis to discipline or eliminate 
a competitor; 
• pre-emption of scarce facilities or resources required by a competitor for the operation of 
a business, with the object of withholding the facilities or resources from a market; 
• buying up of products to prevent the erosion of existing price levels; 
• adoption of product specifications that are incompatible with products produced by any 
other person and are designed to prevent its entry into, or to eliminate it from, a market; 
• requiring or inducing a supplier to sell only or primarily to certain customers, or to refrain 
from selling to a competitor, with the object of preventing a competitor’s entry into, or 
expansion in, a market; and 
• selling articles at a price lower than the acquisition cost for the purpose of disciplining or 
eliminating a competitor.467 
 
It can be noted that, as in Australian law, but unlike EU law, the purpose of the conduct is a crucial 
element for most of these types of conduct, although in Canada (unlike Australia) the effect or 
likely effect is also a necessary component for all abuses.  
 
The abuse provisions were interpreted by Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal in Canada Pipe, 
which concerned a fidelity rebate scheme operated by a company which was alleged to be 
dominant in the relevant Canadian markets for the supply of cast-iron drain, waste and vent 
products.468 
 
The Court distinguished between the concepts “anti-competitive act” and SLC, stating that these 
meant two different things.  As regards “anti-competitive act”, the Court held that the concept was 
to be defined according to its purpose.   Purpose in this sense, according to the Court, does not 
mean subjective intention, although this may be relevant in establishing purpose.  If the reasonably 
foreseeable consequence of the act is a negative effect on a competitor, it will be presumed that 
this was the purpose of the act.  This presumption can be rebutted if the firm can provide a valid 
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business justification for the act, which the Court defined as “a credible efficiency or pro-
competitive rationale for the conduct in question, attributable to [the firm in question] which relates 
to and counterbalances the anti-competitive effects and/or the subjective intent of the acts”.  It also 
had to be shown that the purpose of the act was a “negative effect on a competitor that is predatory, 
exclusionary, or disciplinary” (the anti-competitive element).469   
 
The Bureau states in its guidelines that anti-competitive acts fall into two broad categories: 
exclusionary conduct that raises rivals’ costs, or reduces rivals’ revenues artificially, and predatory 
conduct – essentially selling at a loss in order to eliminate competitors or deter potential entrants. 
470 
 
The Bureau gives some examples of possible business justifications in the guidelines, including 
minimising the costs of production or operation (provided this does not result from the negative 
effect on a rival) or activities that improve a firm’s product, service or some other aspect of the 
firm’s business.471  Looking through the list of examples of anti-competitive acts above, in practice 
it would seem that a valid business justification of this kind would generally be hard to establish. 
A possible exception is that a short-term clearance sale, or promotion of a new product to generate 
demand, could be a valid justification for pricing below cost. In Canada Pipe, the firm’s purported 
business justifications for its fidelity rebate scheme were rejected.472 However, even if a valid 
business justification could be produced, according to the Court this is not sufficient: it must 
“counter-balance” the anti-competitive effects and/or the subjective intent of the acts (although the 
Bureau’s guidelines do not mention this additional step).473  It is not clear how this balancing 
exercise is to be conducted.  
 
                                                     
469 Para 73. 
470 “The Abuse of Dominance Provisions” sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
471 Section 3.2.2. 
472 Paras 84-92. 
473 Para 88. 
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In TREB the Tribunal provided further guidance on the concept of legitimate business 
justifications, and how they are to be weighed against the negative effects on one or more 
competitors. It stated: 
 
“…a business justification for an impugned practice must not only provide a credible pro-
competitive rationale for the practice, it must also be linked to the respondent…For 
efficiencies to be linked to the respondent, there must be persuasive evidence that the 
impugned practice would likely result in the attainment of efficiencies by the 
respondent”.474 
 
On the weighing exercise, the Tribunal stated: 
 
“In conducting the balancing exercise, the Tribunal will endeavour to ascertain whether, 
on a balance of probabilities, the actual or reasonably foreseeable anti-competitive effects 
are disproportionate to the efficiency or pro-competitive rationales identified by the 
respondent; or whether sufficiently cogent evidence exists that the respondent was 
motivated more by subjective ant-competitive intent rather than by efficiency or pro-
competitive considerations”.475 
 
Clearly, it may be very difficult for a dominant business to assess, in advance of engaging in 
conduct, what view a court is likely to take on these matters after the event, and if the business 
gets the assessment wrong, it could be subject to a substantial administrative penalty.476 
 
The Court in Canada Pipe also interpreted the other requisite element of the abuse provisions, 
namely SLC. The Court held that this involved a comparative assessment of the state of 
competition in the market with and without the conduct. Did (or would, if the question is the likely 
effect of the conduct in future) the practice in question “result in a prevention or lessening of 
competition as compared to the conditions governing in the absence of the practice, and was this 
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lessening of a degree sufficient to be considered substantial?”477 As in the Superior Propane 
merger case, which was discussed in section 4 3 3, this involves the construction of a detailed 
hypothetical model as to the state of the market without the conduct, and possibly another such 
model as to the future state of the market with the conduct (if the case concerned the likely future 
effects of the conduct) so that a proper comparison can be made.478 
 
The Court’s approach in Canada Pipe can be contrasted with that of the European Courts in the 
British Airways/Virgin case.479  While the European Courts acknowledged that exclusionary effect 
(actual or potential) on competitors was an essential component for abuse, and that one such effect 
might be to slow down competitors’ growth, no detailed hypothetical models as to the state of the 
market without the conduct were considered necessary for this purpose, as they were in Canada 
Pipe. The exclusionary effect could be assumed from the fact that rival airlines would have to offer 
very large incentives to travel agents if they were to persuade them to sell their tickets, to 
compensate them for the loss of rebate they would otherwise suffer by switching from BA. 
However, as noted in section 4 5 1 above, it will be interesting to see whether the approach of the 
EU Commission and European Courts will change in future, given the European Court’s judgment 
in Intel, holding that if the firm puts forward economic arguments to the General Court challenging 
the Commission’s competition analysis of competitive effects and efficiencies, the General Court 
has to consider in detail whether these arguments are valid. 
 
In assessing whether a practice has the relevant adverse effect on competition, the Act directs the 
Tribunal to “consider whether the practice is a result of superior competitive performance”.480  The 
fact that the Tribunal’s only duty is to consider whether the conduct falls within this category 
suggests that even if it does, the Tribunal might still be entitled to prohibit it.  This is particularly 
relevant given that one of the Act’s objectives is to ensure that SMEs have “an equitable 
opportunity to participate in the economy”.  Could it be argued, for example, that a lessening of 
competition arises even if it is due to the fact that the dominant firm is more efficient than its SME 
                                                     
477 N 468 above para 58. 
478 N 368 above para 37. 
479 N 440 above. 
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rivals?  If this SME objective is relevant in the context of the competition effects of a merger or 
other type of arrangement, and can justify an anti-competitive transaction (as was held to be the 
case in Superior Propane) why would it not be relevant in the context of a dominant firm’s 
conduct?  The Federal Court indicated in Canada Pipe that this objective may indeed be relevant 
in abuse cases, stating that whatever methodology the Commission adopted for comparing the 
market with and without the conduct should be “reflective of the different objectives of the Act”.481  
 
It appears that the concept of “superior economic performance” has not been considered or defined 
in the case law, and it is not addressed in the Bureau’s guidelines.  Perhaps this is because the 
question of superior economic performance is relevant to whether there is a valid business 
justification for the conduct, which is part of the assessment of whether there is an “anti-
competitive act” in the first place, as noted above. 
 
In assessing SLC in the context of abuse, the Bureau has said that the test is whether the conduct 
“creates, preserves or enhances market power”.482  The reference to “creates” seems difficult to 
reconcile with the text of the Act itself, which suggests that control must already exist before the 
abuse provisions can apply. The Commission uses a “but for” test – “but for” the practice in 
question, would there be substantially greater competition?   
 
In assessing what “greater competition” consists of, the guidelines list a number of factors, such 
as whether, in the absence of the conduct, effective competitors might emerge within a reasonable 
period (regarded as being two years) to challenge the incumbent’s dominance.483  Other factors 
include whether consumer prices might be substantially lower, or product quality, innovation or 
choice might be substantially greater, in the absence of the conduct.   
 
As was noted in Chapter 2, unlike in the other subject jurisdictions, abuse of a dominant position 
in Canada under the Competition Act is not in itself prohibited.  Abuse can be the subject of a 
consent agreement or cease-and-desist order, as with “non-hardcore” anti-competitive 
                                                     
481 Para 47. 
482 Section 4. 
483 N 482 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
190 
 
arrangements, and a breach of a Tribunal-endorsed consent agreement or Tribunal order is illegal. 
However, under amendments to the Competition Act that took effect in March 2010, the Tribunal 
can now also impose financial penalties in abuse cases.  Some lawyers have argued that the power 
to impose penalties where there has been no breach of any law may not be compatible with the 
Canadian constitution.484 
 
Most cases of alleged abuse, including Canada Pipe itself, have been resolved by consent 
agreements between the Commission and the relevant parties. For example, the Commissioner 
filed an application with the Competition Tribunal against certain rules of the Canadian Real Estate 
Association that, in the Commissioner’s view, limited consumer choice and prevented innovation 
in the market for real estate brokerage services to home sellers in Canada.  Before the Tribunal 
had an opportunity to resolve the case, the Commissioner and the Association entered into a 
consent agreement whereby the Association undertook to amend its rules to remove the provisions 
in question.485  
 
The Competition Act lists a number of other types of conduct that are not prohibited, but can be 
reviewed, without classifying them either under the agreements provision or under the abuse 
provision.  These are refusals to deal, inducing a supplier to refuse to supply a third party, price 
maintenance, exclusive purchasing, requiring a reseller to supply only in a particular market, and 
tying the supply of one product to the supply of another.486  All of these types of conduct require 
an adverse effect on competition in the market before the Tribunal can make an order.  In the case 
of the first three, the requirement is simply an “adverse effect” on competition, whereas in the case 
of the last three it is the narrower concept of SLC. 
 
4 5 4 South Africa 
 
                                                     
484 See for example “Government passes Major Amendments to the Competition Act and 
Investment Canada Act” 13 March 2009 available at www.casselsbrock.com; George Addy, John 
Bodrug, Charles Tingley “Abuse of Dominance in Canada: 25 years of Section 79 Enforcement” 
Canadian Competition Law Review Vol 25 no 2 (2012) 276, 302. 
485 Commissioner for Competition v Canada Real Estate Association CT-2010-002 (25.10.2010). 
486 Ss 75-77. 
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In the South African law, an explicit efficiency defence (which will be considered later) is available 
for all types of abuse apart from two: excessive pricing, and refusal to supply access to an essential 
facility.487 
 
An “excessive price” is one that bears no reasonable relation to, and is higher than, the economic 
value of the good or service.488  As under EU law, the South African courts have struggled to 
assess how the economic value of the good or service for this purpose is to be determined.  In the 
Mittal Steel case, the Competition Appeal Court, overturning a decision of the Competition 
Tribunal, acknowledged that assessing what constituted an excessive price was a complex task, 
and said that it involved the following steps: 
 
• determination of the actual price which is alleged to be excessive; 
• determination of the economic value of the good or service in question; 
• if the actual price is higher than the economic value, is the difference reasonable? 
• Is the charging of the excessive price to the detriment of the customer?489  
 
The Court remitted the case to the Tribunal to conduct this assessment, but this remittal was pre-
empted by an out-of-court settlement between the parties. 
 
The difficulties in determining what constitutes an excessive price were highlighted again in the 
Sasol case.490 Sasol had argued before the Tribunal that, in the economic value of the product, its 
lower input costs due to the fact that the input was supplied by an affiliated company should be 
ignored, and that the higher costs which would be charged to hypothetical producers under 
conditions of long-run competitive equilibrium should be used as the benchmark. The Tribunal 
disagreed, found that Sasol had engaged in excessive pricing, and imposed on it a penalty of 
ZAR534 million. However, on appeal, the Competition Appeal Court overturned the Tribunal’s 
decision. Although it rejected Sasol’s argument about how the input costs should be calculated and 
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488 Competition Act s 1(1)(vii). 
489 Mittal Steel South Africa Ltd v Harmony Gold Mining Co Ltd 70/CAC/Apr07 par 32.  
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held it should be the actual price charged by the affiliated company, it upheld Sasol’s arguments 
regarding the valuation of capital assets, rate of return on capital, and allocation of intra-group 
costs. On that basis it held that the price-cost mark-up was 12-14 per cent. The Court held that this 
difference was not unreasonable. It stated that “a price which is significantly less than 20 per cent 
of the figure employed to determine economic value falls short of justifying judicial interference 
in this complex area”.491 
 
As mentioned earlier in this Chapter, excessive pricing, and exploitative abuse generally, is 
notoriously unclear in the EU as well, and perhaps at least partly for this reason not all jurisdictions 
prohibit such conduct in their competition laws, although they may do so by other means such as 
sector-specific regulation or consumer protection legislation. 
 
“Essential facility” is defined as “an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonably be 
duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably provide goods or services 
to their customers”.492   
 
Refusal to grant access to an essential facility, as well as excessive pricing, were at issue in a case 
against the pharmaceutical companies GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim.  The 
Commission alleged that the firms had infringed the Competition Act by refusing to license their 
patents in anti-retroviral drugs to generic manufacturers in return for a reasonable royalty. The 
cases were settled without a referral by the Commission to the Tribunal.493  However, in Telkom, 
the Commission did bring the case to the Tribunal, alleging that Telkom, the monopoly fixed line 
service provider at the time, had abused its dominant position by refusing to supply essential 
facilities to its downstream competitors for value added network services, and inducing their 
customers not to deal with them.  The Tribunal agreed with these aspects of the Commission’s 
case, and imposed a penalty of ZAR449 million on Telkom.494 
                                                     
491 Par 175. For a more detailed discussion of the South African cases on excessive pricing see 
Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law of South Africa section 7.9. 
492 S 1.(1)(vi). 
493 Competition Commission “GSK and BI issue anti-retroviral licences” Competition News 15 
March 2004. 
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By international standards, the rule against refusal to supply, whether it concerns access to an 
“essential facility” or otherwise, is unusual as it does not explicitly require proof that competition 
has been reduced (although the requirements for an essential facility will to a considerable extent 
ensure that only anti-competitive acts are covered). In the US, Areeda argued that “[c]ompulsory 
access, if it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional” and that “denial of access is never per 
se unlawful”.495 Citing his views with approval, the US Supreme Court has pointed out that an 
antitrust duty to deal conflicts with the general principle of freedom of contract, and also with 
public policy: 
 
“Compelling firms [with monopoly power] to share the source of their advantage is in some 
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for 
the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities. 
Enforced sharing also requires antitrust courts to act as central planners, identifying the 
proper price, quantity, and other terms of dealing- a role for which they are ill-suited. 
Moreover, compelling negotiation may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: 
collusion”.496 
 
EU competition law also recognises the principle of freedom of contract, even for dominant firms, 
and the potentially adverse public policy consequences of interfering with this right. As Advocate 
General Jacobs put it:  
 
“…it is apparent that the right to choose one’s trading partners and freely to dispose of 
one’s property are generally recognized principles in the laws of the Member States, in 
some cases with constitutional status. Incursions on those rights require careful 
justification…if access to a production, purchasing or distribution facility were allowed 
too easily there would be no incentive for a competitor to develop competing 
facilities…Moreover, the incentive for a dominant undertaking to invest in efficient 
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facilities would be reduced if its competitors were, upon request, able to share the 
benefits ”.497 
As noted in Chapter 2, the Competition Act in section 8(c) also prohibits dominant firms from 
engaging in “exclusionary acts”, subject to the same exception which applies in the case of “non-
hardcore” arrangements, i.e. where the efficiency gains of the conduct outweigh its anti-
competitive effects.  “Exclusionary act” is defined as “an act that impedes or prevents a firm 
entering into, or expanding within, a market”.498 
Some exclusionary acts are expressly listed in section 8(d) of the Act: these are deemed to be 
exclusionary acts, and therefore there is no need to show that they impede or prevent a firm from 
entering into, or expanding within, a market. As Sutherland and Kemp explain, another difference 
between section 8(c) and 8(d) lies in the burden of proof.499  Under section 8(c), once the 
Commission shows that the respondent has committed an exclusionary act, and that it has anti-
competitive effect, the evidential burden is on the respondent to show that the act produced 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gains.  But it is still for the Commission to prove 
that the anti-competitive effect outweighed the relevant gains.  Under section 8(d), however, once 
the Commission proves that the respondent committed one of the specific acts listed and that it has 
an anti-competitive effect, it is for the respondent to prove that the act produces relevant gains and 
that those gains outweigh the anti-competitive effect.  Clearly then, a similar difficulty exists in 
South Africa as with the EU Commission’s “new economic approach” and in Canada – how is this 
weighing exercise to be conducted?  As Sutherland and Kemp comment: 
 
“These gains and effects will most often be conceptual rather than directly quantifiable: it 
is always difficult to establish just how much of a financial effect is attributable to a certain 
act”.500   
 
The exclusionary acts specifically listed in section 8(d) are as follows:  
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• requiring or inducing a supplier or customer to not deal with a competitor; 
• refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor when supplying those goods is 
economically feasible; 
• selling goods or services on condition that the buyer purchases separate goods or services 
unrelated to the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to accept a condition unrelated to 
the object of a contract; 
• selling goods or services below their marginal or average variable cost; 
• buying-up a scarce supply of intermediate goods or resources required by a competitor. 
 
The Competition Tribunal has emphasised that the concept of “exclusionary act” is distinct from 
“anti-competitive effects”, and that it is not necessary to consider whether the efficiency exception 
applies unless the exclusionary act has anti-competitive effects. Otherwise there would be no anti-
competitive effects against which to balance the efficiencies.501  The Tribunal held in South 
African Airways I that, for this purpose, anti-competitive effects can mean either actual harm to 
consumer welfare, or harm to the market structure i.e. foreclosing (or potentially foreclosing) the 
market to rivals, to a substantial extent.502  This case, and its sequel South African Airways II,503 
concerned incentive schemes that the airline operated for travel agents, entitling them to bonuses 
where they which reached certain targets for sales of its tickets.  The Tribunal ruled that the 
schemes constituted an exclusionary act (requiring or inducing a supplier or customer not to deal 
with a competitor), that they had the anti-competitive effect of hampering rivals’ growth in the 
market (since rivals could not match those incentives), and that the airline could not produce any 
valid efficiency justification for the schemes.  They therefore infringed the Act. As in the British 
Airways/Virgin case in the EU,504 it was held that substantial foreclosure does not necessarily mean 
that rivals are completely foreclosed from entering or accessing a market or segment of a market; 
it is sufficient that they are prevented or impeded from expanding in the market.      
 
                                                     
501 Competition Commission v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 18/CR/Mar01 para 110. 
502 N 501 above para 132.  
503 Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd and Comair Ltd v South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 80/CR/Sept06. 
504 Section 4 5 1 above. 
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In the Senwes case, the Tribunal found that Senwes, a vertically-integrated firm which was both a 
grain storage provider and grain trader, had engaged in an exclusionary that was not specifically 
listed in section 8(d) but was caught by section 8(c).505 The act consisted of a margin squeeze, i.e. 
pricing its storage services (of which it was the dominant provider) to other traders at such a level 
that, had it charged its own downstream trading arm at the same level, the latter could not maintain 
its current prices and make a profit.  The Tribunal also found that the practice had anti-competitive 
effects.  Although there is an efficiency defence and (unlike under Section 8(d)) the onus is on the 
Commission to prove that it does not apply, the Tribunal held that the defendant still had to put 
forward its purported defence, as the defendant was better-placed than the Commission to know 
what efficiency justifications might be available.  Since Senwes had not done so, it was held to 
have breached Section 8(c).506 
 
This was the first, and so far only, case in South Africa of margin squeeze abuse.  The Tribunal 
itself conceded that the concept of margin squeeze was relatively novel, even in the EU, but this 
did not stop it from holding that Senwes had committed an abuse, largely by reference to EU 
case law and commentary.  Its decision was essentially upheld in substance on appeal.507 
 
One remarkable aspect of this case was that the consent agreement that settled further procedural 
disputes between the Commission and Senwes included a relatively severe remedy, namely a 
requirement for Senwes to separate its grain trading and storage operations into separate firms, 
albeit under the same ownership, presumably to make its pricing more transparent and ensure that 
it was not discriminating on price between its own trading division and other traders.508  This 
remedy has not been imposed in any EU margin squeeze case.  However, no penalty was imposed: 
under section 8(c) (unlike section 8(d)) a penalty can only be imposed if the conduct is a repeat of 
conduct that the Tribunal had previously found to be prohibited.509 
 
                                                     
505 Competition Commission v Senwes Ltd 110/CR/Dec06. 
506 Par 206. 
507 Senwes Ltd v Competition Commission 87/CAC/Feb09. 
508 Competition Commission v Senwes Ltd 110/CR/Dec06 15/05/2013.  
509 Competition Act s 61.(1)(b). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
197 
 
4 5 5 Hong Kong 
 
In Hong Kong, the concept of abuse is qualified by a competition test: “An undertaking that has a 
substantial degree of market power in a market must not abuse that power by engaging in conduct 
that has as its object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in Hong 
Kong.”510 The “prevent, restrict, distort” test echoes the test for anti-competitive agreements which 
exists in EU law and Hong Kong law, but unlike the EU, Hong Kong has also adopted the test for 
abuse of dominance. It is not clear why it has done so, but the test would seem to limit the abuse 
concept to exclusionary abuse (by targeting conduct which harms competition) as opposed to 
exploitative abuse. 
 
As noted, in the EU there is no satisfactory definition of, or test for, abuse, and the same 
uncertainities also seem to apply in Hong Kong.  Two examples of abuse are given in the statute 
itself, both of which are vague and undefined: 
 
• “predatory behaviour towards competitors”; and 
• “limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers”.511 
 
It may be that the Hong Kong courts will follow EU case law on abuse, but this is not yet certain. 
The statute does not state that its concepts are to be interpreted according to EU case law, as the 
UK and Jersey competition laws do.512 The Competition Ordinance only entered into force on 12 
December 2015, and there is as yet no case law from the Tribunal from which to draw guidance 
on the meaning of “abuse”. 
 
The Hong Kong Competition Commission’s guideline on the abuse provision gives five examples 
of abusive conduct, which seem to have been drawn from EU case law, namely: 
 
• predatory pricing; 
                                                     
510 Competition Ordinance s 21. 
511 S 21(2). 
512 Competition Act 1998 s 60; Competition (Jersey) Law s 60. 
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• tying and bundling; 
• margin squeeze; 
• refusals to deal; and 
• exclusive dealing.513 
 
It is clear that the list of potentially abusive conduct is non-exhaustive. The guideline states: 
“Abusive conduct is potentially any conduct which has the object or effect of harming competition 
in Hong Kong.”514  However, as we have already observed, a business can harm competition, in 
the sense of driving out competitors, merely by competing successfully.  So this will not do as a 
definition of abuse. 
 
4  6  Summary of Lack of Clarity in Competition Laws 
 
In this Chapter, we have seen that there are significant areas where the competition laws of the 
subject jurisdictions are unclear, in each of the four key components of these laws, namely 
arrangements that harm competition, exclusion of such arrangements, assessment of dominance 
or SMP, and abuse of dominance or SMP. We summarise these areas of lack of clarity below, 
taking each of these four components in turn. 
 
4 6 1 Arrangements which harm competition  
In the EU a key question of law remains unresolved, namely whether the European Courts will 
endorse the European Commission’s move away from the traditional economic freedom approach 
to defining competition and harm to competition, to the more market-based approach of examining 
whether the arrangement will lead to SLC, as in Australia, Canada and South Africa (the SLC test).    
 
                                                     
513 “Guideline on the Second Conduct Rule” section 5, available at:  
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/second_conduct_rule/files/Gui
deline_The_Second_Conduct_Rule_Eng.pdf  (accessed on 29-11-2017). 
514 Para 4.1. 
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If the European Courts retain their traditional economic freedom approach, we noted in Section 4 
2 1 the potentially overly-intrusive nature of this approach (all contracts restrict commercial 
freedom).  The European Courts’ attempts to limit this intrusiveness by stating that the restriction 
has to be “appreciable”, and that for this purpose the cumulative effects of similar agreements have 
to be taken into account, have led to considerable uncertainty for businesses in trying to predict 
whether their arrangements will be regarded as harming competition. This is because (a) it is not 
clear how significant the restriction must be for it to be considered “appreciable”, and (b) the 
doctrine of cumulative effects, and the fact that the effects can be appreciable at some times but 
not others during the period of the agreement, makes legal liability dependent on facts of which 
the parties to the agreement have no knowledge, and therefore prevents them from assessing 
whether the arrangement is legal or illegal.  
 
In Hong Kong, the wording of the relevant competition test (“prevent, restrict or distort 
competition”) is identical to the EU test, and it may be that the Hong Kong courts will interpret 
this concept in accordance with EU case law. However, this is not yet certain: there is as yet no 
case law of the Competition Tribunal from which to draw guidance, and the Competition 
Ordinance does not state that the law is to be interpreted according to EU competition law. This 
adds a further layer of uncertainty for Hong Kong businesses in trying to plan their arrangements. 
Even if Hong Kong does follow EU case law, the same uncertainties will be “imported” into the 
Hong Kong law, including whether the courts will ultimately endorse the Commission’s “more 
economic” SLC approach.   
 
However, the SLC test which is currently used in Australia, Canada and South Africa for “non-
hardcore” arrangements, and to which the Commission wishes to move in the EU, is also fraught 
with uncertainty. The uncertainties can be summarised as follows:  
 
• The concept of “lessening competition” is vague, and it is in many cases open to debate 
whether an arrangement has this effect, particularly where it may have adverse effects on 
one parameter of competition (such as price) but positive effects on others (such as service 
quality or innovation). In other words, a great deal of subjectivity is often involved in 
assessing whether an arrangement lessens competition, or is likely to do so in the future. 
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• Whether an arrangement lessens or is likely to lessen competition “substantially” is an even 
more subjective assessment, in many cases. 
• Whether the arrangement causes SLC may vary over time, and depend on factors of which 
the parties have no knowledge or control. They are therefore not in a position to take pre-
emptive action to avoid breaching the law or being subject to enforcement proceedings. 
• It is commonly-accepted in the subject jurisdictions that the application of the SLC test 
involves constructing hypothetical situations. Where the question is whether the 
arrangement is causing or has caused SLC, the hypothesis is what the market would be like 
without the arrangement (the “counter-factual”). Two questions are then asked (both 
largely subjective in many cases as noted above): would competition be greater without the 
arrangement than it is with the arrangement, and would the difference be substantial? 
Where the question is whether the arrangement will cause SLC in future, two hypothetical 
situations have to be constructed: the future states of the market with and without the 
arrangement respectively. The same two questions are then asked. Competition authorities 
and economists may have the analytical tools to construct such hypotheses, but businesses 
that are trying to assess in “real time” whether their arrangement will be regarded as 
substantially lessening competition do not. Moreover, even with such tools, hypothesising 
about the market situation without an agreement, and especially the future market situations 
with and without an agreement, are inherently speculative exercises. No-one really knows 
what the future holds and how market circumstances might change. For example, unknown 
extraneous factors may affect the market impact that an arrangement may have.  
 
Without the analytical tools (or time) to construct such hypotheses before entering into commercial 
arrangements, businesses and their legal advisers tend to look at matters of market structure such 
as market shares (where available), numbers of competitors and barriers to entry, in assessing 
whether the arrangement is likely to cause SLC. There may be some situations where it might seem 
instinctively obvious to businesses or their legal advisers that an arrangement will lead to SLC, 
such as where there are two competitors in a market with high barriers to entry that decide to 
merge, or to form a marketing and sales joint venture.  Equally, where either of these transactions 
involves two out of 30 competitors in a market with low barriers to entry, it may seem instinctively 
obvious that there will be no SLC. But these cases are at the extreme.  There are many more cases 
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that are less obvious, such as where two competitors in a market of six, seven or eight players enter 
into similar transactions.  And in the case of vertical arrangements, what if a supplier with an 
estimated market share of 25 per cent appoints an exclusive reseller for a particular country for a 
period of five years, even where there are other resellers which wish to sell the product but are 
excluded by the agreement from doing so?  Would it make any difference whether the supplier’s 
market share was 20 or 30 per cent, or that the duration of the exclusivity was for three years, not 
five? 
 
4 6 2 Exclusion of Arrangements 
 
As regards EU competition law, we have noted that it is unclear whether the European Courts will 
endorse the EU Commission’s “net consumer benefits” test for assessing whether agreements are 
excluded from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, not least because the test does not 
sit comfortably with the text of Article 101(3) TFEU itself. Assuming the Courts do so, the 
application of the test itself involves severe difficulties, including the following: 
 
• As with assessing whether an arrangement will “lessen competition”, assessing whether it 
will produce net benefits for consumers is a subjective and arbitrary exercise- indeed even 
more so. Take the example of an arrangement between businesses whereby they develop a 
new, better quality but more expensive product than the two products they were each 
supplying previously. Many consumers prefer to pay a higher price to get a better product: 
have they been harmed in these circumstances? Equally, other consumers might prefer a 
lower price, even if it means a poorer quality product: have they been harmed? Equally, 
and conversely, what constitutes a consumer benefit is subjective: certain consumers may 
consider something as a benefit while others may not.  
• Even assuming that what constitutes consumer benefit and consumer harm could be 
defined objectively, quantifying them with any degree of precision is virtually impossible. 
Indeed, the European Commission has recognised that consumer benefits may be 
qualitative rather than quantitative:515 how can both qualitative and quantitative benefits 
                                                     
515 Section 4 3 1 above.  
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feature in the same weighing exercise and produce any kind of objective result? Whether 
consumers will benefit in net terms from a particular agreement is therefore clearly a 
subjective and arbitrary assessment. 
 
In Hong Kong, as with the test for harm to competition, the wording of the exclusion replicates 
the wording of EU competition law. The same question as to whether the Hong Kong courts will 
follow the EU case law applies, and it is not clear (as under EU law) whether they will apply the 
Commission’s net consumer welfare test.  
 
The total welfare-type standard that is used in Australia, Canada and South Africa may have the 
appearance of being more objective and scientific than the net consumer welfare standard. 
However, whether an arrangement will have any “technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain” that will outweigh the harm to competition is an extremely complex assessment, 
has severe difficulties of definition and quantification, and therefore involves a large degree of 
subjectivity. Businesses and their legal advisers are not in a position to predict in many cases 
whether the arrangement will qualify for the exclusion, and even economists may disagree on this 
issue if the arrangement is subsequently challenged.  The assessment is further complicated, and 
made even more subjective, in South Africa and Canada by the fact that the other objectives of the 
competition laws, including promoting the interests of particular groups such as SMEs, also have 
to be taken into account in making the assessment.   
 
In Australia, South Africa and Hong Kong, the difficulties of assessing whether the exclusion 
applies are mitigated by the fact that, unlike in the other subject jurisdictions, businesses (and their 
legal advisers) do not have to rely only on their own assessment of the issue, and do not risk 
proceedings being taken against them if they get the assessment wrong. Unlike the position under 
EU competition law where parties have to self-assess whether the exclusion criteria apply, the 
parties can apply for a ruling from the authority on whether the exclusion applies before 
implementing the arrangement.516 In Australia, for exclusive dealing and private disclosure of 
pricing information to competitors, the business may notify the arrangements to the Commission 
                                                     
516 Although in Hong Kong the Commission is legally-required to deal with the application in 
only limited circumstances: section 4 3 5 above.  
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and implement them, unless and until the Commission objects to them.517  The same issue of 
predicting of legality or illegality does not therefore arise: a business will act legally provided that 
it applies for authorisation (or in Australia, notifies arrangements which are covered by the 
notification system) and complies with whatever ruling the authority makes. However, the facility 
to apply for authorisation or to notify raises different problems, which are examined in Chapter 5.   
 
4 6 3 Dominance / Substantial Market Power 
 
The starting point in all of the subject jurisdictions for assessing dominance or substantial market 
power is defining what the relevant market is.  We have seen that although in some cases it may 
be clear what the relevant product or geographical market is, there are many cases where this is 
unclear.  This is because the concept of relevant market is essentially a hypothetical one and 
involves predicting something that is unknown – how customers would respond to a five to ten 
percent price increase (the so-called “SSNIP” test).  And in cases where the SSNIP test is 
irrelevant, such as where there is no price because the products or services in question are free of 
charge, it is unclear what test is to be applied.   
 
Regarding dominant position or substantial market power, there is a great deal of uncertainty about 
what these concepts mean.  The EU case law has adopted a definition of dominant position that is 
both internally inconsistent (the ability to act in the market to an appreciable extent independently 
versus the ability to prevent effective competition being maintained) and vague.   In South Africa 
the definition is also vague, at least at levels of market share below 45 per cent (at 45 per cent 
market share or above there is, as we have seen, an irrebuttable presumption of dominant position).  
Below 45 per cent, whether a dominant position exists depends on whether there is “market 
power”.  “Market power” is defined as existing if a firm is either able to “control prices” or to 
“exclude competition” or to “behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, 
customers or suppliers”.  But it is not clear what any of these concepts mean.  In one sense, any 
business whose price cuts are matched by competitors controls prices.  We have noted above the 
                                                     
517 CCA s 93. 
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EU conflict between the notions of acting independently, and at the same time excluding 
competitors or competition.   
 
The vagueness in South Africa (and in some respects the EU) has been mitigated to a certain extent 
by market share presumptions, but it is not clear what needs to be shown to rebut the presumptions 
(where they are rebuttable). Moreover, in the EU, and in South Africa where the firm has a market 
share below 45 per cent, it is not clear what mix of factors in what degrees will constitute 
dominance.   
 
Similar problems of definition arise with the concept of dominant position in Canada, and 
substantial market power in Australia. As Hong Kong also uses the concept of substantial market 
power, similar problems are also likely to arise there.  The extent to which a business is constrained 
by the conduct of competitors, potential competitors or customers, and whether that extent is 
“substantial”, is essentially a subjective assessment, and one on which reasonable people may take 
different views.  As with the concepts of SLC and the “relevant market”, although there may be 
some cases where a business or its legal advisers could be confident that substantial market power 
exists (such as where there are only one or two suppliers in a market with high barriers to entry), 
there will be many cases where they can have no such confidence. 
 
4 6 4 Abuse (Misuse) of Dominance / Substantial Market Power 
 
In the EU, as with the assessment of arrangements that harm competition and whether they qualify 
for exclusion, it is not yet clear whether, and if so to what extent, the European Courts will follow 
the European Commission’s “more economic approach”, its emphasis on the effects of conduct 
rather than its form. The European Court’s recent Intel approach suggests that the Courts will have 
to look at arguments regarding the economic effects of conduct and whether any harm the conduct 
causes to competition is outweighed by efficiencies, but it remains to be seen from future cases 
how this will play out in practice. As with restrictive arrangements, there is uncertainty as to the 
extent to which the Courts will follow the Commission’s approach. 
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In Canada and South Africa, broadly speaking the same SLC test applies to abuses of dominance 
and agreements which harm competition, and therefore the same uncertainties apply, due to the 
speculative and subjective assessments that need be made as to whether the courts would find that 
the SLC test was satisfied. Moreover, in South Africa, as the Senwes case showed, the law on what 
constitutes an abuse in South Africa under section 8(c) of the Competition Act is still in the early 
stages of development.  
 
In Hong Kong, and in contrast to the EU, the same “prevent, restrict or distort” language is used 
for abuse as for arrangements.  As regards the latter, although the legal position in the EU is 
unclear, at least there is a body of case law to which reference can be made for how this term has 
been interpreted in the EU.  No such reference can be made under the Hong Kong abuse provision, 
because this term is not used in the EU abuse provision, Article 102.  It is highly unfortunate, 
particularly for businesses in Hong Kong, as well as the courts which have to interpret the law, 
that Hong Kong will start off with a competition law which is so obscure.   
 
In the case of unilateral conduct, we have seen that an adverse effect on competition (however that 
effect is defined) is not sufficient, since vigorous competitive conduct can exclude competitors.  
There must be something in the nature of the conduct to qualify the conduct as an abuse.  As we 
have seen, strenuous efforts have been made to develop a common test for abuse, so far to no avail.  
This would not matter so much for businesses if there was a list of clearly defined types of conduct 
which constitute an abuse, even if they have no common theme.  Non-exhaustive lists that have 
been set out in the Canadian and South African laws certainly help in narrowing the uncertainty, 
as they are relatively specific and lengthy.  Nevertheless, there can still be uncertainty as to the 
meaning of the types conduct listed.  For example, in South Africa one of the specific types of 
conduct listed is pricing below marginal or average variable cost, but as the Media 24 case showed, 
it is unclear what needs to be proved to meet these tests.518  The EU list is much shorter and vaguer, 
(with four examples) and the Hong Kong one even shorter and vaguer (with only two examples). 
 
                                                     
518 Competition Commission v Media 24 (pty) Ltd 92/CR/Oct11. 
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Through the EU case law, categories of conduct that are commonly regarded, at least potentially, 
as abuses have emerged.  The categories include exclusive dealing, fidelity rebates, tying and 
bundling, predatory pricing, margin squeeze and refusal to supply.  The application of some of 
these categories in particular cases can be difficult, such as precisely what costs are relevant in 
predatory pricing and margin squeeze cases, and in what precise circumstances a refusal to supply 
constitutes an abuse. It remains to be seen whether Hong Kong will follow the EU’s approach.  
The Commission, in its guidelines, seems to follow the EU approach, but ultimately it will be a 
decision for the Competition Tribunal. 
We have left Australia till last because it has until very recently taken markedly different approach 
to the concept of abuse (in Australia “misuse”) of SMP.  It is the only one of the subject 
jurisdictions where the legislation stated that the purpose of the conduct was a determining factor, 
not its effect.  But purpose is not enough: as with the other jurisdictions, there must be something 
in the nature of the conduct itself that distinguishes it from legitimate competitive conduct.  In 
Australia, we have seen that this has in the past been interpreted essentially as a “but for” test: but 
for having SMP, would (or could) the business have been able to engage in the relevant conduct? 
(Put another way, the business must act “as if” it did not have substantial market power).  This 
involves, like the assessment of SLC, the construction of a hypothetical situation, in this case 
whether the business could or would have engaged in the conduct without SMP. This is to a large 
extent a speculative exercise. There would seem to be few types of conduct that could only be 
engaged in by businesses with SMP (whatever SMP means – we have noted the clarity problems 
with this concept). The lack of clarity was been made even worse by the 2010 amendments to the 
CCA, which provided a non-exhaustive list of four, relatively vague, factors which could be taken 
into account in determining whether a business has taken advantage of its position of substantial 
market power.  In many cases a business would have found it difficult to assess whether its 
proposed conduct is “materially facilitated” by, or (even vaguer) “otherwise related to”, its SMP. 
The recent abolition of the concept of “misuse”, as we have seen, can be expected to lead to even 
greater legal uncertainty.519  
 
4 7 Failure to Learn from the US Experience  
                                                     
519 Section 4 5 2 above. 
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In fact, the uncertainties that we have described in this Chapter are very similar to those that have 
been experienced in US antitrust law. Most types of arrangement and conduct in US antitrust law 
are now assessed under the so- called “rule of reason”. This rule involves assessing all of the 
economic costs and benefits of a particular arrangement or conduct before the court decides 
whether or not to prohibit it. As we have seen, a similar exercise has to be conducted under the 
competition laws of the subject jurisdictions, to determine whether a particular agreement or (in 
the case of abuse) course of conduct complies with the law. But as Easterbrook has said: 
 
“The welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond our ken. If we 
assembled twelve economists and gave them all the available data about a business 
practice, plus an unlimited computer budget, we would not get agreement about whether 
the practice promoted consumers’ welfare or economic efficiency more broadly defined. 
They would discover some gaps in the data, some avenues requiring further exploration. 
Someone would invoke the principle of second best, claiming that monopoly could be a 
beneficial offset to distortions elsewhere. At least one of the economists would construct a 
new model showing how the practice could reduce efficiency if certain things (unknowable 
from the data) were present. A global inquiry invites no answer; it puts too many things in 
issue”.520 
 
The same can be said of the competition laws in the subject jurisdictions. The root cause of this 
lack of clarity is that liability (or other legal consequences) under the competition laws we have 
examined depends on economic assessments, which by definition are vague and subjective. As 
two commentators have said, in the context of EU law: 
 
                                                     
520 Frank H Easterbrook “The Limits of Antitrust” 63 Tex L Rev 1, 6 (1984). 
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“The more economics-oriented an approach to Articles 81 and 82 (e.g. involving market 
share and market power analyses) the more uncertainty one must accept in order to have 
an economically coherent application of the rules.”521 
 
Ironically, the European Commission actually thought that moving towards a more economic 
approach would make the application of the competition rules clearer, rather than the opposite. 
Gerber reports as follows: 
 
“There was concern among Commission officials and others that if many competition 
authorities were now included in the European Union, this could increase uncertainty and 
lead to major divergences between and among competition laws of the Member States. The 
normative use of economics was seen as a means of avoiding or at least significantly 
reducing this potential for diversity and uncertainty. Economics, it was claimed, was a clear 
conceptual framework for competition law. If, therefore, every Member State followed the 
economic approach, there would be little basis for divergence and its resulting 
uncertainties”.522 
 
What is perhaps most remarkable about this view is that it should have been obvious from the US’s 
experience with the rule of reason that the use of economics creates more uncertainty, not less. 
This apparent failure of the EU to learn from the US experience goes back a long way- not just at 
the level of the enforcement authorities, but also in terms of legal scholarship. A striking example 
of this was that in 1984, the same year that the ex-US judge and academic Frank Easterbrook was 
criticising the uncertainty caused by the use of economics under the US rule of reason in the 
passage quoted above, two EU practitioners were advocating the introduction of a US-style rule 
of reason in EU competition law (albeit with the laudable motive of avoiding the problem of 
mitigating the need to notify so many commercial agreements to the Commission for clearance): 
 
                                                     
521 Barry E Hawk and Nathalie Denaijer “The Development of Articles 81 and 82 EC Treaty: Legal 
Certainty” in European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Policy 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu eds (2001) 130. 
522 David J Gerber “Searching for a Modernised Voice: Economics, Institutions and Predictability 
in European Competition Law” Fordham Int L J Vol 37 1421, 1436. 
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“As regards legal certainty, such an approach [a rule of reason] entails the realistic 
acceptance of a substantial but tolerable level of uncertainty- a level with which many 
businessmen are perfectly willing to live. These practices tend to go in the direction of a 
system which is functionally somewhat like that of the ‘rule of reason’ in the United 
States”.523  
 
The authors do not make clear what they mean by “substantial but tolerable”, or whether they had 
empirical support for the suggested toleration of legal uncertainty by many businesses. It is the 
submission of this thesis that the substantial uncertainty arising from the use of economic 
assessments to trigger legal liability is not tolerable from a rule of law standpoint. 
 
Some of the root causes of the current legal uncertainty which bedevils competition laws, as 
exemplified by the subject jurisdictions, were even identified in the US as long ago as the start of 
the 20th century, in some of the early US cases concerning competition law and economic 
regulation. A brief overview of those cases may illustrate the point. 
 
In International Harvester Co of America v Kentucky, the Supreme Court struck down as void for 
vagueness a Kentucky law which allowed competitors to agree prices, unless the agreement had 
the purpose or effect of fixing a price that was greater or less than the “real value” of the product.524 
The Court’s concern was that the legality of the conduct depended on what the price for the product 
would be in the absence of the agreement- what economists nowadays would call the 
“counterfactual”- and that this was a matter of speculation.  The Court said: 
 
“Value is the effect in exchange of the relative social desire for compared objects expressed 
in terms of a common denominator.   It is a fact, and generally is more or less easy to 
ascertain.  But what it would be with such increase of a never extinguished competition as 
it might be guessed would have existed had the combination not been made, with exclusion 
of the actual effect of other abnormal influences, and, it would seem, with exclusion also 
                                                     
523 Ian Forrester and Christopher Norall “The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and the 
Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and could be Applied” (1984) CMLRev Vol 21(1) 11, 17. 
524 276 US (1914). 
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of any increased efficiency in the machines, but with inclusion of the effect of the 
combination so far as it was economically beneficial to itself and the community, is a 
problem that no human ingenuity could solve.  The reason is not the general uncertainties 
of a jury trial, but that the elements necessary to determine the imaginary ideal are 
uncertain both in nature and degree of effect to the acutest commercial mind.   The very 
community, the intensity of whose wish relatively to its other competing desires determines 
the precise value that it would give, has to be supposed differently organized and subject 
to other influences under which it acts.  In our opinion [the law] cannot stand” (emphasis 
added). 
 
The Court went on to say that “to compel [men] to guess, on peril of indictment, what the 
community would have given for [the goods] if the continually changing conditions were other 
than they are, to an uncertain extent; to divine prophetically what the reaction of only partially 
determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and desires of purchasers, is to exact gifts that 
mankind does not possess.” 
 
As we have seen in this Chapter, this criticism could be levied at competition laws even today. 
The assessment of arrangements and conduct under the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws 
involves, as a standard component, the construction of a hypothetical “counterfactual”, i.e. what 
the situation would have been without the arrangement or conduct in question, the very approach 
which the Supreme Court condemned as being unfair and unconstitutional.   
 
In 1921, the Supreme Court held in United States v L Cohen Grocery Co that an economic 
regulation prohibiting the charging of an “unjust or unreasonable rate or charge” for necessities 
was void for vagueness, on the grounds that the criterion for liability “leaves open... the widest 
conceivable enquiry, the scope of which no-one can foresee and the result of which no-one can 
foreshadow or adequately guard against.”525 
 
                                                     
525 255 US 81, 89 (1921). 
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Similarly, in 1927, the Supreme Court ruled in Cline v Frink Dairy Co that a Colorado antitrust 
statute was unconstitutionally vague in providing a safe harbour for agreements, the object and 
purposes of which were to provide for the parties a “reasonable profit”.526  The Court held that: 
 
“[s]uch an exception in the statute leaves the whole statute without a fixed standard of guilt 
in an adjudication affecting the liberty of the one accused.  An attempt to enforce the 
section will be to penalise and punish all combinations in restraint of trade in a commodity 
when in the judgment of the court and jury they are not necessary to enable those engaged 
in it to make a reasonable profit, but not otherwise”.527 
 
The Court went on to say: 
 
“…it will not do to hold average man to the peril of an indictment for the unwise exercise 
of his economic or business knowledge, involving so many factors of varying effect that 
neither the person to decide in advance nor the jury to try him after the fact can safely and 
certainly judge the result.”528  
 
The uncertainties of interpreting concepts such as “unjust”, “unreasonable” and “reasonable” 
also exist in some of the competition laws we have examined. For example, we have seen that 
one example of abuse under EU competition law which is given in the TFEU is imposing an 
“unfair” purchase price, selling price or other trading condition”.  But what is unfair in this 
context? This is a subjective assessment which is open to conflicting interpretations when 
applied to the facts of a given case. We saw earlier in this Chapter how the European and South 
African courts have struggled with defining the notion of an “excessive” selling price. And in the 
South African statute, an “essential facility” is defined as: “an infrastructure or resource that 
cannot reasonably be duplicated, and without access to which competitors cannot reasonably 
provide to their customers”.529 Again, “excessive” and “reasonable” require subjective 
                                                     
526 274 US 445 (1927). 
527 457-458. 
528 465. 
529 Competition Act s 1(1)(viii). 
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assessments which are open to dispute in particular cases. The same could be said for concepts 
such as “substantially” lessening competition and “substantial” market power. 
  
In summary, where these US statutes on competition or economic regulation were struck down as 
void for vagueness, the vagueness can be divided into two categories. In International Harvester, 
the vagueness stemmed primarily from the fact that, in order to assess whether the arrangement 
was legal or illegal, the parties had to hypothesise about what the situation would be in the absence 
of the agreement in question (the counterfactual).  The Court effectively said that this did not give 
the parties fair warning or notice as to what was illegal, because what the situation would be in the 
absence of the agreement was unknown to anyone, and therefore entirely speculative. In the Cohen 
and Cline cases, on the other hand, the vagueness stemmed from the subjectivity of the descriptors 
triggering liability, namely “unjust”, “unreasonable”, and “reasonable”, there being no objective 
criterion in the law against which to assess whether the conduct in question fell foul of the law. 
Both categories of vagueness exist in the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions, as we have 
seen in this Chapter.  
 
The uncertainties in US antitrust law, particularly in applying the “rule of reason”  led Maurice 
Stucke to answer his question “Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?” in the 
affirmative.530 They also led Connolly to the conclusion that the Sherman Act is so vague as to be 
unconstitutional as a criminal statute.531 We conclude this Chapter by examining whether similar 
criticisms could be levelled at the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions. 
 
4  8  Conclusions: are Competition Laws sufficiently clear? 
 
In Chapter 3 we selected a benchmark for assessing whether the competition laws are sufficiently 
clear, namely the principles that have emerged from the case law of the ECtHR under Article 7 of 
the ECHR regarding the requirement for legal clarity in criminal law. This requirement is a 
                                                     
530 N 9 above. 
531 Robert Connolly “The Sherman Act is Unconstitutional as a Criminal Statute (Part I)” 
available at http://cartelcapers.com/blog/sherman-act-unconstitutional-criminal-statute-part-
1/ (accessed on 1-12-2017). 
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component of the rule of law concept. These principles, and the reasons why they are considered 
to be an appropriate benchmark for clarity in competition laws, were also examined in Chapter 3. 
 
From the Article 7 principles we derived three criteria with which laws have to comply to be 
sufficiently clear, namely: 
 
• the essential ingredients of the “offence”, i.e. what elements need to be established as a 
matter of fact to prove that an infringement has taken place, must be clear; 
• any residual issues in the law that need to be clarified through the case law are by definition 
points of law (such as the type of conduct which may constitute an infringement, or the 
scope of the persons to which it applies) not fact or economic assessment; 
• it must be possible for a legal adviser to reasonably foresee the outcome of the clarification. 
 
This Chapter has demonstrated that the competition laws in all of the subject jurisdictions, to a 
large extent, do not comply with these principles. The reasons are as follows: 
 
• The essential ingredients of a breach of competition law are to a large extent unclear, in 
the sense that it is not clear what actions will trigger liability. In the EU and Hong Kong 
law, it is unclear what the appropriate standard is for assessing whether an arrangement 
between firms is prohibited or permitted: whether it is SLC or a restriction of commercial 
freedom. In the case of abuse or misuse of market power, none of the subject jurisdictions 
have established a satisfactory definition of the concept of abuse/misuse, and it is unclear 
what circumstances will justify conduct which would otherwise constitute an abuse or 
misuse;  
• While there are points of competition law such as the above that remain to be clarified, the 
biggest area of doubt concerns not the law itself, but the assessment of the actual or likely 
economic effects of particular arrangements or conduct. For example,  whether an 
agreement will cause a “substantial lessening of competition”, what constitutes the relevant 
market, and whether a business has a dominant position or substantial market power in that 
market are matters of economic assessment, and as such to a large extent arbitrary and 
subjective, not law. They involve “crystal ball- gazing” and speculation as to the future 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
 
effects of particular arrangements or conduct. In addition, whether the criteria for 
permitting an agreement or conduct that harms competition are satisfied, on the basis of 
either a consumer welfare or a total welfare standard, is largely a matter of arbitrary and 
subjective judgment.  
• Lawyers are not qualified to advise on such economic effects. Except at the two extremes 
where there is obvious illegality or legality (or in the case of Canada, grounds for 
enforcement action, or no such grounds) a firm cannot predict the legal outcome of its 
conduct with sufficient certainty, even with legal advice. This is because of the complex 
and subjective economic assessments involved. As noted above, it is not a matter of 
predicting what view the courts will take on points of law, on which lawyers are qualified 
to advise, but predicting which view the enforcement authorities and courts will take on 
economic assessments, on which they are not qualified to advise, and which often conflict 
with each other.  
• Finding firms liable for competition law infringements, on the basis that the enforcement 
authorities or courts reach a different conclusion on the basis of their economic assessments 
after the event than the firms reached before the event, offends the rule of law principle, as 
reflected in Article 7 ECHR.532 In particular, the imposition of penalties in such cases 
offends this principle.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
532 For concurring views see Peter Whelan “Legal Cartel Criminalisation within the EU Member 
States” (2012) Cambridge Law Journal 71(3) 677, 682; Nordlander & Harrison n 234 above 9. 
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5 Practical Implications of Lack of Clarity in Competition Laws 
  
5 1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 showed how the competition laws in the five subject jurisdictions do not provide 
businesses with clear rules as to what arrangements and conduct are legitimate or may be subject 
to enforcement action. In this Chapter, we look at what the practical implications of this lack of 
legal clarity are.  It will be seen that the lack of legal clarity has a number of serious adverse effects 
in terms of costs to businesses and the economy, fairness, access to justice, and the credibility and 
enforceability of competition laws.  In Chapter 6, we look at possible solutions to mitigate these 
problems. 
 
We would like to make two preliminary points. 
 
First, it might be argued by some that the scale of the problem lack of clarity in the competition 
laws we discussed in Chapter 4 is not as great as it may seem. After all (the argument might run), 
most enforcement these days is against hardcore cartels, the rules against price-fixing and other 
hardcore arrangements are sufficiently clear, there is comparatively little enforcement against 
other horizontal arrangements and vertical arrangements, enforcement against unilateral conduct 
is also comparatively rare, and mergers for the most part are subject to compulsory prior 
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notification based on clear financial thresholds. We would disagree with this argument, for the 
following reasons which will be expanded upon in Chapter 6: 
 
• A vague law against anti-competitive arrangements and unilateral conduct has many 
harmful consequences that will be described in this Chapter, even if it is only enforced in 
practice against cartels (in the case of the former) and in what are considered by the 
enforcement authority to be the most egregious conduct (in the case of the latter). For 
example, businesses still need to ensure that they are compliant with the law and incur the 
costs of doing so, and forbearance in enforcement does not protect them from private legal 
actions, in jurisdictions where standalone private actions are allowed. Selective 
enforcement against the most serious arrangements and conduct is therefore not an 
adequate solution to the problem of legal uncertainty, as we shall argue in Chapter 6. 
• The definition of a cartel is not as clear as it may seem in many cases, as will be explained 
in Chapter 7, and an appropriate definition of abuse (or in the US monopolisation)  has 
never been found, as was discussed in Chapter 4. 
• The relatively low level of enforcement against non-cartel horizontal arrangements should 
not be interpreted as a sign that they are uncommon, or that the parties to proposed 
transactions of this kind do not face compliance problems. A survey by the international 
accountancy firm PwC in 2016 found that on average 49 percent of global Chief 
Executive Officers were expecting to make a strategic alliance (as opposed to a merger) 
that year. In the US the figure was 59 per cent and in China it was 63 per cent. “Strategic 
alliance” was defined as “an agreement between two or more organizations to share 
resources or knowledge to pursue mutually beneficial objectives while remaining 
independent organizations”.533  
• Vertical arrangements are even more common: virtually every business has suppliers and 
customers. While Singapore has excluded vertical agreements from the scope of its 
competition law, and the EU has issued a block exemption for them, many jurisdictions 
(such as the other subject jurisdictions examined in this dissertation) have no such 
                                                     
533 “Joint Ventures and Strategic Alliances: Examining  the Keys to Success”, available at  
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/joint-ventures-strategic-alliances.html 
(accessed on 8-2-2018). 
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exclusion or exemption, and even the application of the EU block exemption is 
complicated by the fact that it is only available up to certain market share thresholds,534 
with the difficulty of defining markets which we discussed in Chapter 4.535 
• A vague law covering a wide range of arrangements and conduct gives scope for the 
authority to change its enforcement policy over time, and what is a not a priority at one 
stage in time may become a priority later. A good example is the recent clampdown by 
the European Commission on resale price maintenance, where it took action against this 
practice for the first time in 15 years,536 and the recent increase in enforcement of 
competition law by the EU and UK competition authorities against excessive pricing (at 
least in the pharmaceutical sector)- a type of conduct that these competition authorities 
have traditionally been loathe to tackle, even although their competition laws prohibit 
excessive pricing).537  
 
The second preliminary point is that some of the adverse effects of legal uncertainty that we deal 
with in this Chapter concern the unfairness and costs it creates for businesses. We are aware that, 
in the area of criminal law, there have been criticisms that businesses have tried to cast 
themselves as victims in order to influence policy debates around law, order and crime 
prevention. In addition, it has been argued that businesses are not worthy of protection as a 
policy matter, because they are just as likely to be offenders rather than victims and are able to 
take care of their own security needs.538 Does this mean that we should not be concerned about 
whether businesses have sufficient legal certainty under competition laws? Although businesses 
                                                     
534 See section 4 3 1. 
535 See section 4 4 1. 
536 “EU issues first RPM fines in 15 years” Global Competition Review 24 July 2018 (accessed on 
25-7-2018). 
537 “European Commission Launches Excessive Pricing Investigation in Pharma Sector” 
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2017/05/european-commission-launches-
excessive-pricing-investigation-in-pharma-sector (accessed on 15-8-2018); “Excessive pricing 
enforcement action on the rise: a new enforcement trend?” 
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/08/excessive-pricing-
enforcement-action(accessed on 15-8-2018). 
538 Matt Hopkins “Business, victimisation and victimology: Reflections on contemporary 
patterns of commercial victimisation and the concept of businesses as ‘ideal victims’” 
International Review of Victimology 2016, Vol 22(2) 161. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
218 
 
sometimes unnecessarily cry foul, we would argue that we should indeed be concerned, for the 
following reasons: 
 
• Businesses are just as entitled to legal certainty as individuals under the rule of law 
principle, and their rights to sufficient legal certainty are guaranteed constitutionally in 
many jurisdictions, include those that are parties to the ECHR. 
• Imposing extra unnecessary costs on businesses through unclear competition laws is not 
just a problem for businesses, it is a problem for society as a whole. It creates economic 
inefficiency, and may also harm consumers as the extra costs may ultimately have to be 
borne by them. 
  
5 2 Compliance Costs 
 
Faced with such unclear rules, a business which wants to avoid the severe adverse consequences 
of breaching competition law (as most businesses probably do, for the reasons explained in Section 
5 6 below) has no choice but to engage specialist competition lawyers for advice on their proposed 
arrangements and conduct.  This is notwithstanding the fact that, for the reasons explained in 
Chapter 4, the lawyer will only be able to give reasonably definitive advice in a minority of cases 
on the margins as to whether a proposal arrangement or course of conduct will be legal or may be 
subject to enforcement action.  Even if it is unable to obtain definitive advice as to whether its 
conduct will be legal or illegal, a business still needs to assess the risks of breaking the law, and 
being subject to sanctions – i.e. is the risk low, medium or high? It will usually instruct a legal 
adviser to conduct this analysis, with the inevitable costs involved. 
 
This is not to say businesses never need to seek legal advice on what they are proposing to do – 
clearly they do.  But the lack of clarity in competition laws means that the legal assessment is a 
much more complex (and therefore costly) task than it would be if the laws were clear.  The move 
towards a “more economic” approach to the enforcement policy of the competition authorities – 
in the EU at least (as observed in Chapter 4) has led to a commensurate increase in the depth of 
the analysis that needs to be carried out beforehand, to assess what views the national authorities 
or courts are likely to take on the particular transaction or conduct, in order assess the compliance 
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risks.  These costs may be multiplied, if the transaction or conduct spans national borders, as many 
do: advice in other jurisdictions may also be required. Specialist economists may also need to be 
engaged for this purpose, further increasing the costs. 
 
5 3  Enforcement and Litigation Costs 
 
If the business does decide to take the risk and go ahead with the proposed arrangement or course 
of conduct, the lack of legal certainty in competition law increases the likelihood of having to 
defend lengthy regulatory enquiries and investigations, and even litigation. The investigation or 
litigation could be initiated by the competition authority, either on its own initiative or following 
receipt of a complaint from a third party. In jurisdictions which allow standalone private actions 
such as the EU and Australia, litigation could also be initiated by a private party.  
 
Many of the key competition concepts such as “relevant market”, “substantially lessen 
competition”, “dominant position”, “substantial market power” and “abuse” are drafted in a very 
broad and vague way, as explained in Chapter 4.  This means that there is a much greater ability 
and incentive for disgruntled competitors to bring commercially-motivated complaints to the 
regulator, or litigation before the courts, if the arrangement or conduct does go ahead, arguing that 
it is in breach of the competition rules.  The vaguer the law, the more scope there is for arguing 
that the arrangement or conduct is anti-competitive. The vagueness of these concepts also increases 
the complexity and costs of the proceedings, as teams of lawyers and economists on either side 
will typically present opposing arguments on each of them.   
 
The cost of dealing with such enquiries, investigations and litigation can be enormous, involving 
not just various teams of lawyers but also economists and other experts, and result in considerable 
disruption to business affairs, including diversion of management time. Given these costs, and the 
uncertainty as to what decision the court will make, the defendant in a private action may have an 
incentive to reach a settlement with the plaintiff, which leads to unfairness- another adverse 
consequence of lack of clarity which is discussed in section 5 4. 
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Litigation costs arising from vague concepts in competition law have long been a concern in the 
US. As we shall see in Chapter 6, it was in large part the reason (along with increasing clarity for 
businesses) why the US Supreme Court introduced per se rules for certain types of conduct such 
as price-fixing- although the pendulum has now swung back in favour of a full “rule of reason” 
analysis for most types of conduct. One prominent US academic and ex-judge Easterbrook 
described how the vagueness of the US rule of reason increases litigation costs as follows: 
 
“When everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive. Any one factor might or might not 
outweigh another, or all of the others, in the factfinder’s contemplation…Faced with a list 
of such imponderables, lawyers must engage in ceaseless discovery. (They might find 
something bearing on a factor, and the factor might be dispositive). The higher the stakes, 
the more firms are willing to spend on discovery and litigation. The marginal week of 
discovery or trial just might mean saving a few millions or tens of millions of dollars. 
Litigation costs are the product of vague rules combined with high stakes, and nowhere is 
that combination more deadly than in antitrust litigation under the Rule of Reason” 
(emphasis added).539 
 
The degree of exposure to the risk of litigation depends very much on whether the jurisdiction in 
question allows “standalone” actions or only “follow-on” actions. Where standalone actions are 
allowed, a private party does not have to await a finding of infringement by a court or authority 
before initiating an action. The business may therefore be exposed to the risk of litigation by a 
private party even if there is no prior finding of infringement by a competition authority or 
adjudicating body. Where only follow-on actions are allowed, on the other hand, if there is no 
finding of infringement, private actions cannot be brought. (It should be noted in this context, 
however, that in South Africa, even if the Competition Commission decides not to prosecute a case 
against certain conduct before the Tribunal, a private complainant can still bring the case before 
the Tribunal directly and seek a declaration of infringement. If the complainant is successful, the 
Tribunal’s declaration may provide the basis for a private damages claim.540 Standalone actions 
                                                     
539 Frank H Easterbrook “The Limits of Antitrust” (1984) Tex L Rev 1, 12. 
540 Competition Act s 51(1). 
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are allowed in the US, EU and Australia, whereas only follow-on actions can be brought in Canada, 
South Africa and Hong Kong. 
 
The degree of exposure to litigation also depends on the financial incentive to litigate. For example, 
under US law, successful plaintiffs in an antitrust litigation can receive damages awards covering 
not just the value of the harm caused, but three times that value (so-called “treble damages”), which 
increases the incentive to resort to litigation.541    
 
A good example of the costs and disruption that competition litigation causes is the “C7” case in 
Australia, which was a standalone private action.542 A pay television company brought an action 
alleging that its rivals had acted in breach of competition law by obtaining exclusive rights to 
broadcast certain sporting events, and refusing to sub-license those rights to it.  The trial judge, 
Justice Ronald Sackville, estimated that the parties had spent approximately 200 million Australian 
dollars on legal costs alone up to the date he issued his judgment, and this was even before the 
case went to appeal.  He commented as follows:  
 
“It is difficult to understand how the costs incurred by the parties can be said to be 
proportionate to what is truly at stake, measured in financial terms. In my view, the 
expenditure of $200 million (and counting) on a single piece of litigation is not only 
extraordinarily wasteful, but borders on the scandalous”.543 
 
While both the trial judge and the appeal court rejected the applicant’s case, the costs of having to 
defend an action of this kind are unlikely to be fully covered in an award of costs, not least because 
of the huge amount of disruption and management time involved.   
 
                                                     
541 Section 4 of the Clayton Act (1914) provides that “any person who shall be injured in his 
business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any 
district court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an 
agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by 
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee” (emphasis added). 
542 Seven Network Limited v News Limited [2007] FAC 1062. 
543 N 554 above para 10. 
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Even in jurisdictions which do not allow standalone damages actions, the costs of having to defend 
a competition investigation or litigation initiated by a competition authority, as opposed to a private 
litigant, can in itself be very high, as the business has to try its utmost to defend itself against the 
adverse reputational and financial consequences of being found in breach of the law.   
 
In spite of these problems, and against advice based on the US experience,544 the EU has proceeded 
with its policy to make private actions for damages in respect of competition law infringements 
easier (albeit stopping short of introducing US-style treble damages). It issued a directive to its 28 
Member States in 2014,545 requiring them to ensure that certain steps are in place by 27 December 
2016 that will, in the words of the European Commission “make it a lot easier for victims of 
antitrust violations to claim compensation”.546  
 
One of these steps is to ensure that courts can (subject to certain conditions) order disclosure of 
documents by the defendant to the plaintiff where the latter “has made a plausible assertion, on the 
basis of facts which are reasonably available to [the plaintiff] that [the plaintiff] has suffered harm 
that was caused by the defendant”.547 On the face of it, this could enable plaintiffs in abuse of 
dominance cases to obtain disclosure merely on showing that the defendant may be dominant and 
that its conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff. But as we saw in Chapter 4, successful competition 
causes harm, so this is arguably too low a threshold. 
 
Another step required by the Directive is to introduce a rebuttable presumption that “cartel 
infringements cause harm”.548 But the definition of cartel is vague and broad:  
 
                                                     
544 John H Beisner and Charles E Borden “On the Road to Litigation Abuse: the Continuing 
Export of US Class Action and Antitrust Law” US Chamber Institute for Legal Reform October 
2006.  
545 Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European 
Union, OJ L349/1 of 5.12.2014. 
546 European Commission Competition Policy Brief  “The Damages Directive- towards more 
effective enforcement of the EU competition rules” January 2015. 
547 Directive 2014/104/EU n 302 above recital 16. 
548 Article 17(2). 
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“ ‘cartel’ means an agreement or concerted practice between two or more competitors 
aimed at coordinating their competitive behaviour on the market or influencing the relevant 
parameters of competition through practices such as, but not limited to, the fixing or 
coordination of purchase or selling prices or other trading conditions, including in relation 
to intellectual property rights, the allocation of production or sales quotas, the sharing of 
markets or customers, including bid-rigging, restrictions of imports or exports or anti-
competitive actions against other competitors”.549 (emphasis added). 
 
This definition seems wide enough to include virtually any arrangement between competitors. The 
effect could be that, for a wide range of such arrangements, the burden will be on the parties to 
show that the arrangement did not cause harm to the plaintiff- the exact opposite to the normal 
burden of proof, and one which might prove difficult for many defendants to rebut. 
 
5 4  Unfairness 
 
Whether an action to pursue an alleged infringement of competition law is initiated by the 
enforcement authority, or by a private party claiming damages, such an action can lead to 
unfairness, where the business or businesses targeted could not predict that the conduct or 
arrangement would be legal or illegal.   
 
First, quite apart from the cost issues discussed in Section 5 3, there is the potential reputational 
damage that such an action can cause, even if the business or businesses are ultimately acquitted 
of any wrongdoing. Being subject to an investigation or a court action for an alleged breach of 
competition law can result in unwelcome media reports and cast doubts over whether the business 
is a good corporate citizen or has good corporate governance.550 It can also have an  impact on its 
share price. For example, in May 2016, it was reported that the South African packaging group 
Mpact’s share price fell by five per cent after it confirmed that the Competition Commission had 
                                                     
549 Article 2(14). 
550 See Chapter 3 section 3 6 2. 
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raided its premises.551 Conversely, in September 2017, when Intel won its case against the 
European Commission (which had imposed a fine on Intel of USD 1.26 billion)- in the sense that 
the European Court remitted the case back to the (lower) EU General Court for further economic 
analysis, it was reported that Intel’s share price had its biggest increase in a month.552  
 
While it might be argued that there is no unfairness if the alleged arrangement or conduct 
constitutes a clear or blatant breach of the law, the media headlines are not likely to make a 
distinction between such alleged breaches and those that are less clear and involve complex 
economic assessments. Even if the business successfully defends the case, the reputational damage 
may already have been done.  
 
Secondly, vague and unclear laws give rise to the prospect that litigation or complaints to the 
competition authority, or the threat of it, is used as a strategic weapon by a competitor to obtain a 
commercial advantage, even where that competitor’s case has little or no merit. In the US, for 
example, it has been said that: 
 
“Antitrust law is most subject to strategic misuse by rent-seeking competitors when it is 
framed as an amorphous standard. A growing literature shows that firms can strategically 
misuse antitrust to coerce or induce their competitors to forego engaging in practices that 
are efficient but disadvantage the plaintiff…Such rent-seeking behaviour is more likely to 
be successful when the governing law is presented as a standard rather than a rule because 
a standard creates more adjudicatory uncertainty, and risk- averse defendants may desist 
from an efficient practice even if it is likely to be vindicated through litigation”.553 
 
                                                     
551 “Mpact’s share price falls after Competition Commission raid” Competition Policy 
International 26 May 2016. 
552 “Intel wins round in fight over $1.26 billion Antitrust Fine”, Bloomberg Technology  6 
September 2017. 
553 Daniel A. Crane “Rules versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication” (2007) 64 Wash. & Lee L 
Rev 49. See also A Neil Campbell, J William Rowley QC “Proposals for Evolving the Patchwork of 
Domestic Monopolisation and Dominance Laws” 12 No. 1 Bus L Int’l 5 (January 2011). 
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Certain academics have questioned the argument that antitrust law can be used strategically to 
extract settlements from defendants in cases which lack merit, arguing that defendants tend to have 
“deeper pockets” than plaintiffs and that “[t]heir wealth allows them to retain effective counsel, 
pay the costs of litigation, and tolerate risk”.554 However, it is questionable whether most 
businesses would want to defend to the end the protracted and expensive litigation that competition 
cases involve, especially when the vagueness of competition laws means that the outcome is 
unpredictable, and an early settlement may be a preferable option even for wealthy businesses. In 
any event, the key issue is not so much whether defendants have to settle unmeritorious cases, but 
whether a clear law would leave less room for argument as to whether or not there was a breach 
of the law, and therefore less scope for such strategic use of competition law.  It is submitted that 
it would. 
 
Thirdly, whereas in investigations or litigation initiated by the competition authority, it can act as 
a “gatekeeper” to ensure appropriate forbearance where the law is unclear, there is no such filter 
in the case of standalone private actions (in jurisdictions where they are permitted). This means 
that in private standalone actions, lack of clarity in the law will not be a bar to a finding of 
infringement and damages liability. Lande and Davis argue in the US context that private 
enforcement law plays an important role in deterring anti-competitive conduct, complementing 
enforcement by competition authorities which, in itself, provides an insufficient deterrent. They 
support their argument in part by the fact that the competition authorities may be reluctant to 
prosecute cases where the application of the law is unclear.555 But if it is unfair that a defendant 
should be held liable in a public enforcement action where the application of the law is unclear, 
the same should surely apply in a private enforcement action. Admittedly, a public enforcement 
action that may result in a severe penalty, which is the case in most of the subject jurisdictions, 
may be treated as a criminal proceeding under the ECHR, as we saw in Chapter 3, and attract more 
stigma than a finding of liability in damages in a private action. Nevertheless, it is still arguably 
                                                     
554 Joshua P Davis, Robert H Lande “Defying Conventional Wisdom: the Case for Private 
Antitrust Enforcement” (2013) 48 G L Rev 1. 
555 Robert H Lande, Joshua P Davis “Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and 
Criminal Enforcement of the US Antitrust Laws” 2011 BYU L Rev 315, 349 (2011). 
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unfair that liability in damages could result from a finding of infringement of a law which is so 
unclear that the defendant did not know what it had to do to comply with it.  
 
In the case of investigations or litigation by the competition authority, it does not need to initiate 
an action at all where it is unclear whether the arrangement or conduct is illegal. If it does, and the 
action is “successful”, the authority or court can take the level of legal clarity into account in 
deciding whether to progress the case to a definitive decision or judgment, or to settle the case 
informally. If there is a formal finding of infringement, the level of clarity can theoretically be 
taken into account in deciding whether any sanctions should be imposed, and if so how severe they 
should be. (Although in the case of penalties, we saw in Chapter 3 that the European Commission 
and Courts at least have shown little leniency in their fining policy where lack of clarity in the law 
has been pleaded. And in any event, leniency in penalties would do little to mitigate the adverse 
effects of lack of clarity in the law, as will be seen in Chapter 6).  
 
In standalone private civil actions for damages, there are no such filters. Once the action is brought 
(and unless the parties reach a settlement) the court must make a decision on liability- either 
infringement or no infringement. The court is unlikely to refuse to make such a finding because 
the law is unclear. The court sees it as its role to interpret and apply the law to the facts of the case. 
If liability is established, the only question then becomes the quantum of loss the applicant has 
suffered: the lack of clarity in the law is irrelevant to the quantum.  The defendant’s only remedy 
is to engage in further litigation, by appealing the decision, either on the merits of the competition 
arguments, or on legal certainty grounds, or both, thereby incurring further costs and disruption.  
 
A fourth way in which the lack of clarity produces unfairness could be called “inequality of arms”, 
or to put it more precisely, information asymmetry.  
 
It is true that in the case of secret cartels such as price-fixing, the secrecy may make it difficult for 
the enforcement authority to detect the infringement, and therefore the asymmetry lies in favour 
of the infringer. Indeed, this is one of the main reasons that many competition authorities have 
introduced leniency policies, to encourage cartel participants to disclose the relevant facts about 
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the cartel to the authority and thereby (in the case of the first to disclose) gain immunity from 
penalties.  For example, the European Commission states: 
 
“In essence, the leniency policy offers companies involved in a cartel - which self-report 
and hand over evidence - either total immunity from fines or a reduction of fines which the 
Commission would have otherwise imposed on them. It also benefits the Commission, 
allowing it not only to pierce the cloak of secrecy in which cartels operate but also to obtain 
insider evidence of the cartel infringement. The leniency policy also has a very deterrent 
effect on cartel formation and it destabilizes the operation of existing cartels as it seeds 
distrust and suspicion among cartel members.”556 
 
However, with other competition infringements, where the question of infringement depends on 
the effects or likely effects of the arrangements or conduct on competition in the market, the 
asymmetry is in favour of the enforcement authority or court. Whereas, in investigating or 
assessing whether there is an infringement, the authority or court will usually be reviewing the 
matter ex post, on the basis of known or ascertainable facts about the effects of the arrangement or 
conduct, a business engaging in an agreement or conduct has to predict the likely impact of the 
agreement or conduct, which is a much more difficult and uncertain task. Secondly, whereas an 
authority or court usually has the power to require any person to provide evidence which may be 
relevant to the case (such as competitors, suppliers, customers and industry bodies), to enable it to 
analyse (for example) the impact of the arrangement or conduct on the market, a firm, trying to 
predict whether its agreement or conduct will fall foul of the law, has no such power. Admittedly, 
larger firms may have the financial resources to engage expert competition lawyers and economists 
to put forward sophisticated arguments and extensive evidence to challenge the authority’s 
findings (resources which may not be available to smaller firms) but this does not remove or offset 
the significant advantage which the authority or court has, as described above, and it is only a 
relatively small number of firms in the market that have such resources.   
 
                                                     
556 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/leniency/leniency.html (accessed on 11-12-2017). 
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In summary, where businesses engage in conduct or arrangements which they could not predict 
result in adverse legal consequences, it can set in train a series of adverse effects which are, it is 
submitted, unfair.  In fact, because of these potentially serious adverse consequences, businesses 
may choose to refrain from engaging in the arrangements on conduct at all, which can lead to 
adverse consequences of a different kind, as explained in Section 5 6. 
  
5 5  Access to Justice 
 
The lengthy and complex litigation which is frequently involved in competition cases, due to the 
vague nature of many competition laws, may put immense strain on the judicial system and slow 
down access to justice for other parties.  In the “C7” case referred to in section 5 3 above, some of 
the other statistics in the case (not just the legal costs) were striking.  Excluding the appeal, for 
example: 
 
• The case lasted for five years, and took up 120 hearing days. 
• It involved 85,653 documents comprising 589,392 pages. 
• The closing submissions alone amounted to at least 1,556 pages for the Applicant and 2,594 
pages for the Respondents. 
• Witness statements amounted to 1,613 pages and expert reports 2,041 pages, excluding 
appendices, calculations, etc. 
• The transcript of the trial amounted to 9,530 pages.557  
 
Justice Sackville commented that what he called “mega-litigation” of this kind “imposes great 
burdens on the judicial system and on individual judges unfortunate enough to be allocated such 
cases”.558 
 
                                                     
557 N 542 above paras 4-6. 
558 Justice Ronald Sackville “Mega-litigation: towards a new approach” (FCA) [2007] FedJSchol 
13 para 2. 
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Similarly, in the Senwes case in South Africa discussed in Chapter 4, it was seven years between 
the initiation of the proceedings in 2006 and the ultimate resolution of the case through a consent 
agreement in 2013.559  There were three appeals in-between, albeit largely on issues of process 
rather than substance. 
 
Also in South Africa, in the ANSAC case, it was nine years between the submission of the 
complaint to the Competition Commission in 1999, and the ultimate settlement agreement between 
the Commission and the parties in 2008. The Tribunal commented on the case as follows: 
 
“If there ever was a Methuselah of proceedings of the Competition Tribunal, 
 this is it. This application is directly connected to a complaint 
against American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and CHC Global (Pty) Ltd 
 (ANSAC and CHC Global respectively, but collectively referred to as the 
applicants) (the complaint) that was referred to the Tribunal by the 
Competition Commission (the Commission) as far back as 23 March 2000. 
The Commission decided to withdraw its complaint referral after Ansac had 
filed an application to request further particulars. The commission filed a 
fresh referral on 14 April 2000. In fact, the complaint against the applicants is 
the first ever complaint to be referred to the Tribunal by the Commission. 
That complaint is still live and a hearing on the merits commenced before 
another panel of the Tribunal only on 23 July 2008, two days after this 
application was heard.”560 
 
Unless courts’ resources are expanded to deal with the increased workload that such complex 
competition cases require (with the additional costs to the public that this involves) the risk is that 
access to justice is slowed down. In other words, whether or not resources are increased, there is 
harm to the public interest. This is likely to be a particular issue in developing countries where 
resources are more limited.  
                                                     
559 N 505 above. 
560 America Natural Soda Ash Corporation v Competition Commission 49/CR/Apr00 13/08/2008 
par 1. 
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5 6  Deterring Beneficial Conduct 
 
In fact, there are a number of reasons why a business faced with anything other than a “low risk” 
analysis from its legal advisers may decide not to go ahead with a particular arrangement or 
conduct, for fear of an adverse ruling by a regulator or court.  These reasons include the following:  
 
• The potential costs of becoming involved in protracted regulatory or litigation proceedings 
(as noted above) are enormous. 
• The adverse financial consequences of making a decision that subsequently proves to be 
wrong are increasing in severity.  Regulatory penalties for infringements have increased 
over time, and are likely to continue to increase. In all of the subject jurisdictions, civil 
actions for damages are available, either on a standalone basis (as in the EU, Australia, 
and- for hardcore arrangements- Canada) or on a follow-on basis (as in South Africa and 
Hong Kong). Competition authorities such as the European Commission are (as noted 
above) encouraging private actions for damages for breach of the competition rules, 
including via class actions, since their own resources to enforce the rules are stretched.561 
• The indirect costs of breaching the rules are also increasing, such as reputational damage.  
This is not just damage to reputation in the eyes of customers or consumers, but also in the 
eyes of investors and other “market-watchers” including regulators themselves.  Pressure 
has been increasing on companies, especially listed companies, to improve corporate 
governance, and having a good compliance record and compliance systems in place – for 
any law, not just competition law – is part of this process.  So a perceived failure in those 
systems can cause substantial reputational damage. 
• Competition regulators have actively sought to stigmatise certain types of conduct found 
to infringe the competition rules, by comparing it to criminal conduct, even when it is not 
categorised as criminal.  This further increases the potential reputational damage arising 
                                                     
561 “Commission recommends Member States to have collective redress mechanisms in place to 
ensure effective access to justice” 11 June 2013, available at  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-524_en.htm (accessed on 1-10-2017). 
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from a finding of infringement.  The most notable illustration of this point is in the area of 
hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing.562   
 
Because of the lack of clarity in the rules, businesses may therefore hold back from engaging in 
agreements or conduct which would produce benefits that the competition law in question is 
intended to achieve, such as economic efficiency or consumer welfare (so-called “chilling 
effects”).  In other words, the lack of clarity in competition law is self-defeating.  An empirical 
survey of business attitudes towards compliance and appetites for non-compliance risk is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, but it can reasonably be surmised that businesses have become more, rather 
than less, averse to regulatory risk, given the increase in regulatory enforcement activity and 
sanctions not just in competition law, but also in areas such as anti-bribery and financial services 
regulation.  
 
In the context of US antitrust law, one author has commented as follows in relation to the “rule of 
reason”: 
 
“A risk—averse and well-counselled company, having no basis for predicting how much 
or what sort of analysis a court might someday apply to evaluate the lawfulness of its 
conduct, will tend to steer clear of conduct that has anti-competitive elements but which a 
court might or might not find to produce net competitive benefits”.563 
 
Similarly, in the context of Article 102 (formerly 82) of the EU Treaty (on abuse of dominance), 
one commentary states: 
 
“…our practical experience in counseling firms is that the application of Article 82EC is 
unclear in material respects.  Firms with 40 per cent market shares often unnecessarily 
worry that they are, or may be, dominant, with the significant consequences that this entails 
for their commercial practices.  The welfare cost of this lack of clarity and excessive 
                                                     
562 See Chapter 3 section 3 6 2. 
563 Jesse W Markham Jr “Sailing a Sea of Doubt: A Critique of the Rule of Reason in US Antitrust 
Law” (2012) 17 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 591, 621. 
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caution must be enormous to the EU economy as a whole – something the EU can ill-afford 
given its lack of competitiveness relative to other international blocs and the stated 
objectives of the Lisbon Agenda in this regard”.564 
 
The problem is particularly acute in the case of unilateral conduct, where the borderline between 
conduct which is deemed to be efficient and beneficial to consumers (and therefore legal), on the 
one hand, and conduct which is deemed to be economically harmful and abusive (on the other), 
is very narrow, and may depend on which side’s economists present the most persuasive case to 
the adjudicating body.  
 
Take the recent Intel judgment of the European Court, for example.565  This case concerned a 
rebate scheme which Intel offered to customers for obtaining all or more of their requirements of 
semiconductors from it. This was clearly beneficial to Intel’s customers, but the European Court 
had traditionally held such schemes to be abusive as they made it more difficult for the dominant 
company’s rivals to compete. When the European Commission assessed the scheme, it applied 
its “as efficient competitor test”: if the evidence showed that a competitor with the same costs as 
the dominant company could not profitably compete with it on price because of the scheme, it 
was an abuse. The Commission found in 2009 that this was the case, and fined Intel the 
equivalent of USD 1.45 billion (a then record penalty for abuse). 
 
Intel appealed against the decision to the European General Court, presenting economic 
arguments challenging the Commission’s analysis. The General Court rejected the appeal, taking 
the view that it did not have to consider these arguments, since previous case law had held that 
this sort of rebate scheme by its very nature was an abuse.566 However, on appeal to the 
European Court of Justice, the ECJ referred the case back to the General Court, stating that when 
the applicant raises arguments to challenge the Commission’s economic analysis, the General 
Court is obliged to consider them.567 So it appears that whether Intel’s USD 1.45 billion penalty 
                                                     
564 Robert O’Donoghue and A Jorge Padilla The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (2006) xi. 
565 Section 4 5 1 above. 
566 Section 4 5 1 above. 
567 Section 4 5 1 above. 
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will be annulled will depend on which side’s economists and lawyers will prevail before the 
court. 
 
Faced with the prospect of such a high penalty and the costs and disruption of having to go 
through a lengthy Commission investigation, followed by at least two sets of court proceedings 
to challenge it, it would not be surprising if many firms take the view that it is simply not worth 
offering such rebates to customers. By therefore raising customers’ costs, it could be argued that 
deterring such practices adversely affects efficiency and perhaps ultimately consumers. 
 
 5 7 Harm to the Enforceability and Credibility of Competition Laws 
 
As we saw in Chapter 3, in some jurisdictions, such as the US, unclear statutes can be declared 
void on the basis that they are unconstitutional. It was noted that the US Supreme Court has indeed 
struck down several US state antitrust (competition) laws on this basis. 
 
In other jurisdictions such as the EU, there have been no successful attempts to persuade courts to 
strike down competition laws themselves as being unconstitutionally vague.  As far as EU 
competition law is concerned, this is impossible, because the competition law is embodied in the 
TFEU itself, which has a constitutional status in that all EU Member States must comply with it. 
 
What is a more definite and realistic concern in these jurisdictions is that individual enforcement 
actions under unclear competition laws can be invalidated because of lack of legal certainty.  We 
discussed above the dilemma which faces businesses in dealing with unclear competition laws: do 
they take the risk of engaging in conduct that may result in lengthy and costly enforcement and 
litigation, or do they adopt a low risk strategy and refrain from conduct which may actually be 
beneficial in economic terms?  Both courses of action are costly and wasteful, in different ways.  
A similar dilemma faces enforcement authorities in deciding whether to prosecute competition 
cases.  Faced with cases where the law is unclear, do they take the risk of prosecuting and being 
defeated, or do they choose to prosecute only the clearest or most obvious cases?  As with the 
business dilemma, either course of action has potential costs. 
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Many enforcement authorities may feel pressure to pursue the latter course and only prosecute the 
clearest and most obvious cases, such as industry-wide price-fixing cartels in which a “whistle-
blower” has given the authority full evidence of the facts. This is particularly the case where they 
are short of resources, and have to prioritise enforcement action rigorously to make what is 
perceived to be the best use of their resources. Commenting in 2013 on the enforcement record of 
the Australian and New Zealand competition authorities, Fox and Trebilcock state: 
 
“The agencies’ recent enforcement record suggests that cartels are their first priority- in 
part because they are viewed as the most egregious infringement of competition law, but 
likely also because they constitute low-hanging fruit for an agency with limited 
resources…Both agencies have had mixed experience with monopolization cases…while 
there have been a number of very high profile monopolization cases, the agencies will 
assess very carefully the facts of the complaint, the importance of the industry, and the 
likelihood of achieving either a successful litigation outcome (or at least a valuable 
precedent) before proceeding with a monopolization case.”568 
 
The facts appear to support this emphasis on cartels. According to statistics published by the 
European Commission, the vast majority of infringement decisions made by national competition 
authorities in the EU concerned the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, as opposed to 
abuse of dominance: 69 per cent versus 24 per cent in 2015.569 Although no breakdown of the 
former category is provided, it is fair to surmise that most if not all of the 69 per cent concerned 
cartels, for the reasons given above. In addition, the wide availability of leniency (amnesty) 
programmes for cartels in the EU makes the authorities’ fact-finding task relatively straightforward 
in many cases. Most cases that the EU Commission itself pursues concern cartels – there are 
relatively few cases on other types of anti-competitive arrangements or abuse of dominance.  
 
Moreover, enforcement authorities do not like to lose cases: it is bad for their reputation.  Outside 
the clear cases such as the price-fixing example cited above, competition cases can be extremely 
                                                     
568 Eleanor M Fox and Michael J Trebilcock  The Design of Competition Law Institutions: Global 
Norms, Local Choices (2013) 79. 
569 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/statistics.html (accessed on 5-10-2017). 
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complex, lengthy and costly.  To pursue such a case then lose, especially if it happens repeatedly, 
can attract political and public criticism about waste of resources. The greater the uncertainty, the 
more likely it is that the authority will lose the case.  As we have seen in Chapter 4, showing that 
an agreement harms competition to the requisite degree and that it does not improve total welfare 
or net consumer welfare are extremely complex exercises in which a lot of subjective assessments 
are involved.  The chances of losing cases which are not clear or obvious are therefore high.  
 
Not only is there the possibility that the enforcement authorities might lose the case on the 
competition law arguments themselves. They may also lose on the constitutional argument which 
is the theme of this thesis, namely that the alleged infringement was not sufficiently predictable, 
i.e. lack of legal certainty.  As we saw in Chapter 3, the European Courts have recognised that the 
ECHR rules on legal certainty apply to EU competition law, and that European Commission 
competition law infringement decisions can be struck down if they are not sufficiently predictable.  
There has been at least one case in the EU where a finding of infringement by the European 
Commission was challenged, in that case unsuccessfully, on the basis that it was not sufficiently 
predictable, contrary to the ECHR.570  We also saw that several challenges have been made to the 
imposition, or size, of fines on this basis.  If the courts are prepared to start applying the ECHR 
principles on legal clarity more actively, this will further increase the risk of enforcement actions 
being successfully challenged. 
 
The result is that the more difficult cases may either not be prosecuted at all, or be settled before 
proceeding to a final decision.  But this has a major public interest disadvantage.  In either case, 
this perpetuates the legal uncertainty, as there are few (if any) decisions available in these (already 
uncertain) areas on which businesses can draw for guidance, leading to large “grey areas” in the 
law.   Although such concepts as “relevant market”, “substantial market power” and “substantial 
lessening of competition” are largely subjective and case-specific, a larger body of published 
decisions would at least give businesses a greater “feel” for the approach of the authorities and 
courts to these issues. 
                                                     
570 Case C-194/14P AC-Treuhand v Commission, available at: 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&td=ALL&num=C-194/14%20P(accessed on 
25-6-17). 
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Whether the enforcement authority decides to take action and loses, or refrains from taking action, 
the credibility of the enforcement regime and the law is likely to suffer.  An authority which loses 
cases on a regular basis will lose credibility, as will a law which is rarely enforced and has large 
grey areas. 
 
Another risk to the credibility of a competition regime is that vague laws lead to the risk of 
inconsistent decisions, and decisions which may be politically influenced, at least in part.  A broad 
law, combined with conduct by a dominant company which attracts major public opprobrium, may 
make it very difficult for enforcement authorities not to intervene, in circumstances where it would 
not otherwise be inclined to intervene.  But responding to public pressure in this way is a recipe 
for inconsistency, in turn exposing the enforcement authorities to further criticism. 
 
Finally, vague laws are susceptible to being enforced inconsistently over time, leading to further 
uncertainty for businesses: note for example, the speculation that typically abounds as to how US 
antitrust enforcement will change when there is a change in the Administration from Democrat to 
Republican and vice-versa, or how EU competition law enforcement might change with a change 
in the identity of the EU Commissioner for Competition.571 
 
5 8  Conclusions 
 
In this Chapter we have seen that the lack of legal certainty in competition laws has severe adverse 
consequences.  It imposes extra, wasteful costs on businesses and the economy; it creates unfair 
consequences for businesses; it harms the public (by increasing the burden on the judicial system); 
and it damages the enforceability and credibility of competition laws themselves. It is submitted 
that these consequences need to be addressed as a matter of priority, if the credibility of 
competition law is to be restored, and the economic waste resulting from this uncertainty is to be 
                                                     
571 See for example “Concerns surface over Trump antitrust picks and policies”, GCR 25 January 
2017. 
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avoided. In Chapter 6 we look at why the methods that have been used thus far to address this legal 
uncertainty have not solved the problem. In Chapter 7 we propose a new way forward. 
 
 
6  Methods of addressing Legal Uncertainty: why they have 
not worked 
 
6 1  Introduction 
 
In Chapter 4, we mentioned a number of tools that have been used to reduce the uncertainty in the 
competition laws of the subject jurisdictions, such as guidelines and lists of examples of anti-
competitive arrangements and abuses- and yet concluded that substantial uncertainty still remains. 
In this Chapter, we analyse in more detail the tools that have been used to increase legal certainty, 
and to mitigate the effects the lack of uncertainty, to understand why they have been ineffective, 
and therefore why a new approach is required.  
 
6 2  Methods for increasing clarity in competition laws  
 
6 2 1 Introduction 
 
We demonstrated In Chapter 4 that the lack of clarity in the competition laws of the subject 
jurisdictions stems from a number of factors, notably the use of vague notions such as the relevant 
market, substantially lessening competition, net consumer benefit, substantial market power, 
dominance and abuse. The subject jurisdictions (and others) have used a variety of techniques in 
an attempt to clarify these concepts. In this section, three methods will be examined in turn: 
statutory examples, indicative assessment factors (such as market shares and barriers to entry), and 
guidelines. 
 
6 2 1 Statutory examples 
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Competition laws commonly contain lists of illustrative statutory examples of agreements and 
conduct which may infringe the prohibitions.  For example: 
 
• Regarding arrangements between businesses, under EU competition law, Article 101(1) 
TFEU contains a non-exhaustive list of five types of agreement that may have the object 
or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition. 
• Regarding abuse of dominant position, the competition laws of the EU, Canada and South 
Africa all contain non-exhaustive lists of types of conduct that may constitute an abuse.  
 
This technique does not increase clarity in the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws to any 
material extent, for the following reasons: 
 
• The EU list of types of arrangement that might infringe Article 101(1) is drafted in very 
vague terms. For example, what does “limit or control production, markets, technical 
development, or investment” mean? The same applies to the list of types of conduct that 
might constitute an abuse under Article 102. There is a tendency to draft such lists in fairly 
broad terms to avoid missing agreements or conduct that the enforcer may wish to catch 
subsequently, even where the lists are non-exhaustive. 
• Apart from hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing, market-sharing and output 
restriction, the types of arrangement listed in Article 101(1) are still subject to the same 
vague competition test that applies to any other type of arrangement: “prevent, restrict or 
distort competition”. In addition, the harm to competition still has to be “appreciable” for 
the prohibition to apply. We discussed in Chapter 4 the vagueness surrounding this concept. 
Moreover, arrangements which harm competition (even, in principle at least, hardcore 
arrangements) may still benefit from an exclusion under Article 101(3), the criteria for 
which are also vague. The vagueness is compounded by the legal uncertainty surrounding 
the issue of whether, and if so to what extent, the European Courts will follow the 
Commission’s “more economic” approach to assessing harm to competition, including its 
“net consumer benefit” test for exclusion. Such an approach would further exacerbate the 
vagueness, given the subjectivity of the assessments involved. 
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• Similarly, in Canada and South Africa, if a business with a dominant position engages in 
one of the acts listed as an “anti-competitive act” or “exclusionary act” (respectively), this 
is not in itself an abuse. In Canada, it must still be shown that the anti-competitive act 
causes or is likely to cause SLC: a vague and subjective notion as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Even if it does, the anti-competitive act may qualify for exclusion on grounds of economic 
efficiency or superior performance. In South Africa, anti-competitive acts have to be 
shown, and a similar exclusion may be available for exclusionary acts. The difficulties 
involved in assessing these matters were discussed in Chapter 4. 
• One of the commonly accepted “canons” of statutory construction is the eiusdem generis 
rule.572 This means that if a statute gives a non-exhaustive list of examples of generally- 
worded conduct which the law addresses, the court will try to identify a common link 
between them in assessing what other types of conduct will be included within the general 
concept. However, this rule is of no help with the examples of abuse in EU law and “anti-
competitive acts” in Canadian law, since these concepts are not defined and the examples 
have little in common with each other. For example, in the Canadian list, it is difficult to 
see any common link between withholding scarce resources and facilities from a 
competitor and margin squeeze. A mere negative effect on a competitor cannot be the 
common link, because vigorous and legitimate competitive conduct also has that effect, as 
we discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
6 2 2 Relevant Assessment Factors 
 
Another common method of seeking to make the competition law assessment clearer and more 
transparent is for the statute to provide lists of relevant assessment factors. These are factors that 
the authority will take into account in assessing whether, for example, a business has a substantial 
degree of market power or dominance, or whether there is a substantial lessening of competition. 
 
                                                     
572 Alec Samuels “The Eiusdem Generis Rule in Statutory Interpretation” Statute Law Review Vol 
5 Issue 1 (Oct 1984) 180. 
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For example, as we noted in Chapter 4,573 the Australian CCA lists a series of relevant factors in 
assessing whether a business has a substantial degree of market power, and whether (if it does) it 
had misused that market power.574  In each case the list was non-exhaustive. In its Intel judgment 
in 2017, the European Court listed a series of indicative factors in assessing whether a dominant 
firm’s conduct is “capable” of harming competition, as we saw in section 4 5 1 above. 
 
More commonly, relevant assessment factors are listed in guidelines rather than statute or case 
law. For example, the European Commission’s guidelines on abuse of dominance list relevant 
factors in assessing whether a business has a dominant position in the market, such as market share, 
the degree of concentration in the market, and barriers to market entry.575 We shall look at the role 
of guidelines below. For now, we shall consider the lists that are commonly found in guidelines. 
 
These lists may provide useful checklists for competition authorities and courts to assess ex post 
facto whether an arrangement or conduct has breached the rules. They may also be helpful to some 
extent in helping businesses and their advisers to conduct risk assessments as to the likelihood of 
a proposed arrangement or course of conduct infringing the rules.  For example, where all factors 
point in one direction (including high barriers to entry, high sustained market share and high levels 
of concentration) it may be concluded that there is likely to be a substantial degree of market power 
or dominance.  But in reality, matters may not be as clear- cut. What if a firm enjoys a very high 
market share, but there are many other competitors and moderately-high barriers to entry?  The 
problem is that such lists do not and cannot indicate what mixture of factors in which amounts is 
determinative, especially when the lists themselves are non-exhaustive.  Moreover, the chances of 
a business predicting wrongly what view the authority or court might take are compounded by the 
following factors: 
 
• It is not just one economic assessment but a number of economic assessments that have to 
be conducted to determine whether an arrangement or conduct is likely to breach the rules. 
                                                     
573 Sections 4 4 3 and 4 5 2. 
574 S 46. 
575 “Guidelines on enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” OJ C45/7 of 24.2.2009. 
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For example, in the case of abuse of dominance, the assessments include what the relevant 
market is, whether there is dominance or a substantial degree of market power in that 
market, and whether there is a substantial lessening of competition or foreclosure of 
competitors. 
• There is a large degree of subjectivity involved in making these assessments. 
• The assessments may vary over the lifetime of a particular arrangement or course of 
conduct, and depend on facts that may not be within the knowledge or control of the 
business or businesses involved. 
 
6 2 3 Guidelines 
 
A third method of seeking to increase clarity in competition laws is by issuing guidelines on how 
the law would apply to certain real life situations. The guidelines could be either statutory, that is 
included within the competition law itself, or administrative, that is issued by the competition 
authority. (Guidelines in practice are not issued by the courts because their role is to interpret the 
law on a case-by-case basis and not to issue general statements on how it may apply the law in 
future cases that come before it). Statutory guidelines carry more weight than administrative ones 
because they are legally-binding, whereas administrative guidelines are not. However, statutory 
guidelines suffer from the disadvantage that they cannot be readily changed to cater for changes 
in enforcement policy, academic thinking, or market circumstances: amendments have to be made 
through the formal legislative process, which is usually cumbersome. Administrative guidelines 
are therefore the norm. 
 
The EU Commission is particularly keen on issuing guidelines. For example, it has issued 
guidelines on horizontal agreements,576 vertical agreements,577 the application of the exemption 
criteria in Article 101(3) TFEU,578 and abuse of dominance.579  Similarly, in Australia, the ACCC 
                                                     
576 “Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements” 
OJ C11/1 of 14.1.2011. 
577 “Guidelines on Vertical Restraints” OJ C130/1 of 19.5.2010. 
578 “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty” OJ C101/97 of 27.4.2004 
579 “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” OJ C45/7 of 24.2.2009. 
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has issued guidelines on cartels, refusals to deal and mergers (amongst others).580  In Hong Kong, 
the substantive (as opposed to procedural) guidelines cover anti-competitive arrangements, abuse 
of substantial market power and mergers.581  In South Africa, the Competition Commission issues 
from time to time “Practitioner Updates” giving guidance on how it approaches the enforcement 
of the Competition Act in particular areas such as joint ventures and mergers.582 
 
Guidelines tend to fall into two categories: substantive (how the law will apply to particular types 
of agreement and conduct, often by reference to hypothetical examples of “real life” situations) 
and procedural (dealing with matters such as how the authority will handle investigations and 
complaints or applications for clearance of particular agreements and conduct- if such a clearance 
facility is available- and the authority’s enforcement priorities as to the types of agreement or 
conduct it will prosecute). 
 
As regards substantive guidelines, there are three main factors that limit their utility: 
 
• they cannot bind the court or other adjudicating body when it applies the law to the facts 
of a particular case; 
• whether an individual agreement or practice is prohibited depends very much on the facts 
of each case- guidelines are often too general to be of much practical value; and 
• the methodology set out in many sets of guidelines is too complex, and the concepts too 
subjective in their application, to be useful to businesses in planning their arrangements 
and conduct. 
 
We deal with each of these factors in turn. 
 
                                                     
580 Available at  https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/browse-publications (accessed on 6-11-
2017). 
581 Available at: https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/guidance.html 
(accessed on 6-11-2017). 
582 Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/practice-notes/ (accessed on 6-11-2017). 
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Regarding the first factor, although administrative guidelines cannot bind a court or other 
adjudicating body, they may still carry some weight. The weight they carry depends on whether a 
judicial or administrative model of enforcement is chosen. Under the administrative model, the 
competition authority makes the substantive decision on whether the law has been breached, 
subject to judicial review (as in the EU), whereas under the judicial model it is a court or tribunal 
which makes that decision (as in Australia, Canada, South Africa and Hong Kong).   
 
Substantive guidelines by the competition authority under the administrative model are potentially 
capable of providing more reliable guidance than under the judicial model.  This is because, under 
the administrative model, the competition authority’s view on the application of the law to 
particular cases is less susceptible to successful challenge in, or otherwise being contradicted by, 
the views of a court or tribunal than under the judicial model. Under the judicial model, on the 
other hand, because it is the court or tribunal that makes substantive decisions in particular cases, 
not the competition authority, any substantive guidelines issued by the competition authority are 
less authoritative.  
 
But even under the administrative model, the EU’s experience of guidelines is salutary. The 
European Court has shown that it is prepared to overrule the Commission’s guidelines on judicial 
review if they do not reflect the Court’s case law.  For example, in December 2005, the 
Commission issued a long-awaited paper containing substantive guidelines on the application of 
the abuse of dominance provision, in response to criticisms that the law on abuse lacked clarity 
and was not sufficiently reflective of consumer welfare, which the Commission stated was EU 
competition law’s main objective.  In her opinion for the European Court in the British 
Airways/Virgin case, Advocate General Kokott pointed out that compliance with the 
Commission’s guidelines could not be used as a defence in the context of assessing whether British 
Airways’ fidelity bonus scheme was abusive: 
 
“… it is immaterial how the Commission intends to define its competition policy with 
regard to Article 82 for the future.  Any reorientation in the application of Article 82 can 
be of relevance only for future decisions of the Commission, not for the legal assessment 
of a decision.  Moreover, even if its administrative practice were to change, the 
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Commission would still have to act within the framework prescribed for it by Article 82 
EC as interpreted by the Court of Justice”.583 
 
Possibly because of these comments, the Commission amended and re-positioned this document 
as procedural guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82, not 
substantive guidance on how the law would apply to certain factual situations.584  We shall look 
at guidelines on enforcement priorities later in this section.  
 
Regarding the second factor, substantive guidelines by nature are cast in general terms, and while 
they may provide examples of how the law might apply in certain hypothetical situations, 
competition cases are very fact-specific. For example, Advocate General Kokott, again in British 
Airways, stated: 
 
“In the area of rebates and bonuses it is particularly clear that, in individual cases, it is 
difficult to draw the line between legitimate conduct and the prohibited abuse of a dominant 
market position”.585 
 
This means that substantive guidelines will rarely enable parties to predict with confidence the 
views of the enforcement authority, court or other adjudicating body on a particular factual 
situation. 
 
As regards the third problem, as we noted in Chapter 4, the tendency now is for competition 
authorities, at least in Europe, to use increasingly sophisticated methods to assess the economic 
impact of commercial practices, ex post, probably at least in part to minimise the prospects of their 
decisions being overturned on judicial review (in an administrative system) or to maximise the 
prospects of bringing a case successfully (in a judicial system).  This means that, conversely, the 
compliance task for businesses is made more complicated, and it is more difficult for them to 
                                                     
583 Opinion delivered on 23 February 2006 in Case C-95/04P British Airways v Commission 
[2007] ECR I-2331 para 28.  
584 See Section 4 5 1 above. 
585 N 583 above para 25. 
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predict whether a given arrangement or course of conduct will infringe the law.  The more 
complicated the economic assessment undertaken by the competition authority, or required by a 
court or other adjudicating body, the more chance there is of a business making a wrong 
assessment- or at least one which is different from that made by the competition authorities or 
courts ex post facto. Guidelines often focus on explaining these analytical methods.  However, far 
from assisting businesses to comply with the rules, they tend to emphasise the complexity of the 
analysis (which in any event is to a large degree subjective, as noted above).  
 
To take an example, for an agreement to qualify for exclusion from the prohibition against anti-
competitive agreements under EU law, the Commission guidelines state that the business must 
quantify the harm to competition, quantify the efficiencies from the agreement, assess how much 
of those efficiencies will be passed on to consumers and then assess whether that portion of the 
efficiencies will outweigh the harm to competition.586  Clearly this assessment would be difficult 
enough (and the chances of reaching a different view from the Commission and courts great 
enough) if those matters were accurately quantifiable (which they are not). However, added to this 
difficulty is the fact that the Commission has stated that even efficiencies of a qualitative rather 
than quantitative nature, such as technological advances, are relevant to the assessment.  How can 
one objectively assess whether technological advances are more important than the adverse effects 
on consumers stemming from a reduction in competition?  This is clearly a matter of subjective 
opinion. The Commission itself has said that where qualitative efficiencies are involved, such as 
new or better products, a “value judgment” is required.587 
We turn now to procedural guidelines. One example of procedural guidelines are those in which 
the enforcement authority (under an administrative enforcement model) gives guidance on the 
calculation of penalties for infringements, such as those issued by the EU Commission.588 These 
are of limited binding effect. In Dansk Rorindustrie v Commission, the European Court held, in 
respect of the Commission’s guidelines on the calculation of penalties, that “although those 
                                                     
586 “Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty” OJ C101/97 of 27.4.2004 
sections 3.2 and 3.4. 
587 N 586 above para 103. 
588 “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003” OJ C210/2 of 1.9.2006. 
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measures may not be regarded as rules of law which the administration is always bound to 
observe, they nevertheless form rules of practice from which the administration may not depart 
in an individual case without giving reasons that are compatible with the principle of equal 
treatment”.589 
 
As noted above, under both the administrative and judicial models, procedural guidelines could 
also include guidelines on the types of agreements and conduct which the enforcement authority 
will choose to prosecute, i.e. its enforcement priorities (as opposed to guidance on what the law 
means).   An example is the EU Commission’s guidelines on abuse of dominant position which 
we mentioned above.590  
 
The utility of such guidelines depends to a large extent on whether the jurisdiction in question 
allows private actions for damages for breach of competition law, and if so whether only follow-
on actions (i.e. actions only after a determination of breach by the authority or court) are allowed, 
or whether standalone actions (actions which can be brought without a prior finding of breach) are 
allowed.  
 
If no private actions are allowed, or only “follow-on” actions are allowed (as in Hong Kong), as 
discussed previously, the fact that the Commission decides not to prosecute a case (whether under 
the administrative or judicial model) will normally rule out the prospect of the business incurring 
any liability, either through such a prosecution or in a private action.591 (However, it should be 
borne in mind that in South Africa, a complainant can, without necessarily claiming damages, 
bring a case to the Tribunal to force a decision, even although the Commission chooses not to 
prosecute).592A business can therefore usually be confident that, if its proposed agreement or 
conduct would not merit enforcement action under the guidelines, it can proceed with such 
agreement or conduct without concern about possible enforcement action or any liability for 
infringement or damages.  
                                                     
589 Case C-189/02 P para 209. 
590 “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” OJ C45/7 of 24.2.2009. 
591 See Section 5 3 above. 
592 Competition Act section 51. 
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However, if standalone actions are allowed (as in the EU), the fact that the Commission chooses 
not to prosecute a case will not preclude a business from incurring liability, since the court may 
still find the business liable if a private damages action is brought. Indeed, the EU and the US have 
put in place incentives for parties to bring private damages claims for competition law violations. 
In 2014, the EU issued a directive to its Member States requiring them to ensure by 27 December 
2016 that they had adequate measures to ensure that private damages actions for breach of EU 
competition law are available.593 The EU Commission had already, in 2013, recommended that 
Member States that had not already done so introduce class actions for breach of directly effective 
EU legal rights, including their right to seek redress in the EU national courts for breach of EU 
competition law.594  And in the US, treble damages awards (damages awards of three times the 
amount of harm actually suffered) and class actions have been in place for antitrust law violations 
for many years. Such incentives may benefit victims of competition law violations, but the more 
competition law cases are pushed to the courts and away from the public enforcement authorities, 
the greater the legal uncertainty for businesses.   
Even where no private actions, or only follow-on actions, are allowed, such guidelines on 
enforcement priorities are usually not legally binding on the competition authority. Although we 
saw, in the case of guidance of penalties, that these were to some extent held to be binding on the 
EU Commission, in the sense that it could not depart from them without giving reasons,595 this is 
not the case with guidelines on how the authority will use its “prosecutorial discretion”.  Akman 
commented  in 2016 that the Commission had made  “little or no use” of the its  Guidelines on 
enforcement priorities under Article 102 TFEU in the Article 102 decisions it had taken since 
issuing the guidelines in 2009, half of which were decisions accepting commitments.596    
                                                     
593 Directive 2014/104/EU on Antitrust Damages Actions OJ L349/1 of 5.12.2014. 
594 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violation of 
rights granted under EU law, OJ L201/60 of 26.7.2013. 
595 N 589 above. 
596 Pinar Akman “The Reform of the Application of Article 102 TFEU: Mission Accomplished?” 
Antitrust LJ Vol 81 (2016) 146. 
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Gerardin  points out the discrepancy between the “more economic” approach in the guidelines, 
and the European Court’s traditional, more formalistic (or per se) approach and questions 
whether the Commission will adhere to the former, or in some cases still be tempted to apply the 
latter: “it remains to be seen to what extent the Commission will apply these principles [in the 
guidelines] when the case-law of the ECJ provides it with an easy win”.597 
Gerardin made this statement before the European Court’s judgment in the Intel case, in which, 
as we saw in Chapter 4, the Court appeared to endorse the Commission’s “more economic” 
approach, and in particular its use of the “as efficient competitor” test in assessing loyalty 
rebates, at least where the firm under investigation submitted with supporting evidence that the 
rebate scheme was not capable of excluding “as efficient” competitors. This may make it more 
difficult for the Commission to look for an “easy win” (even it was tempted to) and to avoid 
conducting a thorough economic analysis. 
Nevertheless, both Gerardin and Akman point to the extensive use of exceptions and 
qualifications in the guidelines, which limit their usefulness. But perhaps the most important 
point for the purpose of this thesis is that, as the Commission guidance itself shows, it can still be 
a very complex task even to work out whether a proposed course of conduct falls within the 
authority’s enforcement priorities.598  Gerardin comments: 
“…while the test proposed by the Commission is conceptually correct, and certainly 
more in line with economics than a per se prohibition, such as the one found in the case 
law, it is very hard to implement in practice and offers very little, if any, guidance to 
dominant firms wishing to grant rebates to, or asked to grant rebates by, their 
customers”.599 
                                                     
597 Damien Gerardin “Is the Guidance Paper on the Commission’s Enforcement Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying  Article 102 TFEU to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct Useful?”14. Available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569502 (accessed on 24-11-17).  
598 See for example the complexity of the analyses contained in the EU Commission’s 
guidelines-  Section 4 3 1 above. 
599 N 597 above at 10. Further contributions on this issue include Daniel A Crane “Formalism 
and Functionalism in the Antitrust Treatment of Loyalty Rebates: a Comparative Perspective” 
81 Antitrust LJ 209 (2016); Jorge Padilla “Whither Article 102 TFEU: a Comment on Akman and 
Crane” 81 Antitrust LJ 223 (2016); Derek Ridyard The Commission’s Article 82 Guidelines:  Some 
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In conclusion, both substantive and procedural guidelines have been of limited value in increasing 
the level of certainty in competition law. 
 
6 2 4 Conclusion 
 
In this section 6 2 we have shown that the methods that have been used to introduce greater clarity 
in competition laws- statutory examples, lists of relevant assessment factors and guidelines- have 
all failed to solve the problem of the lack of clarity in the laws of the subject jurisdictions. 
 
6 3 Methods for mitigating the effects of lack of clarity 
 
As well as seeking to provide greater clarity in competition laws in the ways described in section 
6 2, governments and competition authorities can and have tried to mitigate the effects of the lack 
of clarity on businesses in various ways. Four of them will be examined here, namely 
presumptions, safe harbours, approvals and notifications, and regulatory forbearance. The first two 
of these can be termed substantive methods for mitigating the effects of legal certainty, and the 
second two can be termed procedural methods for doing so. 
 
6 3 1 Presumptions 
 
Presumptions are used quite extensively in competition laws. These are applied at broadly two 
levels, which can be called Level 1 and Level 2. At Level 1, the presumption applies to a given 
type of agreement or conduct: it is presumed either legal or illegal. At Level 2, it applies to certain 
criteria determining legality or illegality. At both levels, the presumptions can be either irrebuttable 
or rebuttable. 
 
                                                     
Reflections on the Economic Issues” 30(5) ECLR 230 (2009); Martin A Gravengaard and Niels 
Kjaersgaard “The EU Commission Guidance on Exclusionary Abuse of Dominance- and its 
Consequences in Practice” 31(7) ECLR 285 (2010); and Axel Gutermuth “Article 82 Guidance: a 
Closer Look at the Analytical Framework and the Paper’s Likely Impact on European 
Enforcement Practice” Global Competition Policy Winter 2009 Vol2 No 1 at 7 (2009). 
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In the context of US antitrust law, Markham suggested that, at Level 1, in order to achieve greater 
clarity, the rule of reason be replaced by a set of irrebuttable and rebuttable presumptions, into 
which particular types of arrangement and conduct would be placed.600 He distinguished conduct 
that is: 
 
• Irrebuttably presumed illegal. This category would include “naked” horizontal restraints 
on price, output, innovation and market access. 
• Rebuttably presumed illegal. He suggested this category should include horizontal 
restraints in the context of joint ventures, league sports and professional associations. 
• Rebuttably presumed legal. This would include, for example, standard setting, patent 
licensing and collaborative research and development. 
• Irrebuttably presumed legal. Following Posner,601 and consistently with the approach in 
Singapore, he suggested that vertical restraints could be placed in this category.  
 
US law indeed irrebuttably presumes that horizontal “naked” price-fixing and market allocation 
are illegal. These are called per se rules of illegality because these arrangements are illegal merely 
by virtue of the fact that they have taken place: whether they actually cause harm to competition 
or produce economic or other public policy benefits is irrelevant. At the other end of the spectrum, 
there is an irrebuttable presumption in Singapore that vertical agreements are legal: this 
presumption takes the form of an exclusion or “carve-out” of vertical agreements from the 
competition law, and could be called a per se rule of legality for vertical agreements.602 So these 
types of presumption are really no different from rules that determine that certain types of practices 
are per se legal or per se illegal, without reference to their effects on competition. We shall look 
at per se rules in more detail in sections 6 5 and 6 6. 
 
It is doubtful whether the rebuttable presumptions at Level 1 that Markham put forward improve 
legal certainty to any material extent. 
                                                     
600 “Sailing a Sea of Doubt” 658-660. 
601 Richard A Posner “The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se 
Legality” 48 U Chi L Rev 6 (1981). 
602 Competition Act Third Schedule para 8(2). 
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As regards Markham’s rebuttable presumption of illegality for joint ventures containing horizontal 
restraints, it is questionable whether this does anything more than shift the burden of undertaking 
a complex economic assessment from the plaintiff to the defendant. If this is the case, it does 
nothing to alleviate the legal uncertainties of such an assessment, and actually makes things worse 
for the defendants since they have to carry this burden. Markham himself seems to suggest that 
this is the case: “[t]hese restraints are rebuttably presumed to be anticompetitive, subject to 
defendants’ proffering sufficient, non-pretextual justifications to show net precompetitive effects”. 
(emphasis added).603 If, on the other hand, it merely means that the defendant has to produce 
enough evidence to show that the transaction does not involve “naked” restraints justifying per se 
treatment, and should be subject to a rule of reason analysis, this would seem to be no different 
from the current legal position.  
 
Equally, a rebuttable presumption that research and developments are legal would seem to reflect 
the normal rule that it is for the plaintiff to prove net anticompetitive effects, and do nothing to 
improve legal clarity.  
 
Turning to Level 2, under EU competition law, for example, hardcore arrangements such as price-
fixing, market-sharing and output-restriction are presumed irrebuttably to satisfy one criterion for 
liability- appreciable harm to competition.604 However, a further criterion also has to be satisfied 
for the arrangement to be illegal: the business must fail to demonstrate that the arrangement 
qualifies for exclusion under Article 101(3) TFEU.605 In South Africa, there is an irrebuttable 
presumption of dominance with a market share of at least 45 per cent, and a rebuttable presumption 
of dominance with a market share of between 35 and up to below 45 per cent. 
 
Where presumptions are irrebuttable and operate at Level 2, they may mitigate the effects of the 
lack of clarity, by narrowing the issues that need to be subject to economic assessment. The extent 
to which they do so depends on the extent to which they are used. At Level 2, the greater the use 
that is made of irrebuttable presumptions in respect of criteria within the rule applying to a 
                                                     
603 N 600 above. 
604 Whish and Bailey Competition Law 148. 
605 See section 4 2 1 above. 
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particular type of arrangement, the closer the rule approximates to a per se one. In competition 
laws that are primarily aimed at addressing the anti-competitive effects of arrangements and 
conduct on a case-by-case (as opposed to per se) basis, the use that can be made of irrebuttable 
presumptions at Level 2 must, by definition, be limited. This is because, for arrangements and 
conduct that are not subject to per se rules, either the anti-competitive effects or the countervailing 
benefits (or both) have to be proved- they cannot be presumed to exist. Bailey argues that “[t]here 
should be no conclusive [i.e. irrebuttable] substantive or evidential presumptions in EU 
competition law”.606   
 
Moreover, while irrebuttable presumptions, in principle, would seem reduce the scope of 
uncertainty by reducing the range of matters over which there is room for economic argument and 
subjectivity, on closer analysis they do so only to a limited extent. For example, even with an 
irrebuttable presumption of dominance at a certain market share level, there is still room for 
argument in many cases as to what the relevant market (and therefore market share) is. And as we 
saw in Chapter 4, the difficulties of determining what constitutes an “excessive” price are 
notorious.607 
 
Rebuttable presumptions, at Level 2 as well as Level 1, serve only to shift the burden of proof 
from one party to the other. In competition laws, most rebuttable presumptions shift the burden of 
proof from the competition authority to the defendant. Far from mitigating the effect of the lack of 
clarity in the law, a rebuttable presumption (as at Level 1) makes matters worse for the firm 
concerned, by placing the onus on the firm to prove something which cannot be proved objectively 
(because it is a matter of largely subjective assessment, as we saw in Chapter 4), and failing to 
carry that burden is one step on the road to liability.  
 
In EU competition law, for instance, there is a rebuttable presumption at Level 2 that a firm with 
a market share of 50 per cent or more has a dominant position.608 In South Africa, a firm is 
rebuttably presumed to be dominant if it has a market share of 35 per cent to below 45 per cent. 
                                                     
606 David Bailey “Presumptions in EU Competition Law” 2010 ECLR Issue 9 at 20. 
607 Section 4 5 4. 
608 Case C-62/86 AKZO v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 para 60. 
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The firm would then have to show that it is not dominant.609 However, it is unclear what a firm 
with these market shares would have to demonstrate to rebut the presumption that it has a dominant 
position. In Europe, the Commission’s guidelines set out indicative factors (including barriers to 
entry and persistently high market share) which can be taken into account in assessing whether 
there is a dominant position, but (as we saw above) the problem with these lists of indicative factors 
is that it is unclear what mix of factors in what amounts would be sufficient to rebut the 
presumption.610 
 
6 3 2 Safe Harbours 
 
Safe harbours are thresholds, usually expressed in terms of market share or turnover, below which 
agreements or conduct will be excluded from the scope of the law, or the parties immunised from 
enforcement action. For example, the Hong Kong Competition Ordinance excludes any 
arrangement between parties whose combined turnover does not exceed a certain level from the 
scope of the prohibition against anti-competitive agreements (except for “hardcore” conduct),611 
and any business whose turnover does not exceed a certain level from the abuse of dominance 
provision.612 The OECD proposed in its model competition law a safe harbour under which a 
business with a market share of no more than 35 per cent would not be considered dominant.613 
                                                     
609 For exclusionary acts, in terms of the Competition Act sections 8(c) and 8(d) we saw that an 
additional exemption is effectively available if the practice has technology, efficiency or other 
pro-competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the conduct. In terms of 
8(d) the firm has to show that these pro-competitive gains exist. This can be described as a 
rebuttable presumption that the conduct should be prohibited. In terms of 8(c) it is the 
Commission or other accuser that has to show that there are no such benefits. However, it has 
been accepted that the firm has an evidentiary burden in these circumstances which comes 
very close to a rebuttable presumption in favour of the Commission. Competition Commission v 
South African Airways (Pty) Ltd 18/CR/Mar01 par 99; Sutherland and Kemp Competition Law of 
South Africa section 7 11 2. 
610 “Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC 
Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings” OJ C45/7 of 24.2.2009 paras 
12-18. 
611 Sch 1 para 5. 
612 Sch 1 para 6. 
613 OECD “A Framework for the design and implementation of Competition Law and Policy” Nov 
1998 142, 143. 
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Under EU competition law, there is a safe harbour for vertical agreements where neither the 
supplier nor the purchaser has a market share exceeding 30 per cent, provide the agreement does 
not contain any “black-listed” provisions, and certain other conditions are satisfied.614 In addition, 
the Commission has issued guidelines stating that it will not take action in respect of agreements 
where the parties’ combined market share does not exceed certain levels.615 In South Africa, the 
abuse of dominance provisions do not apply to a firm if its annual turnover in, into or from South 
Africa is below ZAR 5 million and its assets in South Africa are valued at less than ZAR 5 million. 
However, as Sutherland and Kemp note, these are very low thresholds and will save only very 
small firms dominant in very narrow markets.616    
 
In the US, Crane strongly advocated the use of safe harbours to reduce the scope of arrangements 
and conduct that were subject to economic assessment (and therefore uncertainty) under US 
antitrust law: 
 
“The solution, though imperfect, is to use bright-line rules as immunizing devices for broad 
swathes of industrial behaviour, while preserving a role for standards in determining 
liability for conduct falling outside of the safe harbours created by the rules”.617 
 
(By “standards” Crane meant, in his words, “ex post multi-factor liability determinants” such as 
market power, efficiency, and consumer harm/benefit, i.e. precisely the kind of issues that have 
caused lack of clarity in the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions, as we saw in Chapter 4). 
 
As an example of such a safe harbour, he suggested that a business should not be liable for tying 
the sale of one product to the sale of another unless it has at least a 50 per cent market share in the 
“tying” market. In the subject jurisdictions, the concept of “dominant position” or SMP is 
                                                     
614 Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to categories of 
vertical agreements and concerted practices OJ L102/1 of 23.4.2010. 
615 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance OJ C291/1 of 30.8.2014. 
616 Competition Law of South Africa 7.6. 
617 Daniel A Crane “Rules versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication” (2007) 64 Wash. & Lee L 
Rev 49, 84. 
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effectively a safe harbour for unilateral conduct: a business cannot be liable for unilateral conduct 
unless it has a dominant position or SMP.  
 
Safe harbours based on turnover give more clarity than those based on market share since they are 
more objective: they avoid the need to define the relevant market (a largely subjective assessment 
as we have seen) or to calculate market share.  However, both involve the difficulty of deciding 
on the appropriate level at which the safe harbour should be set. This decision implies an economic 
assessment as to the level below which perceived competition problems are unlikely, but the 
decision is, as the OECD has recognised, a somewhat arbitrary one.618  
 
Whatever level safe harbours are set at, they operate to narrow the scope of the law’s application, 
but do not address the issue of lack of clarity in respect of the large categories of arrangements and 
conduct that remain within the law’s scope.  
 
Related to safe harbours are proposals for filters or screens through which arrangements or conduct 
would have to pass before a full economic assessment is required. The objective again is to narrow 
the scope of arrangements or conduct that are subject to economic assessment, thereby reducing 
costs and increasing certainty. In the US context, Easterbrook proposed a series of five sequential 
filters through which conduct would have to pass before a full rule of reason analysis would be 
merited.619 For example, the first two filters were: 
 
• Does the business have market power? If no, that should end the enquiry. If yes: 
• Is the conduct capable of enriching the defendant by harming consumers? 
 
But as Crane pointed out these filters “can be every bit as vague as the rule of reason. How does 
one know whether a firm has market power without defining a relevant market? How does one 
know whether the defendant’s practices are capable of enriching the defendant by harming 
consumers without analyzing the actual effects of the conduct on prices and output levels?”620 
                                                     
618 N 613 above. 
619 Frank H Easterbrook “The Limits of Antitrust” (1984) 63 Tex L Rev 1, 17-39. 
620 N 617 above. 
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Markovits has also argued that Easterbrook’s proposals (and those of others) assume that economic 
efficiency is the goal of US antitrust law, and that this is incorrect.621 
 
More recently, as we noted in Chapter 4, in a European context Ahlborn and Padilla proposed a 
simpler series of filters to Easterbrook’s in determining whether conduct constitutes an abuse of a 
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU.622 Essentially they suggested just two filters under 
their so-called “structured rule of reason”, which were similar to the two Easterbrook filters 
mentioned above. However they suffer from similar difficulties as those identified by Crane, such 
as the vagueness involved in identifying whether the firm has market power. 
 
6 3 3 Approvals and notifications 
 
Turning to procedural methods of mitigating the effects of lack of clarity, the law might provide a 
facility whereby businesses could, in case of doubt about the legality of a particular arrangement 
or course of conduct, seek prior approval from the competition authority or tribunal before 
proceeding (assuming an approval decision was legally binding). In that way, provided that the 
business awaits the decision before proceeding, and does not proceed if the decision is negative, 
there will be no risk of the business inadvertently breaching, or attracting other adverse 
consequences under, the law.  
 
There is a distinction here between two types of prior approval. The first type (which is the one 
we are referring to here) is effectively a decision as to whether or not a proposed agreement or 
course of conduct harms competition, and if so, whether it benefits from an exclusion. The EU 
used to have such a facility for agreements, but abandoned it in 2003, as we saw in Chapter 4. 
                                                     
621 Richard S Markovits “The Limits to Simplifying the Application of US Antitrust Law” 
University of Texas School of Law, Law and Economics Research Paper no 177 19 January 2010, 
8. 
622 Christian Ahlborn and A Jorge Padilla “From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the 
Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law” 12th Annual Competition Law and 
Policy Workshop, Florence 8-9 June 2007. 
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Canada has a facility whereby, on application by the firm “the Commissioner may provide a 
written opinion for the applicant's guidance”: such an opinion “remains binding for so long as the 
material facts on which the opinion was based remain substantially unchanged and the conduct 
or practice is carried out substantially as proposed.”623 
 
The second type is where the business implicitly or explicitly accepts that the agreement or conduct 
would breach the law if implemented without approval, but the law provides that an authorisation 
can be sought from the Commission or Tribunal on certain public interest grounds. The Australian 
and South African laws contain such provisions.624 In Hong Kong, a firm can apply for a decision 
from the Commission as to whether an agreement or conduct is excluded from the application of 
the law “as a result of” one of the statutory exclusions in the law.625 It is not yet clear whether this 
would enable a firm to obtain a decision that the agreement or conduct did not harm competition 
at all (and therefore no exclusion was needed).  
 
While both types of approval mitigate the effects of the lack of clarity, by protecting the business 
from inadvertently breaching an unclear law (and from sustaining many of the consequent adverse 
effects we discussed in Chapter 5), the first type has a significant advantage over the second type 
for businesses. Under the first type, the business does not have to concede that the agreement or 
conduct harms competition and has the opportunity to argue that it does not. This enables a firm 
to have “two bites at the cherry”: it can present arguments as to why the agreement or conduct 
does not harm competition at all. But if these arguments are unsuccessful, it can argue in the 
alternative that it should benefit from an exclusion. Under the second type, however, the firm has 
already conceded that the arrangement or conduct harms competition by making its application, 
and accepts that its only “escape route” is to obtain an authorisation on grounds of countervailing 
public benefit. Businesses would therefore have to consider the risks carefully before applying for 
an exclusion. 
However, the first type still has a number of significant disadvantages:  
 
                                                     
623 Competition Act s 124.1. 
624 Respectively, CCA s 88, Competition Act s 10.  
625 Competition Ordinance ss 9 and 24. 
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First, when combined with broad prohibitions, difficult economic assessments, and potentially 
severe sanctions for breach, such a facility is likely to mean in practice that businesses feel that 
they have to seek advance clearance for many- perhaps even most- transactions (or conduct, in the 
case of businesses with dominance or SMP). This conflicts with the idea of a free market economy, 
where regulatory scrutiny and intervention is usually regarded as the exception rather than the 
norm.  More, generally, it is inconsistent with the notion of a free society, in which the principle 
is that everything is permitted unless it is specifically prohibited, not the other way round. 
 
Secondly, the same uncertainty factor means, conversely, that in practice the authority or Tribunal 
is likely to be inundated with applications. This in turn means that, for approvals to be given within 
a commercially realistic timeframe, either more public resources have to be allocated to the task 
of reviewing the applications, or the administrative costs of this work have to be passed on to the 
businesses or the public.   
 
Experience with this kind of clearance facility has borne out these problems.  As we observed in 
Chapter 4, the EU abandoned its notification process in 2003 because the large volume of 
applications meant that its resources were being diverted away from dealing with the most serious 
cases, such as hardcore cartels.  Similarly, the UK competition authority, the Office of Fair Trading 
(as it then was) also abandoned the process, except for mergers.  Hong Kong seems to have tried 
to anticipate the problem of excessive applications, by providing in the Competition Ordinance 
that the Commission is not required to give a decision on an exclusion application, except in very 
limited circumstances.626  Since the facility is not available as of right, its utility is debatable.  
 
A prior approval process is therefore only likely to be practicable if it is restricted to a minority of 
agreements and practices, for example by excluding vertical agreements (which vastly outnumber 
horizontal arrangements) from the scope of the competition law, an issue which will be discussed 
in Chapter 7. 
 
                                                     
626 Ss 10(2), 24(2). 
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A third problem is confidentiality.  The Commission or Tribunal may not wish to give a decision 
without consulting third parties such as competitors or customers, but the business or businesses 
concerned may prefer to keep the arrangements or conduct confidential.  In the case of 
arrangements, parties may take the view that the arrangement may become a matter of public 
knowledge anyway, and that some loss of confidentiality is a price worth paying for the comfort 
and security of having official approval. However, with unilateral conduct that might be subject to 
the abuse provisions, confidentiality is more critical. In engaging in the conduct, the business may 
be trying to gain a market advantage over its competitors, and this objective could be defeated if 
its commercial strategy is publicly disclosed.  So businesses may be reluctant to use the facility in 
these circumstances, and be faced with the choice of either taking the risk and proceeding with the 
conduct, or refraining from embarking on it for fear of breaching the rules, neither of which is 
satisfactory. 
 
A fourth problem is that, when coupled with a competition law which regulates agreements and 
conduct based on their economic effects (as the competition laws of the subject jurisdictions to a 
large extent do), it is an imperfect solution from the public policy perspective. This is because the 
economic effects of commercial agreements and conduct can vary over time, whereas a decision 
to authorise an arrangement is based on a “snapshot” of the agreement or conduct at a particular 
point in time, combined perhaps with an assessment of the likely future effects of the agreement 
or conduct, which may not prove to be accurate. An authorisation once given cannot be retracted, 
unless there are conditions allowing the authority to retract the authorisation if the economic 
circumstances, or the balance between harm to competition and public benefit change. For 
example, the Hong Kong competition law enables the Commission to rescind its decision that the 
agreement or conduct is excluded from the prohibition if there has been “a material change of 
circumstances since the decision was made”.627 But such conditions defeat the legal certainty 
which the prior approval process is designed to secure. 
 
Admittedly, a system of prior approvals has been commonly-accepted by businesses and 
authorities worldwide for one category of commercial transaction, namely mergers and 
                                                     
627 Competition Ordinance ss 14(1)(a) and 29(1)(a). 
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acquisitions. More than 130 countries have competition laws, and the vast majority of those- 110- 
have some form of merger control, in many cases taking the form of voluntary or compulsory 
applications for prior approval with suspensory effect (i.e. the deal cannot be implemented unless 
it is cleared by the authority).628 There are a number of reasons why this type of transaction merits 
a system of prior approval which do not apply to other agreements and conduct. In particular: 
 
• They can result in lasting harm to competition, particularly in the case of horizontal 
transactions which involve the loss of a competitor from the market. Authorities typically 
wish to review these transactions carefully, before they are completed, to assess whether 
they harm competition, and if so whether there are efficiencies or other public benefits 
which outweigh the that harm. 
• Businesses wish to obtain advance certainty that there is no risk that the authority will 
challenge the transaction after it is completed and require them to unwind it since this can 
be a very costly and disruptive process.  
 
A variation on the system for seeking prior approval for proposed arrangements or conduct is the 
Australian system of notification which applies to private disclosure of price information and 
exclusive dealing arrangements, as discussed in Chapter 4.629  
 
One advantage of such a notification system is that the parties can get on with implementing the 
agreement or conduct without having to wait for the authority’s approval decision, which might 
take months to obtain. Another advantage of the notification system in Australia is that it does just 
give the parties immunity from prosecution by the ACCC: the conduct will also be deemed to 
comply with the CCA until such time as the immunity is revoked.630 This is important, since 
                                                     
628 Whish & Bailey Competition Law 856. 
629 Section 4 3 2. The system is explained by the ACCC in its “Guide to Exclusive Dealing 
Notifications” (“the Guide”), available at: 
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Guide%20to%20exclusive%20dealing%20notification.pd
f (accessed on 7-11-2017). 
630 For example, s 93(7)(b) states “…the engaging by the corporation in the conduct referred to 
in the notice after the giving of the notice shall not be taken, for the purposes of section 47, to 
have the purpose, or have or be likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening 
competition”. 
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otherwise immunity from prosecution by the ACCC would not protect the parties from third party 
actions under section 82 of the CCA.   
 
Nevertheless, the system still has drawbacks, particularly for exclusive dealing agreements other 
than third line forcing. Because the former only infringe the CCA if they satisfy the SLC test, the 
parties may prefer to take their own view on whether this is the case (with the uncertainties 
involved in that assessment that we discussed in Chapter 4), rather than expose the agreement to 
the potential attention of the authority (and third parties), and potential adverse action which might 
not otherwise have happened. This may account for why “[t]he ACCC receives only a few 
notifications each year involving exclusive dealing conduct other than third line forcing”.631 
 
With third line forcing, the notification process is more useful because this type of conduct is a per 
se breach of the CCA, unless notification is made, or an approval on grounds of public benefit is 
obtained. However, as with other forms of exclusive dealing, there is still a degree of uncertainty 
as to whether the ACCC will intervene against the conduct, especially if a complaint is made 
(notifications being a matter of public record), and if so whether the conduct will be permitted on 
the grounds that the public benefits will be deemed to outweigh the public detriment from the 
arrangements. So the rule against third line forcing is at most a qualified per se one. And in any 
event this type of conduct- like mergers- is likely to form a relatively small proportion of 
commercial arrangements as a whole. 
 
6 3 4 Forbearance to Accommodate Uncertainty 
 
Governments and competition authorities can, and sometimes do, try to acknowledge the legal 
uncertainties businesses face in complying with general prohibitions in competition laws, by 
treating them leniently in the event that they inadvertently breach the rules (an approach we shall 
hereafter refer to as “forbearance”). Forbearance, as we shall see, may be written into the law itself, 
or it may be a matter of the competition authority’s enforcement practice. Following the 
chronology of a typical competition case, forbearance can take place at four stages: 
                                                     
631 The Guide p 17. 
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• the competition authority decides to initiate enforcement proceedings only where there is 
a clear and obvious breach which the businesses should have been aware of (“Stage 1”); 
• after having initiated enforcement proceedings, the competition authority, in recognition 
of the lack of clarity, makes a settlement with the business(es) instead of proceeding to a 
decision (where the administrative model is used) or bringing proceedings to the court or 
other adjudicating body (where the judicial model is used) (“Stage 2”); 
• at the stage of the authority’s decision or the adjudicating body’s judgment, forbearance 
could be shown by holding that there is no infringement because the law was not 
sufficiently clear (“Stage 3”); 
• assuming an infringement is established, forbearance could be shown by imposing no 
penalty, or a lower penalty, on grounds of the lack of clarity (“Stage 4”). 
 
Regarding Stage 1, the competition authorities in all of the subject jurisdictions have a discretion 
to decide which cases to investigate and prosecute, subject to having a sufficient basis for at least 
suspecting a possible infringement. They could therefore, at least in theory, choose to investigate 
and pursue only those cases where there is a clear and obvious breach. A major problem with this 
approach, however, is that what may be clear and obvious to the authority may not be clear and 
obvious to the business concerned, because of the wider range of information and evidence which 
is accessible to the authority, and of which the business may be unaware. The business’s lawyers 
have a similar information deficit, and therefore legal advice is unlikely to solve this problem. It 
is likely therefore that there will be a consensus on what a clear and obvious breach is only at the 
extreme. A commitment by the authority only to take action in clear and obvious cases is likely 
therefore to be of limited assistance to a business in planning its conduct. Businesses cannot be 
entirely sure that the authority will never prosecute cases that fall within what they see as “grey 
areas”. 
 
In any event, as we noted in Chapter 5, many businesses wish to avoid breaching the law even if 
the authority chooses not to prosecute the breach. Moreover, in jurisdictions where standalone 
private actions are allowed, or follow-on actions can be established without the intervention of the 
competition authority, a decision by the authority not to prosecute the breach would not preclude 
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the possibility of the business being sued in a private action. For these reasons, we take issue with 
one author’s argument that “[i]f…a cartel case did indeed arise involving uncertainty as to 
unlawfulness, any consequent doubt concerning criminal liability could be resolved through the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion: one could ensure that only civil or administrative proceedings 
result”.632 This thesis argues that businesses should not be subject to vague competition laws, 
whether the consequences of breaching those laws are civil or criminal.  
 
Regarding Stage 2, facilities for settlement instead of a formal decision or court proceedings exist 
in all of the subject jurisdictions’ competition laws. In the EU, for example, the Commission can 
accept a commitment from the business concerned to take certain steps to eliminate the harm to 
competition as an alternative to proceeding to a formal decision.633 In Canada and South Africa, 
the competition authority can enter into a consent agreement with the business or businesses 
concerned, whereby they agree to take certain steps to rectify the harm to competition, instead of 
the case going through full proceedings and a judgment (in both jurisdictions, adjudicatory bodies 
have to endorse the consent agreement, and it is illegal to breach the terms of the consent 
agreement).634 
  
Of all the subject jurisdictions, Hong Kong has perhaps the most sophisticated settlement system, 
in terms of the range of options available. First, the Competition Commission may accept a 
commitment from a person to take action, or refrain from taking action, to address concerns about 
a possible infringement.635 Secondly, for hardcore infringements and abuse of dominance, it may 
issue an infringement notice offering not to bring proceedings in the Tribunal, provided that the 
business or businesses commits to taking specific steps to rectify the alleged infringement.636  
Thirdly, for non-hardcore arrangements, it must issue a warning notice requiring the business to 
                                                     
632 Peter Whelan ”Legal Certainty and Cartel Criminalisation within the EU Member States” 
(2012) 71 The Cambridge Law Journal 677, 686. 
633 Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 OJ L1/1 of 4.1.2003. 
634 Sections 4 2 3 and 4 2 4 above. 
635 Competition Ordinance ss 60-65. 
636 Competition Ordinance ss 67-76. 
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take certain steps to rectify the alleged infringement within a certain period: if the business 
complies with the notice the Commission cannot bring proceedings before the Tribunal.637 
 
Whereas in the EU, Canada and South Africa it is up to the discretion of the enforcement authority 
whether to enter a settlement, in Hong Kong the Commission (as noted above) has no discretion 
when it comes to issuing warning notices for non-hardcore arrangements:  it must give the 
business(es) the opportunity to rectify the breach, and thereby avoid Tribunal proceedings and a 
possible penalty.638  Non-hardcore arrangements is precisely the area (along with abuse of 
dominance) where there is the greatest lack of clarity in competition law.  In fact, the concept of 
the warning notice was introduced during the passage of the Bill through the legislative process, 
expressly to allay businesses’ concerns that they might otherwise be prosecuted for infringements 
of which they were not aware, due to the vagueness of the prohibition. The Government stated: 
 
“The proposed warning notice would enable the Commission to take swift action to halt 
non-hardcore activities while at the same time address the concern that businesses, 
particularly SMEs, might unknowingly engage in non-hardcore activities.”639  
 
As we shall see later in this section, South Africa’s competition law also treats inadvertent breaches 
more leniently. But the difference is that, whereas in Hong Kong the inadvertent breach (for 
arrangements as opposed to abuse) would escape any finding of liability, in South Africa the 
leniency does not exonerate the business from a finding of infringement, only from the imposition 
of a penalty. Nevertheless, in Hong Kong, a prior warning notice is not available for abuse of 
dominance, which as discussed in Chapter 4 is an area of major uncertainty.  
 
To what extent would forbearance at Stages 1 and 2 mitigate the adverse effects of lack of clarity 
identified in Chapter 5?  
 
                                                     
637 Competition Ordinance s 82(1). 
638 Competition Ordinance s 82. 
639 CB (1) 91/11-12 (01) available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr09-
10/english/bc/bc12/papers/bc121025cb1-91-1-e.pdf  (accessed on 7-11-2017). 
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As noted in Chapter 5, one of the major problems of lack of clarity is the cost and disruption caused 
by lengthy and complex investigations and litigation. Forbearance at Stages 1 and 2 would mitigate 
these effects by pre-empting and avoiding such investigations and litigation by the authority (less 
so in the case of Stage 2 as the investigation would already have started).  A consequential effect 
of the lengthy and complex investigations due to lack of clarity is the slowing down of access to 
justice or increasing demand on public resources, so forbearance at Stages 1 and 2 also mitigates 
these effects. By reducing the pressure on the judicial system it would have the effect of improving 
overall access to justice and saving public resources.  
 
The extent of mitigation of these effects would be less in the EU because it permits, and even 
encourages, standalone private actions. So even if the authority decides not to investigate, or offers 
to settle, this would not preclude the possibility of private actions being brought. Even where only 
“follow-on” actions are allowed, the degree of protection from private claims which settlement at 
Stage 2 provides depends on the precise trigger point for private rights of action to arise: is it only 
a judgment of the adjudicating body, or could it be an earlier event?  In Canada, outside the area 
of criminalised hardcore arrangements, an action can only be brought if an order by the Tribunal 
(including one endorsing a consent agreement) is breached.640 So entering into a consent 
agreement should protect the business from any private damages actions, provided that the 
business complies with its terms.  In South Africa, the court can include an award of damages in 
an order endorsing a consent agreement. If it does so, that will protect the business from any 
subsequent claim for damages.641 If it does not do so, the complainant can bring a private action 
for damages following a Tribunal judgment finding an infringement.642 In Hong Kong, a private 
action can be brought not only following a Tribunal judgment, but also following an admission of 
liability contained in commitments given following the issue of an infringement notice in respect 
of hardcore arrangements (an admission of liability being a legal condition of such commitments 
being accepted).643  
 
                                                     
640 Competition Act s 36. 
641 Competition Act s 49D(4)(b). See Premier Foods v Manoim NO (20147/2014) [2015] ZASCA 
159 (4 November 2015) par 11. 
642 Competition Act s 65(6)(b).  
643 Competition Ordinance s 67(3)(b). 
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Forbearance at Stage 1 would avoid damage to reputation arising from inadvertent breaches of 
unclear laws- one of the elements of unfairness that results from unclear laws- since such breaches 
would not become a matter of public knowledge. However, this would not necessarily be the case 
at Stage 2. First, news that an investigation has been opened can leak, and if it does, the ensuing 
damage to reputation can be costly.644 Secondly, settlements are normally published, and there can 
be a human tendency to suspect that there was wrongdoing, even if the matter does not proceed to 
a formal decision or judgment. This is especially the case where the authority will agree to a 
settlement only if the business admits guilt. This appears to be the usual practice in South Africa, 
although the law does not require it. Moreover, it also appears to be the usual practice for the 
business to agree to pay an administrative penalty as a condition of reaching a settlement.645  In 
South Africa, therefore, settlements, as well as Tribunal judgments following full proceedings, can 
cause substantial reputational damage. In the other subject jurisdictions, no admission of guilt is 
required (except in the case of hardcore arrangements in Hong Kong which the businesses take 
steps to stop), enabling the business to publish its own media statement emphasising the fact that 
no infringement has been found or admitted. 
 
One of the elements of unfairness arising from the lack of clarity that we identified in Chapter 5 
was “inequality of arms”: the fact that a business can be found guilty of an infringement on the 
basis of facts to which it has no knowledge and cannot access.646 While this element of unfairness 
is not an issue at Stage 1, because no investigation has been opened, it could be an issue at Stage 
2. Through an informal settlement, the competition authority can obtain a “quick win”, on the basis 
of facts that may be unknown to the business concerned, without having to go all the way through 
a protracted investigation and litigation. Even if the business has a good defence, it may feel 
pressurised into settling quickly to avoid the cost, disruption, and greater reputational risk involved 
in formal proceedings and a possible adverse decision or judgment. This is arguably unfair. 
 
                                                     
644 Section 5 4. 
645 Magalie Masamba “Competition law consent agreements: the pros and cons of a quick 
settlement” 9 Oct 2012 available at http://www.bowmanslaw.com/insights/competition-law-
consent-agreements/ (accessed on 7-11-2017). 
646 Section 5 4. 
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In terms of deterring (or “chilling”) beneficial arrangements and conduct- one of the other major 
adverse effects of unclear laws- whether this is an issue at Stage 1 depends, firstly, on how 
confident the business is that the authority will only investigate and prosecute what the business 
sees as clear and obvious breaches. We explained above that the authority’s view of what is clear 
and obvious may differ from that of the business concerned. Secondly, even if the views of the 
business and the authority were to coincide on this point, if the jurisdiction in question permits 
standalone private actions, or follow-on actions can be established without the intervention of the 
competition authority, the business cannot be sure that a court or other adjudicating body will not 
find an infringement. As noted in Chapter 5, a court sees it as its role to make a decision on whether 
there is liability or not. It is therefore unlikely that a court would refrain from finding liability just 
because the law as applied to the facts in question is unclear. The possibility of private actions may 
still cause a business to “pull its competitive punches” where the application of the law is unclear. 
Whether this is the case may depend on how likely it is in practice that such actions would be 
brought (depending on the “litigation culture” in the jurisdiction concerned, businesses may not 
pursue standalone actions even if they are allowed) and on the business’s own appetite for 
defending litigation.  
 
Forbearance at Stage 2, on the other hand, may not prevent chilling effects for risk-averse firms 
that do not wish to take the risk of being subject to investigations and potential reputational 
damage. This is especially so where the authority has only a discretion, not an obligation, to enter 
into informal settlements- which is the case in all of the subject jurisdictions, apart from Hong 
Kong in the case of non- hardcore arrangements. 
 
As regards the other adverse effects of lack of clarity that we identified in Chapter 5, forbearance 
at neither Stage 1 nor Stage 2 mitigates these effects: 
 
• It does not reduce the high costs of compliance. 
• It does not reduce the greater scope for strategic use of complaints and litigation, and the 
costs of dealing with them. 
• In jurisdictions that allow standalone actions, or where follow-on actions can be established 
without the intervention of the competition authority, it does not remove the prospect of a 
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court finding an infringement in respect of an arrangement or conduct that the business 
could not reasonably predict, even with legal advice, was illegal.  
• It does not serve to clarify the law, and therefore perpetuates the lack of clarity in 
competition law. It is only by prosecuting the less obvious cases to the stage of a final 
decision or judgment that the authority or court (respectively) has an opportunity to provide 
greater clarity in the application of the law. One commentator states in the EU context: 
“[p]erhaps the strongest criticism levied against the Commission's practice of adopting 
commitment decisions is that they fail to sufficiently elucidate the law in novel and 
complex competition cases. This is due to the lack of a formal finding of infringement in 
commitment decisions coupled with the fact that they provide limited opportunity for the 
solution adopted to be challenged before the General Court and the Court of Justice. While 
a commitment decision may offer ‘legal comfort’ to its addressee and rapidly restore 
competition in a given instance, it may provide less clarity and thus legal certainty for other 
actors than infringement decisions, which provide a more effective legal road map”.647 
Another commentator argues that there is “a vicious circle in that the less clarity there is in 
one particular area, the more likely commitments will be to all sides involved, leading to 
an even greater lack of guidance and clarity in that area”.648 In Canada and South Africa, 
consent agreements typically do not contain anything more than a superficial legal or 
economic analysis. 
 
Assuming that the case proceeds to Stage 3- a decision whether or not an infringement has been 
committed- forbearance could be exercised by finding no infringement, on the grounds that the 
law is insufficiently clear. In Canada, such forbearance is embodied in the competition law itself 
when it comes to as non-hardcore arrangements. As we saw in Chapter 4, it is not illegal to engage 
in such an arrangement which causes SLC and has no countervailing efficiency justification. The 
most that can happen is that the Tribunal makes an order requiring the parties to alter or terminate 
their agreement to eliminate the SLC. (It is illegal to breach the terms of such an order). Although 
                                                     
647 Melchior Wathelet “Commitment Decisions and the Paucity of Precedent” Journal of 
European Competition Law and Practice Vol 6 Issue 8 (Oct 2015) 553.  
648 Pinar Akman “The Reform of the Application of Article 102 TFEU: Mission Accomplished?” 81 
Antitrust LJ 145 (2016). 
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the decision to treat non-hardcore arrangements in this way was expressly rationalised on the basis 
that such arrangements often have efficiencies which outweigh the harm to competition, it could 
equally have been justified on the grounds of lack of clarity: it is not appropriate to prohibit 
arrangements on the basis of such an economic assessment, which the parties are not in a position 
to make when they enter into the arrangement. In the other subject jurisdictions, there is no such 
leniency: the authority or the court at Stage 3 will see it as its role to decide whether or not there 
is an infringement, irrespective of whether the application of the law to the arrangement or conduct 
was unclear. For example, in the one EU case where a business has challenged the finding of an 
infringement under Article 7 ECHR on the grounds of nulla crimen sine lege, the European Court 
rejected the challenge, holding that the business, with legal advice, should have reasonably 
foreseen that its conduct (acting as a facilitator for a price-fixing cartel) would constitute an 
infringement 649 
 
Forbearance at Stage 3 would limit the reputational damage and unfairness arising from being 
found guilty of a competition law infringement, and being subject to penalties for arrangements or 
conduct that the business could not reasonably have predicted was illegal. We noted in Chapter 3 
that the Canadian model in respect of non-hardcore arrangements would be unlikely to be 
classified as a criminal offence were the ECtHR’s criteria to be applied, with the more stringent 
requirements of legal clarity that such classification would entail. However, being involved in a 
competition authority investigation, even if it cannot lead to a finding of illegality, might still 
adversely affect reputation. Investigations can be kept confidential while they are being carried 
out, but will be revealed once the consent agreement or Tribunal proceedings become publicly 
known. Nor is forbearance at Stage 3 likely to mitigate any of the other adverse effects of lack of 
clarity to any great extent. First, a Canadian business might still feel obliged to incur the costs of 
legal advice on the prospect of the authority issuing a cease-and-desist order against an 
arrangement or conduct, even if it is not illegal. Secondly, it may be deterred from engaging in the 
arrangement or conduct if the legal advice is not sufficiently robust. (An empirical study on 
whether the Canadian regime for non-hardcore arrangements means that Canadian businesses are 
less “risk-averse” in these two respects than their counterparts in other jurisdictions would be 
                                                     
649 Section 3 6 5 above. 
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useful, but is outside the scope of this thesis). Thirdly, it may still have incurred costs in investing 
in a particular business, which it cannot recover if it is later prevented from continuing with it. As 
for the other adverse effects of lack of certainty, the potentially heavy costs of the litigation 
required to get to Stage 3 would not be mitigated, with the implications for access to justice that 
this entails.  
 
Finally, at Stage 4, assuming a finding of infringement has been made, forbearance could be shown 
in whether sanctions should be imposed, and if so how severe they should be.  
 
In Canada and South Africa, such forbearance has been formalised in the competition laws 
themselves. In Canada, outside the expressly-criminalised hardcore category of arrangements, no 
penalty can be imposed for entering into or implementing an arrangement which causes SLC and 
does not qualify for the efficiency exclusion. Nor (as noted above) does a business act illegally by 
doing so. Since the assessment of non-hardcore arrangements involves a much greater lack of 
clarity than the assessment of hardcore arrangements, treating them more leniently in this way 
could be seen as a fair reflection of this lack of clarity.  However, the same does not apply to abuse 
of dominance, which also involves a great lack of clarity, and yet the Tribunal can still impose an 
administrative penalty.650 In South Africa, forbearance is demonstrated by the fact that, for 
arrangements and exclusionary acts which are not specifically identified in the Competition Act, 
a penalty can only be imposed if the arrangement or conduct is a repeat of conduct that has 
previously been declared to be an infringement, thereby recognising that a “first offender” may 
have committed the breach inadvertently due to lack of legal certainty.651 
 
Outside of these areas in Canada and South Africa, and in the subject jurisdictions where such 
mechanisms are not included in the competition laws themselves, that is, the EU, Hong Kong and 
Australia, the competition authority or adjudicating body could still take account of the lack of 
clarity in the law by deciding that no penalty should be imposed, or by imposing a lower penalty 
than would otherwise be imposed. However, the EU Commission has rarely regarded lack of 
clarity in the law as justifying a lower penalty, or no penalty at all. An exception occurred in 2001, 
                                                     
650 S 79(3.1-3.3). 
651 S 59. 
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when the Commission issued a decision finding that a firm had abused its dominant position, but 
decided not to impose a fine on the following basis:  
 
“The Commission recognises that DSD could not easily assess, on the basis of previous 
decisions of the Commission or the European Court of Justice, the compatibility of its 
behaviour with the competition rules of the Treaty. Following the clarifications given in 
this decision, the Commission will not hesitate in the future to bring proceedings in similar 
cases and, insofar as necessary, to impose fines.”652  
 
The Commission’s guidelines on the methodology for setting penalties for infringements make no 
mention of lack of legal clarity as a factor justifying a lower penalty, or no penalty at all.653 This 
reticence in showing forbearance on grounds of lack of clarity is perhaps understandable, given 
the European Court’s acceptance that the Article 7 ECHR principles on legal clarity apply to 
competition law. A decision by the Commission that no penalty should be imposed for an 
infringement on grounds of lack of clarity might call into question whether any finding of 
infringement at all was justified under Article 7, and invite legal challenge on that basis. Similarly, 
a decision that lack of clarity justified a lower penalty might call into question not only the finding 
of infringement, but also the imposition of any penalty. 
 
In its appeal against the EU Commission’s decision that it had abused its dominant position by 
favouring its own comparative shopping service, it is reported that Google has argued that the 
penalty of 2.42 billion euros was not warranted inter alia “because the Commission advanced a 
novel theory” as a basis for liability.654 It remains to be seen whether the European General Court 
will be sympathetic to this argument.  
 
                                                     
652 See Commission Press Release IP/01/584 of 20 April 2001 “Commission acts against Duales 
System Deutschland AG (Green Dot) for the abuse of a dominant position”. 
653 “Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation No 1/2003” OJ C210/2 of 1.9.2006. 
654 OJ C 369/37 of 30.10.2017. 
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If forbearance on grounds of lack of clarity was to be exercised at Stage 4, in the form of a finding 
of no penalty, or a lower penalty, it might help to mitigate to some extent the reputational damage 
a business may suffer from being involved in an investigation and held to have committed a breach 
of competition law. The degree to which it would do so would probably be highest if no penalty 
was imposed at all, and lowest if only a very small reduction in the penalty was made. But 
forbearance at Stage 4 would not mitigate any of the other adverse effects of lack of clarity 
identified in Chapter 5.  
 
6 4 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this Chapter has explained why: 
 
• none of the methods for improving clarity in competition laws that we have examined- 
statutory examples, relevant assessment factors and guidelines, have proved effective in 
doing so: and 
• none of the methods for mitigating the adverse effects of lack of clarity in competition laws 
that we have examined- presumptions, safe harbours and filters, prior approvals and 
regulatory forbearance- have done so to any material extent, and  each of them are subject 
to drawbacks.  
 
This is not to say that one or more of these methods might be a useful supplement to a competition 
law that itself provides greater legal certainty. What we have argued is that they have not been 
successful in providing greater legal certainty under the general prohibition approach which 
permeates most of our current competition laws. Chapter 7 describes a proposed way forward. 
 
7  A Way Forward 
 
7 1 Introduction 
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Since none of the existing tools we examined in Chapter 6 have adequately resolved the problem 
of legal uncertainty in competition laws, a different approach is required. This assumes that we 
need competition laws at all: clearly the ultimate solution to the problem of legal uncertainty in 
competition laws would be to abolish them. We start by explaining why this is generally not a 
realistic option.  
 
Having concluded that competition laws addressing business arrangements and conduct are here 
to stay for the foreseeable future, we then look at whether the need to engage in economic 
assessments (relevant market, substantial lessening of competition, substantial market power etc.)- 
i.e. the primary cause of the legal uncertainty that we identified in Chapter 4- can be removed, or 
at least substantially reduced.  
 
As regards agreements, we consider first the possibility of whether there are any categories of 
agreement which could be excluded from the scope of competition laws completely, thereby 
reducing the volume of agreements in respect of which any economic assessment is needed. In 
particular, we look at the possibility of removing vertical agreements from the scope of the 
prohibition on anti-competitive agreements. (Although the EU has a “block exemption” for vertical 
agreements, this approach has major limitations, as we shall see). Given that vertical agreements 
vastly outnumber horizontal agreements in the market place, a “carve-out” of vertical agreements 
from the competition laws that currently apply to them would drastically reduce the number of 
agreements that would need to be subject to any kind of economic assessment, and thereby greatly 
reduce the compliance burden on businesses.  
 
We then look at how legal certainty can be improved with respect to horizontal agreements, 
including the possibility of introducing or extending the use of per se prohibitions for particular 
types of commercial arrangements, i.e. rules that prohibit specific types of arrangements, 
regardless of their economic effects. In principle, per se prohibitions should again remove the need 
for economic assessments. 
 
 To the extent that an exclusion of vertical arrangements and per se rules for certain horizontal 
agreements (assuming both were feasible) would not cover all types of arrangements, we then look 
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at how legal certainty could be increased for the other types. Finally, we look at whether, and if so 
how, the uncertainties in addressing abuse of dominance or substantial market power can be 
resolved.  
 
7 2  Do we need Competition Laws? 
 
In general, new laws are adopted to remedy or prevent harm to society that would result from their 
absence. In the case of competition laws, their “raison d’ệtre” is that, in their absence, businesses 
would have the ability and incentive to harm the competitive process, thereby defeating one or 
more objectives that are intended to be achieved through this process, such as economic efficiency 
or consumer welfare. But is it the case in every jurisdiction that businesses have this ability and 
incentive? There are many cases which show that this ability and incentive still exists.  
 
Many hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing have occurred, even until recently, in spite of 
ever-higher penalties designed to deter them, suggesting a strong incentive to subvert the 
competitive process through collusion.655 There is a wide consensus that “naked” price-fixing (i.e. 
price-fixing which is designed only to maintain or increase profits) and other hardcore 
arrangements such as output restriction (to increase price) and bid-rigging should be prohibited 
because they have no economic value to justify the economic harm they cause. For example, the 
International Competition Network (ICN), a network of competition authorities across the world, 
has a working group on cartels, the mission statement of which says:  
 
“The mandate of the Cartel Working Group is to address the challenges of anti-cartel 
enforcement, including the prevention, detection, investigation and punishment of cartel 
conduct. At the heart of antitrust enforcement is the battle against hard core cartels directed 
at price-fixing, bid-rigging, market-allocation and output-restriction”656  
                                                     
655 See for example the EU Commission’s decision of 27 September 2017 to impose a fine of 880 
million euros on the truck producer Scania for participating in a price-fixing cartel with other 
truck producers for 14 years: Commission Statement 17/3509. 
656 http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/cartel.aspx 
(accessed on 8-11-2017). 
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It may be the case that in some jurisdictions, there are fewer industries that are prone to collusion 
than others, because the economic conditions for effective cartelisation (homogeneous products or 
services, few suppliers, high barriers to entry) may not be present. But even in these jurisdictions, 
trade and professional associations can, and have, set uniform prices and other conditions for their 
members to adopt, thereby restricting competition between them. The early cases in some smaller 
jurisdictions such as Singapore, Jersey and Hong Kong, have concerned precisely these sorts of 
practices.657 If there is to be a law to prevent these practices which is to be accepted as fair, it 
cannot be selective as to the industries to which it applies. 
 
Moreover, even if it could be established that a jurisdiction’s own internal economic circumstances 
did not necessitate a competition law, there are strong international pressures to adopt one: 
 
• It is a standard practice in free trade agreements (“FTAs”) between governments not only to 
provide for the elimination of trade barriers, but also to agree to adopt or maintain competition 
laws. A 2015 study of a sample of 216 FTAs on the database of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) found that 88 per cent of them addressed competition issues (up from 60 per cent in 
1990) and that 37 per cent of them included provisions requiring the contracting parties to 
adopt, maintain or apply regulatory measures against anti-competitive conduct.658 The EU, as 
the world’s largest trading bloc, has been instrumental in “exporting” competition law to other 
countries wishing to do free trade deals with it. A condition of the typical free trade agreement 
requires that each party has rules in place to deal, inter alia, with anti-competitive agreements 
and abuses of dominance. For example, the free trade agreement between the EU and Vietnam 
signed in 2016 contains the following provision: 
 
                                                     
657 See the websites of the relevant competition authorities: (respectively) www.ccs.gov.sg; 
www.cicra.gg; www.compcomm.hk (accessed on 8-11-2017).  
658 Francois Charles Laprevote, Sven Frisch and Burcu Can “Competition Policy within the 
Context of Free Trade Agreements” E15 Expert Group on Competition Policy and the Trade 
System September 2015. 
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 “(1) The Parties shall adopt or maintain comprehensive competition legislation that proscribes 
anticompetitive conduct, with the objective of promoting economic efficiency and consumer 
welfare, and shall take appropriate action with respect to such conduct.  
(2) The respective competition laws shall effectively address in their respective territories:  
a) agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted 
practices which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition,  
b) abuses by one or more enterprises of a dominant position, and  
c) concentrations between enterprises which would significantly impede effective 
competition.”659  
• In addition, even without such pressures, a country which depends on, or wants to attract, 
inbound investment from overseas businesses (commonly referred to as “foreign direct 
investment” or “FDI”) may wish to re-assure potential investors that they will be able to 
compete “on a level playing field” with local businesses through the existence and enforcement 
of a competition law. There is empirical evidence to suggest a positive correlation between 
competition law and its enforcement, on the one hand, and the level of FDI on the other.660   
• Regional economic groupings of countries often agree on, or seek to encourage the 
introduction of, competition laws. The EU is one obvious example. Another is the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising ten countries in the region which “have 
committed to introduce national competition law by 2015”.661 As part of this initiative, for 
example, the Philippines’ new competition law took effect in July 2015, and Myanmar’s in 
February 2017. 
                                                     
659 Available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1437  (accessed on 8-11-
2017). 
660 Julian L Clarke “Competition Policy and Foreign Direct Investment” World Trade Institute 
2003, available at http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2003/papers/clarke.pdf (accessed on 8-11-2017). 
661 See www.asean-competition.org/aegc (accessed on 9-11-2017). 
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• Related to the last point, peer pressure through organisations like the World Trade Organisation 
and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which regard having a 
competition law as international best practice, encourages member countries to have them, and 
to have regular discussions about issues of competition law and policy.  For example, Gerber 
states that in the case of China, “foreign institutional pressure…was applied not only to 
encourage China to enact a competition law, but also to influence decisions regarding its 
contents.” He specifically mentions the WTO and OECD in this context.662 
• Moreover, there is a general perception that introducing competition law merely reflects the 
international norm, and that this in itself is sufficient justification. Hence, the introduction of 
such a law represents the desire not to be an international “pariah”, and to be fashionable. The 
establishment of competition law as an international norm has been facilitated not only by the 
influence of FTAs and the efforts of bodies such as the WTO and OECD (as described above) 
but also by the creation of the ICN. In April 2016 it was reported that the ICN had a 
membership of 132 competition authorities from 120 jurisdictions.663 There are estimated to 
be approximately 194 countries in the world,664 (i.e. 62 per cent of countries have competition 
laws). This represents considerable peer pressure, particularly amongst so-called developed 
countries where competition laws are virtually ubiquitous. It is likely effectively to place a 
burden on a country to justify internationally why it does not need a competition law:  it is a 
much easier task diplomatically to simply “join the club”. 
 
Taking all of the factors discussed in this section into account, it is submitted that most jurisdictions 
would conclude that they should have a competition law which as a minimum contains (a) 
provisions for preventing or acting against anti-competitive agreements between businesses, 
especially hardcore arrangements and (b) provisions for preventing or acting against unilateral 
conduct by businesses with substantial market power or dominance. This is the case, it is 
                                                     
662 Global Competition 232. 
663 See “International Competition Network Marks its Fifteenth Annual Conference promoting 
International Convergence and Cooperation” 29 April 2016 available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/04/international-competition-network-
marks-its-fifteenth-annual (accessed on 9-11-2017). 
664 http://www.worldatlas.com/nations.htm (accessed on 9-11-2017). 
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submitted, whether the main benefit they see from the law is economic efficiency, consumer 
welfare, and/or other public interest benefits.  
 
7 3 Are Vague Competition Law Prohibitions Inevitable? 
 
We have seen in Chapter 4 that the current system of intervention under competition laws, which  
involves to a large extent prohibitions based on economic assessments, does not provide sufficient 
legal certainty for the businesses that have to comply with them. We have also seen in Chapter 6 
why the various methods which have so far been used to provide greater certainty under such 
prohibitions, or mitigate the effects of the lack of it, have been unsuccessful. The question now is 
whether competition laws can be designed in a way which provides sufficient legal certainty.  
 
Previous literature has acknowledged the uncertainty in competition laws, but appears to assume 
that uncertainty is inherent in the design and drafting of competition laws, and that the challenge 
is to make their application and enforcement (by courts and enforcement authorities) clearer and 
more predictable. For example, Stucke has argued that US antitrust law’s “rule of reason” not only 
contravenes the rule of law’s principle of clarity,665 but that it is inherently susceptible to the 
pursuit of multiple conflicting objectives (presumably because of this lack of clarity).666 He 
suggests that instead of choosing a single objective at the expense of others, antitrust should adopt 
a “blended goal” approach. By this approach he appears to mean prohibiting (or at least prioritising 
enforcement action against) arrangements or conduct that is contrary to all of the various possible 
objectives. This, he argues, should be combined with clearly- defined “rules”. He stops short of 
suggesting what these rules might be. He does not question whether the underlying statute (the 
Sherman Act) could be amended to provide greater legal certainty. This would be virtually 
inconceivable in any event, given that the Sherman Act has remained unchanged since its adoption 
in 1898, and its interpretation and application have been shaped by the US courts’ case law. So, 
                                                     
665 Maurice E Stucke “Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?” UC Davis L Rev Vol 42 
No 5 (June 2009) 1375. 
666 “Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals”  BCLR Vol 53 No 2 (2012) 551. 
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by “rules” he presumably means the approaches the courts should adopt in future, in their 
application of the Sherman Act through the case law. 
 
Ezrachi also appears to assume that uncertainty is inherent in competition law itself, in part because 
of the economic analysis that is involved. He uses two metaphors in describing competition laws: 
“sponge” and “membrane”.667 Competition law is like a sponge, he argues, because of its 
“susceptibility [i.e. porousness] to national peculiarities originating in its design and evident in its 
application, and its exposure to intellectual and regulatory capture”. Although economic analysis 
has been welded as a membrane onto the sponge in an effort to achieve greater certainty and 
consistency across jurisdictions, the certainty created by the membrane is illusory because the 
national peculiarities will continue to influence practical outcomes, and economic analysis in itself 
is imprecise. He concludes: 
 
“The key to effective competition law enforcement is not in the pretence of purity [from 
economic analysis], but in the understanding of the interface between the ‘sponge’, 
‘membrane’ and the domestic environment, and in a credible move to enhance its 
transparency, limit its susceptibility, and promote a workable rule of law”. (emphasis 
added). 
 
He does not identify what would constitute a “credible move” in this direction. 
 
Steuer is somewhat more specific in describing how the enforcement of competition law could be 
changed to provide greater clarity.668 He essentially argues that enforcement should be targeted 
only against exclusionary monopolistic conduct (its EU equivalent would be exclusionary abuse 
of a dominant position) and cartels: what he calls “bullying” and “ganging up” respectively. In 
other words, non-cartel horizontal agreements and vertical agreements should not be targets for 
enforcement, because they are generally justified by efficiencies, and vertical problems only arise 
                                                     
667 Ariel Ezrachi “Sponge” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Vol 5 Issue 1 (April 2017) 49. 
668 Richard M Steuer “The Simplicity of Antitrust Law” University of Pennsylvania Journal of 
Business Law Vol 14 No 2 (Winter 2012) 543. 
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if there is market power anyway, so are sufficiently covered by the monopolisation provision 
(section 2 of the Sherman Act). 
 
On this basis, Steuer argues that “antitrust is simpler than it seems. Properly applied, antitrust 
focuses simply, and entirely, on combating two of the most innate proclivities in human nature- 
bullying and ganging-up- when such conduct harms competition. Once this is understood, the 
concerns about irrationality and disharmony begin to disappear”.  
 
Steuer concludes: 
 
“If judges, enforcement officials, and lawyers confine their focus to unilateral and 
collective activity that threatens serious harm to competition, the proper application of the 
legal and economic principles and tools will become clearer. Antitrust is not that 
complicated. Once this is appreciated, both the direction and value of antitrust becomes 
easier to comprehend, apply and explain: Don’t put up with bullies who stifle competition. 
Don’t permit ganging-up to diminish competition”.669  
 
There are a few issues with this analysis. First, whether a firm has the power to control prices, or 
a strong likelihood of achieving such power, are matters of great uncertainty in many cases, as we 
have seen in Chapter 4. Secondly, there is no sufficiently precise definition of “bullying”. As we 
discussed earlier in Chapter 4, even dominant companies are allowed to compete vigorously, and 
an abuse (or monopolization under US antitrust law) cannot consist merely of excluding 
competitors through vigorous competition. The dividing line between acceptable and unacceptable 
unilateral conduct therefore still remains unclear. Thirdly, Steuer appears to require that both 
bullying and ganging-up have some kind of adverse effect on competition for them to be prohibited 
(in his words “stifle” or “diminish” or “threaten serious harm to” competition). But as we have 
seen in Chapter 4, whether agreements or conduct will harm competition, and if so to such an 
extent as to be illegal, are matters that are often unclear and difficult to assess in many cases. 
 
                                                     
669 557. 
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Steuer’s thesis is, however, compelling in arguing for a reduction in the scope of the enforcement 
of competition laws, in particular by arguing for non-enforcement against non-cartel horizontal 
agreements and vertical agreements. A question that this dissertation will now examine is whether 
any exclusions from enforcement, and the uncertainties involved in Steuer’s concepts of “bullying” 
and “ganging-up”, can be addressed in the design of competition laws themselves, i.e. competition 
legislation. If achievable, this would clearly be preferable, from the legal certainty point of view, 
to leaving enforcement to administrative discretion under vague legislation. As we have argued 
earlier, vague competition laws and reliance upon economic assessments allow for arbitrary and 
subjective judgment calls, and to enforcement approaches that vary over time, depending on the 
priorities of whoever is in charge of enforcement and public pressures, leading to a great deal of 
uncertainty.   
 
We will argue later in this Chapter that these exclusions and uncertainties can indeed be addressed 
in the design and drafting of the competition law itself: in other words (to answer the question in 
the heading of this section) vague competition law prohibitions are not inevitable.   
 
We recognise that two of the oldest and most influential systems of competition law, US and EU 
law, are not likely to be re-designed in the foreseeable future. As noted above, the US Sherman 
Act has remained unchanged since 1898, and the tradition of interpretation and application by the 
courts is well-entrenched. Likewise, the EU competition rules have remain unchanged since they 
were incorporated in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, and there is a considerable body of case law 
interpreting and applying them. In the EU there is the added complication that an amendment to 
the competition provisions would require an agreement between its 28 Member States (or 27 if the 
UK leaves the EU, as is its government’s current plan). Most Member States’ national competition 
laws are also closely modeled on the EU provisions, and are also unlikely to be materially re-
designed in the foreseeable future. It is perhaps for these reasons that previous literature (as noted 
above) has tended to take uncertainty in competition legislation as “a given”, and to focus more 
on achieving greater certainty in the enforcement and application of competition laws. 
 
Nevertheless this leaves many other jurisdictions that do not have such constraints, and that are 
free to amend their competition legislation to provide greater legal certainty. Of the subject 
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jurisdictions covered in this dissertation alone, Australia, Canada and South Africa have, on 
numerous occasions, made major amendments to their competition laws since they were adopted, 
and Hong Kong is reported to be launching a major review of its competition law by the end of 
2018, even although it has only been fully in force since 2015.670 For those jurisdictions like 
Vietnam which are subject to free trade agreements (FTAs) requiring them to have competition 
laws in place, the FTAs (as we saw in section 7 2) leave them considerable discretion as to how 
those laws should be modeled. So this dissertation’s thesis will be relevant to many jurisdictions. 
Even for the US and the EU, it is hoped that will be informative as to what can be achieved with a 
“clean slate”, in illustrating the shortfalls in legal certainty at present, and in providing a 
benchmark for seeking to minimise (if not eliminate) the problems of legal uncertainty we 
discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
In the following sections of this Chapter, we look first at the extent to which certain types of 
agreement or conduct could be per se excluded (in clear enough terms) from competition laws. 
This would at least serve to narrow the scope (and hence the volume) of agreements and conduct 
that would need to be subject to any kind of economic assessment. Secondly, and conversely, we 
look at whether there are any types of agreement or conduct which might be suitable for clear per 
se rules of prohibition, i.e. rules that prohibit specific types of agreements or conduct in 
themselves, regardless of their effects (economic or otherwise). Thirdly, to the extent that there 
may be other agreements or conduct that are considered economically harmful, we look at how 
they should be addressed.  
 
 
7 4  Exclusions from the scope of Competition Laws  
 
In considering whether there are any categories of arrangement which can be excluded from the 
scope of the prohibition of anti-competitive arrangements, vertical agreements seem to be an 
                                                     
670 Comments by the Chief Executive Officer of the Hong Kong Competition Commission at a 
meeting of the Hong Kong Legislative Council’s Panel on Economic Development dated 26 
March 2018, para 49 of the minutes, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr17-
18/english/panels/edev/minutes/edev20180326.pdf (accessed on 5-4-2018). 
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obvious “candidate”.671 There are two reasons for this. The first is the view that vertical restraints 
are only potentially problematic in terms of economic efficiency or consumer welfare if one of the 
parties has substantial market power or dominance, in which case the rules on abuse should be 
sufficient to deal with any competition problems. The second is that vertical restraints are more 
likely than not to generate efficiencies which outweigh any harm to competition. As the EU 
Commission has stated: 
 
“For most vertical restraints, competition concerns can only arise if there is insufficient 
competition at one or more levels of trade, i.e. if there is some degree of market power at 
the level of the supplier or the buyer or at both levels. Vertical restraints are generally 
less harmful than horizontal restraints and may provide substantial scope for 
efficiencies.”672 
 
Expanding on this point, it has also stated: 
 
“Certain types of vertical agreements can improve economic efficiency within a chain of 
production or distribution by facilitating better coordination between participating 
undertakings. In particular, they can lead to a reduction in the transaction and distribution 
costs of the parties and to an optimisation of their sales and investment levels. The 
likelihood that such efficiency-enhancing effects will outweigh any anti-competitive 
effects due to restrictions contained in vertical agreements depends on the degree of market 
power of the parties to the agreement”.673  
 
Singapore has excluded vertical agreements from the scope of its competition law: this could be 
called a rule of per se legality for vertical agreements.674 The ex-Chief Economist of the Singapore 
Competition Commission stated that this exclusion reflected the view that “vertical agreements 
are normally pro-competitive and those that are not are often limited by international competition 
                                                     
671 As noted above, Steuer argued that both vertical and (non-cartel) horizontal agreements 
should not be a focus for enforcement- see n 668 above. 
672 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints OJ C130/1 of 19.5.2010 para 6. 
673 N 672 above recitals 6 and 7. 
674 Singapore Competition Act Third Schedule para 8. 
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or are difficult or costly to evaluate- an important factor in a small economy with limited 
administrative resources”.675 In other words, it was thought that the cost of letting a minority of 
harmful agreements escape the law was outweighed by the benefits of the exclusion in terms of 
savings in administration costs.  
 
The emphasis on weighing economic costs and benefits is consistent with the fact that Singapore 
has adopted a total welfare approach where it is net economic benefits that matter, as opposed to 
net consumer benefits, to the evaluation of arrangements under the competition law.676 As we saw 
in Chapter 4, Australia, Canada and South Africa also, broadly speaking, apply a total welfare 
standard, but have not excluded vertical agreements from the scope of the law.  
 
The issue of whether to exclude any category of agreements from the scope of competition law, 
and if so which, is complicated in Canada and South Africa by the fact that, as we saw in Chapter 
4, their competition laws have multiple (and at times inconsistent) objectives. They do not only 
seek to promote economic efficiency. Presumably these other objectives would also have to be 
taken into account in making the decision as to what category or categories (if any) should be 
excluded from the law’s scope. 
 
As was noted in Chapter 6, it has also been suggested in the US context that a rule of per se legality 
for vertical agreements may be one way of reducing the scope of the rule of reason in US antitrust 
law and thereby making the law clearer.677 
 
The EU has taken a more cautious approach to vertical agreements than Singapore. The EU 
Commission has issued a “block exemption regulation” for vertical agreements, under which they 
                                                     
675 R Ian McEwin “Competition Law in Singapore” 17 March 2011 available at 
http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com/publication/competition-law-in-singapore/ (accessed 
on 9-11-2017). 
676 N 675 above. 
677 Section 6 3 1 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
285 
 
will be excluded from Article 101(1) TFEU provided that certain criteria are satisfied.678 For 
example, the exemption does not apply if the market share of the supplier or purchaser exceeds 30 
per cent, or if the agreement contains resale price restrictions. In effect, therefore, it operates more 
like a safe harbour for certain vertical agreements than a rule of per se legality, and involves the 
uncertainties of defining markets that we identified in Chapter 4. An outright exclusion would be 
preferable in terms of legal certainty. Moreover, given that the reason for the market share limit is 
a concern about market power, it is not clear why the EU Commission felt such a limit was 
necessary, given the availability of the abuse of dominance provisions to deal with any such 
problems. The benefits of catching any problems which might slip the net because of a shortfall 
between the 30 per cent market share limit and dominance would arguably be outweighed by the 
costs savings of a clear exclusion. 
 
A Singapore-style exclusion of vertical agreements from the prohibition of anti-competitive 
agreements would reduce dramatically the scope of the lack of clarity in competition law, in the 
sense that the vast majority of commercial agreements are vertical agreements (a firm has many 
more contracts with its suppliers and customers than with its competitors). To remove vertical 
agreements from the need for scrutiny under this prohibition would therefore make life a lot easier 
for many businesses by substantially reducing their compliance costs: they would only have to be 
concerned about vertical restraints if they were dominant or has substantial market power. It would 
also free up enforcement authorities’ resources to tackle more serious anti-competitive 
arrangements or conduct.  
 
In Singapore, as noted above, the decision to exclude vertical agreements was taken on the basis 
of a cost-benefit assessment and the fact that overall economic efficiency (in the sense of total 
welfare) was the law’s objective. In other jurisdictions, it is conceivable that the view might be 
taken that a vertical agreements exclusion would not be justified. But given the potentially huge 
savings in compliance costs for businesses and administration costs for the authorities, such an 
exclusion at least merits serious consideration.  
                                                     
678 “Commission Regulation (EU) No 330/2010 of 20 April 2010 on the application of Article 
101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical 
agreements and concerted practices” OJ L102/1 of 23.4.2010. 
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It seems that the definition of “vertical agreements” would not pose a major problem, in terms of 
clarity, for the purpose of drafting an exclusion. The Singapore Competition Act, for example, 
defines a vertical agreement as:  
“any agreement entered into between two or more undertakings each of which operates, 
for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production or distribution 
chain, and relating to the conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell 
certain goods or services and includes provisions contained in such agreements which 
relate to the assignment to the buyer or use by the buyer of intellectual property rights, 
provided that those provisions do not constitute the primary object of the agreement and 
are directly related to the use, sale or resale of goods or services by the buyer or its 
customers.”679  
A key phrase in the above passage is “for the purposes of the agreement”. This phrase implicitly 
recognises that the parties may be in a vertical arrangement for the purposes of the agreement in 
question, but for other purposes they may not be, and indeed may be competitors. A good example 
of this is in the telecommunications industry. Telecommunications operators have to enter into 
reciprocal interconnection agreements with each other to ensure that customers of one operator 
can connect with customers of the other. Under these agreements, each operator purchases 
interconnection services from the other (a vertical arrangement) even although the operators 
compete with each other at the retail level.  
 
There is one possible exception to an exclusion of vertical agreements. While in Singapore, the 
exclusion of vertical agreements from the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements will apply 
irrespective of whether the agreement contains resale price maintenance (RPM), many 
jurisdictions are concerned about RPM, at least where the RPM consists of the supplier imposing 
minimum or fixed resale prices on a dealer, as opposed to maximum resale prices. For example, in 
the EU, the imposition of minimum or fixed prices will deny the agreement the benefit of the block 
exemption, and in Hong Kong the Commission has even said that in some cases it may amount to 
                                                     
679 N 674 above para 8(2). 
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“serious anti-competitive conduct”.680  South Africa goes as far as to have a per se prohibition 
against minimum resale price maintenance, whereas in the US the per se approach to RPM was 
abandoned by the Supreme Court in the Leegin case .681. This dissertation takes no view on how 
RPM should be treated. Our only point here is that, from the point of view of increasing legal 
certainty, there could be an exclusion of vertical agreements with the exception of RPM, and RPM 
could  dealt with as described in 7 6 below. 
 
Turning to horizontal agreements, clearly excluding all horizontal agreements as well as vertical 
agreements would be unwise, as hardcore conduct such as industry-wide price-fixing is almost 
universally-condemned as harmful economically, and an exclusion would fail to meet the 
international standards we described at 7 2 above. Moreover, it is difficult to identify any type of 
horizontal agreement which, by its very nature, can be identified as generally economically 
efficient, or to produce public benefits that outweigh the harm to competition, such as to be suitable 
for a definitive exclusion from the prohibition against anti-competitive arrangements. in 
competition law. For example, although the EU Commission has said that cooperation between 
actual or potential competitors limited to research and development “rarely gives rise to restrictive 
effects on competition within the meaning of Article 101(1)”, this does not apply  where the parties 
have “market power” (a nebulous concept as we discussed in Chapter 4).682  Likewise, it is difficult 
to identify any type of unilateral conduct by firms with a dominant position or substantial market 
power that, by its very nature, has these properties. For example, whereas pricing above costs is 
generally regarded as being lawful, in the EU even above-cost pricing has been condemned in 
certain circumstances.683 (There is also the difficulty of assessing costs for the purpose of whether 
determining whether prices are above costs, as shown by the excessive pricing cases that we 
discussed in Chapter 4).684 Similarly, although in the US a refusal to supply is generally regarded 
                                                     
680 “Guideline on the First Conduct Rule” para 5.6, available at 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/legislation_guidance/guidance/guidance.html (accessed on 9-
11-2017). 
681 Competition Act s 5(2). 
682 “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal cooperation agreements” OJ C11/1 of 14.1.2011 para 132.  
683 See, for example, Case C-395/96 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transport v Commission [2001] 
ECR I-1365. 
684 See section 4 51 regarding the EU and section 4 5 4 regarding South Africa. 
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as lawful, there are exceptions,685 and the EU takes a somewhat stricter approach. As we saw, 
South Africa even regards refusal to supply access to an essential facility as a per se infringement. 
 
Looking at the opposite end of the spectrum, are there any categories of agreement or conduct that 
can be identified as generally inefficient, or to harm competition to an extent that is not justified 
by any public benefit, and as such be suitable for specific prohibition, as opposed to a specific 
exclusion? We deal with this question next. 
 
 7 5  Per se rules of Illegality  
 
7 5 1 Potential benefits of per se rules of illegality 
 
Given that the general concepts for determining liability under the competition laws of the subject 
jurisdictions provide insufficient clarity, a natural question to ask is whether rules prohibiting 
specific types of agreement, irrespective of their effects (i.e. per se rules) would mitigate the 
adverse consequences of lack of clarity that we identified in Chapter 5. These are often called per 
se rules of illegality since the arrangement is prohibited in itself, that is, without the need to show 
any harm to competition, or that the harm to competition outweighs any public interest benefits 
such as efficiency. 
 
Per se rules of illegality should certainly improve legal clarity in theory, since liability or other 
legal consequences would depend only on questions of fact, i.e. whether the parties entered into 
an arrangement of a type specifically identified in the law, and not on economic assessments. A 
business would (at least in theory) know just from looking at the law what arrangements would be 
prohibited, or have other legal consequences, thereby reducing compliance costs, and the 
administration costs of the competition regime would be reduced by avoiding the need for lengthy 
and complex investigations. Per se rules might also reduce litigation costs: as argued in Chapter 
                                                     
685Philip Areeda “Essential Facilities: an Epithet in need of Limiting Principles” 58 Antitrust LJ 841 
(1989-1990). 
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5, the vagueness of concepts such as SLC increases the complexity, and therefore the costs, of 
litigation.686  
 
The US experience with per se rules of illegality is instructive. As we saw in Chapter 2, section 1 
of the US Sherman Act is drafted in very wide terms, stating that “every” contract, combination or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is unlawful.  The US Supreme Court realised that this 
section could not be applied literally, since every contract to some extent restrains trade, so it 
introduced the qualification that the restriction had to unduly restrict competition or obstruct trade, 
contrary to the public interest – the so-called “rule of reason”. 687 
 
Around the same time or shortly thereafter, however, the Supreme Court recognized that there 
were some types of arrangement, such as price-fixing, which by their very nature could not be 
justified under the “rule of reason” and therefore no inquiry into their potential benefits or effects 
was necessary: they were per se illegal. Apart from price-fixing, arrangements that were prohibited 
per se included vertical price and territorial restraints, and horizontal market-sharing (of territories 
or customers).688 
 
The Supreme Court highlighted the benefits of per se rules as being increased certainty, and 
efficiency in the administration of justice: 
 
“This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are 
prescribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it 
also avoids the necessity of a prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of 
the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large whether 
                                                     
686 In Chapter 3, we dealt with Raban’s arguments that vague rules may be more predictable, and 
argued that even if those views are valid in respect of some areas of law, they do not apply to 
competition laws. 
687 Jesse W Markham Jr “Sailing a Sea of Doubt: a Critique of the Rule of Reason in US Antitrust 
Law” 17 Fordham J Corp & Fin L 591, 600-606 (2012). 
688 N 687 above 606-607. 
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a particular restraint has been unreasonable – an inquiry so often fruitless when 
undertaken”.689  
 
Similarly: 
 
“Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid them in predicting 
in any particular case what courts will find to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act.  
Should Congress ultimately determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the 
law, it can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, and leave courts 
free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a flexible 
approach.”690  
 
However, from the 1970s, per se rules started to fall out of favour.  As Gerber explains, this was 
largely due to the emergence and influence of the Chicago School of law and economics.691 As 
noted in Chapter 2, according to this school, economics should provide the basis for antitrust 
(competition) law, and the main objective of antitrust law should be economic efficiency.  This 
emphasis on economics drove the elimination of most per se rules because, according to Gerber:  
 
“[e] conomists have demonstrated effectively that in most areas of antitrust law it is 
difficult to predict in a precise way the effects of particular conduct without extensive 
knowledge of the economic context in which it occurs.  They have argued, therefore, that 
per se rules should be eliminated, except perhaps in those few areas where economic 
science can have a high degree of confidence in predicting the competitive impact of such 
conduct…”692   
                                                     
689 National Pacific Railway Co v US  356 US 1, 5 (1958). 
690 United States v Topco Assocs 405 US 596, 610 (1972). 
691 Gerber Global Competition 145. See also Jonathan B Baker “Per se rules in the Analysis of 
Horizontal Restraints” The Antitrust Bulletin (Winter 1991) 773; William C Wood “Costs and 
benefits of per se rules in Antitrust Enforcement” Antitrust Bulletin (Winter 1993) 887; David I. 
Gelfand and Linden Bernhardt “Vertical Restraints: Evolution from Per Se to Rule of Reason 
Analysis” paper submitted for the November 16, 2017 ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum. 
692 Gerber N 601 above. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
291 
 
 
Accepting these views, the courts responded by gradually eliminating the per se categories, leaving 
almost all arrangements subject to rule of reason analysis.693 Now, the only per se rules that exist 
apply to horizontal arrangements on price and market allocation, and (as we shall see below) on a 
qualified basis, tying the sale of one product or service to the supply of another: per se rules against 
all other vertical restraints have been eliminated, including most recently resale price maintenance 
in 2007.694 However, as we saw in Chapters 4 and 5, the rule of reason has attracted much criticism 
in the US for its lack of certainty- the reason for introducing per se rules in the first place. The tide 
is now therefore turning back in favour of bringing back more clarity into US antitrust law, using 
methods which are less blunt and more subtle than per se rules, as we saw in section 6 3.  
 
From the enforcer’s perspective, a general prohibition of the type which exists in most of the 
subject jurisdictions would be broad enough to allow them to take enforcement action against types 
of arrangements and conduct that are generally regarded as socially undesirable, such as price-
fixing between competitors. Per se rules would not be necessary for this purpose from the 
enforcer’s perspective.  However, a general prohibition is less suitable than a per se prohibition 
because (a) it is usually subject to a threshold of “substantially” or “appreciably” harming 
competition, giving the firms concerned the opportunity to argue that the prohibition should not 
apply in their case because the harm to competition is not sufficiently serious;  (b) even if the harm 
to competition is sufficiently serious, the effect on competition test is qualified in all of the subject 
jurisdictions by an exclusion on grounds of efficiency or other public benefits, giving the firm or 
firms concerned another potential set of arguments as to why the prohibition should not apply; and 
(c) from a business’s perspective, a general prohibition leaves uncertainty about how agreements 
and conduct outside cartels will be treated by the enforcement authorities and courts.  In other 
words, the “general prohibition with possible exclusion” approach sends mixed messages to 
businesses engaging in arrangements which are always going to be stopped by the enforcement 
authorities or courts, assuming they are detected, and causes considerable uncertainty to businesses 
engaging in other types of agreement and conduct. 
 
                                                     
693 Gerber N 601 above. 
694 Leegin Creative Leather Products Inc v PSKS Inc (2007) 551 US 877. 
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So are there any types of agreements which are suitable for per se prohibition? If so, what are 
they? We deal with this issue next. 
 
7 5 2 Per se rules prohibiting which types of agreement or conduct? 
 
There seems to be a broad international consensus that hardcore arrangements, whereby 
competitors coordinate their pricing, reduce supply to maintain or increase prices, or share markets 
or customers are always objectionable- at least where they involve all or most of the operators in 
an industry. These practices are commonly-called price-fixing, output-restriction and market-
sharing (or market-allocation). Secret collusion between competitors to manipulate the outcome 
of tender processes which are intended to be competitive (otherwise known as bid-rigging or 
collusive tendering) is also widely-condemned, at least where it concerns the supply of products 
or services (bid-rigging for the purchase of products or services can reduce costs, thereby 
increasing efficiency, and the cost-savings might be passed onto consumers, if there is sufficient 
competition between the operators in the downstream market. Of course it may be objectionable 
for other reasons, such as where fraud or misrepresentation is involved, as will be discussed 
below).  
 
In the case of industry-wide secret price-fixing cartels, economists have found empirically that 
they are on balance inefficient for the economy,695 (although they can only be sustained if certain 
economic conditions are present).696 
 
As noted above, the ICN has said “At the heart antitrust enforcement is the battle against hard core 
cartels directed at price fixing, bid rigging, market allocation and output restriction.”.”697 The 
OECD has also said:  
 
                                                     
695 Andrea Guenster, Martin Carree and Mathijs A. van Dijk “Do Cartels Undermine Economic 
Efficiency?” December 2011 available at: www.aeaweb.org/conference (accessed on 9-11-17). 
696 Margaret C Levenstein, Valerie Y Suslow “What Determines Cartel Success?” Journal of 
Economic Literature Vol XLIV (March 2006) 43. 
697 Section 7 2 above. 
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“Hard core cartels, or agreements among competitors fixing prices, rigging bids (collusive 
tenders), restricting output or dividing markets, are the most serious and harmful violations 
of competition law. They injure consumers by raising prices and restricting supply. They 
create market power, waste and inefficiency in countries whose markets would otherwise 
be competitive”.698 (emphasis added). 
 
Regarding the OECD’s statement, it is questionable (as noted above) whether bid-rigging in 
purchases reduces efficiency and harms consumers. And although price-fixing may have no (or 
little) efficiency justification, whether it harms consumers depends on the level of the distribution 
chain at which it takes place. If price-fixing takes place in the supply of raw materials for a 
particular product, this may have little adverse effect on consumers if the downstream market for 
the finished product is highly competitive and the suppliers of the final product absorb the costs 
of the inflated raw material prices instead of passing them on to consumers. So it seems that the 
public policy justification for an unqualified prohibition against  (non-purchasing) cartels is that 
they involve collaboration between competitors which has no efficiency justification and which 
(in the case of sales to end consumers) harms consumers, or (in the case of sales to intermediate 
businesses in the supply chain) may harm consumers.   
 
The public policy hostility to the four “cardinal sins” of price-fixing, output- restriction, market-
sharing and bid-rigging is manifested for the most part expressly in the competition laws of most 
of the subject jurisdictions: 
 
• Under EU law, the examples of agreements which may be prohibited under Article 101(1) 
TFEU include those which “fix purchase or selling prices”, “limit or control production” 
or “share markets or sources of supply”. Although bid-rigging is not expressly-mentioned, 
it would usually involve one or more of these three practices in any case, and would 
therefore be covered by these examples. However, it is still at least theoretically possible 
                                                     
698 OECD “Hardcore Cartels- Harm and Effective Sanctions” Policy Brief May 2002 1, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/21552797.pdf (accessed on 10-11-2017). 
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for these arrangements to be qualify for exclusion under Article 101(3) TFEU, if the four 
criteria in this Article are met.699  
• In Hong Kong, the four types of arrangement are expressly described in the statute as 
“serious anti-competitive conduct” which entitles the Commission to bring proceedings 
against the parties directly in the Tribunal, as opposed to first issuing a Warning Notice 
(which it is obliged to do for other arrangements), giving the parties a chance to rectify the 
breach and thereby avoid proceedings in the Tribunal.700 
• Australia and South Africa have per se rules against such arrangements, except that in 
South Africa output- restriction is not specifically mentioned.701 Nevertheless, it is still 
possible in these jurisdictions to apply for an authorisation on grounds of public benefits. 
• Canada is the only one of the subject jurisdictions which has unqualified per se rules 
against the four types of practices, in the sense that they are prohibited without any 
possibility exception: indeed engaging in any of them constitutes a criminal offence.702 
 
The noxious effects of these types of arrangements to which the OECD referred in the statement 
above (raising prices and restricting supply) would not necessarily apply in all cases. For example, 
if two small operators in a market of 20 fixed their prices, this may have no impact on the market 
price. In an ideal world, one would not want to prohibit arrangements that cause no harm. Since 
price-fixing, output restriction and market-sharing only appear to be problematic where they 
involve market power, could a rule prohibiting these types of conduct be qualified by some kind 
of market power test? The problem with this approach is that the rule would then no longer be a 
per se one, and since the assessment of SMP is one of the reasons why competition laws are so 
unclear, as we discussed in Chapter 4, such a rule would not solve the clarity problem. For clarity 
to be provided through a per se rule, there can be no qualification to the rule on nebulous grounds 
such as lack of market power: the law has to identify the conduct which is targeted, without 
qualification. In other words, “all or nothing”. Provided that, in aggregate, more harm is caused 
by the existence of the arrangements and conduct than benefits- in other words the cost of catching 
                                                     
699 Chapter 4, section 4 3 1. 
700 Competition Ordinance s 82(1)(b). 
701 Chapter 4 sections 4 2 2 and 4 2 4. 
702 Chapter 4 section 4 2 3. 
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some “innocent” parties (“Type I errors”), plus the costs of compliance and enforcement, are 
exceeded by the benefits of catching all of the harmful ones- a per se prohibition would be justified 
in economic terms.  Hovenkamp put it this way: 
 
“…it might be justifiable to spend a great deal of societal resources prosecuting a particular 
violation whose social cost is rather small, such as a cartel that is not working very well 
anyway, and whose sales involve a very small market, in order to discourage such behavior 
in potential cartel organizers. The social cost of the current violation can never be 
recovered. The only effective purpose of the prosecution is to deter future violations”.703 
 
In the interests of legal clarity it would be preferable if there were no exceptions to the prohibition 
of the four types of arrangement rule on grounds of economic efficiency or other public benefits. 
Under EU law, as noted above, any of these four types of arrangement may at least theoretically 
be excluded if the four criteria in Article 101(3) are satisfied: a matter which it is for the parties to 
self-assess as there is no facility to seek prior approval. But since there is a consensus that they are 
rarely, if ever, beneficial in terms of efficiency or consumer welfare, consideration should be given 
to ruling out the possibility of exclusion to create greater clarity and avoid sending mixed 
messages. The same applies to the possibility of authorisation or exemption in Australia and South 
Africa, although legal uncertainty is less there than under EU law, because the parties do not have 
to self- assess whether the public benefit objective applies, and can seek prior approval.   
 
One problem that arises with per se rules is that arrangements such as price-fixing or market-
sharing do not always exist in isolation, and may form part of a wider arrangement which may be 
economically efficient. For example, competitors might agree to set up a joint sales venture, which 
may create efficiencies but (by definition) involve price-fixing, because the parties will be selling 
at a common price.  The challenge is therefore how to separate those where the parties’ only object 
is to reduce competition (what in the US are called “naked restraints”) from those which might 
have a valid economic justification or benefit. This is sometimes called the “characterization” 
                                                     
703 Herbert Hovenkamp “Antitrust’s Protected Classes” 88 Mich. L Rev 1 (1989). 
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problem. We deal with this, and other challenges of drafting per se prohibitions, in section 7 4 3 
below.   
 
While there is a broad consensus that certain types of commercial arrangement (as described 
above) should always be prohibited, the same consensus does not exist in respect of unilateral 
conduct by firms with a dominant position or SMP. Such conduct may or may not be harmful, 
depending on the circumstances.  
 
Alone amongst the subject jurisdictions, South Africa has sought to categorise certain types of 
unilateral conduct by dominant firms as per se unlawful, namely “excessive” pricing, and 
“unreasonable” refusal to provide access to an essential facility. But we saw in Chapter 4 the 
difficulties in determining what an “excessive” price is, and “excessive” and “unreasonable” are 
both subjective concepts.704 One of the potential advantages of per se rules is that they should be 
free of value judgments of this kind, and therefore be easy and clear to apply. The per se prohibition 
regarding essential facilities also sits uncomfortably with the constitutional right to protection of 
private property that exists in many jurisdictions.  
 
We therefore believe that other means need to be found to address the problem of legal certainty 
in respect of unilateral conduct. We deal with this issue in section 7 7 below. 
 
7 5 3 Challenges of drafting per se rules 
 
A good way of illustrating the characterisation difficulty involved in drafting per se rules is by 
contrasting the different outcomes when the European Commission and South African courts 
respectively had to decide on the legality of the American Soda Ash Corporation (ANSAC) export 
cartel under their competition laws.  
 
In the EU, under the pre-2003 regime where parties could apply for clearance or exemption from 
the competition rules to the European Commission, ANSAC had made such an application. 
                                                     
704 Section 4 5 4. 
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However, in its 1990 decision, the Commission took the view that the cartel had both the object 
and effect of restricting competition within the EU contrary to Article 85(1) (as it then was), and 
did not satisfy the criteria for exemption under 85(3).705 There being no per se rules of illegality 
under EU competition law, the Commission applied the normal approach which applies to all 
agreements, namely whether the agreement has the object or effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition, and if it does, whether it satisfies the criteria for exemption.   
 
By contrast, when the legality of this export cartel under the South African competition law fell to 
be assessed some 15 years later, one of the legal issues which arose was whether this arrangement 
constituted “an agreement directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price of any other 
trading condition” within the meaning of Section 4(1)(b) of the Competition Act. 
 
The South African Supreme Court of Appeal drew a distinction between (a) an arrangement 
whereby competitors form a separate jointly owned entity which purports to set the price for the 
parents’ products but is in reality just a facade to hide the reality that the parents are fixing the 
prices through the jointly-owned company;706 and (b) “a bona fide joint venture that is embarked 
upon by competitors for a legitimate purpose, through the vehicle of a separate entity, which must 
necessarily set a price for the goods that it supplies (emanating from the competitors) merely as an 
incident to the pursuit of the joint venture”.707  The Court held that, in the latter case, there was 
“no a priori reason to assume that such an arrangement constitutes prohibited price-fixing as 
contemplated by s 4(1)(b)” and that it may well fall under the general prohibition under s 4(1)(a), 
requiring an assessment of economic effects and justification.708  The Court did not make a 
definitive decision on this point because the Tribunal had not yet ruled on it. But the Court did say 
evidence apart from the agreement itself might be necessary to establish whether the joint venture 
was in truth “a single entity supplying its own goods to the market” or “merely a cloak for what is 
                                                     
705 Commission Decision of 19 December 1990 (Ansac) OJ L 152/1 of 15.6.1991. 
706 Par 53. 
707 Par 54. 
708 Par 55. 
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in truth collusive action designed to ensure that the goods of competitors are supplied to the market 
at non-competitive prices”.709  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal declined to rule on what evidence might be relevant in determining 
the issue, but if the Court was right to suggest that certain joint selling arrangements may fall 
within Section 4(1)(a) rather than Section 4(1)(b), it would seem that evidence pointing to the 
purpose or purposes of the arrangement would be relevant. In fact, as noted above, the Court stated 
that there could be a “bona fide joint venture that is embarked upon by competitors for a legitimate 
purpose” (emphasis added).  It would not be too challenging for competitors to advance arguments 
that the purpose of such an arrangement was to achieve efficiencies at the sales level, but is the 
purpose still legitimate if the parties know that those efficiencies fall well short of offsetting the 
harm to competition which results from the arrangement?  
 
Another illustration of the difficulty of interpreting Article 4(1)(b) was the case of Competition 
Commission v South African Breweries, where the Tribunal held that, although strictly speaking 
the arrangements between a beer supplier and its exclusive distributors of beer involved “dividing 
markets”, on a literal reading of that Article, the distributors were not sufficiently independent of 
the supplier to be competitors of each other for the purposes of the per se  prohibition against 
market division between competitors in that Article.710 Although this case concerned the per se 
prohibition on market division, the same reason would equally seem to apply if pricing restrictions 
had been agreed between them via their supplier, instead of market division. The Tribunal warned 
against a literal interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) and said that the reality of the situation had to be 
examined.711  
 
Canada has sought to address the characterisation issue expressly in its competition law.  Under 
the Canadian Competition Act it is a defence to an allegation of a breach of the per se prohibitions 
on price-fixing, market-sharing and output restriction for the accused to show, on a balance of 
probabilities, that the price-fixing element is (a) ancillary to a broader or separate arrangement that 
                                                     
709 Par 58. 
710 134/CR/Dec07 24/03/2014 pars 89, 90. 
711 Pars 69-80. 
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includes the same parties, (b) is directly related to and reasonably necessary for giving effect to 
that broader or separate arrangement and (c) the broader or separate arrangement would not 
otherwise breach the per se prohibitions.712 This is similar to ancillary restraints doctrine in EU 
competition law, which we examined in Chapter 4. The Competition Bureau has said in its 
guidelines that “if the alleged ancillary restraint is merely part of a broader price-fixing, market 
allocation or output restriction cartel, the defence is unavailable”.713 So it would seem that a joint 
selling venture, which is primarily designed to achieve efficiencies in sales or distribution even 
though it involves the joint venture selling at a single price, would qualify for this defence, and 
fall to be addressed (if at all) under the general provision for addressing agreements, namely 
section 90.1.   
 
Further examples of how the characterisation problem has been addressed can be found in the US 
case law, where the question has arisen as to whether the arrangement was to be treated as caught 
by the per se rule against price-fixing, or should instead be subject to a rule of reason analysis. 
 
One case, Broadcast Music Inc v CBS Inc, concerned the establishment of common licence fees 
for copyrighted music by the Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, and Broadcast Music 
Inc. (BMI). The Court took the view that, although this was price-fixing in a literal sense, a rule 
of reason analysis, not per se treatment, should be applied because the collaboration resulted in 
the supply of a product which none of the participants could have supplied individually.714 
 
Another case, NCAA v Board of Regents, involved an arrangement between US colleges 
controlling the number of college football games available for broadcast, and limiting price 
competition in bidding for television contract arrangements. Although the Court struck down these 
restrictions as anti-competitive, again it did not apply a per se analysis.  As in the BMI case, it 
took the view that these restraints were necessary if the product was to be made available at all.715  
                                                     
712 S 45(4). 
713 “Competitor Collaboration Guidelines” para 2.5.4 available at 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03177.html (accessed on 10-11-
2017). 
714 441 US 1 (1979). 
715 468 US 85 (1984). 
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Similarly, in Californian Dental Association v FTC, the issue was whether the Association’s 
guidelines, which restricted members from advertising prices and quality of services, merited more 
than the cursory “quick-look” which the judge at first instance had taken in concluding that the 
restrictions were unlawful. The Supreme Court held that they did: 
 
“Where any anti-competitive effects of given restraints are far from intuitively obvious, the 
rule of reason demands a more thorough enquiry into the consequences of those restraints, 
rather than the abbreviated analysis the Ninth Circuit performed in this case…This case 
fails to present a situation in which the likelihood of anticompetitive effects is 
comparatively obvious, for the CDA’s advertising restrictions might plausibly be thought 
to have a net precompetitive effect or possibly no effect at all on competition”.716  
 
As regards output-restriction, the EU Commission has recognised that there is a distinction 
between this practice in its “naked” form, where it has no objective other than to maintain or 
increase prices, and other forms where it may have an efficiency objective. If two competitors 
agreed to rationalise their production facilities and reduce their output due to over-supply, this 
might save resources and therefore be economically efficient. The EU Commission has recognised 
the efficiency benefits of at least some forms of jointly-agreed output restrictions, by issuing a 
block exemption regulation for so-called “specialisation agreements”.717 These are agreements 
                                                     
716 526 US 756 (1999) 757. 
717 Commission Regulation 1218/2010 OJ L335/43 of 18.12.2010. For discussions of this block 
exemption regulation see Moritz Lorenz An Introduction to EU Competition Law (2013) 146-149; 
Richard Whish and David Bailey Competition Law 8ed (2015) 637-640. The European Court has 
held that an agreement between Irish beef processors, whereby some of them would leave the 
industry to reduce overcapacity in return for compensation by the others, was a restriction of 
competition “by object” (i.e. no actual harm to competition had to be proved). (see Case C-
209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd, Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I- 8637). However, as the Commission pointed out in its 
media release commenting on the judgment,  “the ECJ did not expressly exclude that a 
reduction of overcapacity could result in economies of scale among processors which stay in 
the industry. It was for the defendant to prove under Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty that these 
positive effects outweigh the negative effects associated with reductions of capacity”. See 
MEMO/08/728 of 20 November 2008. 
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whereby one or both parties agree to cease production of certain products and buy them only from 
the other party. These agreements are excluded from the scope of the competition law, if certain 
criteria are satisfied.718 
 
As regards bid-rigging in the supply of products or services, such as construction materials or 
building maintenance services, the characterisation problem does not arise: it is hard to see any 
economic justification for or merit in secretly and collusively manipulating the outcome of a tender 
process which is meant to be competitive. Such collusion has the effect of artificially inflating 
prices to customers and perhaps ultimately consumers. However bid-rigging in the purchase of 
goods or services such as land, broadcasting rights, or radio spectrum for mobile communications, 
may reduce the cost of inputs, cost savings from which customers may ultimately benefit in the 
form of competitive prices.  And yet the per se rule against bid-rigging in Canada makes no 
distinction between bid-rigging in sales and bid-rigging in purchases.719 Of course, bid-rigging for 
purchases might be prohibited for other reasons, for example if it involves fraud or  
misrepresentation, or a breach of  tendering rules, but these matters should not be relevant to 
competition laws, if the purpose is to design rules which are economically-efficient and coherent, 
as well as clear. It is questionable therefore whether bid-rigging in purchases is suitable for 
inclusion in a per se prohibition.  
 
Apart from the characterisation problem, which applies to three out of four of the types of 
arrangement that may be suitable for per se prohibitions as discussed above, a per se rule against 
price-fixing raises further drafting challenges, in terms of definition. These are: 
 
• What constitutes collusion on price? 
• How specific does the subject matter of the collusion have to be? 
• What exactly does “price” for this purpose mean? 
 
We deal with these three issues in turn. 
 
                                                     
718 N 717 above. 
719 Competition Act s 47(1). 
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First, price-fixing implies that the parties have colluded with each other in some way, but what 
constitutes collusion? Clearly a formal agreement between competitors to raise prices would do 
so- but few, if any, businesses which wished to fix prices without being caught would be unwise 
enough to commit themselves to a formal agreement. So competition laws in many jurisdictions 
(including the subject ones) do not require there to be a formal agreement regarding price to be in 
force, and a lesser form of collusion - what the EU calls a “concerted practice”- is sufficient for 
the prohibition to apply. But how loose can this collusion be? Does there have to be some kind of 
mutual understanding, or is it sufficient for one competitor to disclose their future pricing 
intentions to the other?  
 
Under EU law, it seems that the unilateral disclosure of commercially sensitive information by one 
competitor to another, which the latter acts upon or does not distance itself from, is sufficient,720 
and the Hong Kong competition authority seems to take a similar approach721.  The EU 
Commission’s guidelines state: 
 
“A situation where only one undertaking discloses strategic information to its competitor(s) 
who accept(s) it can also constitute a concerted practice.  Such disclosure could occur, for 
example, through contacts via mail, e-mails, phone calls, meetings etc.  It is then irrelevant 
whether only one undertaking unilaterally informs its competitors of its intended market 
behaviour or whether all participating undertakings inform each other of the respective 
deliberations and intentions”.722 
 
The examples of anti-competitive arrangements and conduct in the competition provisions of the 
EU Treaty do not refer to the giving of information – either mutual or unilateral- and it is not 
obvious from a literal reading of those provisions that one-way information provision would be 
classified as an “agreement” or “concerted practice”. There has been considerable case law from 
the European Courts’ case law as to the circumstances in which information exchange or disclosure 
                                                     
720 N 722 below. 
721 “Guideline on the First Conduct Rule” para 2.28.  
722 “Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements” 
OJ C11/1 of 14.1.2011 para 62.  
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will be deemed unlawful.723 However, from the perspective of a jurisdiction which is drafting a 
new competition law or reviewing its existing competition law (the perspective adopted in this 
thesis), it is clearly preferable that these circumstances, or clear criteria to assess these 
circumstances, are set out in the legislation itself. 
 
It is submitted that if a per se rule against price-fixing were to be put in place, it should not extend 
to mere disclosure or exchange of commercially-sensitive information in itself. There may be valid 
reasons to disclose or exchange commercially-sensitive information, such as if the firms involved 
are contemplating a merger and need to know certain commercially-sensitive information to decide 
whether to proceed, or if the exchange is ancillary to a transaction which is economically beneficial 
and legitimate under competition law (we discussed the ancillary restraints doctrine in Chapter 
4).724 Admittedly, there may be situations where this is not the case, and the purpose of the 
disclosure or exchange is to facilitate the fixing of prices or engage in other hardcore cartel 
conduct, but as we shall see such conduct would be caught anyway under a per se rule against 
price-fixing. The information disclosure or exchange may constitute evidence in establishing the 
existence of hardcore arrangements, but it should not in itself be subject to a per se prohibition. 
 
Including a one-way disclosure in a per se rule of illegality would also be problematic for the 
following reasons: 
 
• The essence of the rule against anti-competitive arrangements is a mutual cooperation or 
understanding, whether tacit or express, secret or open. In the vernacular, “it takes two to 
tango”, and both or all parties are liable if infringement is found.  
• It would conflict with the traditional rule and practice that unilateral conduct is only 
problematic if there is an abuse of dominance or substantial market power (or in the case 
                                                     
723 See the case law cited in footnotes 41-73 of the Guidelines  referred to in n 733 above. See 
also  Andreas Scordamaglia “Cartel Proof, Imputation and Sanctioning in European Competition 
Law: Reconciling effective enforcement and adequate protection of procedural guarantees” The 
Competition Law Review Vol 7 Issue 1 (2010) 5 at 21-35. 
724 Section 4 2 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
304 
 
of the US, monopolization), and that otherwise competition laws only intervene if there is 
collusion between two or more parties; 
• It would seem excessive and disproportionate for the recipient of the information in 
particular to be held liable or penalised, merely because it had involuntarily received 
information that it had acted upon (it cannot expunge from its consciousness information 
that it has received, and pretend it does not exist) or had not adequately “distanced itself” 
from it (whatever steps that might involve, which is not clear).  
 
Secondly, how specific does the subject matter of the collusion have to be? For example, is a vague 
discussion or agreement about a future intention to raise prices sufficient, or does the amount and 
timing of the proposed price increase need to be discussed or agreed? Again, EU case law seems 
to take a fairly broad approach to this issue.725 In a case involving two banks in the UK- Barclays 
and Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)- the UK competition authority decided in January 2011 that 
the communication of such general information about future intentions was sufficient to constitute 
an infringement of the UK Competition Act, and imposed a penalty of GBP 28.6 million on RBS. 
The case only came to light because Barclays, the recipient of the information, “blew the whistle” 
to the authority.726 Clearly it would be more satisfactory, in the interests of legal certainty, for the 
legislation itself to clarify what level of specificity of the information is sufficient to trigger the 
prohibition. If such general information is to be caught by the rule, it would have to be drafted in 
broad enough terms to include it. However, a broadly drafted rule such as this, especially when 
combined with the prospect of high penalties and whistleblowing, might deter the provision or 
exchange of information between competitors in certain contexts that are actually beneficial, such 
as research and development cooperation. 
 
Thirdly, what constitutes “price” involves potentially difficulties of interpretation and drafting.  It 
is clear under EU law, for example, that prohibited price-fixing is not limited to the actual price 
charged to the customer. It could include agreements on maximum discounts (or not to discount 
                                                     
725 See section 2 of the EU Commission’s “Guidelines on the Application of Article 101(1) to 
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements” OJ C11/1 of 14.1.2001.  
726 Decision no. CA98/01/2011 of 20 January 2011, available at 
www.webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk (accessed on 10-11-2017). 
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from publish prices), agreements on surcharges to be applied, agreements to pass on certain cost 
inputs to customers, and so on.  So the wording of a per se prohibition would need to be wide 
enough to encompass all of these things, if no loopholes are to be left. For the purpose of its 
criminal offence of price-fixing, the Canada Competition Act defines “price” as including “any 
discount, rebate, allowance, price concession or other advantage in relation to the supply of a 
product”.727 But it does not expressly refer to price surcharges, which were the subject of the air 
freight cartel case in the EU.728 
 
It is submitted that neither the characterisation problem, nor any of the other drafting issues 
identified above, would be insurmountable in drafting a per se rule against price-fixing. The 
characterisation problem could be addressed by the concept of the “primary” or “predominant” 
purpose of the collusion. If the “primary” (“predominant”) purpose of the collusion is, directly or 
indirectly, to influence the price of the competitors’ products (or services), this would distinguish 
“naked” price collusion from other arrangements where price might be fixed as an ancillary 
consequence of arrangements which have another primary purpose, such as joint selling 
arrangements of which the primary purpose is to achieve efficiencies. The concept of the 
predominant purpose would also render it unnecessary to define how specific the information has 
to be (if too vague it could not reasonably be expected to influence the price) and it would not be 
necessary to set out expressly the various forms in which price could be influenced (discounts, 
rebates, surcharges, etc). We have addressed the remaining issue- what constitutes collusion- by 
arguing that mere disclosure or exchange of information in itself should not be the subject of a per 
se rule.  
 
Indeed, the same solution may work for market-sharing and output-restriction, since it would seem 
that these practices, in their “naked” forms have has their predominant purpose to influence price, 
directly or indirectly. And with bid-rigging in the sale of products or services, the characterisation 
problem does not arise, and the drafting would be straightforward. 
 
                                                     
727 S 45(8). 
728 “Commission re-adopts decision and fines air cargo carriers €776 million for price-fixing 
cartel” EU Commission Press Release IP/17/661 of 17 March 2017. 
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The test of the predominant or primary purpose of the arrangement would be consistent with the 
judgment of South Africa’s Supreme Court of Appeal in the ANSAC case. As we saw above, the 
Court held that the key factor in determining whether price-fixing through a joint venture should 
be addressed under the per se rule of section 4(1)(b), or subject to a rule of reason analysis under 
section 4(1)(a), was whether the joint venture had been embarked upon for a “legitimate purpose”. 
If it was thought appropriate the primary/predominant purpose test could be buttressed by an 
ancillary restraint exception of the type that exists under the Canadian statute, as discussed above. 
 
It cannot be ruled out that in some cases economics will play a role in determining the primary 
purpose of the collusion. For example, the parties may put forward efficiency arguments in an 
attempt to argue that the primary purpose of the collusion was to reduce costs and not to influence 
price. It will then be up to the authority or adjudicating body to decide this issue on the basis of 
the submissions put forward to it. This may not be a straightforward exercise, as the Supreme 
Court of South Africa in the ANSAC case hightlighted.729 But this should not be as onerous, 
complex or subjective a task as the ones that exist currently in defining the relevant market, 
assessing whether a firm has substantial market power or dominance, or predicting whether an 
agreement or course of conduct will substantially lessen competition, and if so whether it would 
produce net consumer or other public benefits. The enforcement would need to have a reasonable 
suspicion of hardcore arrangements before commencing an investigation, and  would need to be 
confident, on the basis of the evidence it had gathered, that the primary purpose test was satisfied 
before commencing proceedings for infringement- otherwise it could resort to the mechanism 
described in section 7 6 below for non-hardcore arrangements. 
 
Could these per se rules against “price-fixing” be drafted with sufficient clarity to comply with the 
ECHR principles we discussed in Chapter 3? It is submitted that they could, as explained below. 
 
We noted that the first criterion that the law must fulfil under the ECtHR principles is that the 
“essential ingredients” of the infringement must be clear. The first ingredient is relatively 
                                                     
729 N 706 above. See also Philip Sutherland “The Ansac Saga and the Enforcement of Per Se 
Prohibited Horizontal Restrictive Practices in South Africa” in Barry J Rodger (ed) Landmark 
Cases in Competition Law: Around the World in Fourteen Stories (2013) 255. 
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straightforward: there must be “collusion”. This is a well-recognised concept, and is a matter of 
fact and evidence. Secondly, the collusion must be between two or more actual or potential 
competitors. Whether one business competes, or potentially competes, with another will in most 
cases be relatively straightforward to establish, after a factual inquiry. The third criterion should 
focus on the primary purpose of the collusion, defined objectively. (As we noted in Chapter 3, this 
would also be consistent with the fact that criminal offences normally require a mens rea element, 
and competition laws that include punitive and deterrent penalties for infringement are likely to be 
treated as criminal for ECHR purposes). If the evidence demonstrates to the requisite standard that 
the primary purpose of the collusion was to raise or maintain the price of the products or services, 
the third ingredient would be satisfied. In other words, if all three ingredients are satisfied, the per 
se rule will have been breached.  
 
If the rule is framed in this way, the second and third basic criteria for legal clarity we identified 
from the Article 7 ECHR case law should also be relatively straightforward to satisfy. Since the 
need for any complex assessment of economic effects has been eliminated (by definition) from the 
per se rule, any residual points that may need to be clarified are likely to be points of law (second 
criterion) and a legal adviser should be able to predict the outcome on the basis of his or her legal 
knowledge and skills, not on the basis of a speculative economic assessment (third criterion). 
 
In conclusion, per se rules would substantially reduce the problems of lack of clarity discussed in 
Chapter 5, by eliminating the root causes of the lack of clarity identified in Chapter 4, namely the 
vagueness of concepts such as relevant market, SLC, total welfare, and net consumer benefit. It is 
also possible for a per se law (taking price-fixing as an example) to be drafted with sufficient 
precision to satisfy the ECtHR’s basic criteria for clarity.  
 
Before leaving the subject of per se rules for certain arrangements, it should be noted that South 
Africa has a per se prohibition against minimum resale price maintenance (RPM), unlike the other 
subject jurisdictions.730 As noted above,731 the US abolished the per se rule against RPM and it is 
now subject to a rule of reason analysis. The subject jurisdictions other than South Africa do not 
                                                     
730 Competition Act s 5(2). 
731 Section 7 5 1. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
308 
 
have per se rules against RPM, although in the EU its inclusion in an agreement will deny it the 
benefit of the block exemption for vertical agreements.732 Whether RPM should be subject to a 
per se rule, or dealt with other tools as discussed in the next section, is a matter of public policy 
preference in each jurisdiction. We do not comment on the economic merits or otherwise of RPM 
in this thesis. 
 
7 6 How should we deal with arrangements that are not per se 
prohibited? 
 
Non-hardcore arrangements such as research and development, production or selling joint 
ventures, and other forms of cooperation agreements, are unsuitable for per se prohibition, because 
in many cases they are economically efficient or bring other public benefits. So how should they 
be addressed by competition laws, if at all? 
 
We submit that countries have a choice of two options. First, they may simply leave them outside 
the scope of the law completely. We have seen in section 7 4 that this is the approach that Singapore 
has taken with respect to vertical agreements. Other countries might also take a similar approach 
not just to vertical agreements, but also to non-hardcore horizontal agreements. A jurisdiction that 
has per se rules prohibiting hardcore cartel conduct, and a merger control system, could quite 
reasonably take the view that this is sufficient to capture most arrangements that are potentially 
harmful, that other transactions are just as likely to be economically beneficial (in terms of 
economic efficiency or consumer welfare) as detrimental, and on that basis they should be left 
outside the scope of the law. In the US context, we saw in section 7 3 that Steuer has argued that 
they should not be a focus of antitrust enforcement, and that enforcement should be directed only 
at monopolisation and cartels. An exclusion of vertical agreements and non-hardcore horizontal 
agreements from the scope of the law would clearly be the preferred approach from the legal 
certainty perspective. 
 
                                                     
732 Section 7 4. 
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However, most jurisdictions would probably wish to have some mechanism in place to deal with 
non-hardcore horizontal arrangements. They may not be convinced that the predominant purpose 
of the arrangement is to influence prices directly or directly, and therefore that it is caught by the 
per se rule against these arrangements that we proposed in section 7 5. But they may still wish to 
have the opportunity to examine them, and put a stop to them if they believe that any harm they 
cause to competition is not justified by efficiency or other public benefits. What sort of mechanism 
(if any) would be compatible with the need for legal certainty? 
 
We argued in Chapters 4 and 5 that a prohibition of agreements based on whether they substantiallv 
harm competition, and if so whether they are justified on grounds of economic efficiency or 
consumer benefits, is unacceptable on legal certainty grounds, This is in spite of the efforts that 
have been made to introduce greater clarity, or mitigate the lack of clarity, in such a prohibition, 
as described in Chapter 6. 
 
One approach would be to follow the Canadian model of enforcement for such agreements, 
whereby they are not prohibited or subject to penalties, but the authority can intervene to stop an 
arrangement which harms competition and is not justified by efficiency (or other countervailing 
benefits in the jurisdiction concerned such as consumer welfare).733 As we saw in Chapter 6, it 
would limit, albeit not eliminate, the reputational damage and unfairness arising from being found 
guilty of a competition law infringement, and being subject to penalties and potential damages 
claims for arrangements or conduct that the business could not reasonably have predicted was 
illegal.734 
 
The Canadian model of enforcement is by no means a panacea for legal uncertainty in competition 
laws. As noted in Chapter 6, a firm might still have to incur legal costs in obtaining advice on the 
prospect of regulatory intervention in the future, and it may have incurred costs in investing in a 
particular investment which it cannot recover if the enforcement authority intervenes against the 
arrangement.  
 
                                                     
733 Competition Act s 90.1. 
734 Section 6 3 4. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
310 
 
These costs could be reduced by having a facility for prior authorisation of agreements, where a 
firm could apply for an advance ruling from the authority on whether a proposed agreement is 
likely to be problematic. We noted in Chapter 6 that such a facility may not be workable unless a 
significant category of agreements are excluded (such as vertical agreements, as we discussed in 
section 7 4), and that it has a number of other limitations.735 However, provided notification was 
not compulsory for the firms concerned, it could be a usual supplement to the Canadian 
enforcement model in terms of providing extra legal clarity for firms who wished to take this step 
before deciding whether to implement their arrangements. 
 
The authority could further increase clarity by issuing guidelines on the circumstances in which it 
would exercise its enforcement powers. Since standalone private actions are by definition ruled 
out under the Canadian model of enforcement- because there is no prohibition against non-
hardcore arrangements- such guidelines are likely to carry more weight:  there is less risk of the 
adjudicating body contradicting the enforcement authority’s decision. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Canada also has a facility for seeking a prior opinion from the Commissioner on proposed 
arrangements or conduct, and the Commission has issued enforcement guidelines. 
 
In summary, we believe the Canadian model of enforcement for non-hardcore arrangements, 
combined with a facility for prior authorisation (if feasible) and enforcement guidelines, would 
represent a fair compromise between the public policy need to have some control over non-
hardcore arrangements, on the one hand, and to limit the harm from legal uncertainty described in 
Chapter 5, on the other.  
 
7 7 How should we deal with Unilateral Conduct? 
 
As we saw earlier in this Chapter, a per se prohibition against hardcore conduct, such as price-
fixing and bid-rigging in the supply of products or services, can be justified on the basis that, in 
aggregate, they harm competition, raise prices (and therefore costs) for intermediaries in the supply 
                                                     
735 Section 6 3 3. 
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chain and (directly, or potentially indirectly) for final consumers, and have no countervailing 
economic benefits. 
 
It is difficult to identify any types of unilateral conduct where this conclusion can be drawn. In the 
past, the EU Courts and Commission (for example) had been criticised for taking a formalistic (or 
per se) approach to certain types of conduct such as loyalty rebates, resulting in conduct being 
prohibited in some cases that had no harmful effects on competition or consumers.736 Whish and 
Bailey state that there is now a “fair degree of consensus” that “the economics of abuse are 
sufficiently complex that this is not an area in which formalistic, or per se, rules are 
appropriate”.737 Indeed the European Court itself now appears to have recognized this, by 
overturning the General Court’s decision in Intel, on the grounds that the latter had failed to look 
at the economic effects of the loyalty rebate scheme in upholding the Commission’s  decision that 
the scheme constituted an abuse.738 
 
So how should unilateral conduct by dominant firms (or those with SMP) be handled? As with 
non-hardcore horizontal arrangements jurisdictions again, at least in theory, have a choice between 
two options. First, they could leave unilateral conduct out of the scope of the law completely, on 
the basis that the benefits of having measures in place to deal with such conduct are not justified 
by the costs. However, unlike with non-hardcore arrangements, such an exclusion is unlikely to be 
credible or feasible from the international perspective, given all of the external pressures we 
described in section above, and the fact that it is standard practice worldwide to have measures in 
place to deal with unilateral conduct by firms with dominance or SMP.739 Moreover, such an 
exclusion is unlikely to be palatable domestically in political terms: governments generally do not 
wish to appear powerless to deal with actions by dominant or powerful enterprises which are 
unpopular with the public. As we discussed in Chapter 2, one of the main reasons competition laws 
were introduced in the first place was to enable the authorities or courts to deal with abuses of 
                                                     
736 Whish and Bailey Competition Law 185. 
737 N 736 above. 
738 Case C-413/14 P Intel v Commission, judgment of 6 September 2017 (not yet reported), 
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=C-413/14 (accessed on 3-10-2017). 
739 Section 7 2. 
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market power by dominant firms.740 If a government wishes to encourage new entrants to markets 
(whether overseas or domestic investors) it may also wish to re-assure potential investors that it 
has measures in place to deal with abuse.  
 
As with non-hardcore arrangements, we have argued in this thesis that a prohibition against 
unilateral abusive conduct is unacceptable on legal certainty grounds. But the Canadian experience 
again shows that provisions to deal with abuse need not take the form of a prohibition. The same 
approach as noted above in relation to non-hardcore arrangements could be taken, with no 
prohibition against such conduct, but the Tribunal empowered to issue a cease-and-desist order for 
the future. As with non-hardcore arrangements, this would avoid the human rights concern of being 
found guilty of an infringement which the business could not reasonably predict.  
 
In Canada this concern still exists because of the power to impose a penalty for abuse even though 
there is no infringement of a prohibition. In our view, this aspect is not acceptable on legal certainty 
grounds, and contravenes the principle of nulla poena sine lege.741 Even if this power was 
removed, the Canadian approach would not resolve all of the adverse consequences of lack of legal 
certainty, as discussed in section 6 3. However, provided there is no such power to impose a 
penalty, the Canadian model of enforcement, coupled with a facility for prior authorisation and 
enforcement guidelines (which exists in Canada for proposed unilateral conduct as well as non-
hardcore arrangements) would in our view be a reasonable pragmatic compromise between the 
public policy need to have some control over abuse, on the one hand, and to limit the harm from 
legal uncertainty described in Chapter 5, on the other.742 While we do not envisage that as much 
use would be made of a prior authorisation facility for proposed conduct as for arrangements, for 
the reasons we discussed in Chapter 6,743 it would be potentially useful nonetheless. 
 
It may be argued that, under the approach suggested above, the damage from the abuse may already 
have been done by the time the enforcement authority intervenes. However, we believe that this is 
                                                     
740 Section 2. 
741 See Chapter 4 section 4 5 3. 
742 Competition Act s 124.1. 
743 Section 6 3 3. 
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a price that has to be paid if the law cannot define the conduct which is subject to a prohibition 
with sufficient certainty. A prohibition which is not sufficiently precise leads to the serious adverse 
consequences we discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Moreover, experience shows that there are other mechanisms and tools available to competition 
authorities that enable them to detect anti-competitive conduct quickly and put a stop to it, without 
having to prohibit the conduct in vaguely defined terms and imposing the added risk on the firm 
of being subject to substantial penalties or damages claims in the event of infringement.  
 
For example, competition regimes can give powers to competition authorities to conduct market 
enquiries, to enable them to keep abreast of competition problems in particular sectors, and 
whether these may be due to anti-competitive conduct or other factors such as inappropriate 
regulation or high barriers to entry, whether avoidable or unavoidable. This facility could enable 
them to detect, and intervene more quickly to prevent, harm to competition arising from anti-
competitive conduct by firms with substantial market power or dominance.  For example, the 
competition authorities in South Africa and Hong Kong authority have such powers.744 Such 
powers are likely to be more effective if they include the power to require persons to provide 
information, as the EU and UK rules do. The Hong Kong competition authority has the power to 
conduct market inquiries, but has pointed out that the legislation does not give it the power to 
compel persons to provide information.745  
 
Finally, competition problems in an economy may arise from factors other than anti-competitive 
conduct, and there are tools with which governments may equip themselves to deal with such 
problems. For example, in the UK, the competition authority has powers to conduct market 
investigations, which include the power to impose structural or behavioural remedies against 
                                                     
744 For South Africa see Competition Act s 43A-43C. For Hong Kong see Competition Ordinance s 
130(e). 
745 Competition Commission “Report on Study into Hong Kong’s Auto-fuel Market” May 2017 p 
1, available at: 
https://www.compcomm.hk/en/media/press/files/Full_Report_Auto_fuel_Market_Study_Repo
rt_Eng.pdf(accessed on 10-11-2017). 
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businesses, even if they have not been found guilty of any anti-competitive conduct.746 In 2009, 
the UK Competition Commission required British Airports Authority to sell three of the seven UK 
airports it owned to different purchasers, in order to increase competition within the sector.747 And 
in 2014, the Competition & Markets Authority (the successor to the Commission) issued an order 
prohibiting auditing firms from conducting more than ten consecutive audits for any of the top 350 
companies listed on the London stock exchange without going through a competitive tender 
process, in order to allow for greater competition between the big auditing firms and smaller 
ones.748 
 
In conclusion, jurisdictions have a significant range of choice in deciding whether, and if so how, 
to deal with arrangements and conduct which fall outside the scope of per se rules of illegality. 
How they exercise that choice largely depends on their prior assumptions about the ability of 
markets to rectify themselves of any market failures (i.e. their faith in markets), or put another 
way, their willingness to intervene in markets,  and the extent to which they are prepared to give a 
free rein to dominant firms. But international pressure, as explained in section 7 2 above, is also a 
significant factor. 
 
7 8 Conclusion 
 
In summary, the approach that we advocate is based on a combination of two methods: 
 
• Per se rules of prohibition for agreements which can be presumed as economically 
harmful in net terms (in short, hardcore arrangements such as price-fixing) and, 
                                                     
746 Enterprise Act 2002 Part 4, in particular s 138.   
747 See Competition Commission “BAA airports market investigation: a report on the supply of 
airport services by BAA in the UK” 19 March 2009, available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402170726/http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/assets/competitioncommission/docs/pdf/non-
inquiry/rep_pub/reports/2009/fulltext/545.pdf (accessed on 10-11-2017). 
748 The Statutory Audit services for Large Companies Market Investigation (Mandatory Use of 
Competitive Tender Processes and Audit Committee Responsibilities) Order 2014, available at: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/54252eae40f0b61342000bb4/The_Order.pdf 
(accessed on 11-11-2017). 
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conversely, per se rules of exclusion for agreements which can be presumed to be 
economically beneficial in net terms (vertical agreements); 
• Where jurisdictions wish to have mechanism to intervene against non-hardcore 
agreements and abuse of a dominant position based on harm to competition and whether 
the harm is justified by efficiencies, this should not be done by way of outright 
prohibition. The Canadian model (minus the penalty provision for abuse) provides a 
model which is more consistent with the requirement for legal certainty. 
 
Wils has also argued for a differentiation between hardcore arrangements and other conduct in 
enforcement models, and that only the former should be subject to per se prohibition. Although 
he made this point in arguing that hardcore arrangements conduct should attract jail sentences for 
individuals, our argument is that the clarity provided through per se prohibitions should also 
apply to hardcore arrangements  even where no jail sentences are involved, given the serious 
consequences that a breach of competition generally can attract, that hardcore arrangements can 
be defined with sufficient legal certainty, and that they are generally regarded as harmful to an 
economy in net terms.  
 
Wils  recognises that imprisonment would be inappropriate for other types of anti-competitive 
arrangements and abuses of dominance, for reasons including lack of legal certainty: “…the risk 
of undesirably chilling lawful behavior is much more substantial, as the borderline between anti-
competitive and pro-competitive behavior is often less obvious”. He goes on to say that “for 
those types of violations, fines on undertakings, or fines combined with director disqualification, 
may suffice”.749 
 
It will be clear from this dissertation that we strongly disagree that such sanctions are appropriate 
even for non-hardcore arrangements or abuse of dominance or significant market power, for the 
same reason of legal uncertainty which Wils cites to justify no jail sentences for such 
                                                     
749 At 37. Whelan also recognizes that criminalisation is not appropriate outside hardcore 
arrangements, without specifying how other arrangements and abuse should be handled: Peter 
Whelan “Legal Cartel Criminalisation within the EU Member States” (2012) Cambridge Law 
Journal 71(3) 677. 
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infringements. Indeed, we have also argued that no prohibition leading to possible infringement 
is appropriate for such arrangements and conduct, given the current state of legal uncertainty in 
these rules.  The model we have proposed is a more appropriate way of addressing them, as this 
dissertation has sought to demonstrate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8  Overall Conclusions 
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This dissertation has shown that the general prohibition approach which is commonly adopted in 
competition law (including those of four out of the five jurisdictions examined in this paper)- an 
approach whereby arrangements between, or unilateral conduct by, businesses may or may not be 
prohibited and subject to penalties depending on economic assessments - is untenable in today’s 
society, by commonly accepted standards of legal certainty. 
 
It is untenable for many reasons, but they can be grouped as follows: 
 
• It is unfair. It is fundamentally unfair that persons who are legally obliged to comply with 
a law cannot predict with any great level of certainty whether their proposed actions will 
be held legal or illegal. But this is the situation under the general prohibition approach. 
This unfairness is not a merely subjective or arbitrary judgment- it is based on standards 
established by the ECtHR under the ECHR. 
• It causes economic waste. The vagueness which is inherent in the general prohibition 
approach creates much greater costs than either no prohibition, or a specific prohibition 
would, in terms of compliance costs, costs of dealing with investigations or litigation, and 
chilling conduct which is economically beneficial. It is ironic that competition, and 
competition law, is valued for its ability to promote efficiency, but the general prohibition 
approach does the opposite. 
• It is an affront to the rule of law principle. This is on two grounds. First it violates the 
principle that persons bound by a prohibition should know what they have to do to comply 
with it (the first point above).  Secondly, it exposes the interpretation and application of 
the law to the policy and vagaries of the individual preferences of whoever is in charge of 
enforcement, as opposed to applying the law objectively to the facts. In other words, “a 
government of men, not laws”. 
• It damages the credibility of the legal system, by encouraging the authorities to enforce the 
law only in extreme or obvious cases, leaving broad swathes of conduct within the scope 
of the prohibition but in practice unchallenged. 
 
So what can be done about this situation? We have considered the various methods that have been 
used to provide greater certainty, and to mitigate the effects of lack of certainty, under the general 
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prohibition approach, and found them lacking in serious respects, in terms of bringing sufficient 
legal certainty to a general prohibition. We have also considered, and rejected, the option of 
abandoning competition laws addressing business arrangements and conduct completely. Even if 
is not clear from the economic situation in a particular country that there is conduct causing 
economic harm which is of such an extent as to justify the cost of a regime to tackle it, there are 
wider concerns to consider, such as encouraging inward investment, securing free trade deals, and 
generally being considered as a “good international citizen”. And politically it is also important to 
have an instrument in place to address egregious conduct by powerful firms, that is measures to 
address abuse of dominance or substantial market power. 
 
This leads us to the following conclusions: 
 
1. The competition law should have measures to address certain anti-competitive 
arrangements, and abuse of dominance market power. The law should have the basic 
components outlined below.  
2. For vertical agreements, jurisdictions should seriously consider excluding them from the 
prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, given that they are widely recognized as 
efficient, and that the provisions on abuse of dominance or substantial market power 
should be sufficient to deal with any competition problems that may arise from them. 
3. In the case of horizontal agreements, the law should prohibit by means of per se rules 
hardcore arrangements, i.e. price-fixing, output restriction and market-sharing, where 
their predominant purpose is to affect price, and bid-rigging in supplies (not purchases). 
This is for four reasons: (a) they can generally be considered to be harmful (or at least not 
beneficial) to competition and inefficient; (b) prohibitions for these types of conduct can 
be defined with sufficient legal certainty (c) it is difficult to see how a mechanism other 
than prohibition would be effective in deterring them and (d) any mechanism other than 
prohibition would not be perceived as in accordance with international standards. 
4. In the case of non-hardcore horizontal arrangements, the provisions should not take the 
form of a prohibition, because of the uncertainties of weighing harm to competition 
against economic efficiency or other public benefits. It is not acceptable that businesses 
should be exposed to the possibility of being found guilty of an infringement and penalised 
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for making an economic assessment which differs from that of the enforcement authority 
or adjudicating body, looking at the matter ex post facto. The consequences are 
exacerbated where jurisdictions allow standalone private actions, exposing businesses not 
only to the risk of infringement and penalties, but also private claims for damages. Instead, 
jurisdictions should follow the Canadian model of enforcement, allowing the competition 
authority, as a last resort to issue a cease and desist order (under the administrative 
enforcement model) or to seek such an order from the adjudicating body (under the 
judicial enforcement model). It should only be unlawful to implement such arrangements 
if there is a breach of a consent agreement or cease and desist order, or if the authority had 
refused prior authorisation where it was applied for (see 6 below). 
5. In the case of abuse, the provisions should also not take the form of a prohibition, because 
there are no specific types of unilateral conduct that can be categorized as  always harmful 
in net terms- the effects of the conduct have to be considered case by case. Since a general 
prohibition based on economic effects would not provide sufficient legal certainty, as 
discussed above, another mechanism has to be found. In our view, as with non-hardcore 
agreements, the Canadian model of enforcement (minus the ability of the Tribunal to 
impose a penalty) is the most appropriate solution, since it gives the authority power to 
tackle abusive conduct, but does not put the business at risk of breaching the law by 
engaging in conduct that it could not have predicted was illegal. 
6. For both non-hardcore agreements and abuse, the Canadian model of enforcement could 
be supplemented by a facility for voluntary applications for prior approval (provided 
vertical agreements are excluded from the scope of the law) and enforcement guidelines 
issued by the competition authority. 
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